1919-1921 


GEORGE  A.  SCHNEIDER 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
GIFT  OF 

John  Adams 


A  Supplemental  Compilation  of 
THE  DECISIONS  AND  DICTA 

OF 

THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  ILLINOIS 

AS  APPLIED  TO 

The  'Workmen's 
Compensation  Act 

IN  FORCE 

1912-1921 


WITH  NOTES  ON  THE  AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  ACT 
IN  FORCE  JULY  1,  1921 


GEORGE  A.  SCHNEIDER 

OF  THE  CHICAGO  BAR 
Counsel  for  the  Industrial  Commission 


T 


COPYRIGHT  1921 

by 
GEORGE  A.  SCHNEIDER 

Chicago.  Illinois 


PREFACE. 


Since  the  publication  of  our  last  book  on  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  123  new  cases  in- 
volving important  principles  of  this  law  have  been 
decided  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  itself  has  been  amended  in  sev- 
eral respects  by  the  Legislature. 

The  instantaneous  success  of  our  first  book  has 
convinced  us  that  there  are  many  attorneys  and 
others  who  make  use  of  a  book  which  is  a  glossary 
and  not  a  theoretical  treatise  of  legal  principles. 
Therefore,  we  have  adhered  to  the  same  method  of 
treatment  in  the  text  and  have  made  cross  references 
in  each  paragraph  to  the  original  work.  Thus,  this 
supplement  and  the  original  treatise  cover  all  of 
the  decisions  and  dicta  of  the  Supreme  Court  down 
to  the  June,  1921,  term.  Four  cases  in  which  opinions 
were  filed  in  June  are  held  up  on  petitions  for  re- 
hearing and  will  not  receive  the  further  consider- 
ation of  the  Court  until  October,  1921. 

The  material  collected  in  this  volume  represents 
all  of  the  published  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Illinois  from  the  case  of  Bowman  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  126,  to  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  532. 

The  Act  as  it  is  in  force  on  July  1,  1921,  is  set 
out  in  full. 

The  writer  gratefully  acknowledges  the  support 
that  he  has  received  from  the  members  of  the  bar 
and  others  who  have  supported  his  efforts.  He  has 


PEEPACE 

on  hand  at  all  times  most  of  the  recent  decisions  of 
the  Supreme  Court  and  will  be  glad  to  forward  ref- 
erences to  such  cases  at  any  time  to  subscribers. 

It  is  suggested  that  attorneys,  having  cases  in 
the  Supreme  Court  on  petitions  for  writ  of  error, 
send  the  writer  copies  of  the  briefs  and  reply  briefs. 
These  cases  are  not  reported  and  as  some  of  them 
involve  important  principles  which  later  become 
precedents,  authorities  presented  in  such  cases  are 
useful  and  the  writer  is  glad  to  act  as  a  Clearing 
House  in  order  to  preserve  this  information  for  the 
members  of  the  bar  who  are  interested  in  Work- 
men's Compensation  cases. 

The  numerals  in  the  right-hand  margin  of  the  Act 
refer  to  the  text  of  the  book  published  in  1919. 
Where  the  prefix  "s"  appears  before  the  numerals 
it  refers  to  the  page  in  this  text. 

In  the  table  of  cases,  reference  is  also  made  to 
the  original  book  and  to  this  text,  the  supplement, 
the  bold  face  type  numerals  preceded  by  "s"  refer 
to  the  text  in  this  volume. 

The  numbers  in  the  left  hand  margin  of  the  text 
refer  to  the  page  in  the  text  of  the  book  published 
in  1919. 

The  rules  of  the  Industrial  Commission  and  of  the 
Circuit  Court  of  Cook  County  have  not  been 
changed.  Nor  do  we  find  it  necessary  to  include 
herein  any  new  forms,  therefore  the  material  at 
pages  491  to  535  in  the  1919  reference  book  has  not 
been  included.  The  Supreme  Court  has  changed 
Rule  43  which  may  be  found  at  page  353. 

GEORGE  A.  SCHNEIDER. 
Chicago,  Illinois, 
October  1, 1921. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT. 


The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 1 

Table  of  Compensation » 31 

Scope  35 

Constitutionality    37 

Foundation  on  police  power 37 

Due  process  38 

Class  legislation   38 

The  right  to  trial  by  jury 39 

Delegation  of  judicial  powers 39 

Impairment  of  right  of  contract 39 

Scope  of  legislative  enactment 40 

As  to  regulating  practice 40 

Interpretation  of  legislative  intention 40 

Statutory  construction 41 

Presumptions 45 

Miscellaneous  interpretations 45 

Common  law  rights  as  affected  by  the  act 45 

Extra-territorial  effect 46 

Section  1 48 

Liability    48 

"May  elect  to  provide  and  pay  compensation" 50 

"Accidental  injuries" 51 

Definition  of  accident 52 

The   occurrence 53 

Illustrations  of  accidental  injuries 57 

Injury  by  disease 58 

Suicide 59 

Pre-existing  diseases 59 

Industrial  or  occupational  disease 61 

External   force 66 

Elements — Vis  major 66 

"Arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment" 67 

Negligence   68 

"Arising  out  of" 69 

Examples  of  accidents  not  arising  out  of 73 

Examples  of  accidents  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of 

employment   77 

"In  the  course  of" 81 

Duration  of  employment 83 


11  TABLE  OP  CONTENTS 

Commencement  and  termination 84 

Interruption  of  employment 89 

Scope  of  employment 90 

Volunteer   91 

Disobeying   orders 97 

The  risk  must  be  incidental  to  employment 100 

Risks  common  to  public 104 

Exposed  to  the  hazard 106 

Assaults    107 

Street  risks  110 

Accidents  during  meal  hours Ill 

Proof  of  accident 114 

Found  dead  114 

Section  1   (a) 117 

Section  1   (b) 117 

"Every  employer  within  the  provisions" 117 

Section  1   (c) 118 

Section  1   (d) 118 

Section  3 118 

Constitutionality    120 

"Enterprises  or  businesses" 120 

"Declared  to  be  extra-hazardous" 123 

Par.  1 125 

"Maintaining"   125 

Par.  2 126 

"Electrical  Work" 126 

Par.  3 126 

"Carriage  by  land" 126 

Par.  4 127 

Par.  5 127 

Par.  6 127 

Par.  7 127 

Par.  8 127 

"Municipal  ordinance  regulations" 127 

"Guarding  of  appliances" 129 

Hazard  in  enterprise  or  occupation 130 

Section  3% 138 

Section  4 140 

"Employer"    141 

"Contract  of  Hire" 142 

Section  5 142 

"Employee"    143 

"Entitled  to  receive  a  pension" 144 

"Except  any  official" 144 

"One  employed  by  a  contractor  who  has  contracted"..  145 

Contract  of  employment 146 

Casual  employment 147 

Employees  engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce 149 

Independent  contractor 156 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  lii 

Section  6 162 

Section  7 163 

"The  amount  of  compensation" 163 

Section  7   (a) 164 

"Children"    164 

"Under  legal  obligation  to  support" 165 

Emancipation  of  child 168 

Marriage 169 

Section  7   (b) 170 

"Leaves  any  parent,  totally  dependent" 171 

Section  7    (c) 173 

"Partially   dependent" 173 

"At  time  of  injury  was  dependent" 175 

Section  7   (d) 177 

Section  7    (e) 177 

Section  7  (f ) 177 

Section  7   (g) 178 

"Compensation  shall  be  paid  to  the  persons" 179 

Section  7   (h) 181 

Section  8 182 

"The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid". . .  182 

Section  8  (a) 182 

"Medical,  etc.,  services  for  a  period  of  eight  weeks". .  183 
"And  in  addition  thereto,  etc.,  hospital  services" 183 

Section  8   (b) 184 

"Period  of  temporary  total  incapacity" 184 

Section  8    (c) 186 

"For  any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement" 186 

"Disfigurement  to  hand,  head  or  face" 187 

Section  8   (d) 188 

"Partially  incapacitated" 188 

"Average  amount  earned" 190 

"Equal  to  fifty  per  centum" 192 

"Earning  or  is  able  to  earn" 193 

Section  8    (e) 193 

"Temporary  total  incapacity" 194 

"The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid". . .  194 

Section  8   (e),  Pars.  1  to  6 195 

"Loss  of  phalange" 195 

Section  8   (e),  Pars.  7-12 197 

"Loss  of  a  hand" 198 

Section  8  (e) ,  Par.  13 198 

Section  8  (e),  Pars.  14-15 199 

Section  8  (e),  Par.  16 .200 


Iv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Section  8  (e),  Par.  17 202 

Section  8  (e),  Par.  18 203 

Section  8   (f) 204 

Section  8   (g) 206 

Section  8   (h) 207 

Section  8   (i) 207 

Section  8   (j) 207 

Section  9 209 

"Commutation  of  Compensation" 210 

"Probable  future  payments" 211 

Miscellaneous  Constructions 213 

Review  of  Lump  Sum  settlements 216 

Evidence  and  orders 217 

Section  10 218 

Section  10   (a) 218 

"Salary,  wages  or  earnings" 218 

Section  10   (b) 221 

Section   10    (c) 222 

Section  10   (d) 222 

Section  10   (e) 222 

Section  10   (f ) 223 

Section  10   (g) 223 

Section  10   (h) 224 

Section  10   (i) 224 

Section  11 225 

Section  12 225 

"Entitled  to  receive  disability  payments" 227 

"Submit  to  examination" 228 

Section  13   (a) 229 

Section  13    (b) 229 

Section  14 229 

Section  15 230 

Section  16 233 

"Reasonableness  of  any  fee" 235 

Section  17 235 

Section  18 235 

Section  19 ' 236 

"Disputed  questions  of  law  or  fact" 236 

Section  19   (a) 236 

"Commission  designates  arbitrator" 237 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS  v 

Section  19   (b) 237 

Application  for  adjustment  of  claim 238 

"Proper  evidence" 239 

Statements  of  injured 244 

Doctors — Experts 245 

Inferences    247 

Presumption 248 

Hearsay 252 

Burden  of  proof 252 

Circumstantial  evidence 255 

Evidence  not  objected  to 256 

Award  or  decision 257 

"Statement  of  facts"   260 

"Stenographic    report"    260 

"May  grant  further  time"   261 

"Authentication"    261 

Sufficiency  of  evidence 261 

Section  19   (c) 267 

Section  19   (d) 267 

Section  19   (e) 271 

"The  Commisison  shall  review" 273 

"May  find  specially  upon  any  question  of  fact" 273 

"Shall  be  the  record,  etc." 275 

•"The  Decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission" 275 

Section  19  (f) 279 

"Acting  within  its  powers" 279 

Section  19  (f )  (1) 280 

Authorities  on  review  of  facts 281 

Jurisdiction  289 

"By  writ  of  certiorari"  290 

"Upon  praecipe"  292 

Transfer  of  cause  293 

Scope  of  review  294 

Method  of  raising  question 295 

"Circuit  Court  has  power  to  review,  etc." 298 

Commission  certifying  proceedings — costs  299 

Section  19   (f )    (2)    300 

"File  a  bond"  300 

"Court  may  confirm  or  set  aside  decision" 300 

Judgments  and  execution  in  certiorari 303 

"Remand"    304 

Supreme  Court  practice   306 

Court  powers    310 

"Supersedeas"     311 

"Writ  of  error"   311 

Scope  of  review    312 

Sufficiency  of  evidence   314 

The   record    317 

Costs    .                                                                         318 


vl  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Section  19  (g)   318 

Judgment   319 

Interest  on  the  award   320 

Section   19    (h) 321 

Section  19    (i) 325 

Section  19    (j) 326 

Section  19  (k) 326 

Section  20   326 

Section   21    326 

"Right  to  compensation  extinguished" 327 

Section  22   328 

Section  23    330 

Section  24    332 

"Provided  employee — returns"    338 

Section   25    339 

Section  26   340 

Section  27   342 

Section   28    343 

"Primarily  liable  to  pay" 344 

Section  29    346 

Section   30 347 

Section  31 348 

Section  32   350 

Section  33    351 

Section  33%    351 

Section   34    351 

Section  35    351 

Supreme  Court  rule 353 

Index   .  .   355 


TABLE  OF  CASES  Til 


TABLE  OF  CASES 


Note:  The  numbers  in  bold  face  type  preceded  by  "S"  indi- 
cate page  of  text  in  this  volume.  All  other  page  numbers  refer 
to  Schneider's  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  1912-1919. 

Adams  &  Westlake  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  590.     8.76-94-96. 
Alabach  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  338.     8.122-124-125-136-849. 
Albaugh-Dover  Co.  v.  I.E.,  278  111.  179.     280-282-311-323-345. 
Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  597.     8.175-265. 
Alexander  v.  I.E.,  281  111.  201.     52-72-73-76-78-82-90-93-95-97- 

98-102-110. 

American  Milling  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  560.     209-303-349-351. 
American  Steel  Foundries  Co.  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  99.     3-189-190-205- 

455-456. 

American  Steel  Foundries  v.  Melenik  (Ind.),  126  N.E.  33.    S.lltt, 
Anderson  &  Co.  v.  Adamson,  50  S.L.  855.  S.77. 
Anderson  v.  Balfour,  3  B.W.C.C.  588.  101-164. 
Andrew  v.  Failsworth  Ind.  Society  (1904),  2  K.B.  32.  56-101.  S.77 
Anslow  v.  Cannock,  2  B.W.C.C.  365.     8.225. 
Arcade  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  27.    336-341. 
Ardery  v.  Smith,  35  Ind.  App.  94.     123. 

Armitage  v.  London  &  Western  Ry.  Co.,  86  L.T.  883.    55-106. 
Armour  &  Co.  v.  I.E.,  273  111.  590.     281-283-284-353-356-358-364- 

388. 

Armour  &  Co.  v.  I.E.,  275  111.  328.     3-15-23-26-136-147-148-159. 
Armour  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  Supreme  Court,  No.  13149.     8.61. 
Arnold-Murdock  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  295.   27,248,270,311,391,392,397, 

398,412,414,415,416. 

Arter  v.  Byington,  44  111.  468.     8.331. 
Atchison  T.&  S.F.Ry.Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  590.    S.154,155. 
Auburn  &  Alton  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  568.    8.165,166. 
Aurora  Brewing  Co  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  142.     3,20,32,167,185,186,187, 

188,268,270,345. 

Baer's   Express   Co.  v.    I.E.,   282   111.   44.     84,85,88,93,182,279,312, 

338,348,355. 

Baggott  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  530.    S.52,53,54,56,57,58,61,66,262^99,303. 
Bailey  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  623.     66,78,238,329. 
Baird  v.  Burley,  45  Scott.  L.  R.  416.     55,106. 
Ballard  v.  Louisville  &  N.R.R.Co.,  128  Ken.  826.    8.73,206. 
Ballou  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  434.     8.40,195,203,205,242,314. 
Barnabus  v.  Bersham  Colliery  Co.,  3  B.W.C.C.  216.  60.     S.253. 
Barnes  v.  Illinois  Fuel  Co.,  283  111.  173.     121,124,126,131. 
Barnhard  v.  American  Concrete  Steel  (N.Y.),  125  N.E.  675.     8.48. 
Barrett  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  39.     118,420,422. 

Baum  v.  I.C.,  288  111.   516.     75,79,82,96,110,277,300,356,358,363,405. 
Bekkedal  Lbr.  Co.  v.  I.C.  (Wis.),  169  N.W.  561.     8.250. 
Bell  v.  Toluca  Coal  Co.,  272  111.  576.     5,132. 


Till  TABLE  OF  CASES 

Ben  Avon  Borough  v.  Ohio  R.  Valley  Co.,  253  U.S.  287.    S.287, 

288,289. 

Bennett  v.  Russell  &  Sons  Co.,  12  N.&  C.C.A.  659.     8.86, 
Bereda  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.B.,  275  111.  514.     262,274,275,307,318,330. 
Bergstrom  v.  I.e.,  286  111.  29.     65,78,376. 
Bernstein  v.  Brothmann,  275  111.  290.     352,383. 
Beveridge  v.  111.  Fuel  Co.,  283  111.  31.     124,129,131,171,206. 
Big  Muddy  Coal  &  I.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  235.     48,52,55,58,59,63, 

64,72,233,324,346;     8.60. 

B.D.&C.R.R.CO.  v.  I.E.,  276  in.  120.   302,304,352,394,395,396. 

B.D.&C.R.R.CO.  v.  I.B.,  276  in.  239.   84,m,308. 

B.D.&C.R.R.CO.  v.  I.E.,  275  in.  454.   53,299,303,306,308,319,370,371. 

Big  Muddy  Coal  &  I.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  515.     8.275,276,312,320, 

323,325. 

Bishop  v.  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  290  111.  194.     8.189,140,163. 
Bishop  v.  Busse,  69  111.  403.     8.282,288. 
Bitter  v.  Saathoff,  98  111.  266.     8.282. 
Bolden's  Case  (Mass.),  126  N.B.  668.     S.91. 

Bowman   v.    I.C.,    289    111.    126.     4,26,27,28,29,31,32,235,236,403,413, 

420,422,425,427. 

Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  284.  8.106,120,121,124,127,128,129, 

183,135,186,232,291. 

Bradley  Mfg.  Works  v.  I.B.,  283  111.  468.     118,372,373,378,389. 

Brennan  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  49.     98,103,135,137,140,166.  S.1 19,124,186. 

Brice  v.  Lloyd,  2  B.W.C.C.  26.     8.112. 

Brimie  v.  Belden  Mfg.  Co.,  287  111.  11.     133. 

Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  16.     8.157,158,160,161,162,295, 

296,303. 

Brodhead  v.  Minges,  198  111.  513.     368. 
Broforst  v.  Owners  S.S.  Blenfleld,  6  B.W.C.C.  613.     61. 
Brost  v.  Whitall-Tatum  Co.,  89  N.J.L.  531.     122. 
Brown  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  155  111.  A.  434.     8.288. 
Bryant  v.  Fissell,  84  N.J.L.  72.     8.103. 
Bullis  v.  City  of  Chicago,  235  111.  475.     181. 
Burke  v.  Balentine  &  Co.,  38  N.J.L.  105.     8.105. 
Bushnell  v.  I.B.,  276  111.  262.     263,414,415,416,419,420,421,424. 
Butler  St.  Foundry  &  I.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  70.     179,228,454,455. 
Bylow  v.  St.  Regis  Paper  Co.,  166  N.Y.S.  874.    8.82^9. 
Bystrom  v.  Jacobsen,  162  Wis.  180.     66. 
Cambra  v.  Santos,  123  N.E.  503.     8.221. 
Caminetti  v.  U.S.,  242  U.S.  470.     8.43. 

Carson-Payson   Co.  v.   I.C.,  285   111.   635.     243,329,350,376,391,402. 
Carter  v.  Gunnells,  67  111.  270.     S.282. 

Casparis    Stone    Co.    v.    I.E.,    278    111.    77.     8,10,20,22,397,398,400, 

415.417,425. 

C.C.C.&St.L.Ry.  Co.,  v.  I.C.,  294  111.  374.     8.89,118,149,150,158, 
Central  Garage  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  291.     74,79,97,109,117,301;     8.72,98. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  294  111.  325.     S.257.302,30r>,806. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  297  111.  451.     8.236,275,276,325,338. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  297  III.  513.     S.2 18,220,22 1,222,223,22*, 

225,260. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  Jx 

Central  111.  Pub.  S.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  256.     S.55,66,70,7 1,72,73, 

77,78,79,103,1W,105,106,107,1H. 

Central  111.  Pub.  S.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  62.     S.30,51,290,291,292, 

293,  294,  306. 

Central  Locomotive  Works  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  436.     S.182,334,335,336, 

337. 

Challenge  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  596.     S.80,295, 

Challis  v.  London  &  S.W.  Ry.  Co.  (1905),  2  K.B.  154.     57,102,108. 
Chenoweth  v.  Burr,  242  111.  312.     S.282. 
Chicago  v.  Marsh,  238  111.  254.     S.282. 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.R.   Co.  v.  I.E.,  274  111.   336.     280,281,288,291, 

297,306. 

Chicago  &  Alton  R.R.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  603.     201,202,203,265. 
Chicago  &  Alton  R.R.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  599.     S.151,152,153,304. 
Chicago  &  Interurban  Traction  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  230.     178,182, 

254,388. 

Chicago  &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  148  111.  141. 

368. 

Chicago  B.&Q.R.R.  Co.  v.  Dickenson,  88  111.  431.     S.283. 
Chicago  B.&Q.R.R.  Co.  v.  Stumps,  55  111.  367.     S.283. 
Chicago  Cleaning  Co.  v.  I.E.,  283  111.  177.     29,34,77,89,114,136,137 

139,172,     S.123. 

Chicago  Dry  Kiln  Co.  v.  I.B.,  276  111.  556.     89,104,136,155,163,164, 

165,309,371. 

Chicago  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  573.     35,186,188, 

189,190,191,298. 

Chicago  Home  of  Friendless  v.  I.C.,  297  111.  286.     S.187,188,19o, 

198,310. 

Chicago  Junction  R.R.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  512.     196,197. 
Chicago  Packing  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  497.     77,263,269,288,297,313, 

351. 

Chicago    Rys.    Co.    v.    I.E.,    276    111.    112.     4,6,7,8,10,11,14,75,92,96, 

136,144,411.     S.328. 

Chicago  Rawhide  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  616.     S.52,57,59,64,79, 

240,241,252,256,333. 

Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Fischer,  141  111.  614.     S.282. 
Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Hirsch,  132  111.  A.  656.     S.283, 
Chicago,  R.I.&P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  273  111.  528.     143,195,200,290. 
Chicago,  R.I.&  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  126.     110,203,300.     S.90, 

108. 

Chicago  Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  294  111.  351.     S.183,184,316,817. 
Chicago  Steel  Foundry  Co.  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  544.     317,350,376. 
Chicago  Traction  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  230.     207. 
Chisholm  v.  Walker  &  Co.,  2  B.W.C.C.  261.     S.162. 
Chludzinski  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  162  N.Y.  Supp.  225.     S.78. 
Christensen  v.  Bartelmann  Co.,  273  111.  346.    335. 
Chytraus  v.  Chicago,  160  111.  18.     S.282. 

Cinofsky  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  521.     S.122-123-186-143-146-157-161.278. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  188.     S.143-144. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  23.    S.39-43-136-145. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  406.     S.100-107-108-109-110. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  409.    S.42-297-306-307.310-311-313. 


x  TABLE  OF  CASES 

City  of  Chicago  v.  I.  C.,  294  111.  388.     S.-87-88-147. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  291.     S.-125.146-349-850. 
City  of  Joliet  v.  I.e.,  291  111.  555.  S.62.58.65.56.58.254.26S-279. 
City  of  Pana  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  279.     304-344-379-393-400-402. 
City  of  Rock  Island  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  76.     136-139-140-141-155-177. 
Clark  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  561.  8.42-48-46.210-211.212.213.214.215- 

216-218-236-308-827. 
Clark  v.  Getts,  1  111.  A.  454.     8.288. 
Clark  v.  Vorhees,  131  N.E.  553.     8.274. 
Clyde  S.S.  Co.  v.  Walker,  244  U.S.  255.     203. 
Columbia  School  Co.  v.  Lewis,  116  N.E.  (Ind.),  1.    S.161. 
Commonwealth  Edison  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  74.     32-212-370-371. 
Compton  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  41.     45-68-154-155-171.     S.-136. 
Consumers  Mutual  Oil  Producing  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  423.     S.-147- 

148-254. 

Conway  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  313.     268-271-417-418-426. 
Coon  v.  Kennedy,  248  U.S.  457.     203. 

Courter  v.  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  111.  488.     21-31-261-333- 

337-380-382. 

Coyne  v.  City  of  Chicago,  180. 
Crabtree  v.  Reid,  50  111.  206.  8.282. 
Craig  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  8  B.W.C.C.  339.     7. 
Crescent  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  102.     227-228. 
Cronin's  Case  (Mass.),  124  N.E.  669.     S.177. 
Crooks  v.   Tazewell   Coal-  Co.,  263   111.  343.     6-8-9-18-19-120-126- 

127. 

Curran  v.  Wells  Bros.,  281  111.  615.     43-121-123-124. 
Dalgleish  v.  Roperie  Co.,  50  S.L.R.  916.     256. 
Davies  v.  Gillespie,  5  B.W.C.C.  64.     S-77. 
Davis  v.  I.C.,  297  111.  29.     S..121.128-125-126-141.142.159-248-296. 

349. 

Davis  v.  St.  Paul  Coal  Co.,  286  111.  64.     132. 

Decatur  Construction    Co.    v.    I.C.,    296    111.    290.      8.44-199-248- 

245-260-276-279-280-293-301. 

Decatur  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  276  111.  472.     43-75-80-204-257. 
Deibeikis  v.  Link  Belt  Co.,  261  111.  454.     2-6-8-9-10-12-13-14-18- 

20-44-157-271-275-446.     8.287. 
Delano  v.  Devine,  272  111.  166.     6. 
Devine  v.  Delano,  272  111.  166     130-280-290. 
Dewhurst  v.  Mather  (1908),  1  B.W.C.C.  328.     187. 
Diamond  Livery  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  591.     S.147-149-311. 
Dickinson  v.  I.E.,  280  111.  342.     75-118-197-198. 
Dietrich  v.  I.E.,  286  111.  50.     153-155. 

Dietz  v.  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263  111.  480.     6-8-14-15-21- 

23-24-30-31-126-128-129-157. 

Dietzen  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  11.     51-67-68-70-71-79-81-91-92-94-95- 
97-117-269-319-324-346-377.     8.67,93,98,100. 
Dietzen  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  Sup.  Ct.  No.  14017.     8.289. 
Di  Saldlo  v.  Menahan,  225  N.Y.  766.     8.82. 
Donnelly  v.  Baird,  1  B.W.C.C.  95.     8.268. 
Dotzauer  v.  Strand  Hotel,  3  B.W.C.C.  387.     61. 
Dragovich  v.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  111.  478.     5-16-17-33-75-96. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  xl 

Draper  v.  Baker,  61  Wis.  450.     S.283. 

Drtina  v.  Charles  Tea  Co.,  281  111.  259.     357-361-379-386-387. 
Dzikowska  v.  Superior  Steel  Co.,  259  Pa.  578.     S.77. 
East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  I.C.,  298  111.   61.     S.-119- 

122-129-134-163-165-827-828. 
Eckert's  Case  (Mass.),  124  N.E.  421.     S.-146. 
Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  459.  S.54-67-69-71-79-100-107- 

109-114-253-314-317. 

Edmunds  v.  Owners  of  S.S.  Peterson,  5  B.W.C.C.  157.     S.lll 
Eldridge  v.  Endicott-Johnson  Co.  (N.Y.),  126  N.E.  254.     S.64. 
Ellsworth  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  514.     S.51-121-217-321-322-325. 
Emery  Motor  Livery  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  532.     S.56-75-88-100. 
Emmert  v.  Trustees  of  Preston  School,   1  Cal.  Ind.   Com.  Dec. 

(Nov.  4,  1914),  17,101. 

Enterprise  Fence  &  Foundry  Co.  v.  Majors,  121  N.E.   (Ind.),  6. 

S.-269. 

Erie  R.R.  Co.  v.  Winfield,  244  U.S.  270.  203. 
Europe  v.  Addison  Amusement  Co.,  131  N.E.  750.     S.  132-133. 
Ewen  v.  Wilbor,  208  111.  492.     S.281. 
Fairbank  Co.  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  11.     79-83-87-89-105-106-112.     S.88- 

102. 

Fallin  v.  L.E.M.L.&A.  Ins.  Assn.,  102  S.E.  177.     S.202. 
Federal  Rubber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Havolic,  162  Wis.  341.  S.74. 
Feldman  v.  Braunstein,  87  N.J.L.  20.     S.269. 
Fisick  v.  Lorber,  95  Misc.  574;  159  N.Y.S.  722.     S.284. 
Fitt  v.  Central  111.  Public  Service  Co.,  273  111.  617.     382. 
Floccher  v.  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co.,  221  Mass.  54.     237. 
Forschner  &  Co.  v.  I.E.,  278  111.  99.     247-250-251-339-342. 
Foth  v.  Macumber,  161  Wis.  559.     183. 
Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  329.     S.157-158-159-160- 

278. 

Frantz  v.  Lenhart,  56  Pa.  365.     S.283. 
Frey  v.  Kerens-Donnewald  Co.,  271  111.  121.     6-17-371. 
Friebel  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  280  111.  76.    43-83-87-88-112-127- 

136-148-165-206-442-446-447-450.     S.88. 

Friedman  Mfg.  Co.  v.   Ind.  Com.,  284  111.  554.     38-39-40-264-331- 

354-384-385-387. 

Frings  v.  Pierce  Arrow  Motor  Car  Co.,  169  N.Y.S.  309.     S.200. 
1-rizell  v.  Cole,  42  111.  362.     S.2S3. 

Fruit  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  154.     142-146-174-175-340.     S.124-127. 
Gage  v.  Eddy,  179  111.  492.     S.282. 

Geigher  v.  Gotham  Can  Co.,  177  App.  Div.  (N.Y.)  29;  163  N.Y.S. 

678.     S.196. 

Gibson  v.  Ind.  Bd.,  276  111.  73.     53-75-85-136-149-150. 
Gillen  v.  D.A.&G.,  215  Mass.  96.     S.224. 

Gilliland  v.  Ash  Grove  Lime  &  Portland  Cement  Co.,  104  Kan. 

771.     S.57. 

Goelitz  Co.  v.  I.E.,  278  111.  164.     207-208-209-210-226-245-246-248- 
251-252-300-302-311-323-345.     S.189-214. 
Gones  v.  Fisher,  286  111.  606.     446-448. 

Granite  Sand  &  Gravel  Co.  v.  Willoughby,  123  N.E.  (Mass.)  194. 

S.89. 


xii  TABLE  OF  CASES 

Graves  v.  Colwell,  90  111.  612.     8.281. 
Gray  v.  Ames,  220  111.  251.     368. 

Great  Northern  R.R.  Co.  v.  Dawson  (1905),  1  K.B.    331.    255. 
Grimm  v.  Clark  Delivery  Car  Co.,  199  111.  App.  553.     8.281. 
Grosby  v.  Thorpe-Hawley  Co.,  206  Mich.  250.     8.54. 
G.T.W.R.R.   Co.   v.    I.C.,   291    111.    167.     S.35.86-87.88-89.40.45-46- 
116-120.150-152.154-156-231-234.287.305-817. 
Gunn  v.  Donoghue,  135  111.  479.     368. 

Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  425.     8.226-227 -289-240- 

245-276-277-284-295-816. 

Hafer  Washed   Coal   Co.   v.   I.C.,   295   111.   578.     8.93-99-208-241- 

244-264. 

Hagenbeck  v.  Randall  (Ind.),  126  N.E.  501.    8.46. 
Haggard's  Case,  125  N.E.  (Mass.)  565.     8.76. 
Hahnemann  Hospital  v.   I.E.,  282  111.  316.     34-53-73-77-82-86-88- 

93-134-136-137-152-168-169-173- 178-263-320-321-327-338-348.        S. 

100-123. 

Haiselden  v.  I.E.,  275  111.  114.     423. 
Haish  v.  Dreyfus,  111  111.  App.  44.     8.235. 
Halsted  Co.  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  509.     314-315-373-422. 
Hamilton  v.  State,  103  Ind.  96-98.     123. 
Hammond  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  262.     65-224-225-422.     8.238. 
Hannibal  v.  111.  Indemnity  Exchange,  Circuit  Court,  Cook  County, 

General  No.  B.18926.     433-436. 
Hanstock  v.  Long  (Ind.),  124  N.E.  509.     8.218. 
Harper  v.  Owen  Fay  Livery,  177  111.  A.  138.     8.288. 
Harris  v.  Hatfleld,  71  111.  298.     8.831. 
Hartz  v.  Hartford  Faience  Co.,  97  Atl.  1020.     58.     8.98. 
Havey  v.  Erie  R.R.  Co.  (N.J.),  95  Atl.  124.     8.177. 
Heed  v.  I.E.,  287  111.  505.     201-288. 
Heinze  v.  I.E.,  288  111.  342.     302-427. 
Heitz  v.  Ruppert,  218  N.Y.  148.     57-108. 
Henderson  v.  Meyer,  225  U.S.  631.     407. 
Henry  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  491.     8.49-95-96-101.182. 
Henry  Pratt  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  367.    8.176-177-180. 
Herrick  v.  Gary,  83  111.  85.     8.281. 
Higgins  v.  Midland  Casualty  Co.,  281  111.  431.     8.58. 
Hills  v.  Blair,  182  Mich.  20.     8.88. 
Hines  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  231.     8.150.153-156.262. 
Hochspeier  v.  I.B.,  278  111.  523.     32-145-146-173. 
Hoening  v.  I.C.,  159  Wis.  646.    8.74. 
Horn  v.  Baltimore  Ry.  Co.,  54  Fed.  301.     8.283. 
Hoskins  v.  Lancaster,  3  B.W.C.C.  476.     8.88. 
Hotel  Bond  Co.,  93  Atl.  245.     8.176. 

Houghton  v.  Sutton  Heath  &  Lea  Green  Collieries  Co.,  3  B.W.C.C. 

221.     8.221. 

Houlihan  v.  Sulzberger  Sons,  282  111.  76.    438,448. 
Hoyne  v.  Danisch,  264  111.  467.     30. 
Hughes  v.  Clover  &  Co.,  3  B.W.C.C.  275.  60-66. 
Hulley  v.  Moosbrugger,  88  N.J.L.  161.     56-107. 
Humphrey  v.  I.E.,  285  111.  372.     58-77-112-117-215.     8.250. 
Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  579.     8.122-123-135-248-253- 

256-266-333. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  xiii 

I.C.  v.  Pera  (Ohio),  125  N.E.  662.     S.110. 

Ide  v.  Faul  &  Timmons,  179  App.  Div.    (N.Y.)    567;   166  N.Y.S. 

858.     8.197. 

Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  I.C.,  298  111.  463.     S.51-54-55-56-58-108-114.251- 

253.25o-262-335-336-337-338. 

111.  Central  Railroad  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  267.     182-199. 
111.  Central  R.R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  208  111.  608.     8.246. 
111.  Electric  Co.  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  282  111.  468.     8.43. 
111.  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  233.     8.85-40-41-231-232- 
330-331-340-341-342-343-344.345-346-348. 

111.  Publishing  &  Printing  Co.  v.  I.C.,  Supreme  Court  No.  14012. 

S.119. 

111.  Steel  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  594.     8.169-170-179-239-318. 
111.  Midland   Coal  Co.  v.   I.E.,  277  111.  333.     229-234-241-303-304- 

308-320-323-330. 

Indian  C.C.&M.  Co.  v.  Wehr  (Ind.),  128  N.E.  765.     S.90. 
International  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  524..  .8.47-186- 
187-188-194-202-210-213-214-218-231  -  232-233-240-241-242  -  244- 

246-273-328-329-330-331. 

International  Harvester  Co.  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  489.     39-78-90-94-97- 

111-117-298-299-328-361.     S.88-100. 
Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  I.C.,  294  111.  106.     S.167-168-169. 
Ismay  v.  Williamson,  1  B.W.C.C.  231.     61. 
Ivissen  v.  Miller  (Ind.),  125  N.E.  652.     S.162. 
Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  I.  C.,  295  111.  18.     S.204.205-226-227-228-229. 

258. 

Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  85.     8.204. 

Jackson  (Receiver)  C.&E.I.R.R.  Co.  v.  I.E.,  280  111.  526.     6-8-198- 

199-263-272-415-419. 

Jakub    v.    I.C.,    288    111.    87.    49-51-54-63-66-274-321-322-331-332. 

8.60-66. 

Jendrus  v.  Detroit  Steel  Products  Co.  (Mich.),  144  N.W.  563.     8. 

268. 

Johnson  v.  Choate,  284  111.  214.    136-137-138-174-182-446. 
Joliet   Motor   Co.   v.    I.E.,    280    111.    148.     228-238-316-421.     8.238- 

267-271. 

Juergens  Bros.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  420.     8.44-198-200-201-202-300- 

303. 

Keefe  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  258  111.  28.     8.245. 

Keeran  v.  Peoria,  Bloomington  &  Champaign  Traction  Co.,  277 
111.   413.     2-6-10-19-20-24-27-35-36-41-42-44-166-205-440-446- 

447. 

Keller  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  314.  S.173.174-175.177-179-180.240.257.265- 

266. 

Kelly  v.  Kerry  County  Council,  1  B.W.C.C.  194.    8.78. 
Kennedy  v.  Public  Utilities  Com.,  286  111.  490.     355. 
Kenney  v.  City  of  Boston,  222  Mass.  401.     Ill  N.E.  47.     8.177. 
Keokuk  North  Line  Pack  Co.  v.  True,  88  111.  608.     8.282. 
Keremaker  v.  Owners  of  S.S.  Corsican,  4  B.W.C.C.  295.     8.78. 
Kerens-Donnewald   Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  35.     266-273-352-368-369- 

372. 
Kerr  v.  Ritchies,  6  B.W.C.C.  419.     61. 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CASES 

Kettles  v.  People,  221  111.  221.     246. 

Keystone  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  587.     S.171-180-240- 

248-2i9-2&>-265. 

Kinghorn  v.  Guthrie,  50  S.L.R.  863.     S.78. 
King's  Case  (Mass.),  125  N.E.  153.     S.218-221. 
Kirby  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.R.  Co.,  187  Ala.  443.     S.73. 
Klawinski  v.  L.S.&M.S.R.R.  Co.,  185  Mich.  643.     8.106. 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Stewart,  253  U.S.  149.     8.156. 
Knowles  v  Knowles,  86  111.  1.     8.283. 

Krcinovich  v.  American  Car  &  Foundry  Co.   (Mich.),  159  N.W. 

362.     S.268. 

Labanowski  v.  Hoyt  Metal  Co.,  292  111.  218.     8.64-65-66. 
La  May  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  76.  8.124-147-158-159. 
Lamieux  v.  Contractors  Mutual  Liability  Ins.  Co.,  223  Mass.  346. 

237. 

Larke  v.  Hancock  Life  Insurance  Co.,  90  Conn.  303.     102.     S.66. 
La  Salle  v.  Evans,  111  111.  A.  69.     8.288. 
Lasley  v.  Tazewell  Coal  Co.,  294  111.  399.     8.235. 
Lauruszka  v.  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  111.  304.     5-335. 
La  Veck  v.  Parke  Davis  &  Co.,  190  Mich.  604.     S.105. 
Lavin  v.  Wells  Bros.,  272  111.  609.     18-44-275. 
Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  I.C.,  298  111.  175.     8.51  -246-247 -260- 

261-263-264-290. 

Lefens  v.  I.E.,  286  111.  32.     74-77-277-278-302-329-348-377. 
Lenning  v.  Lenning,  176  111.  180.    S.282. 
Lesh  v.  111.  Steel  Co.,  (Wis.)  157  N.W.539.    S.268. 
Leveroni  v.  Travellers  Ins.  Co.,  219  Mass.  488.    8.88. 
Liberty  Foundries  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  601.    8.819-820. 
Lombard  College  v.  I.C.,  294  111.  548.     S.123.348-349. 
Lorchitsky  v.  Gotham  Folding  Box  Co.,  128  N.E.  899.    8.274. 
Louisville  &  Nashville  R.R.  Co.  v.  I.B.,  282  111.  136.  23-24-27-28- 

33-34-301-318-319-336-340-341.     8.43. 
Lundon  v.  Chicago,  83  111.  App.  208.    S.282. 

Mackenzie  v.  Coltness  Iron  Co.,  6  Sess.  Case  (5th  series)  Scot. 

Ct.  of  Sess  8.     8.86. 

Madden  v.  American  Mutual  Liability  Insurance  Co.,  222  Mass. 

487.    64. 

Maggert  v.  Peoria  R.  Co.,  179  111.  A.229.    8.282-283. 
Mailers  v.  I.B.,  281  111.  418.    218-219. 
Maranofsky's  Case,  (Mass.)  125  N.E.  565.    8.68. 
Marion  County  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  463.     8.48-67-90-102-108- 

109-268. 

Mark  Mfg.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  620.     237.    S.198. 
Marshall  v.  Owners  of  Ship  Wild  Rose,  2  B.W.C.C.  76.    8.112. 
Marshall  v.  Owners  of  Ship  Wild  Rose,  3  B.W.C.C.  514.    295. 
Marshall  v.  City  of  Pekin,  276   111.   187.     41-45-103-161-162-176- 

177-262.     8.136. 

Marshall  Field  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  333.     12-87-180-192-313. 
Marvin's  Case  (Mass.)  125  N.E.  154.    S.218. 
Matter  of  Dose  v.  Moehle  Lithographing  Co.,  221  N.Y.  401,  117 

N.E.  616.    8.132. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  xv 

Matthiessen-Hegeler  Zinc  Co.  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  378.     4-9-37-42-48- 

49-50-51-63-66-77-151-175.     S.52-64. 

Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  487.     S.123-125-127-135- 

136-232. 

McDeed  v.  McDeed,  67  111.  545.    8.282. 

McGarry  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  577.  S.61-278-279-301-303-309-310-313-316. 
McGuire  &  White  Detective  Agency  v.  I.C.,  Supreme  Court.  No. 

13978.  8.138-139. 

Mclnerney  v    Buffalo  &  Susquehanna  R.R.  Corp.,  225  N.Y.  130. 

S.88. 

Mclnnes  v.  Dunsmair,  1  B.W.C.C.  226.     S.55. 
Mclntyre  v.  Rodgers  &  Co.,  41  Scott,  L.R.  107.     57-108. 
McLaughlin  v.  Anderson,  4  B.W.C.C.  376.     S.77. 
McLaughlin  v.   I.E.,  281   111.   100.     23-45-105-128-133-137-138-140- 
150-167-169-173-174-177-188-189-191.  S.134. 
McMorran  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  569.     8.44-185-195-196-197. 
McMurray  v.  Peabody  Coal  Co.,  281  111.  218.    384-385-386-387-388- 

389. 

McNally  v.  Hudson  &  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  87  N.J.L.  455.    S.269. 
McNiece  v.  Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co.,  4  B.W.C.C.  351.     101. 
Mechanics  Furniture  Co.  v.  I.E.,  281  111.  530.     73-109-115-117-209- 

213-214-290-291-373.  S.253. 
Meeker  v.  Boylan,  28  N.J.L.  274.    S.283. 
Mepham  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  484.    S.67 -93-94-95-255-309. 
Meredosia  Levee  &  Drainage  District  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  68.  204-205. 
Merlo  v.  Johnston  City  Coal  Co.,  258  111.  328.     S.43. 
Messmer  v.  Bell,  et  al.,  19  Ann.  Gas.  (Ky.)  1.    S.157. 
Messmer  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  562.     184. 

Metal  Stamping  Corporation  v.  I.E.,  285  111.  528.  215-216-329-376. 
Meyer  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  642.     351-402-426. 
Meyer  v.  Mead,  83  111.  19.    S.282. 

Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  503.     8.71-73-82-83-84- 

87-146-182. 

Miller  v.  Riverside  Storage  &  Cartage  Co.,  (Mich.)  155  N.W.  462. 

8.177. 

Miner  v.  Franklin  County  Telephone  Co.,  83  Vt.  311.    8.96, 
Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  353.     8.37-97-99-140- 
162-163-172-179-180-181-225-231-234-235- 
236-237-238-239-251-275-336-338. 

Missouri    Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Taber,  244  U.S.  200.     203. 
Mitchell  v.  Hinman,  150  111.  538.     S.282. 

Mockler  v.  Hawkes,  173  (N.Y.)  App.  Div.  333,  158  N.Y.S.  759.  S.196. 
Moll  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  347.     184-265. 
Moran's  Case  (Mass.)  125  N.E.  157.     S.177. 
Morgan  v.  Owners  of  S.  S.  Zenaida,  2  B.W.C.C.  19.     S.77. 
Morris  &  Co.  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  67.     19-278-282-283-287-297. 
Morris  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  49.     8.41-67-69-75-76-95-253-265. 
Mortimer  v.  McMullen,  202  111.  413.     S.281. 

Mountain  Timber  Co.  v.  State  of  Washington,  243  U.S.  219.    5-9 
Mount  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  429.     8.54-185-186-194-198- 

203-206-259-267-268-269-270. 
Moustgaard  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  156.    279-281-426. 


xvl  TABLE  OF  CASES 

Mueller  v.  Illngman  (Ind.)  125  N.E.  464.    S.110. 
Mueller  Construction  Co.  v.  I.E.,  283  111.  148.    47-53-58-67-70-74- 
82-86-89-97-98-99-101-102-105-108-111-171- 
328-372. 

Munn  v.  I.E.,  274  111.  70.     84-86-96-306-320-330-351-362-366-367. 
Murphy  v.  Burwlck,  43  Ir.L.T.126.    55-107. 
Murrell  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  334.     8.42-44.164.165-207. 
National  Zinc  Co.  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  598.    S.172.176-179-238-249-250. 

251.256.34U.305. 

Nawkosas  v.  Western  Paper  Stock  Co.,  260  111.  172.    5-15. 
Nawkosas  v.  Western  Paper  Stock  Co.,  272  111.  138.    6-17. 
Nelson  v.  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  12  N.&  C.C.A.  660.     8.86. 
Nelson  v.  Fend,  203  111.  120.     S.282. 

Nelson  Construction  Co.  v.  I.E.,  286  111.  632.    91-95-113.     S.82-88- 

90-92-103. 

Nesbit  v.  Rayne  &  Bean  (1910)  2  K.B.689.    56-101-107. 
Neustadt  v.  Hall,  58  111.  172.     8.881. 
New  Staunton  Coal  Co.  v.  Fromm,  286  111.  254.     130. 
New  York  Central  Rd.  Co.  v.  White,  243  U.  S.  188.     9-43-434-446. 
New  York  Central  Rd.  Co.  v.  Winfleld,  244  U.S.  147.     202-203. 
Nicol  v.  Young's  Parafine  Oil  Co.,  52  S.L.  354.  .8.86. 
North  Chicago  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  176  111.  635.  S.282. 
North  Chicago  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fitzgibbons,  180  111.  466.     8.281-282. 
Northern  111.  Light  &  Traction  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  565.    72-76-93- 

299-347-354.       S.98-258-254. 

Northwestern  Iron  Co.  v.  I.C.,  160  Wis.  633.     8.112. 
N.Y.C.R.R.  Co.  v.  Tonsellito,  244  U.S.  360.  203. 
O'Brien  v.  Albrecht  Co.,  6  A.L.R.  Ann.  1257,  206  Mich.  101.    8.182. 
O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140.    8.50.133-139-140-347. 
O'Callaghan  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  222.     8.189-266-279-313-315-817. 
Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  297  111.  392.     8.288-295-296-297-306-313-318. 
O'Donnell  v.  Clare  County  Council,  6  B.W.C.C.  457.     8.161. 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  461.  8.50-289-256.322.329-330-331-388- 

337-338-339. 

Ohio  Bldg.  Safety  Vault  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  96.  42-47-71-75-99- 
100-101-102-105-110-116-280-281-291-296- 
299-310-322-345.  8.90-108-116.253. 

Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  229.     8.189-190-191-244-245.278- 

274. 

Olson  v.  Owners  of  S.S.  Dorset  (1913)  6  B.W.C.C.  658.     60. 
Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  539.     8.48.118.120-129-130- 

187-291-292-294. 
Otis  Elevator  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  396.     26-28-235-355-357-363-405- 

427-429-430-431. 

Owners  of  Ship  Swansea  Vale  v.  Rice,  4  B.W.C.C.  298.    296. 
Packer  v.  Olds  Motor  Works,  195  Mich.  497.    162  N.W.  80.    8.196. 
Panther  Creek  Mines  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  565.     8.166-167-173-251. 
Parker-Washington  Co.  v.  I.E.,  274  111.  498.     11-12-21-135-143-144- 

146-179-323-330-351-367-420-421-452. 
Paskewie  v.  E.SI.L.&  S.Ry.Co.,  281  111.  385.    222. 
Paul  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  532.     44-47-119-126-128-134-217-222-224-225- 

315-348-353-378-434.    8.236. 


TABLE  OP  CASES  xvii 

Payne  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  223.  8.86-89-114.146.150.152.199. 
Payne  v.  i.e..  295  111.  388.  S.49-57-67-78-74-75-76-92.102-103.107. 
Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  I.E.,  281  111.  579.  213-214-215. 
Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  407.  267-356-357-358-362-363- 

365-366-368-381. 

Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  330.    S.171.249-251-801-302. 
Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  449.     S.188-199-241-242-243-245. 

246-247-256-278-801-302. 

Pedersen  v.  Delaware,  Lackawanna  &  Western  Rd.  Co.,  229  U.S. 

146.     202. 

Peak  v.  People,  76  111.  289.     8.282. 
P.C.C.&St.L.R.R.Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  396.     8.150-151-155. 
Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  I.E.,  277  111.  53.     90-98-104-107-136-165- 

166.     8.57-108-119. 

Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  31.     47-48-51-54-58-70-76-77- 

100-106-108-329-375.     8.51.107-108. 
People  v.  Highway  Commrs.,  270  111.  141.    30. 
People  v.  McGoorty,  270  111.  610.     22-34-333-336-337-342-348-354- 

358.     8.290. 

People  v.  SteWart,  281  111.  365.     8.43. 
People  v.  Wren,  4  Scam.  269.    30. 

Peoria  Cordage  Co.  v.  I.E.,  284  111.  90.     279-282-283-284-294-374- 

417-418.    S.189. 

Peoria  Rd.  Terminal  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  352.  54-60-61-62-64-66- 

69-72-293-296-326-347.     8.116. 

Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  177.    S.215.216-217-247 -321-324-825. 
Perry  County  Coal  Co.  v.  I.e.,  294  111.  117.    8.59-200. 
Perry  v.  Wright  (1908)  1  B.W.C.C.  351.    256. 
Peterson  &  Co.  v.  I.E.,  281  111.  326.     53-115-117-118-263-293-312- 

326.    8.254. 

Phenix  v.  Castner,  108  111.  207.     S.282. 
Piatt  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  188  Mo.  App.  584.     122. 
Pierce  v.  Boyer  Coal  Co.  99  Neb.  321.    56-107. 
Pierce  v.  Supply  Co.  I  K.B.  997;  4  B.W.C.C.  242.    101. 
Pinkerton's   Detective  Agency  v.   I.C.,   Supreme   Ct.   No.   13892. 

S.187-138. 

Podger  v.  Parsley,  S.C.  584.     100. 
Pomphrey  v.  South wark  Press  (1901),  1  Q.B.  86.     255. 
Protection  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dill,  91  111.  174.    8.281. 
Przykopenski  v.  Citizens  Coal  Mining  Co.  270  111.  275.    5. 
Rainford  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  289  111.  427.     S.69-78-82-89-90- 

102. 

Ralph  v.  Chicago  R.  Co.  32  Wis.  177.     8.283. 
Re  Bennett,  153  Fed.  673.     407. 
Re  Bollman  (Ind.)  126  N.E.  639.     S.90. 
Re  Branconnier,  223  Mass.  273.    237. 
Re  Bratesi,  126  Fed.  588.    407. 
Re  Emslie,  102  Fed.  291.    408. 
Re  Gibbons,  168  N.Y.S.  412.    8.54. 
Re  Hallett,  121  N.E.  (Mass.)  503.     8.89. 
Re  Harvard  (Ind.)  125  N.E.  215.    8.224. 
Re  Holland,  (Ind.)  126  N.E.  236.    8.329. 


xviii  TABLE  OF  CASES 

Re  Howard,  125  N.E.  215.    S.221. 
Re  Kirby-Dinnis  Co.,  25  Fed.  116.    406. 
Re  London  G.&  A.Co.  (Mass.)  124  N.E.  286.    S.881. 
Re  Loper,  64  Ind.  App.  57.     S.74. 
Re  McCarthy,  230  Mass.  429.     S.57. 
Re  McManaman,  224  Mass.  554.     S.107. 
Re  McNicol,  215  Mass.  497.     57-72-74-81-102-108.     S.70. 
Re  Meley,  219  Mass.  136.    237. 
Rennie  v.  Reid,  1  B.W.C.C.  324.     187. 
Re  Petri,  215  N.Y.  335,  109  N.E.  549.     S.195-197. 
Re  Stacy,  225  Mass.  174.    S.82-89. 
Re  Stewart,  (Ind.)  126  N.E.  42.    S.177. 
Re  Sundine,  218  Mass.  1.    S.S9. 
Re  Von  Ette.     (Mass.)  Ill  N.E.  696.    S.250. 

Reynolds  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  287  111.  124.     120-122-123-125- 

129-130-131-259 

Richards  v.  Indianapolis  Abattoir  Co.,  92  Conn.  274.    S.112. 
Richardson  v.  Sears,  Roebuck  Co.,  271  111.  325.    6. 
Richardson  Sand  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  335.     S.172-178-174-276. 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  298  111.  532.    S.257-258-259-291-295-297-298- 


Robinson  v.  Melville  Mfg.  Co.,  165  N.C.  495.    S.74. 
Robson,  Eckford  &  Co.  v.  Blakely,  5  B.W.C.C.  536.     S.78, 
Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  I.e.,  295  111.  332.     S.92-97.114-174.175- 

254-262.266. 

Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  358.    S.60-141-142-143- 

151-152-201-308-315. 

Rock  Island  Bridge  &  Iron  Works  v.  I.e.,  287  111.  648.     216-217- 

218      S.177 

Rockwell  v.  Lewis,  154  N.Y.S.  893.     237. 
Rogers  v.  School  Board,  (1912)  S.C.  584.    S.78. 
Rose  v.  Morrison  et  al.,  4  B.W.C.C.  277.     S.113. 
Rosenthal  v.  Board  of  Education,  239  111.  29.    368. 
Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  323.     S.191-299-303-31  1-312-313. 
Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  182.  S.182-269-270-271-34U-317-818. 
Roszek  v.  Bauerle  &  Stark  Co.,  282  111.  557.    182-183. 
Rowland  v.  Wright  (1909),  1  K.B.  963.     56-101-108. 
Ruda  v.  I.B.,  283  111.  550.     29-230-243-254-257-258-259-274. 
Ruff  v.  Jarrett,  94  111.  475.     S.281. 
Sabella  v.  Braziliere,  6  Neg.&  C.C.A.  (N.J.)  958.     187. 
Sanitary  District  v.  I.E.,  282  111.  182.     97-103-170-173-174-328-344- 

379 

Savoy  Hotel  Co.  v.  I.B.,  279  111.  329.    16-69-83-116-280-294-298-312- 

318-325-349-353-361.     S.189. 
Schaeffer  v.  DeGrotiola,  86  N.J.  505.     S.147. 
Schroetke  v.  Jackson-Church  Co.,  193  Mich.  616.     S.58. 
Schwab  v.  Emporium  Co.,  216  N.Y.  712.    237. 

Schwarm  v.  Thompson  Co.,  281  111.  486.     245-250-251-252-327-353. 
Schweiss  v.  I.C.,  292  111.  90.     S.49.67.69-70-81-82-83-84.87-89-91- 

304. 
Scully  v.  I.C.,  284  111.  567.     77-86-99-112-114-136-141-142-191-238- 

242. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  xix 

Sedlock  v.  Carr  Coal  Co.,  98  Kan.  680.    8.86. 

Seggebruch  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  163.  46-103-104-133-134-148-156-159- 

165-172-265. 

Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  11.    8.98-116-247-308-309-310-318. 
Sheldon  v.  Needham,  7  B.W.C.C.  471.    101. 
Simonds  v.  King,  8  B.W.C.C.  189.    100. 

Simpson  Construction  Co.  v.I.B.,  275  111.  366.     331-391-393-395. 
Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  511.     8.119-122-124- 

126-129-131-1M. 

Skarpeletzes  v.  Counes  (N.Y.),  126  N.E.  268.     S.177. 
Slago  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  271.     8.188-190-192-193-198-203. 
Smith-Lohr  Coal  Co.  v.  I.E.,  279  111.  88.     241-305-320-321-339-346- 

378-417.    S.290. 

Smith-Lohr  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  286  111.  34.     78-207-208-209- 
210-222-223-295-299-300-377.     8.117-180. 
Smith-Lohr  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  355.    S.187-189. 
Smith  v.  Bates  Machine  Co.,  182  111.  166.    8.219. 
Snyder  v.    I.C.,   297    111.   175.     8-238-244.257-262-267-270-271-274- 

296-308-314-315. 

Sonneman  v.  Mertz,  221  111.  362.    8.281. 
So.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Jensen,  244  U.S.  205.    203. 
Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  350.     8.70-99-115-117-248-250- 

252-254-256-314. 

Spiegel's  House  Furnishing  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  422.    279-285-286- 

287-297. 

Sponatski,  220  Mass.  526.    102. 
Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  408.     8.219-220-221- 

222-223-224-225. 

Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  315.    8.60-201-202-207-255- 

263-266. 

Squire-Dingee  Co.  v.  I.E.,  281  111.  359.     278-287-288-289-326-373- 

401. 

Staley  v.  111.  Central  Rd.  Co.,  268  111.  356.    192. 
State  v.  District  Court,  129  Minn.  502.    8.105. 
State  v.  District  Court,  138  Minn.  250.    8.57-250. 
State  v.  Ind.  Com.,  126  N.E.  317.     8.210. 
State  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  129  Minn.  178.    102. 

Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  435.     8^1-52-53-77-78-80-81-90- 

98-99-244-252.253.257. 

Steers  v.  Dunnewald  (N.J.),  89  Atl.  1007.     8.250. 
Stephens  Engineering  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  88.     8.117-315-324-334- 

338. 

Stertz  v.  I.C.,  158  Pacific  Reports,  pg.  285.     1. 
Stetz  v.  Mayer  Boot  &  Shoe  Co.,  163  Wis.  151.    184. 
St.  Louis  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  298  111.  272;  131  N.E. 

617.     8.59-65-199-245-254-276. 

Storrs  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  595.    136-138-141-175-350-424. 
Stratton  v.  Central  City  Ry.  Co.,  95  111.  25.    8.281. 
Strom  v.  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.,  271  111.  544.    130. 
Stubbs  v.  I.E.,  280  111.  208.     227-229-230-231-233. 
Stubbs  v.  I.C.,  289  111.  525.     8.187-188-259-260-265-279-312-313. 


xx  TABLE  OP  CASES 

Suburban  Ice  Co.  v.  I.E.,  274  111.  630.    3-23-25-33-104-136-159-163- 
165-307-341-352-413-419-423-427.     S.119. 

Sulzberger  &  Sons  Co.  v.  I.E.,  285  111.  223.    54-62-65-305-314-375- 

417. 

Sunnyside  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  523.     S.48-49-68-91-98.94-96. 

316. 

Swift  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  564.     70-79-109.     S.107-108. 
Swift  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  132.     46-207-208-209-210-222-226-227- 

246-377-378-382-410-422-427. 

Tarpper  v.  Western-Mott  Co.,  200  Mich.  275.     8.74. 
Taylor  v.  Felsing,  164  111.  331.     8.282. 
Taylor  v.  Jones,  1  B.W.C.C.  3.     S.86. 

Tazewell  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  465.     247-252-264-266-343. 
Thackway  v.  Connelley  &  Son,  3  B.W.C.C.  37.    60. 
Thede  Bros.  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  483.     192-264-378. 
Thompson  v.  Sherwood  Shoe  Co.,  178   (N.Y.)  App.  Div.  319;  164 

N.Y.S.  869.     S.196. 

Thornton  v.  Duffy  (Oh.),  124  N.E.  54.    S.87. 
Toledo,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Foster,  43  111.  480.    S.282. 
Tombs  v.  Bomford  (1912),  5  B.W.C.C.  338.     187. 
Tribune  Co.  v.   I.C.,  290  111.  402.     8.230-303-322-323-328-329.338- 

335-336 

Trim  Joint  School  District  Board  v.  Kelley    (1914),  A.  C.   667. 

56-101-102-107. 

Union  Bridge  &  Constr.  Co.  v.  I.e.,  287  111.  396.     20-25-37-39-40- 

265-275-301-384.     S.16-47. 

United  Breweries  Co.  v.  Anderson,  185  111.  App.  386.    267. 
United  Disposal  &  Recovery  Co.  v.  I.e.,  291  111.  480.     S.44-67-68- 

70-71-72.87-88-92.97-101-10S.110.141. 

Uphoff  v.  I.E.,  271  111.  312.     23-24-30-45-133-134-140-141-143-156- 

179-262.    8.124. 

Valley  S.S.  Co.  v.  Wattawa,  244  U.S.  202-203. 
Van  Simaeys  v.  Cook  County,  201  Mich.  540.    8.161. 
Vaughan's  Seed  Store  v.  Simonini,  275  111.  477.     41-103-135-137- 
156-157-158-160-163-164-176.    8.124-131. 

Victor  Chemical  Works  v.  I.E.,  274  111.  11.  4-7-8-21-25-32-36-37- 
38-119-122-186-188-192-211-269-275-276-278- 
281-307-328-330-335-349-358-369-418. 

Voight  v.  I.C.,  297  111.  109.     S.190.191.192-193-242-246-298-309-814. 
Von  Boeckmann  v.  Corn  Products  Refining  Co.,  274  111.  605.    5-16- 

157-367. 

Vose  v.  C.I.P.S.  Co.,  286  111.  519.     142-439-450. 
Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  I.C.,  295  111.  141.     S.43-59-60-89.103.113. 

115-250-251-252-255-307-808-315. 

Wabash   R.R.    Co.   v.    I.C.,    286    111.    194.     64-200-237-239-242-390- 

411-412-420.     8.60-322.328-381. 

Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  I.e.,  294  111.  119.    S.48-81-84-85-86.90.91-92-102. 
Wall  v.  Pfanschmidt,  265  111.  180.     8.43. 
Walsh  v.  River  Spinning  Co.,  41  R.I.  490.     8.57. 
Walsh  v.  Waterford  Harbor  Commrs.,  7  B.W.C.C.  960.    8.162. 
Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  I.C.,  290  111.  536.    S.59.68.80-83-98-101-113- 

117-256-316. 


TABLE  OF  CASES  xxi 

Walsh  v.  Lock,  7  B.W.C.C.  117.    8.268. 
Walther  v.  American  Paper  Co.,  89  N.J.L.  732.    56-107. 
Wangerow  v.  I.E.,  286  111.  441.     200. 

Wangler  Boiler  &  Sheet  Metal  Works  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  118.    4-22- 

47-210-250-384-410. 

Warner  v.  Couchman  (1911),  1  K.B.  351.    S.78. 
Warner  v.  Crandall,  65  111.  195.     S.282. 
Warner  v.  King,  267  111.  82.    30. 

Wasson  Coal  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  217.    8.114-116-248-254.261. 
Waters  v.  Pioneer  Fuel  Co.,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  (Minn.)  564.    S.161. 
Weeks  v.  Stead,  7  B.W.C.C.398.    101. 
Weil  v.  Federal  Ins.  Co.,  264  111.  425.    267. 

Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  I.C.,  293  111.  284.     8^0-54-67-72-75-76-81- 

82.83-90-97-98.100-101.104-111-112.113. 
Wells  Bros.  v.  I.E.,  285  111.  647.    230-232.     8.187. 
Wendzinski  v.  Madison  Coal  Co.,  282  111.  32.    132. 
West  Chicago  R.C.  v.  Dean,  112  111.  A.  10. 

Western  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  296  111.  408.     8.68-71-81-85- 

116-169-250. 

Western  Electric  Co.  v.  I.C.,  285  111.  279.     30-62-65-328-363-364- 

365-366-374-375-380-381.     8.808. 

Western  Indemnity  v.  Pillsbury,  170  Cal.  686.    57-108. 
Western  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Pillsbury,  172  Cal.  807.     8.162. 
West  Side  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  I.C.,  291  111.  301.    8.68-91-92-97. 
White  v.  Wiseman,  5  B.W.C.C.  654.    8.225. 
Wilcox  v.  International  Harvester  Co.,  278  111.  465.    8.65. 
Wilkinson  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.,  240  111.  205.     8.115. 
Wilks  v.  Dowell  &  Co.  (1905),  21  T.  L.  R.  487.    61. 
Willett  &  Co.  v.  I.C.,  287  111.  487.     122-123-128-267. 
Wiscaless  v.  Hammond,  Standish  &  Co.   (Mich.),  166  N.W.  993. 

8.115. 

Wisconsin  Steel  Co.  v.  I.C.,  288  111.  206.  83-97-117-291-293-294-295- 

296-298-344-369.     8.254. 

Workmen's  Banking  Co.  v.  Rautenberg,  103  111.  460.     8.381. 
Yarbour  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  Ry.  Co.,  235  111.  589.    8.245. 
Zukas  v.  Appleton  Mfg.  Co.,  279  111.  171.    44-130. 


xxii  TABLE  OF  CASES 


TABLE  OF  CASES  IN  WHICH  WHIT  OF  ERROR  HAS  BEEN 
DENIED  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT. 


13891  Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (David  Bohan- 
non). 

13149  Armour  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Anna  Reinhard, 
Admx.). 

13689  Armstrong  Paint  &  Varnish  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commisison 
(Emelie  Suchard). 

13068  Buehler,  Matt.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Waldheim  Cem- 
etery). 

13262  Burlin  W.  S.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (John  Russo). 

13298  Caldwell  &  Son  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Mary  Wis- 
niewski). 

13243  Carder  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Kurrus  Livery  &  Un- 
dertaking Co.). 

13377  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Re- 
becca Latham,  Admx.). 

13710  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (H.  W. 
Seibert). 

13142  Chicago  Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (H.  J. 
Schneider,  Admx.). 

13072  Chicago  West  Pullman  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission 
(Mary  A.  Bender.) 

12947  Clark  Coal  &  Coke  Co.  v.  Industrial  Conunission  (Frank 
Grundler). 

13255  Dawson  Manfg.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Rosanna 
Heckrotte). 

13888  Federal  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Anna  Hurley). 

13478  Felman,  M.  A.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Jos.  jjwansbro). 

13688  Flint  Sanitary  Milk  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Otto 
Schaller,  Admx.). 

13250  Green  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Harry  Mohr). 

13702  Harris  v.  Industrial  Commission  (West  Frankfort  Coal 
Co.). 

13875  Hines  Lumber  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Jos.  Ku- 
bicek). 

13717  111.  Sixth  Vein  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Liz- 
zie Ashauer,  Admx.). 

12892  Inderrieden  Canning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Eliz- 
abeth Schmelz). 

13578  Linn  &  Scruggs  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Chris. 
Hendrion,  Admx.). 

13264  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion (Mary  Perry). 

13780  Mandel  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Tina  Schaeffer, 
Admx.). 


TABLE  OF  CASES  '  xxiii 

13082  Oakland    Fdy.     Co.    v.     Industrial    Commission    (Straus, 

et   al). 
13470  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.   Industrial   Commission    (Fred   Bud- 

insky). 
13697  Peabody     Coal    Co.    v.    Industrial     Commission    i  ('Stella 

Kavish). 
13892  Pinkerton's    Detective   Agency   v.    Industrial    Commission 

(Chi.    Savings    Bank,   Admx.). 
13715  Radium    Coal    Co.  -v.    Industrial     Commission     (William 

Roberts). 
13138  Ramsay,   Gordon    A.,    Admx.    v.    Industrial    Commission 

(Chi.   City   Ry.   Co.). 

13707  Ritchey    Coal    Co.    v.    Industrial     Commission     (H.    Gal- 

braith). 

13708  Ritchey  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission   (Chas.  Kend- 

zoria) . 

13889  Sykes  Steel  Roof'g  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission   (Elmer 
Lawless). 

13886  Taylor    Coal    Co.   v.    Industrial   Commission    (Mon.   Jack- 
son). 

13065  Taylor  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Ida  B.  Green, 
Admx.). 

13378  Tobey    Furniture    Co.    v.    Industrial    Commission    (Peter 
Amundsen). 

13685  U.  S.  Brewing  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission    (Jos.  Main- 
hart). 

13719  U.    S.    Crushed     Stone     Co.    v.    Industrial     Commission 
Selma   McClain). 

13368  Village  of  East   Dundee  v.  Industrial  Commission    (Min- 
nie Fritz). 

13897  Wahlfeld     Manfg.    Co.    v.    Industrial     Commission     (Geo. 
Echels). 

13879  Western    Coal    &    Mining    Co.    v.    Industrial    Commission 
(Paul  Dorris,  Admx.). 

13259  Williamson    County    Coal    Co.    v.    Industrial    Commission 

(Jas.   0.   Boyd). 

Hemmer   v.   Industrial   Commission. 

Keystone   Wheel   &   Wire   Co.   v.    Industrial   Commission. 
McGuire  et  al.  v.  Industrial  Commission. 
Stellen  Coal   Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission. 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

OF  THE 

STATE  OF  ILLINIOS 

In  Force   July   1,   1921. 


Compensation 


Accidental 
Injuries 


Employer 
Election 
to  Pay 
Compensation 


Notice  of 
Election 

Bound  to 
Employees 


NOTE. — The  following  sections  were  amended  in  1921: 
one  (1),  three  (3),  seven  (7),  eight  (8),  twelve  (12),  four- 
teen (14),  nineteen  (19),  twenty-four  (24)  and  twenty-five 
(25).  The  figures  in  the  margin  indicate  the  page  at  which 
the  section  is  treated  in  Schneider's  "Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act,  1912-1919."  The  figures  with  the  prefix  "a" 
(indicating  supplement)  refer  to  the  pages  of  the  text  in 
this  volume. 

AN  ACT  to  promote  the  gener.al  welfare  of  the  people  of 
this  State  by  providing  compensation  for  accidental  in- 
juries or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment 
within  this  State;  providing  for  the  enforcement  and 
administering  thereof,  and  a  penalty  for  its  violation, 
and  repealing  an  Act  entitled,  "An  Act  to  promote 
the  general  welfare  of  the  people  of  this  State  by  pro- 
viding compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death 
suffered  in  the  course  of  employment,"  approved  June  10, 
1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912.  [Approved  June  28,  1913,  in 
force  July  1,  1913,  with  amendments  in  force  July  1, 
1921.] 

§  1.  That  an  employer  in  this  State,  who  does  not  come 
within  the  classes  enumerated  by  section  three  (3)  of  this 
Act,  may  elect  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  for  acci- 
dental injuries  sustained  by  any  employee  arising  out  of 
and  in  the  course  of  the  employment  according  to  the 
provisions  'of  this  Act,  and  thereby  relieve  himself  from 
any  liability  for  the  recovery  of  damages,  except  as  herein 
provided. 

(a)  Election  by  any  employer  to  provide  and  pay  com- 
pensation according  to   the   provisions   of  this  Act   shall 
be  made  by  the  employer  filing  notice  of  such  election  with 
the    Industrial    Board. 

(b)  Every  employer  within  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
who  has  elected  to  provided  [provide]  and  pay  compensa- 

(1) 


S48 

40 
S51 

43 
S62 

47 
S81 

79 

118 

S117 


119 
S117 


THE  ACT 


tion  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  be  bound 
thereby  as  to  all  his  employees  until  January  1st  of  the 
next  succeeding  year  and  for  terms  of  each  year  thereafter: 
Provided,  any  such  employer  who  may  have  once  elected,      120 
Rejection  may  ei^t  not  to  provide  and  pay  the  compensation  herein 

Filed  Whe»  provided  for  accidents  resulting  in  either  injury  or  death 

and  occurring  after  the  expiration  of  any  such  calendar 
year  by  filing  of  notice  of  such  election  with  the  Industrial      121 
Board  at  least  sixty  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of  any 
Kotle*  such  calendar  year^'and  by  posting  such  notice  at  a  con- 

FostUf  spicuous  place   in  the  plant,   shop,   office,   room   or   place      123 

where  such  employee  is  employed,  or  by  personal  service, 
in  written  or  printed  form,  upon  such  employees,  at  least 
sixty  (60)  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of  any  such  cal- 
endar year. 

UTrct  of  (c)    In  the  event  any  employer  mentioned  in  this  sec-      127 

Mrction  tion,  elects  to  provide  and  pay  the  compensation  provided    S118 

in  this  Act,  then  every  employee  of  such  employer,  as  a 
part  of  his  contract  of  hiring  or  who  may  be  employed  at 
the  time  of  the  taking  effect  of  this  Act  and  the  accept- 
ance of  its  provisions  by  such  employer,  shall  be  deemed 
to  have  accepted  all  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  shall 
bo  bound   thereby   unless   within   thirty    (30)    days   after 
such  hiring  or  after  the  taking  effect  of  this  Act,  and  its 
Rejertloi  by         acceptance  by  such  employee,  he  shall  file  a  notice  to  the 
Employer  contrary  with  the  Industrial  Board,  whose  duty  it  shall  be 

to  immediately  notify  the  employer,  and  until  such  notice 
to  the  contrary  is  given  to  the  employer,  the  measure  of 
liability  of  such  employer  shall  be  determined  according 
to  the  compensation  provisions  of  this  Act:  Provided,  hoto- 
Kmployees  ever,,  that  any  employee  may  withdraw  from  the  opera- 

withdrawai          tion  of  this  Act  upon  filing  a  written  notice  of  withdrawal 
at  least  ten   (10)   days  prior  to  January  1st  of  any  year 
with  the  Industrial  Board,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  imme- 
diately   notify   such   employer    by    registered    mail,    and, 
Kotlee  until   such   notice   to  the   contrary  is  given   to  such   em- 

ployer,  the  measure  of  liability  of  such  employer  shall  be 
determined  according  to  the  compensation  provisions  of 
this  Act. 

Rejection.  (d)    Any  such  employer  or  employee  may,  without  preju-      128 

withdrawal  of      dice  to  any  existing  right  or  claim,  withdraw  his  election    S118 
Klectloi  to  to  reject  this  Act  by  giving  thirty  (30)  days'  written  notice 

in  such  manner  and  form  as  may  be  provided  by  the 
Industrial  Board.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  29, 
1921.] 

S  2.  Section  two  of  an  Act  entitled,  "An  Act  to  promote 
the  general  welfare  of  the  people  of  this  State  by  pro- 
viding compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death  suf- 
fered in  the  course  of  employment  within  this  State; 
providing  for  the  enforcement  and  administering  thereof, 
and  a  penalty  for  its  violation,  and  repealing  an  Act  en- 


THE  ACT 


State,  etc., 

Extra- 

Hazardous 

Automatically 


Structure 

Construction 

Carriage 


Warehouse 

Mining 
Explosive- 

.Materials 

Explosive 
Gases 


Statutes  or 
Ordinances 


Farmers 
Excluded 


titled  'An  Act  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  people 
of  this  State  by  providing  compensation  for  accidental 
injuries  or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment, 
approved  June  10,  1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912,'  "  approved 
June  28,  1913,  in  force  July  1,  1913,  as  subsequently 
amended,  is  hereby  repealed.  [Amended  by  Act  ap- 
proved June  25,  1917.] 

§    3.     The  provisions   of  this  Act  hereinafter   following  133 

shall    apply    automatically    and    without    election    to    the  S118 
State,    county,  city,   town,   township,    incorporated   village 
or  school  district,  body  politic  or  municipal  corporation, 

and  to  all  employers  and  all  their  employees,  engaged  in  S120 

anv  department  of  the  following  enterprises  or  businesses  134 

which  are  declared  to  be  extra  hazardous,  namely:  S123 

1.  The    erection,    maintaining,    removing,    remodeling,      136 
altering  or  demolishing  of  any  structure,  except  as  pro-      140 
vided  in  sub-paragraph  8  of  this  section.  S125 

2.  Construction,   excavating  or   electrical  work,  except      141 
as  provided  in  sub-paragraph  8  of  this  section.  S126 

3.  Carriage  by  land  or  water  and  loading  or  unloading      142 
in  connection  therewith,  including  the  distribution  of  any    S126 
commodity  by  horse-drawn  or  motor  driven  vehicle  where 

the  employer  employs  more  than  three  employees  in  the 
enterprise  or  business,  except  as  provided  in  sub-paragraph 
8  of  this  section. 

4.  The  operation  of  any  warehouse  or  general  or  termi-      147 
nal  storehouses.  S127 

5.  Mining,  surface  mining  or  quarrying.  149 

6.  Any  enterprise  in  which  explosive-materials  are  man-      149 
ufactured,   handled   or   used   in   dangerous   quantities. 

7.  In  any  enterprise  wherein  molten  metal,  or  explosive      151 
or   injurious    gases   or   vapors,   or    inflammable  vapors   or 
fluids,    or    corrosive    acids    are   manufactured,   used,    gen- 
erated,   stored    or   conveyed    in    dangerous    quantities. 

8.  In  any  enterprise  in  which  statutory  or  municipal  or-  151 
dinance  regulations  are  now  or  shall  hereafter  be  imposed  S128 
for  the  regulating,  guarding,  use  or  the  placing  of  machin-  S129 
ery  or  appliances  or  for  the  protection  and  safeguarding 

of  the  employees  or  the  public  therein;  each  of  which 
occupations,  enterprises  or  businesses  are  hereby  declared 
to  be  extra  hazardous:  Provided,  nothing  contained  herein 
shall  be  construed  to  apply  to  any  work,  employment  or 
operations  done,  had  or  conducted  by  farmers  and  others  155 
engaged  in  farming,  tillage  of  the  soil,  or  stock  raising,  or 
to  those  who  rent,  demise  or  lease  land  for  any  such  pur- 
poses, or  to  any  one  in  their  employ  or  to  any  work  done 
on  a  farm  or  country  place,  no  matter  what  kind  of  work 
or  service  is  being  done  or  rendered.  [Amended  by  Act 
approved  June  29,  1921.] 


THE  ACT 


OrtllrBte 


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Proof  IB 
Law  AetloB 


V  ..mi    ef 
Ortl«rat« 


State  BBd 

SBB-«lTltlOBt 

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P»r«oB  IB 


I  3%.      (a)    If  the  plaintiff  in  any  action  mentioned  in      176 
section  3  shall  in  his  declaration  or  in  his  other  pleading    8138 
allege  that  the  employer  has  filed  notice  of  his  election  not 
to  provide  and  pay  compensation  according  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  such  allega- 
tion be  not  denied  by  a  verified  pleading,  then  such  em- 
ployer shall  for  the  purpose  of  that  action  be  conclusively 
presumed  to  have  filed  his  notice  of  non-election. 

(b)  A  certificate  of  the  fact  of  the  filing  by  an  em- 
ployer of  the  notice  of  non-election  provided  in  section  2 
and  of  the  non-withdrawal  thereof  shall  be  prima  facie 
proof  in  any  action  mentioned  in  section  3  of  the  fact  of 
the  filing  of  such  notice  of  non-election  and  of  the  non- 
withdrawal  thereof.  Such  certificate  may  be  under  the 
seal  of  the  industrial  board  and  signed  by  any  member 
or  the  Secretary  thereof,  of  which  seal  and  signature  as 
such  officer  the  court  shall  take  judicial  notice.  Said  cer- 
tificate may  be  in  substantially  the  following  form: 

This  is  to  certify  that  the  attached  is  a  correct  copy 

of  notice  filed  with  the  industrial  board  by 

on  the day  of ,  19 

electing  not  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of 
Illinois,  and  that  the  original  of  said  notice  is  now  on  file 
in  the  office  of  the  industrial  board  and  has  not  been  with- 
drawn since  the  date  of  the  filing  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof,  this  certificate  has  been  subscribed 

and  the  seal  of  the  industrial  board  affixed  this day  of 

,    19 


of  Industrial  Board. 

[Amended  by  Act  approved  May  31,  1917.] 

9  4.  The  term  "employer"  as  used  in  this  Act  shall  be 
construed  to  be: 

Firtt:  The  State,  and  each  county,  city,  town,  township, 
Incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic,  or  munic- 
icapal  corporation  therein. 

Second:  Every  person,  firm,  public  or  private  corpora- 
tion, including  hospitals,  public  service,  eleemosynary,  re- 
ligious or  charitable  corporations  or  associations  who  has 
any  person  in  service  or  under  any  contract  for  hire, 
express  or  implied,  oral  or  written,  and  who  is  engaged 
COB  tract  of  Hlr«  in  any  of  the  enterprises  or  businesses  enumerated  in  sec- 
BB*IB«M  IB  m  tion  three  (3)  of  this  Act,  or  who  at  or  prior  to  the  time 
of  the  accident  to  the  employee  for  which  compensation 
under  this  Act  may  be  claimed,  shall  in  the  manner  pro- 
vided In  this  Act,  have  elected  to  become  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  this  Act.  and  who  shall  not,  prior  to  such 
accident,  have  effected  a  withdrawal  of  such  election  in 
the  manner  provided  In  this  Act.  [Amended  by  Act  ap- 
proved June  25,  1917.] 


THE  ACT 


Employee  §  5.     The  term  "employee"  as  used  in  this  Act,  shall  be 

Construed  construed  to  mean: 

Employment  First — Every  person  in  the  service  of  the  State,  county, 

by  State  city,  town,   township,   incorporated  village  or  school  dis- 

trict, body  politic  or  municipal  corporations  therein,  under 
appointment,    or    contract    of    hire,    express    or    implied, 
Official  oral  or  written,  except  any  official  of  the  State,  or  of  any 

Excepted  county,  city,  town,  township,  incorporated  village,  school 

district,   body   politic    or   municipal   corporation    therein: 
Effect  of  Provided,  that  any  such  employee,  his  personal  representa- 

Fenslon  tive,  beneficiaries  or  heirs,  who  is,  are  or  shall  be  entitled 

to  receive  a  pension  or  benefit  for  or  on  account  of  dis- 
ability or  death  arising  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  his 
employment  from  a  pension  or  benefit  fund  to  which  the 
State  or  any  county,  town,  township,  incorporated  village, 
school  district,  body  politic  or  municipal  corporation  there- 
in is  a  contributor,  in  whole  or  in  part,  shall  be  entitled 
to  receive  only  such  part  of  such  pension  or  benefit  as 
is  in  excess  of  the  amount  of  compensation  recovered  and 
received  by  such  employee,  his  personal  representative, 
beneficiaries  or  heirs  under  this  Act,  And,  provided,  fur- 
Independent  ther,  that  one  employed  by  a  contractor  who  has  con- 

Contractor  tracted  with  the  State,'  or  a  county,  city,  town,  township, 

incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  munici- 
pal corporation,  therein,  through  its  representatives,  shall 
not  be  considered,  as  an  employee  of  the  State,  county, 
city,  town,  township,  incorporated  village,  school  dis- 
trict, body  politic  or  municipal  corporation  which  made 
the  contract. 

Contract  of  Hire       Second — Every  person  in  the  service  of  another  under 
any  contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written, 
Aliens  including  aliens,  and  minors  who  are  legally  permitted  to 

Minors  work  under  the  laws  of  the  State,  who,  for  the  purpose  of 

this  Act,  shall  be  considered  the  same  and  have  the  same 
Excluded  When  power  to  contract,  receive  payments  and  give  quittances 
Not  In  Usual  therefor,  as  adult  employees,  but  not  including  any  person 
Course  of  Trade  w^°  *s  not  engaged  in  the  usual  course  of  the  trade,  busi- 
ness, profession  or  occupation  of  his  employer;  Provided, 
Exclusion  toy  that  employees  shall  not  be  included  within  the  provisions 
Laws  of  United  ot  this  Act  when  excluded  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
States  relating  to  liability  of  employers  to  their  employees  for 

personal  injuries  where  such  laws  are  held  to  be  exclusive. 
[Amended  by  Act  approved  May  31,  1917.] 

Damages  at  §  6.     No  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover  dam- 

Common  Law        ages  for  injury  or  death  sustained  by  any  employee  while 
engaged   in  the  line  of  his  duty  as  such  employee  other 
than  the  compensation  herein  provided  shall  be  available 
Employees  to  any  employee  who  is  covered  by  the  provisions  of  this 

Corered  by  Act  Act,  to  any  one  wholly  or  partially  dependent  upon  him, 
the  legal  representatives  of  his  estate,  or  any  one  other- 
wise entitled  to  recover  damages  for  such  injury. 


THE  ACT 


widow  aBd 

(  hiurm 
Mir»  itinc 
obligation  to 
Support 
vm.mnt 

Payment* 

Drdnrted 

Parent.  Child 


i  ..tail) 
Dependent 

Awommt 


Parent,  Children 


Partial 

Dependenry 

Apportionment 


Collateral  Heln 
Dependency 

Perreatairt 


K»  Helm 

Fnaeral 
KxpeBtcs 

Compensation 

installment-. 
How  Fixed. 


S  7.  The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid 
for  an  injury  to  the  employee  resulting  in  death  shall  be: 

(a)  If  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child  or  children 
whom  he  was  under  legal  obligations  to  support   at  the 
time  of  his  injury,  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the  average 
annual  earnings  of  the  employee,  but  not  less  in  any  event 
than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars  and  not  more 
in  any  event  than  three  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty 
dollars. 

Any  compensation  payments  other  than  necessary  med- 
ical.  surgical  or  hospital  fees  or  services  shall  be  deducted 
in  ascertaining  the  amount  payable  on  death. 

(b)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph    (a)    of 
this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  any  parent,  husband, 
child  or  children  who  at  the  time  of  injury  were  totally 
dependent  upon  the  earnings  of  the  employee,  then  a  sum 
equal  to  four  times  the  average  annual  earnings  of  the 
employee,  but  not  less  in  any   event  than   one  thousand 
six  hundred  fifty  dollars,  and  not  more  in  any  event  than 
three  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars. 

(c)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph    (a)   or      216 

(b)  of  this  section  and  •the  employee  leaves  any  parent,    S173 
child  or  children,  grandparent  or  grandchild,  who  at  the 
time  of  injury  were  dependent  upon  the  earnings  of  the    S174 
employee,  then  such  proportion  of  a  sum   equal   to  four 
times  the  average  annual  earnings  of  the  employee  as  such 
dependency  bears  to  total  dependency,  but  not  less  in  any 
event  than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars  and  not 
more  in  any  event  than  three  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty 
dollars.    Any  compensation  payments  other  than  necessary 
medical,  surgical  or  hospital  fees  or  services  shall  be  de- 
ducted in  ascertaining  the  amounts  payable  on  death. 

<d)     If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraphs  (a),  (b)       219 
or  <c)   of  thls  section  and  the  employee  leaves  collateral    S177 
heirs  dependent  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee 
upon  his  earnings,  such  a  percentage  of  the  sum  provided 
in  paragraph    (a)   of  this  section  as  the  average  annual 
contributions  which  the  deceased  made  to  the  support  of 
such  dependent  collateral  heirs  during  the  two  years  pre- 
ceding the  injury  bears  to  his  average  annual  earnings 
during  such  two  years. 

(e)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraphs  (a),  (b),      219 

(c)  or  (d)  of  this  section,  a  sum  not  to  exceed  one  hundred    S177 
and  fifty  dollars   for  burial  expenses  to  be   paid  by  the 
employer  to   the  undertaker  or  to  the  person  or  persons 
incurring  the  expense  of  burial. 

(f)  All    compensation,    except    for    burial    expenses      219 
provided  in  this  section  to  be  paid  in  case  injury  results  in    S177 
death,  shall  be  paid  in  installments  equal  to  the  percentage 

of  the  average  earnings  as  provided  for  in  section  8  of  this 
Act,  at  the  same  Intervals  at  which  the  wages  or  earnings 


THE  ACT 


of  the  employees  were  paid;  or  if  this  shall  not  be  feasible, 
then  the  installments  shall  be  paid  weekly:  Provided, 
such  compensation  may  be  paid  in  a  lump  sum  upon  peti- 
tion as  provided  in  section  9  of  this  Act. 

Compensation  (g)    The  compensation  to  be  paid  for  injury  which  re-       220 

to  Whom  Paid      suits  in  death,  as  provided  in  this  section,  shall  be  paid    S178 
to  the  persons  who  form  the  basis   for  determining  the    S179 
amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  by  the  employer,  the 
Determination       respective  shares  to  be  in  the  proportion  of  their  respec- 
of  Dependency       tive  dependency  at  the  time  of  the  injury  on  the  earnings 
of  the  deceased:  provided,  that  the  Industrial  Commission 
or  an  arbitrator  thereof  may,  in  its  or  his  discretion,  order 
Child's  Share        or  award  the  payment  to  the  parent  or  grandparent  of  a 
Paid  to  child  for  the  latter's  support  the  amount  of  compensation 

which  but  for  such  order  or  award  would  have  been  paid 
to  such  child  as  its  share  of  the  compensation   payable, 
Orders  which  order  or  award  may  be  modified  from  time  to  time 

Modified  by  the  commission   in  its  discretion  with  respect  to  the 

persons  to  whom  shall  be  paid  the  amount  of  said  order  or 
award  remaining  unpaid  at  the  time  of  said  modification. 
Compensation  The  payments  of  compensation  by  the  employer  in  ac- 

Dlscharge  by         cordance  with  the  order  or  award  of  the  Industrial  Corn- 
Payment  of  mission  shall  discharge   such   employer   from  all  further 
obligation  as  to  such  compensation. 

Beneficiaries  In  a  case  where  any  of  the  persons  who  would  be  entitled 

Non-Resident  to  compensation  is  living  at  any  place  outside  of  the 

United  States,  then  payment  shall  be  made  to  the  personal 
Personal  representative  of  the  deceased  employee.  The  distribution 

Representative  by  such  personal  representative  to  the  persons  entitled 
Reqnired  shall  be  made  to  such  persons  and  in  such  manner  as  the 

commission  shall  order. 

(h)     1.     Whenever  in  paragraph    (a)   of  this  section  a      226 

minimum  of  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars  is  pro-    S181 

vided,  such  minimum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following 

cases   to   the   following  amounts: 
One  Child  One  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars  in  case  of  a 

widow  and  one  child  under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time 

of  the  death  of  the  employee. 

Two  or  More  One  thousand  eight  hundred  fifty  dollars  in  case  of  a 

Children  widow  and  two  or  more  children  under  the  age  of  16  years 

at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  employee. 

Compensation  2.     Wherever  in  paragraph    (a)    of  this  section  a  maxi- 

Increase  of  mum  of  three  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars  is  pro- 

Maximnm  vided,  such  maximum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following 

cases  to  the  following  amounts: 
One  Child  Four  thousand  dollars  in  case  of  a  widow  and  one  child 

under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the 

employee. 

Two  or  More  Four  thousand   two  hundred   fifty  dollars    in  case  of  a 

Children  widow  and  two  or  more  children  under  the  age  of  16  years 


THE  ACT 


Time 


at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  employee.      [Amended  by 
Act  approved  June  29,  1921.] 

Compensation  §  8.     The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid 

>  on-  Fatal  to  the  employee  for  an  injury  not  resulting  in  death  shall 

in.inrj  be: 

Medical  (a)    The  employer  shall  provide  the  necessary  first  aid 

Hospital  medical  and  surgical  services;  all  necessary  hospital  serv- 

ices  during  the  period  for  which  compensation  may  be  pay- 
able; also  all  necessary  medical  and  surgical  services  for 
a  period  not  longer  than  eight  weeks,  not  to  exceed,  how- 
ever,  an  amount  of  two  hundred  dollars,  and  in  addition 
such  medical  or  surgical  services  in  excess  of  such  limits  as 
may  be  necessary  during  the  time  such  hospital  services 
are  furnished.  All  the  foregoing  services  shall  be  limited 
to  those  which  are  reasonably  required  to  cure  and  relieve 
Employee  from  the  effects  of  the  injury.  The  employee  may  elect  to 

Own  Doctor          secure  his  own  physician,  surgeon  or  hospital  services  at 

his  own  expense. 

Compensation  (b)    If  the  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  for  work 

Temporary  lasts  for  more  than  six  working  days,  compensation  equal 

Total  incapacity    to    fifty    percentum    of   the    earnings,   but    not   less    than 

$7.50  nor  more  than   $14.00   per   week,  beginning   on  the 

eighth  day  of  such  temporary  total  incapacity  and  contin- 

uing as  long  as  the  temporary  total  incapacity  lasts,  but 

Limitation  on       not   after   the   amount    of   compenastion   paid    equals   the 

\  MI..UIH  amount  which  would  have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit 

under  paragraph  (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died 

as  a  result  of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs 

surviving  as  provided   in  said  paragraph    (a),  section  7: 

Commencement     Provided,   that  in   the  case   where  temporary  total   inca- 

pacity for  work  continues  for  a  period  of  four  weeks  from 

the  day  of  the  injury,  then  compensation  shall  commence 

on   the   day   after   the    injury. 

Compensation  (c)    For  any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement  to  the 

Dlsflgnreraent        hand,  head  or  face,  the  employee  shall  be  entitled  to  com- 

pensation   for   such    disfigurement,    the    amount    fixed   by 

agreement  or  by  arbitration  in  accordance  with  the  provi- 

Anionnt  sions   of   this   Act,   which   amount   shall   not   exceed   one- 

Limited  quarter  of  the  amount  of  the  compensation  which  would 

have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  paragraph  (a), 

section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result  of  the  in- 

jury at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving,  as  pro- 

When  Wot  vided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7:    Provided,  that  no 

Allowed  compensation    shall    be    payable    under    this    paragraph 

where  compensation  is  payable  under  paragraph   (d),   (e) 

or  (f)  of  this  section:      And,  provided  further,  that  when 

the  disfigurement  is  to  the  hand,  head  or  face  as  a  result 

of  any  injury,  for  which  injury  compensation  is  not  pay- 

able  under   paragraph    (d),    (e)    or    (f)    of  this   section, 

compensation  for  such  disfigurement  may  be  had  under 

this   paragraph. 


THE  ACT 


Compensation  (d)     If,  after  the  injury  has  been  sustained,  the  em- 

Partiai  ployee  as  a  result  thereof  becomes  partially  incapacitated 

incapacity  from  pursuing  his  usual  and  customary  line  of  employ- 

ment, he  shall,  except  in  the  cases  covered  by  the  specific 
schedule  set  forth  in  paragraph  (e)  of  this  section,  receive 
compensation,  subject  to  the   limitations  as  to  time  and 
maximum  amounts  fixed  in  paragraphs  (b)  and  (h)  of  this 
section,   equal   to   fifty  per  centum   of   the   difference   he- 
Amount  Earned    tween  the  average  amount  which  he  earned  before  the  acci- 
Before  and  dent,  and  the  average  amount  which  he  is  earning  or  is 

After  Accident  able  to  earn  in  some  suitable  employment  or  business  after 
the  accident. 

Compensation  (e)     For   injuries    in   the   following   schedule,   the   em- 

ployee shall  receive  in  addition  to  compensation  during 
Additional  for       the  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  for  work  result- 
Specific  Losses      ing  from  such  injury,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  paragraphs   (a)   and   (b)   of  this  section,  compensation, 
for  a  further  period,  subject  to  the  limitations  as  to  time 
and  amounts  fixed  in  paragraphs  (b)  and  (h)  of  this  sec- 
Schedule  tion,  for  the  specific  loss  herein  mentioned,  as  follows,  but 
shall  not  receive  any  compensation  for  such  injuries  under 
any  other  provisions  of  this  Act. 

Thnmb  *•    For  ^e  l°ss  °*  a  thumb,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 

plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  sixty  weeks; 

First  Finger  2-  For  tne  l°ss  of  a  first  finger,  commonly  called  the 

index  finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its 
use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during 
thirty-five  weeks; 

Second  Finger  3.  For  the  loss  of  a  second  finger,  or  the  permanent  and 

complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  thirty  weeks; 

Third  Finger  4.  For  the  loss  of  a  third  finger,  or  the  permanent  and 

complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  twenty  weeks; 

Fomrth  Finger  5.  For  the  loss  of  a  fourth  finger,  commonly  called  the 
little  finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its 
use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during 
fifteen  weeks ; 

Phalange  6.  The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  the  thumb,  or  of  any 

finger,  shall  be  considered  to  be  equal  to  the  loss  of  one- 
half  of  such  thumb  or  finger  and  compensation  shall  be 
one-half  the  amounts  above  specified; 

More  Than  7.    The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  consid- 

One  Phalange  ered  as  the  loss  of  the  entire  finger  or  thumb;  Provided, 
however,  that  in  no  case  shall  the  amount  received  for 
more  than  one  finger  exceed  the  amount  provided  in  this 
schedule  for  the  loss  of  a  hand; 

Great  Toe  8.  For  the  loss  of  a  great  toe,  fifty  percentum  of  the  av- 

erage weekly  wage  during  thirty  weeks; 


10 


THE  ACT 


Other    Toct 


Phalange 
of  Toe 


More  Thai 
One  Phalange 
Hand 


Arm 
Foot 
Leg 

Eye-Sight 


Permanent 
Partial  Loss 


Proportioning 


Loss  of 
Aajr   Two 

Total 

Permanent 

Disability 


Compennatlon 


Disability 
Complete 


Pension 

for    Life 


9.  For  the  loss  of  one  toe  other  than  the  great  toe,  fifty 
percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  ten  weeks, 
and  for  the  additional  loss  of  one  or  more  toes  other  than 
the  great  toe,  fifty  percentm  of  the  average  weekly  wage 
during   an   additional   ten   weeks; 

10.  The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  any  toe  shall  be  con- 
sidered to  be  the  equal  to  the  loss  of  one-half  of  such 
toe,   and  compensation   shall   be  one-half  of  the   amount 
above  specified; 

11.  The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  con- 
sidered as  the  loss  of  the  entire  toe; 

12.  For  the  loss  of  a  hand,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  one  hundred  and  fifty  weeks; 

13.  For  the  loss  of  an  arm  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  two  hundred  weeks; 

14.  For  the  loss  of  a  foot,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage,  during  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  weeks; 

15.  For  the  loss  of  a  leg,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  it«  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage,  during  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  weeks; 

16.  For  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye  or  for  the  perma- 
nent and  complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the 
average  weekly  wage  during  one  hundred  weeks: 

17.  For  the  permanent  partial  loss  of  use  of  a  member 
or  sight  of  an  eye,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  that  portion  of  the  number  of  weeks  in  the 
foregoing  schedule  provided  for  the  loss  of  such  member 
or  sight  of  an  eye  which  the  partial  loss  of  use  thereof 
bears  to  the  total  loss  of  use  of  such  member  or  sight  of 
eye. 

18.  The   loss   of  both   hands,   or   both   arms,   or   both 
feet,  or  both  legs,  or  both  eyes,  or  of  any  two  thereof,  or 
the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  use  thereof,  shall  con- 
stitute total  and  permanent  disability,  to  be  compensated 
according  to  the  compensation  fixed  by  paragraph   (f)    of 
this  section:  Provided,  that  these  specific  cases  of  total  and 
permanent  disability  shall  not  be  construed  as  excluding 
other  cases. 

(f)  In  case  of  complete  disability,  which  renders  the 
employees  wholly  and  permanently  incapable  of  work, 
compensation  equal  to  fifty  percentum  of  his  earnings  but 
not  less  than  $7.50  nor  more  than  $14.00  per  week,  com- 
mencing on  the  day  after  the  injury,  and  continuing  until 
the  amount  paid  equals  the  amount  which  would  have  been 
payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  paragraph  (a),  section  7, 
if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result  of  the  injury  at  the 
time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving  as  provided  in  said 


THE  ACT 


Amount  of 


Return  to 
Work. 
Pension 
Cut  Off. 


Award 
Modified. 


Compensation 

Death,  Pay- 
ment of  Part 


Minimum 

$500.00 


Period   of 
Payment 

Employees 
Incompetent 


Limitations 
Tolled 

Compensation 
Paid  in 
Installments 


paragraph  (a),  section  7,  and  thereafter  a  pension  during 
life  annually  equal  to  8  per  cent  of  the  amount  which 
would  have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  para- 
graph (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result 
of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving, 
as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7.  Such  pen- 
sion shall  not  be  less  than  $10.00  per  month  and  shall 
be  payable  monthly:  Provided,  any  employee  who  receives  S204 
an  award  under  this  paragraph  and  afterwards  returns  to 
work,  or  is  able  to  do  so,  and  who  earns  or  is  able  to  earn 
as  much  as  before  the  injury,  payments  under  such  aw'ard 
shall  cease;  if  such  employee  returns  to  work,  or  is  able 
to  do  so  and  earns  or  is  able  to  earn  part  but  not  as  much 
as  before  the  injury,  such  award  shall  be  modified  so  as  to 
conform  to  an  award  under  paragraph  (h)  of  this  section: 
provided,  further,  that  disability  as  enumerated  in  subdivi- 
sion 18,  paragraph  (e)  of  this  section  shall  be  considered 
complete  disability. 

(g)  In  case  death  occurs  as  a  result  of  the  injury  242 
before  the  total  of  the  payments  made  equals  the  amount  S206 
payable  as  a  death  benefit,  then  in  case  the  employee 
leaves  any  widow,  child  or  children,  parents,  grandparents, 
or  other  lineal  heirs,  entitled  to  compensation  under  sec- 
tion 7,  the  difference  between  the  compensation  for  death 
and  the  sum  of  the  payments  made  to  the  employee,  shall 
be  paid  to  the  beneficiaries  of  the  deceased  employee,  and 
distributed  as  provided  in  paragraph  (f)  of  section  7,  but 
in  no  case  shall  the  amount  payable  under  this  para- 
graph be  less  than  $500.00. 

(h)  In  no  event  shall  the  compensation  to  be  paid  242 
exceed  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage,  or  ex-  S207 
ceed  $14.00  per  week  in  amount;  nor,  except  in  case  of  com- 
plete disability,  as  defined  above,  shall  any  payments 
extend  over  a  period  of  more  than  eight  years  from  the 
date  of  the  accident.  In  case  an  injured  employee  shall 
be  incompetent  at  the  time  when  any  right  or  privilege 
accrues  to  him  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  a  con- 
servator or  guardian  may  be  appointed  pursuant  to  law, 
and  may,  on  behalf  of  such  incompetent,  claim  and  exercise 
any  such  right  or  privilege  with  the  same  force  and  effect 
as  if  the  employee  himself  had  been  competent  and  had 
claimed  or  exercised  said  right  or  privilege;  and  no  lim- 
itations of  time  by  this  Act  provided  shall  run  so  long 
as  said  incompetent  employee  is  without  a  conservator  or 
a  guardian. 

(i)     All  compensation  provided  for  in  paragraphs   (b),      243 
(c),   (d),   (e),  and   (f)  of  this  section,  other  than  case  of    3207 
pension  for  life,  shall  be  paid  in  installments  at  the  same 
intervals  at  which  the  wages  or  earnings  of  the  employee 
were  paid  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  or  if  this  shall  not  be 
feasible,  then  the  installments  shall  be  paid  weekly. 


12 


THE  ACT 


Compensation 
Increase   of 
Percentage 


Weekly 

Minimum 

Increase  for 
One  Child 

Two 


Tkree 


Maximum 
Increased 


Compensation 
Lump  Sum 
Notice 


<  <>ni  mutation 
How  Made 


Complete 
Disability 


(J)  1.  Wherever  in  this  section  there  is  a  provision 
for  fifty  percentum,  such  percentum  shall  be  increased  five 
pcrcentum  for  each  child  of  the  employee  under  16  years 
of  age  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee  until  such 
percentum  shall  reach  a  maximum  of  sixty-five  percentum. 

2.  Wherever  in  this  section  a  weekly  minimum  of  $7.50 
is  provided,  such  minimum  shall  be  increased  in  the  fol- 
lowing cases  to  the  following  amounts: 

$8.50  in  a  case  of  any  employee  having  one  child  under 
the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  em- 
ployee; 

$9.50  in  a  case  of  an  employee  having  two  children  under 
the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  em- 
ployee; 

$10.50  in  a  case  of  an  employee  having  three  or  more 
children  under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
jury to  the  employee. 

3.  Wherever    in    this    section    a   weekly   maximum    of 
$14.00  is  provided,  such  maximum  shall  be  increased  in  the 
following  cases  to  the  following  amounts: 

$15.00  in  case  of  an  employee  with  one  child  under  the 
age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee. 

$16.00  in  case  of  an  employee  with  two  children  under 
the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  injury  to  the  employee. 

$17.00  in  case  of  an  employee  with  three  or  more  child- 
ren under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  injury  to  the 
employee.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  29,  1921.] 

§  9.  Any  employer  or  employee  or  beneficiary  who  shall 
desire  to  have  such  compensation,  or  any  unpaid  part  there- 
of, paid  in  a  lump  sum,  may  petition  the  Industrial  Board, 
asking  that  such  compensation  be  so  paid,  and  if,  upon 
proper  notice  to  the  interested  parties  and  a  proper  show- 
ing made  before  such  board,  it  appears  to  the  best  interest 
of  the  parties  that  such  compensation  be  so  paid,  the  board 
may  order  the  commutation  of  the  compensation  to  an 
equivalent  lump  sum,  which  commutation  shall  be  an 
amount  which  will  equal  the  total  sum  of  the  probable 
future  payments  capitalized  at  their  present  value  upon  the 
basis  of  interest  calculated  at  three  per  centum  per  annum, 
with  annual  rests:  Provided,  that  in  cases  indicating  com- 
plete disability  no  petition  for  a  commutation  to  a  lump  sum 
basis  shall  be  entertained  by  the  Industrial  Board  until 
after  the  expiration  of  six  months  from  the  date  of  the 
injury,  and  where  necessary,  upon  proper  application 
being  made,  a  guardian,  conservator  or  administrator,  as 
the  case  may  be,  may  be  appointed  for  any  person  under 
disability  who  may  be  entitled  to  any  such  compensation, 
and  an  employer  bound  by  the  terms  of  this  Act,  and 
liable  to  pay  such  compensation,  may  petition  for  the 
appointment  of  the  public  administrator,  or  a  conservator, 


THE  ACT 


Award 
Rejection    of 


Compensation 
Computation 

Annual 
Earnings 

Basis 

Employment 
Grade  of 

Basis 

Employment 
Same    Class 


Basis 


Employment 

Annual 

Earnings 

SOOx 

Employment 
Part  Time 

Annual 
Earnings 


200x 

Employee 
Earning 
No   Wage 


or  guardian,  where  no  legal  representative  has  been  ap- 
pointed or  is  acting  for  such  party  or  parties  so  under 
disability.  Either  party  may  reject  an  award  of  a  lump 
sum  payment  of  compensation,  except  an  award  for  com- 
pensation under  section  7  or  paragraph  (e)  of  section  8 
or  for  the  injuries  denned  in  the  last  paragraph  of  para- 
graph (e)  of  section  8  as  constituting  total  and  perma- 
nent disability,  by  filing  his  written  rejection  thereof  with 
the  said  board  within  ten  days  after  notice  to  him  of  the 
award,  in  which  event  compensation  shall  be  payable  in 
installments  as  herein  provided.  [Amended  by  Act  ap- 
proved June  28,  1915;  in  force  July  1,  1915.] 

§  10.  The  basis  for  computing  the  compensation  pro- 
vided for  in  section  7  and  8  of  the  Act  shall  be  as  fol- 
lows: 

(a)  The  compensation  shall  be  computed  on  the  basis 
of  the  annual  earnings  which  the  injured  person  received 
as  salary,  wages  or  earnings  if  in  the  employment  of  the 
same   employer   continuously   during   the   year    next   pre- 
ceding the  injury. 

(b)  Employment  by  the  same  employer  shall  be  taken 
to  mean  employment  by  the  same  employer  in  the  grade 
in  which  the  employee  was  employed  at  the  time  of  the 
accident,  uninterrupted  by  absence  from  work  due  to  ill- 
ness or  any  other  unavoidable  cause. 

(c)  If  the  injured  person  has  not  been  engaged  in  the 
employment  of  the  same  employer  for  the  full  year  im- 
mediately preceding  the  accident,  the  compensation  shall 
be  computed  according  to  the  annual  earnings  which  per- 
sons of  the  same  class  in  the  same  employment  and  same 
location,   (or  if  that  be  impracticable,  of  neighboring  em- 
ployments  of  the  same   kind)    have   earned   during  such 
period. 

(d)  As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the 
custom   to   operate   throughout   the   working   days   of   the 
year,  the  annual  earnings,  if  not  otherwise  determinable, 
shall  be  regarded  as  300  times  the  average  daily  earnings 
in  such  computation. 

(e)  As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the 
custom  to  operate  for  a  part  of  the  whole  number  of  work- 
ing days  in  each  year,  such  number,  if  the  annual  earnings 
are  not  otherwise  determinable,  shall  be  used  instead  of 
300  as  a  basis  for  computing  the  annual  earnings:     Pro- 
vided,  the  minimum  number  of  days   which  shall  be  so 
used  for  the  basis  of  the  year's   work  shall  be  not   less 
than  200. 

(f)  In  the  case  of  injured  employees  who  earn  either 
no  wage  or  less  than  the  earnings  of  adult  day  laborers 
in  the  same  line  of  employment  in  that  locality,  the  yearly 
wage  shall  be  reckoned  according  to  the  average  annual 


14 


THE  ACT 


Earnings 
Day's  Work  as 
Bails 


<  o 

Where  Prerlons 

ln.lurl.-v 


Compensation 
Determination 

Of      lll-tlllllllrlll 

Period 

Employer 

Responsibility 

Measnre  of 

Compensation 

Limits 


Employee 
Examined 
Expense  of 
Employee 


Time 


Medical 
Examination 


earning  of  adults  of  the  same  class  in  the  same   (or  if 
that  is  impracticable  then  of  neighboring)   employments. 

(g)  Earnings,  for  the  purpose  of  this  section,  shall  be 
based  on  the  earnings  for  the  number  of  hours  commonly  S223 
regarded  as  a  day's  work  for  that  employment,  and  shall 
exclude  overtime  earnings.  The  earnings  shall  not  include 
any  sum  which  the  employer  has  been  accustomed  to  pay 
the  employee  to  cover  any  special  expense  entailed  on  him 
by  the  nature  of  his  employment. 

(h)     In  computing  the  compensation  to  be  paid  to  any      259 
employee,  who,  before  the  accident  for  which  he  claims    S224 
compensation,    was    disabled    and    drawing    compensation 
under  the  terms  of  this  Act,  the  compensation  for   each 
subsequent  injury  shall  be  apportioned   according  to   the 
proportion  of  incapacity  and  disability  caused  by  the  re- 
spective injuries  which  he  may  have  suffered. 

(i)  To  determine  the  amount  of  compensation  for  each  254 
installment  period,  the  amount  per  annum  shall  be  ascer-  259 
tained  pursuant  hereto,  and  such  amount  divided  by  the  S224 
number  of  installment  periods  per  annum. 

§  11.  The  compensation  herein  provided,  together  with  259 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  the  measure  of  the  re-  S225 
sponsibility  of  any  employer  engaged  in  any  of  the  enter- 
prises or  businesses  enumerated  in  section  three  (3)  of 
this  Act,  or  of  any  employer  who  is  not  engaged  in  any 
such  enterprises  or  businesses,  but  who  has  elected  to  pro- 
vide and  pay  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  sus- 
tained by  any  employee  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  according  to  the  provisions  of  this 
Act,  and  whose  election  to  continue  under  this  Act,  has 
not  been  nullified  by  any  action  of  his  employees  as  pro- 
vided for  in  this  Act.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  25, 
1917.1 

§   12.      An  employee  entitled  to  receive  disability  pay-      259 
ments  shall  be  required,  if  requested  by  the  employer,  to    S225 
submit  himself,  at  the  expense  of  the  employer,   for  ex-    S228 
amination  to  a  duly  qualified  medical  practitioner  or  sur-      260 
geon  selected  by  the  employer  at  a  time  and  place  reason- 
ably convenient  for  the  employee,  as  soon  as  practicable 
after  the  injury,  and  also  one  week  after  the  first  examina- 
tion  and    thereafter   at   intervals   not   oftener   than    once 
every   four   weeks,   which    examination   shall    be   for    the 
purpose  of  determining  the  nature,   extent   and   probable 
duration  of  the  injury  received  by  the  employee,  and  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  amount  of  compensation 
which  may  be  due  the  employee  from  time  to  time  for 
disability  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act:     Pro- 
vided, however,  that  such  examination  shall  be  made  in 
the  presence  of  a  duly  qualified   medical  practitioner  or 
surgeon  provided  and  paid  for  by  the  employee,  if  such 
employee   so  desires:      Provided,   further,   that   such   ex- 
amination shall  not  be  made  on  the  day  of  the  hearing. 


THE  ACT 


In  all  cases  where  the  examination  is  made  by  a  surgeon 
engaged  by  the  employer,  and  the  injured  employee  has 
Heport  no  surgeon .  present  at  such   examination,  it  shall  be  the 

duty  of  the  surgeon  making  the  examination  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  employer  to  deliver  to  the  injured  employee, 
upon  his  request,  or  that  of  his  representative,  a  statement 
in  writing  of  the  condition  and  extent  of  the   injury  to 
the  same  extent  that  said  surgeon  reports  to  the  employer. 
Examination          If  the  employee  refuses  so  to  submit  himself  to  examina- 
Obstrneted  tion    or    unnecessarily    obstructs    the    same,    his    right    to 

Compensation        compensation    payments    shall    be    temporarily    suspended 
suspended  until  such  examination  shall  have  taken  place,  and  no  com- 

pensation shall  be  payable  under  this  Act  for  such  period. 
It  shall  be  the  duty  of  surgeons  treating  an  injured  em- 
ployee who  is  likely  to  die,  and  treating  him  at  the  in- 
Burgeon's  Duty  stance  of  the  employer  to  have  called  in  another  surgeon 
Employee  to  be  designated  and  paid  for  by  either  the  injured  em- 

About  to  Die  ployee  or  by  the  person  or  persons  who  would  become  his 
beneficiary  or  beneficiaries,  to  make  an  examination  before 
the  death  of  such  injured  employee.  [As  amended  by  an 
Act  approved  June  29,  1921.] 

ndustrial  §  13.     (a)     There  is  hereby  created  a  board  which  shall      260 

Board  Created  be  known  as  the  Industrial  Board  to  consist  of  five  mem-  S229 
bers  to  be  appointed  by  the  Governor,  by  and  with  the 
consent  of  the  Senate,  two  of  whom  shall  be  representa- 
tive citizens  of  the  employing  class  operating  under  this 
Act,  and  two  of  whom  shall  be  representative  citizens  of 
the  class  of  employees  operating  under  this  Act,  and  one 
of  whom  shall  be  a  representative  citizen  not  identified 
with  either  the  employing  or  employee  classes  and  who 
shall  be  designated  by  the  Governor  as  chairman.  Ap- 
pointment of  members  to  places  on  the  first  board  or  to 
fill  vacancies  on  said  board  may  be  made  during  recesses 
of  the  Senate,  but  shall  be  subject  to  confirmation  by  the 
Senate  at  the  next  ensuing  session  of  the  Legislature. 

(b)  When  there  shall  become  effective  the  Act  known 
as  "The  Civil  Administrative  Code  of  Illinois,"  being  an 
Act  entitled  "An  Act  in  relation  to  the  civil  administra- 
tion of  the  State  Government,"  there  shall  thereupon  be 
vested  in  the  Industrial  Commission  and  the  industrial  261 
officers  thereof  by  said  Act  created,  all  of  the  powers  and 
duties  vested  in  the  Industrial  Board  by  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  and  thereupon  wherever  in  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  reference,  shall  be  made  to  the 
Industrial  Board,  the  board  or  to  any  member  thereof, 
it  shall  be  construed  as  referring  and  shall  apply  to  said 
Industrial  Commission,  the  said  commission,  and  any  in- 
dustrial officer  thereof,  respectively.  [Amended  by  Act 
approved  June  25,  1917.] 

Salaries  §  14.     The  salary  of  each  of  the  members  of  the  com-      261 

mission  appointed  by  the  Governor  shall  be  six  thousand    S229 


16 


THE  ACT 


Board 


dollars  ($6,000.00)  per  year,  except  that  the  salary  of  the 
chairman  shall  be  seven  thousand  five  hundred  dollars 
($7,500.00)  per  year.  The  commission  shall  appoint  a 
secretary  whose  salary  shall  be  five  thousand  dollars 
($5,000.00)  per  year  and  shall  employ  such  assistants 
and  clerical  help  as  may  be  necessary. 

The  salary  of  the  arbitrators  designated  by  the  com- 
mission shall  be  at  the  rate  of  four  thousand  two  hun- 
dred dollars  per  year. 

Relmbarftement  The  members  of  the  commission  and  the  arbitrators 
shall  have  reimbursed  to  them  their  actual  traveling  ex- 
penses and  disbursements  made  or  incurred  by  them  in 
the  discharge  of  their  official  duties  while  away  from  their 
places  of  residence  in  the  performance  of  their  duties. 
The  commission  shall  provide  itself  with  a  seal  for  the 
authentication  of  its  orders,  awards  and  proceedings  upon 
which  shall  be  inscribed  the  name  of  the  commission  and 
the  words  "Illinois  —  Seal."  [Amended  by  Act  approved 
June  29,  1921.] 

§  15.  The  Industrial  Board  shall  have  jurisdiction  over 
the  operation  and  administration  of  this  Act,  and  said 
board  shall  perform  all  the  duties  imposed  upon  it  by  this 
Act,  and  such  further  duties  as  may  hereafter  be  im- 
posed by  law  and  the  rules  of  the  board  not  inconsistent 
therewith. 

Rile*  »nd  {  16-    The  board  may  make  rules  and  orders  for  carry- 

Orders  ing  out  the  duties  imposed  upon  it  by  law,  which  rules  and 

Procedure  orders  shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  reasonable  and  valid; 

and  the  process  and  procedure  before  the  board  shall  be 
as  simple  and  summary  as  reasonably  may  be.  The  board 
upon  application  of  either  party  may  issue  dcdimus  potes- 
tatem  directed  to  a  commissioner,  notary  public,  justice  of 
the  peace  or  any  other  officer  authorized  by  law  to  admin- 
ister oaths,  to  take  the  depositions  of  such  witness  or  wit- 
nesses as  may  be  necessary  in  the  judgment  of  such  appli- 
Dedlnti  cant.  Such  dcdimus  potestatem  may  issue  to  any  of  the 

i',.  i.  -tat.  in  officers  aforesaid  in  any  state  or  territory  of  the  United 

States  or  in  any  foreign  country.     The  board  shall  have 
the  power  to  adopt  necessary  rules  to  govern  the  issue  of 
such   ih  iiinius   potestatem.      The   board,   or  any   member 
Power*  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by  said  board  shall 

have  the  power  to  administer  oaths,  subpoena  and  examine 
witnesses,  to  issue  subpoenas  duccs  tecum,  requiring  the 
production  of  such  books,  papers,  records  and  documents 
as  may  be  evidence  of  any  matter  under  inquiry,  and  to 
examine  and  inspect  the  same  and  such  places  or  prem- 
ises as  may  relate  to  the  question  in  dispute.  Said  board, 
or  any  member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by 
said  board,  shall,  on  written  request  of  either  party  to  the 
dispute,  issue  subpoenas  for  the  attendance  of  such  wit- 
nesses and  production  of  such  books,  papers,  records,  and 


THE  ACT 


17 


Refusing  to 
Comply   With 
Order 


Contempt  How 

Punished 


Provision  for 
Stenographers 


Fixing  of  Fees 


Blank   Forms 


Records 


Books 


Questions 
Determined 


documents  as  shall  be  designated  in  said  applications,  -pro- 
viding, however,  that  the  parties  applying  for  such  sub- 
poena shall  advance  the  officer  and  witness  fees  provided 
for  in  suits  pending  in  the  Circuit  Court.  Service  of  such 
subpoenas  shall  be  made  by  any  sheriff  or  constable  or 
other  person.  In  case  any  person  refuses  to  comply  with 
an  order  of  the  board  or  subpoena  issued  by  it  or  any 
member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by  said 
board,  or  to  permit  an  inspection  of  places  or  premises, 
or  to  produce  any  books,  papers,  records,  or  documents,  or 
any  witness  refuses  to  testify  to  any  matters  regarding 
which  he  may  be  lawfully  interrogated,  the  County  Court 
of  the  county  in  which  said  hearing  or  matter  is  pending, 
on  application  of  any  member  of  the  board  or  any  arbi- 
trator designated  by  the  board,  shall  compel  obedience  by 
attachment  proceedings,  as  for  contempt,  as  in  a  case  of 
disobedience  of  the  requirements  of  a  subpoena  from  such 
court  on  a  refusal  to  testify  therein. 

The  board  at  its  expense  shall  provide  a  stenographer  to 
take  the  testimony  and  record  of  proceedings  at  the  hear- 
ings before  an  arbitrator,  committee  of  arbitration,  or  the 
board,  and  said  stenographer  shall  furnish  a  transcript  of 
such  testimony  or  proceedings  to  any  person  requesting  it 
upon  payment  to  him  therefor  of  five  cents  per  one  hun- 
dred words  for  the  original  and  three  cents  per  one  hun- 
dred words  for  each  copy  of  such  transcript. 

The  board  shall  have  the  power  to  determine  the  reason-  S235 
ableness  and  fix  the  amount  of  any  fee  or  compensation 
charged  by  any  person  for  any  service  performed  in  con- 
nection with  this  Act,  or  for  which  payment  is  to  be  made 
under  this  Act  or  rendered  in  securing  any  right  under 
this  Act.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  May  31,  1917.] 

§  17.  The  board  shall  cause  to  be  printed  and  furnish  267 
free  of  charge  upon  request  by  any  employer  or  employee  S235 
such  blank  forms  as  it  shall  deem  requisite  to  facilitate 
or  promote  the  efficient  administration  of  this  Act,  and  the 
performance  of  the  duties  of  the  board;  it  shall  provide  a 
proper  record  in  which  shall  be  entered  and  indexed  the 
name  of  any  employer  who  shall  file  a  notice  of  declina- 
tion or  withdrawal  under  this  Act,  and  the  date  of  the 
filing  thereof;  and  a  proper  record  in  which  shall  be  en- 
tered and  indexed  the  name  of  any  employee  who  shall  file 
such  a  notice  of  declination  or  withdrawal,  and  the  date  of 
the  filing  thereof;  and  such  other  notices  as  may  be  re- 
quired by  the  terms  and  intendment  of  this  Act;  and  rec- 
ords in  which  shall  be  recorded  all  proceedings,  orders  and 
awards  had  or  made  by  the  board,  or  by  the  arbitration 
committees,  and  such  other  books  or  records  as  it  shall 
deem  necessary,  all  such  records  to  be  kept  in  the  office 
of  the  board. 

§  18.    All  questions  arising  under  this  Act,  if  not  settled      268 
by  agreement  of  the  parties  interested  therein,  shall,  ex-    8235 


18 


THE  ACT 


By  Board  cept  as  otherwise  provided,  be  determined  by  the  Indus- 

trial Board. 

Qaeitlons  of  §  19.     Any  disputed  question  of  law  or  fact  shall  be  de- 

Law  or  Fact         termined  as  herein  provided. 

Arbitrator  (a)     It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Industrial  Commission 

Designated  upon  notification  that  the  parties  have  failed  to  reach  an 

agreement,  to  designate  an  arbitrator;  Provided,  that  if  the 
compensation  claimed  is  for  a  partial  permanent  or  total 
DUpiU  permanent  incapacity  or  for  death,  then  the  dispute  may, 

at  the  election  of  either  party,  be  determined  by  a  commit- 
tee of  arbitration,  which  election  for  determination  by  a 
committee  shall  be  made  by  petitioner  filing  with  the  com- 
mission his  election  in  writing  with  his  petition  or  by  the 
other  party  filing  with  the  commission  his  election  in  writ- 
ing within  five  days  of  notice  to  him  of  the  filing  of  the  pe- 
tition, and  thereupon  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Industrial 
Commission,  upon  either  of  the  parties  having  filed  their 
election  for  a  committee  of  arbitration  as  above  provided, 
to  notify  both  parties  to  appoint  their  respective  represen- 
Deilgnatlon  tatives  on  the  committee  of  arbitration.  The  commission 

of  Committee  shall  designate  an  arbitrator  to  act  as  chairman,  and  if 
of  Arbitration  either  party  fails  to  appoint  its  member  on  the  committee 
within  seven  days  after  notification  as  above  provided,  the 
commission  shall  appoint  a  person  to  fill  the  vacancy  and 
notify  the  parties  to  that  effect.  The  party  filing  his  elec- 
tion for  a  committee  of  arbitration  shall  with  his  election 
deposit  with  the  commission  the  sum  of  twenty  dollars, 
to  be  paid  by  the  commission  to  the  arbitrators  selected 
by  the  parties  as  compensation  for  their  services  as  arbi- 
trators, and  upon  a  failure  to  deposit  as  aforesaid,  the  elec- 
tion shall  be  void  and  the  determination  shall  be  by  an 
arbitrator  designated  by  the  commission.  The  members 
of  the  committee  of  arbitration  appointed  by  either  of 
the  parties  or  one  appointed  by  the  commission  to  fill  a 
vacancy  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  one  of  the  parties  to 
appoint,  shall  not  be  a  member  of  the  commission  or  an 
employee  thereof. 

Arbitration  (b)    The  arbitrator  or  committee   of  arbitration  shall 

make  such  inquiries  and  investigations  as  he  or  they  shall 
deem  necessary,  and  may  examine  and  inspect  all  books, 
papers,  records,  places,  or  premises  relating  to  the  ques- 
tions in  dispute,  and  hear  such  proper  evidence  as  the  par- 
Hearlag*  ties  may  submit.  The  hearings  before  the  arbitrator  or 

committee  of  arbitration  shall  be  held  in  the  vicinity  where 
*otire  the  injury  occurred,  after  ten  days'  notice  of  the  time  and 

place  of  such  hearing  shall  have  been  given  to  each  of  the 
!>••<  M..n  parties  or  their  attorneys  of  record.    The  decision  of  the 

arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  be  filed  with 
the  Industrial  Commission,  which  commission  shall  imme- 
diately send  to  each  party  or  his  attorney  a  copy  of  such 
decision,  together  with  a  notification  of  the  time  when  it 
Rerlew  was  filed,  and  unless  a  petition  for  a  review  is  filed  by 


THE  ACT 


Physician 
Appointed 
Fees   for 
Services 


Tim*  for  either  party  within  fifteen  days  after  the  receipt  by  said 

party  of  the  copy  of  said  decision  and  notification  of  time 
when  filed,  and  unless  such  party  petitioning  for  a  review 
shall  within  twenty  days  after  the  receipt  by  him  of  the 
copy  of  said  decision,  file  with  the  commission  either  an 
agreed  statement  of  the  facts  appearing  upon  the  hearing 
before  the  arbitrator  or  commitee  of  arbitration,  or  if  such 
Stenographic         party  shall  so  elect,  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the 
Report  Filing       proceedings  at  such  hearings,  then  the  decision  shall  be- 
come the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  and  in  the 
absence  of  fraud  shall  be  conclusive:     Provided,  that  such 
Extension  Industrial    Commission    may    for    sufficient    cause    shown 

of  Time  grant  further  time  not  exceeding  thirty  days,  in  which  to 

petition  for  such  review  or  to  file  such  agreed  statement 
or  stenographic  report.  Such  agreed  statement  of  facts  or 
correct  stenographic  report,  as  the  case  may  be,  shall  be 
authenticated  by  the  signatures  of  the  parties  or  their 
attorneys,  and  in  the  event  they  do  not  agree  as  to  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  stenographic  report  it  shall  be  authenti- 
cated by  the  signature  of  the  arbitrator  designated  by  the 
commission. 

(c)  The  Industrial  Commission  may  appoint,  at  its  own 
expense,  a  duly  qualified,  impartial  physician  to  exam- 
ine the  injured  employee  and  report  to  the  commission. 
The  fee  for  this  service  shall  not  exceed  five  dollars  and 
traveling  expenses,  but  the  commission  may  allow  addi- 
tional reasonable  amounts  in  extraordinary  cases.  The 
fees  and  the  payment  thereof  of  all  attorneys  and  phy- 
sicians for  services  authorized  by  the  commission  under 
this  Act  shall,  upon  request  of  either  the  employer  or  the 
employee  or  the  beneficiary  affected,  be  subject  to  the 
review  and  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission. 

Insanitary  (d)     If  any  employee  shall  persist  in  insanitary  or  in- 

Practlces  jurious  practices  which  tend  to  either  imperil  or  retard 

his  recovery  or  shall  refuse  to  submit  to  such   medical, 

surgical  or  hospital  treatment  as  is  reasonably  essential 

to  promote  his  recovery,  the  commission  may,  in  its  dis- 

Compensation        cretion,  reduce  or  suspend  the  compensation  of  any  such 

Suspended  injured  employee. 

Review  by  (e)     If  a  petition  for  review  and  agreed  statement  of 

Commission  facts  or  stenographic  report  is  filed,  as  provided  herein, 

the  Industrial  Commission  shall  promptly  review  the  de- 
cision of  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  and 
all  questions  of  law  or  fact  which  appear  from  the  said 
Additional  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic  report,  and  such  addi- 

Evldenee  tional   evidence   as  the   parties   may  submit.     After   such 

hearing  upon  review,  the  commission  shall  file  in  its  office 
its  decision  thereon,  and  shall  immediately  send  to  each 
party  or  his  attorney  a  copy  of  such  decision  and  a  noti- 
fication of  the  time  when  it  was  filed. 

Hearing  Such  review  and  hearing  may  be  held  in  its  office  or 

elsewhere  as  the  commission  may  deem  advisable:     Pro- 


20 


THE  ACT 


vided,  that  the  taking  of  testimony  on  such  hearing  may 
be  had  before  any  member  of  the  commission  and  in  the 
event  either  of  the  parties  may  desire  an  argument  before 
others  of  the  commission,  such  argument  may  be  had  upon 
written  demand  therefor  filed  with  the  commission  within 
five  days  after  the  commencement  of  such  taking  of  testi- 
ComnUsloB  mony,  in  which  event  such  argument  shall  be  had  before 

MI    iia in  not   less  than  a   majority,   of  the   commission:    Provided, 

that  the  commission  shall  give  ten  days'  notice  to  the 
parties  or  their  attorneys  of  the  time  and  place  of  such 
taking  of  testimony  and  of  such  argument. 

Special  In  any  case  the  commission  in  its  decision  may  in  its 

Finding!  discretion  find  specially  upon  any  question  or   questions 

of  law  or  fact  which  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  by 
either  party,  whether  ultimate  or  otherwise.  Any  party 
may,  within  twenty  days  after  receipt  of  notice  of  the 
commission's  decision,  or  within  such  further  time,  not 
exceeding  thirty  days,  as  the  Commission  may  grant,  file 
with  the  commission  either  an  agreed  statement  of  the 
facts  appearing  upon  the  hearing,  or,  if  such  party  shall 
so  elect  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  additional 
proceedings  presented  before  the  commission,  in  which  re- 
port the  party  may  embody  a  correct  statement  of  such 
other  proceedings  in  the  case  as  such  party  may  desire 
Report  to  have  reviewed,  such  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic 

Authentication  report  to  be  authenticated  by  the  signatures  of  the  parties 
or  their  attorneys,  and  in  the  event  that  they  do  not  agree, 
then  the  authentication  of  such  stenographic  report  shall 
be  by  the  signature  of  any  member  of  the  commission. 
If  a  reporter  does  not  for  any  reason  furnish  a  tran- 
script of  the  proceedings  before  the  arbitrator  in  any  case 
for  use  on  a  hearing  for  review  before  the  industrial 
commission,  within  thirty  (30)  days  of  the  filing  of  the 
petition  for  review,  the  industrial  commission  may,  in 
its  discretion,  order  a  trial  de  novo  before  the  industrial 
commission  in  such  case,  upon  application  of  either  party. 
Record  of  The  applications  for  adjustment  of  claim  and  other  docu- 

i-r. ..,.,-, line-  ments  in  the  nature  of  pleadings  filed  by  either  party,  to- 

gether with  the  decisions  of  the  arbitrator  and  of  the  In- 
dustrial Commission  and  the  statement  of  facts  or  steno- 
graphic reports  hereinbefore  provided  for  in  paragraphs 
(b)  and  (c)  shall  be  the  record  of  the  proceedings  of  said 
commission,  and  shall  be  subject  to  review  as  hereinafter 
provided. 

Decision  (f)     The  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  acting 

Conelniire  within  its  powers,  according  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph 

(e)  of  this  section  shall,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  be  con- 
clusive unless  reviewed  as  in  this  paragraph  hereinafter 
provided. 

circuit  Conrt  (1)     Tne  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  where  any  of  the 

parties  defendant  may  be  found  shall  by  writ  of  certiorari 

Rtriew  to  the  Industrial  Commission  have  power  to  review  all 


Writ  of 

Certiorarl 


Issued 


Time 
Certiorarl 


Record    of 
Proceedings 


Certification 
Costs 


Receipt 
for  Costs. 


Certiorarl 
Bond 


Confirming 
Setting  Aside 


THE  ACT 

questions  of  law  and  fact  presented  by  such  record:  Pro- 
vided, that  no  additional  evidence  shall  be  heard  in  the 
Circuit  Court,  and  the  findings  of  fact  made  by  the  com- 
mission shall  not  be  set  aside  unless  contrary  to  the 
manifest  weight  of  the  evidence,  except  such  as  arise  in  a 
proceeding  in  which  under  paragraph  (b)  of  this  section  a 
decision  of  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  has 
become  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission.  Such 
writ  shall  be  issued  by  the  clerk  of  such  court  upon 
praecipe.  Service  upon  any  member  of  the  Industrial 
Commission  or  the  secretary  thereof  shall  be  service  on 
the  commission,  and  service  upon  other  parties  interested 
shall  be  by  scire  facias,  or  service  may  be  made  upon  said 
commission  and  other  parties  in  interest  by  mailing  notice 
of  the  commencement  of  the  proceedings  and  the  return 
day  of  the  writ  to  the  office  of  said  commission  and  the  last 
known  place  of  residence  of  the  other  parties  in  interest 
at  least  ten  days  before  the  return  day  of  said  writ.  Such 
suit  by  writ  of  certiorari  shall  be  commenced  within  tweflty 
days  of  the  receipt  of  notice  of  the  decision  of  the  commis- 
sion. 

The  Industrial  Commission  shall  not  be  required  to  cer- 
tify the  record  of  their  proceedings  to  the  Circuit  Court, 
unless  the  party  commencing  the  proceedings  for  review 
in  the  Circuit  Court,  as  above  provided,  shall  pay  to  the 
commission  the  sum  of  five  cents  per  one  hundred  words 
of  testimony  taken  before  said  commission  and  three  cents 
per  one  hundred  words  of  all  other  matters  contained  in 
such  record. 

In  its  decision  on  review  the  industrial  commission  shall 
determine  in  each  particular  case  the  amount  of  the  prob- 
able cost  of  the  record  to  be  filed  as  a  return  to  the  writ 
of  aertiorari  in  that  case  and  no  praecipe  for  a  writ  of 
certiorari  may  be  filed  and  no  writ  of  certiorari  shall  is- 
sue unless  the  party  seeking  to  review  the  decision  of  the 
industrial  commission  shall  exhibit  to  the  clerk  of  the 
said  Circuit  Court  a  receipt  showing  payment  of  the  sums 
so  determined  to  the  secretary  of  the  industrial  commis- 
sion. 

(2)  No  such  writ  of  certiorari  shall  issue  unless  the 
one  against  whom  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  have 
rendered  an  award  for  the  payment  of  money  shall  upon 
the  filing  of  his  praecipe  for  such  writ  file  with  the  clerk 
of  said  court  a  bond  conditioned  that  if  he  shall  not  suc- 
cessfully prosecute  said  writ,  he  will  pay  the  said  award 
and  the  costs  of  the  proceedings  in  said  court.  The  amount 
of  the  bond  shall  be  fixed  by  any  member  of  the  Indus- 
trial Commission  and  the  surety  or  sureties  on  said  bond 
shall  be  approved  by  the  clerk  of  said  court. 

The  court  may  confirm  or  set  aside  the  decision  of  the 
Industrial  Commission.  If  the  decision  is  set  aside  and 


22 


THE  ACT 


DrrUIoa 


Rtnaadlar 

Judgments 

R«Tlew 

Writ    of    Error 


Mm.-   to 
Mi.-    out    Writ 


Bond    J  u<l mil.- ii t 

Mill. I 


of 
Majority 


.1  ml  i:  MI  i- nt 
OB    Award 


CoiU 
Attorney  Feet 


the  facts  found  In  the  proceedings  before  the  commission 
are  sufficient,  the  court  may  enter  such  decision  as  is  jus- 
tified by  law,  or  may  remand  the  cause  to  the  Industrial  S304 
Commission  for  further  proceedings  and  may  state  the 
questions  requiring  further  hearing,  and  give  such  other 
instructions  as  may  be  proper. 

Judgments  and  orders  of  the  Circuit  Court  under  this 
Act  shall  be  reviewed  only  by  the  Supreme  Court  upon  a 
writ  of  error  which  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  discretion 
may  order  to  issue,  if  applied  for  not  later  than  the  second 
day  of  the  first  term  of  the  Supreme  Court  following  the 
rendition  of  the  Circuit  Court  judgment  or  order  sought 
to  be  reviewed:  provided,  that  if  the  first  day  of  said  term 
is  less  than  thirty  days  from  the  rendition  of  said  judg- 
ment or  order,  then  application  for  said  writ  of  error  may 
be  made  not  later  than  the  second  day  of  the  second  term 
following  the  rendition  of  said  judgment  or  order. 

The  writ  of  error  when  issued  shall  operate  as  a  super- 
sedes. 

The  bond  filed  with  the  praeclpe  for  the  writ  of  certir 
orari  as  provided  in  this  paragraph  shall  operate  as  a  stay 
of  the  judgment  or  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  until  the 
time  shall  have  passed  within  which  an  application  for 
a  writ  of  error  can  be  made,  and  until  the  Supreme  Court 
has  acted  upon  the  application  for  a  writ  of  error,  if  such 
application  is  made. 

The  decision  of  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  com-    S305 
mittee    of   arbitration    or    of    the    Industrial    Commission 
shall  be  considered  the  decision  of  such  committee  or  com- 
mission, respectively. 

(g)  Either  party  may  present  a  certified  copy  of  the  de-  381 
cision  of  the  Industrial  Commission,  when  no  proceedings  S318 
for  review  thereof  have  been  taken,  or  of  the  decision  of 
such  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  when  no  claim 
for  review  is  made,  or  of  the  decision  of  the  Industrial 
Commission  after  hearing  upon  review,  providing  for  the 
payment  of  compensation  according  to  this  Act,  to  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  county  in  which  such  accident  oc- 
curred or  either  of  the  parties  are  residents,  whereupon 
said  court  shall  render  a  judgment  in  accordance  there-  385 
with;  and  in  case  where  the  employer  does  not  institute 
proceedings  for  review  of  the  decision  of  the  Industrial 
Commission  and  refuses  to  pay  compensation  according  to 
the  award  upon  which  such  judgment  is  entered,  the  court  385 
shall,  in  entering  judgment  theron,  tax  as  costs  against 
him  the  reasonable  costs  and  attorney  fees  in  the  arbi- 
tration proceedings  and  in  the  court  entering  the  judg- 
ment, for  the  person  in  whose  favor  the  judgment  is 
entered,  which  judgment  and  costs,  taxed  as  herein  pro- 
vided shall,  until  and  unless  set  aside,  have  the  same 
effect  as  though  duly  rendered  in  an  action  duly  tried  and 


THE  ACT 


determined  by  said  court,  and  shall,  with  like  effect,  be 
entered  and  docketed.   The  Circuit  Court  shall  have  power, 
Judgment  at  any  time,  upon   application,   to   make  any  such  judg- 

Modlfication          ment  conform  to  any  modification  required  by  any  subse-    S319 
quent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon  appeal,  or  as 
the   result  of  any  subsequent  proceedings  for  review,  as 
provided  in  this  Act.  * 

Notice  Required       Judgment  shall  not  be  entered  until  fifteen  days'  notice 
for  Judgment        of   the   time  and   place  of  the   application   for   the  entry 
of  judgment  shall  be  served  upon  the  employer  by  filing 
such  notice  with   the  Industrial  Commission  which  com- 
mission shall,  in  case   it  has  on   file  the  address  of  the 
employer  or  the  name  and  address  of  its  agent,  upon  whom 
notices  may  be  served,  immediately  send   a  copy  of  the 
Bond  notice  to  the  employer  or  such  designated  agent;   and  no 

No  Judgment  judgment  shall  be  entered  in  the  event  the  employer  shall 
file  with  the  said  commission  its  bond  with  good  and  suffi- 
cient surety  in  double  the  amount  of  the  award,  condi- 
tioned upon  the  payment  of  said  award  in  the  event  the 
said  employer  shall  fail  to  prosecute  with  effect  proceed- 
ings for  review  of  the  decision  or  the  said  decision,  upon 
review,  shall  be  affirmed. 

Disability  (h)    An  agreement  or  award  under  this  Act  providing      390 

Recurrence  for  compensation  in  installments,  may  at  any  time  within      392 

Review  eighteen   months   after   such   agreement  or   award  be   re-    S320 

Agreement  viewed   by  the   Industrial   Commission  at   the   request   of 

either  the  employer  or  the  employee,  on  the  ground  that 
the  disability  of  the  employee  has  subsequently  recurred, 
increased,  diminished  or  ended;  and  on  such  review,  com- 
pensation payments  may  be  re-established,  increased,  di- 
minished or  ended;  Provided,  that  the  commission  shall 
give  fifteen  days'  notice  to  the  parties  of  the  hearing  for 
review:  And,  provided,  further,  any  employee,  upon  any 
petition  for  such  review  being  filed  by  the  employer,  shall 
be  entitled  to  one  day's  notice  for  each  one  hundred  miles 
necessary  to  be  traveled  by  him  in  attending  the  hearing 
of  the  commission  upon  said  petition  and  three  days  in 
addition  thereto,  and  such  employee  shall,  at  the  discre- 
Fee  for  Travel  tion  of  the  commission,  also  be  entitled  to  five  cents  per 
mile  necessarily  traveled  by  him  in  attending  such  hear- 
ing, not  to  exceed  a  distance  of  300  miles,  to  be  taxed  by 
the  commission  as  costs  and  deposited  with  the  petition 
of  the  employer. 

(i)     Each  party,  upon  taking  any  proceedings  or  steps      402 
whatsoever  before  any  arbitrator,  committee  of  arbitration,    S325 
Industrial  Commission  or  court,  shall  file  with  the  Indus- 
Address  trial  Commission  his  address,  or  the  name  and  address  of 
Filed                      any  agent  upon  whom  all  notices  to  be  given  to  such  party 
shall  be  served,  either  personally  or  by  registered  mail, 
addressed  to  such  party  or  agent  at  the  last  address  so 
Notice  filed  with  the  Industrial  Commission:     Provided,  that  in 
the  event  such  party  has  not  filed  his  address,  or  the  name 


24 


THE  ACT 


and  address  of  an  agent,  as  above  provided,  service  of  any 
notice  may  be  had  by  filing  such  notice  with  the  Industrial 
Commission. 

(j)     Whenever  in  any  proceeding  testimony  has  been 
taken  or  a  final  decision  has  been  rendered,  and  after  the 
taking  of  such  testimony  or  after  such  decision  has  be- 
neath of  *  come  final,  the  injured  employee  dies,  then  in  any  subse- 
Kmpioyee  quent  proceeding  brought  by  the  personal  representative  or 
beneficiaries  of  the  deceased  employee,  such  testimony  in 
Testimony  the  former  proceeding  may  be  introduced  with  the  same 
OB  Former  force  and  effect  as  though  the  witness  having  so  testified 
Hearing  were   present    in   person    in    such    subsequent    proceeding 
and  such  final  decision,  if  any  shall  be  taken  as  a  final 
adjudication  of  any  of  the  issues  which  are  the  same  in 
both  proceedings. 

(k)  In  any  case  where  there  has  been  any  unreason- 
able or  vexatious  delay  of  payment  or  intentional  under- 
payment of  compensation,  or  proceedings  have  been  insti- 
tuted or  carried  on  by  the  one  liable  to  pay  the  compensa- 
tion, which  do  not  present  a  real  controversy,  but  are 
Additional  merely  frivolous  or  for  delay,  then  the  commission  may 

Compensation  award  compensation  additional  to  that  otherwise  payable 
under  this  Act  equal  to  fifty  percentum  of  the  amount 
payable  at  the  time  of  such  award.  [Amended  by  Act 
approved  June  29,  1921.] 

Reports  §  20.    The  Industrial  Board  shall  report  in  writing  to 

Bulletins  the  Governor  on  the  30th  day  of  June,  annually,  the  details 

and  results  of  its  administration  of  this  Act,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  terms  of  this  Act,  and  may  prepare  and 
issue  such  special  bulletins  and  reports  from  time  to  time 
as  in  the  opinon  of  the  board,  seems  advisable. 

Award  §  21.     No  payment,  claim,  award  or  decision  under  this 

.\on>As«lgnable     Act  shall  be  assignable  or  subject  to  any  lien,  attachment 
or  garnishment,  or  be  held  liable  in  any  way  for  any  lien, 
Decision  debt,  penalty  or  damages.     A  decision  or  award  of  the  In- 

Recorded  dustrial  Commission  against  an  employer  for  compensation 

under  this  Act,  or  a  written  agreement  by  an  employer  to 
pay  such  compensation  shall,  upon  the  filing  of  a  certified 
copy  of  the  decision  or  said  agreement,  as  the  case  may 
be,  with  the  recorder  of  deeds  of  the  county,  constitute 
Men  a  lien  upon  all  property  of  the  employer  within  said 

county,   paramount   to   all    other   claims   or    liens,   except 
mortgages,  trust  deeds,  or  for  wages  or  taxes,  and  such 
liens   may  be   enforced   in   the   manner   provided   for   the 
foreclosure   of   mortgages   under   the   laws    of   this   State, 
compensation        Any    right    to    receive   compensation    hereunder    shall    be 
KxtlnguUhed         extinguished  by  the  death  of  the  person   or  persons   en- 
titled thereto,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  rela- 
tive to  compensation  for  death  received   in  the  course  of 
neneflclary  employment:     Provided,  that  upon  the  death  of  a  benefici- 

Ueath  ary,  who  is  receiving  compensation  provided  for  in  section 


THE  ACT 


7,  leaving  surviving  a  parent,  sister  or  brother  of  the 
deceased  employee,  at  the  time  of  his  death  dependent 
upon  him  for  support,  who  were  receiving  from  such  bene- 
ficiary a  contribution  to  support,  then  that  proportion  of 
the  compensation  of  the  beneficiary  which  would  have  been 
paid  but  for  the  death  of  the  beneficiary,  but  in  no  event 
exceeding  said  unpaid  compensation,  which  the  contribu- 
tion of  the  beneficiary  to  the  dependent's  support  within 
one  year  prior  to  the  death  of  the  beneficiary  bears  to  the 
compensation  of  the  beneficiary  within  that  year,  shall 
be  continued  for  the  benefit  of  such  dependents,  notwith- 
standing the  death  of  the  beneficiary.  [Amended  by  Act 
approved  June  28,  1919.] 

§  22.  Any  contract  or  agreement  made  by  any  employer 
or  his  agent  or  attorney  with  any  employee  or  any  other 
beneficiary  of  any  claim  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
within  seven  days  after  the  injury  shall  be  presumed  to 
be  fraudulent. 

§  23.  No  employee,  personal  representative,  or  bene- 
ficiary shall  have  power  to  waive  any  of  the  provisions  of 
this  Act  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  compensation  which 
may  be  payable  to  such  employee,  personal  representative 
or  beneficiary  hereunder  except  after  approval  by  the  In- 
dustrial Board. 

§  24.  No  proceedings  for  compensation  under  this  Act 
shall  be  maintained  unless  notice  of  the  accident  has  been 
given  to  the  employer  as  soon  as  practicable,  but  not  later 
than  30  days  after  the  accident.  In  cases  of  mental  in- 
capacity of  the  employee,  notice  must  be  given  within  six 
months  after  such  accident.  No  defect  or  inaccuracy  of 
such  notice  shall  be  a  bar  to  the  maintenance  of  proceed- 
ings of  arbitration  or  otherwise  by  the  employee  unless 
the  employee  proves  that  he  is  unduly  prejudiced  in  such 
proceedings  by  such  defect  or  inaccuracy.  Notice  of  the 
accident  shall  state  the  name  and  address  of  the  employee 
injured,  the  approximate  date  and  place  of  the  accident, 
if  known,  and  in  simple  language  the  cause  thereof;  which 
notice  may  be  served  personally  or  by  registered  mail,  ad- 
dressed to  the  employer  at  his  last  known  residence  or 
place  of  business;  provided  no  proceedings  for  compensa- 
tion under  this  Act  shall  be  maintained  unless  claim  for 
compensation  has  been  made  within  six  months  after  the 
accident,  or  in  the  event  that  payments  have  been  made 
under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  unless  written  claim  for 
compensation  has  been  made  within  six  months  after  such 
payments  have  ceased  and  a  receipt  therefor  or  a  state- 
ment of  the  amount  of  compensation  paid  shall  have  been 
filed  with  the  Commission:  Provided,  that  no  employee 
who  after  the  accident  returns  to  the  employment  of  the 
employer  in  whose  services  he  was  injured  shall  be  barred 
for  failure  to  make  such  claim  if  an  application  for  ad- 
justment of  such  claim  is  filed  with  the  Industrial  Commis- 


26 


THE  ACT 


sion  within  eighteen  months  after  he  returns  to  such 
employment  and  the  said  commission  shall  give  notice 
to  the  employer  of  the  filing  of  such  application  in  the 
manner  provided  in  this  Act.  [Amended  by  Act  approved 
June  29,  1921.] 

Liability  S  25.     Any  employer  against  whom   liability  may  exist      431 

Belief  From          for  compensation  under  this  Act,  shall  upon  the  order  and    8339 

direction  of  the  Industrial  Commission: 

Depositing  (a)     Deposit  the  commuted   value  of  the  total   unpaid 

<  "inpeni  ation  compenstaion  for  which  such  liability  exists,  computed  at 
three  per  centum  per  annum  in  the  same  manner  as  pro- 
vided in  section  9,  with  the  State  Treasurer,  or  County 
Treasurer  in  the  county  where  the  accident  happened,  or 
with  any  State  or  National  bank  or  Trust  Company  doing 
business  in  this  State,  or  in  some  other  suitable  depository 
approved  by  the  Industrial  Commission:  Provided,  that 
any  such  depository  to  which  such  compensation  may  be 
paid,  shall  pay  the  same  out  in  installments  as  in  this  Act 
provided,  unless  such  sum  is  ordered  paid  in,  and  is  com- 
muted to  a  lump  sum  payment  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  this  Act;  or 

Anility  (b)     Purchase   an    annuity,   in   an   amount   of   compen- 

sation due  or  computed,  under  this  Act  within  the  limita- 
tion provided  by  law  in  any  insurance  company  grant- 
ing annuities  and  licensed  or  permitted  to  do  business  in 
this  State  which  may  be  designated  by  the  employer  or 
the  Industrial  Commission.  [Amended  by  Act  approved 
June  29,  1921.] 

Prorlsloi  §   26.     (a)     Any  employer  who  shall  come  within  the      431 

to  Pay  provisions  of  section  3  of  this  Act,  and  any  other  employer    S340 

who  shall  elect  to  provide  and  pay  the  compensation  pro- 
vided for  in  this  Act  shall: 

-i. 1 1.  ni i- nt  (1)     File  with  the  commission  a  sworn  statement  show- 

ing his  financial  ability  to  pay  the  compensation  provided 
for  in  this  Act,  or 

)•  iirnuiiinif  (2)     Furnish  security,  indemnity  or  a  bond  guarantee- 

Aeeirlty  Ing  the   payment   by   the  employer   of   the   compensation 

provided  for  in  this  Act,  or 

in  MIC  in  *  (3)     Insure  to  a  reasonable  amount  his  liability  to  pay 

such  compensation  in  some  corporation  or  organization  au- 
thorized, licensed  or  permitted  to  do  such  insurance  busi- 
ness in  this  State,  or 

Alteraatlre  (4)     Make  some  other  provisions  for  the  securing  of  the 

payment  of  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  and 

(5)     Upon  becoming  subject  to  this  Act  and  thereafter 

as  often  as  the  commission  may  in  writing  demand,  file 

with  the  commission  in  form  prescribed  by  it  evidence  of 

his  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph. 

\  PIT..  MI  i  by  (b)     The  sworn  statement  of  financial  ability,  or  secur- 

CommissioB  ity,  indemnity  or  bond,  or  amount  of  insurance,  or  other 


THE  ACT 


Insurer 
Insolvent 


Delay  and 
Unfairness 


Discontinuance 
of  Business 


Order 
Review  of 


Kon-Compilance 


Penalty 


provision,  filed,  furnished,  carried,  or  made  by  the  em- 
ployer, as  the  case  may  be,  shall  be  subject  to  the  ap- 
proval of  the  commission,  upon  the  approval  of  which,  the 
commission  shall  send  to  the  employer  written  notice 
of  its  approval  thereof.  The  filing  with  the  commission  of 
evidence  of  compliance  with  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section 
as  therein  provided  shall  constitute  such  compliance  until 
ten  days  after  written  notice  to  the  employer  of  the  dis- 
approval by  the  commission. 

(c)  Whenever    the    Industrial    Commission    shall    find 
that  any  corporation,  company,  association,  aggregation  of 
individuals,  or  other  insurer  affecting  workmen's  compen- 
sation  insurance   in  this   State  shall  be   insolvent,   finan- 
cially unsound,  or  unable  to  fully  meet  all  payments  and 
liabilities  assumed  or  to  be  assumed  for  compensation  in- 
surance in  this  State,  or  shall  practice  a  policy  of  delay 
or  unfairness  toward  employees  in  the  adjustment,  settle- 
ment, or  payment  of  benefits  due  such  employees,  the  said 
Industrial   Commission   may   after   reasonable   notice   and 
hearing  order  and  direct  that  such  corporation,  company, 
association,  aggregation  of   individuals,   or   insurer,   shall 
from  and  after  a  date  fixed  in  such  order  discontinue  the 
writing  of  any  such   workmen's   compensation   insurance 
in  this  State.     Subject  to  such  modification  of  said  order 
as  the  commission  may  later  make  on  review  of  said  order, 
as  herein  provided,  it  shall  thereupon  be  unlawful  for  any 
such    corporation,    company,    association,    aggregation    of 
individuals,   or  insurer  to  effect  any  workmen's  compen- 
sation insurance  in  this  State.     Any  such  order  made  by 
said  Industrial  Commission  shall  be  subject  to  review  by 
the  courts,  as  in  the  case  of  other  orders  of  said  Indus- 
trial   Commission,    provided    that    upon    said    review   the 
Circuit   Court   shall  have   power   to   review   all   questions 
of  fact  as  well  as  of  law. 

(d)  The  failure  or  neglect  of  an  employer  to  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  paragraph   (a)  of  this  section  shall 
be  deemed  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a  fine  equal  to 
ten  cents  per  each  employee  of  such  employer  at  the  time 
of  such  failure  or  neglect,  but  not  less  than  one  dollar  nor 
more  than  fifty  dollars,  for  each  day  of  such  refusal  or 
neglect  until  the  same  ceases.     Each  day  of  such  refusal 
or  neglect  shall  constitute  a  separate  offense.     [Amended 
by  Act  approved  June  28,  1919.] 

§  27.  (a)  This  Act  shall  not  affect  or  disturb  the  con- 
tinuance of  any  existing  insurance,  mutual  aid,  benefit,  or 
relief  association  or  department,  whether  maintained  in 
whole  or  in  part  by  the  employer  or  whether  maintained 
by  the  employees,  the  payment  of  benefits  of  such  associa- 
tion or  department  being  guaranteed  by  the  employer  or 
by  some  person,  firm  or  corporation  for  him:  Provided, 
the  employer  contributes  to  such  association  or  depart- 
ment an  amount  not  less  than  the  full  compensation  herein 


28 


THE  ACT 


provided,  exclusive  of  the  cost  of  the  maintenance  of  such 

association  or  department  and  without  any  expense  to  the 

.Mutual  Benefit      employee.     This   Act  shall  not   prevent   the   organization 

Society  and  maintaining  under  the  insurance  laws  of  this  State  of 

any  benefit  or  insurance  company  for  the  purpose  of  insur- 

ing against  the  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  the 

expense  of   which   is  maintained   by   the  employer.     Thiv 

Act    shall    not   prevent    the   organization    or    maintaining 

under  the  insurance  laws  of  this  State  of  any  voluntary 

mutual  aid,  benefit  or  relief  association  among  employees 

for  the  payment  of  additional  accident  or  sick  benefits. 

Insurer  (b)     No  existing  insurance,  mutual  aid,  benefit  or  re- 

Can  Not  lief  association  or  department  shall,  by  reason  of  anything 

Discontinue  herein  contained  be  authorized  to  discontinue  its  operation 

without  first  discharging   its   obligations   to   any   and   all 

persons  carrying  insurance  in  the  same  or  entitled  to  re- 

lief or  benefits  therein. 

(c)  Any  contract,  oral,  written  or  implied,  of  employ- 
ment providing  for  relief  benefit,  or  insurance  or  any  other 
device  whereby  the  employee  is  required  to  pay  any  prem- 
ium or  premiums  for  insurance  against  the  compensation 
provided  for  in  this  Act  shall  be  null  and  void,  and  any 
employer  withholding  from  the  wages  of  any  employee  any 
amount  for  the  purpose  of  paying  any  such  premium  shall 
^e  suilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  punishable  by  a  fine  of 
not  less  than  ten  dollars  nor  more  than  one  thousand  dol- 
lars, or  imprisonment  in  the  county  jail  for  not  more  than 
six  months,  or  both,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court. 

§  28-  In  tne  event  the  employer  does  not  pay  the  com- 
pensation  for  which  he  is  liable,  then  an  insurance  com- 
pany, association  or  insurer  which  may  have  insured  such 
employer  against  such  liability  shall  become  primarily 
liable  to  pay  to  the  employee,  his  personal  representative 
or  beneficiary  the  compensation  required  by  the  provisions 
joint  °f  tnis  Act  to  be  paid  by  such  employer.  The  insurance 

Award  carrier  may  be  made  a  party  to  the  proceedings  to  which 

the  employer  is  a  party  and  an  award  may  be  entered 
jointly  against  the  employer  and  the  insurance  carrier. 
[Amended  by  Act  approved  June  28,  1919.] 

Third  Person  §  29-     Where  an  injury  or  death  for  which  compensation 

in.iiir.i  by  ls  payable  by  the  employer  under  this  Act,  was  not  proxi- 

mately  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  employer  or  his 
employees,  and  was  caused  under  circumstances  creat- 
ing a  legal  liability  for  damages  in  some  person  other  than 
the  employer  to  pay  damages,  such  other  person  having 
also  elected  to  be  bound  by  this  Act,  or  being  bound  there- 
by under  section  three  (3)  of  this  Act,  then  the  right  of 
the  employee  or  personal  representative  to  recover  against 
Subrogation  such  other  person  shall  be  subrogated  to  his  employer  and 

such  employer  may  bring  legal  proceedings  against  such 
other  person  to  recover  the  damages  sustained  in  an 


Wages 
withheld  for 
Premium 


Carrier 


THE  ACT 


amount  not  exceeding  the  aggregate  amount  of  compensa- 
tion payable  under  this  Act,  by  reason  of  the  injury  or 
death  of  such  employee.  Where  the  injury  or  death  for 
which  compensation  is  payable  under  this  Act,  was  not 
proximately  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  employer  or 
his  employees  and  was  caused  under  circumstances  cre- 
ating a  legal  liability  for  damages  on  the  part  of  some  per- 
Thlrd  Person  son  other  than  the  employer  to  pay  damages,  such  other 
Not  Under  Act  person  having  elected  not  to  be  bound  by  this  Act,  then 
legal  proceedings  may  be  taken  against  such  other  person 
to  recover  damages  notwithstanding  such  employer's  pay- 
ment of  or  liability  to  pay  compensation  under  this  Act, 
but  in  such  case  if  the  action  against  such  other  person  is 
brought  by  the  injured  employee  or  his  personal  represen- 
tative and  judgment  is  obtained  and  paid,  or  settlement  is 
made  with  such  other  person,  either  with  or  without  suit, 
then  from  the  amount  received  by  such  employee  or  per- 
sonal representative  there  shall  be  paid  to  the  employer 
the  amount  of  compensation  paid  or  to  be  paid  by  him  to 
such  employee  or  his  personal  representative:  Provided, 
that  if  the  injured  employee  or  his  personal  representative 
shall  agree  to  receive  compensation  from  the  employer  or 
to  institute  proceedings  to  recover  the  same  or  accept  from 
the  employer  any  payment  on  account  of  such  compensa- 
tion, such  employer  shall  be  subrogated  to  all  the  rights 
of  such  employee  or  personal  representative  and  may 
maintain,  or  in  case  an  action  has  already  been  instituted, 
may  continue  an  action  either  in  the  name  of  the  em- 
ployee or  personal  representative  or  in  his  own  name 
against  such  other  person  for  the  recovery  of  damages 
to  which  but  for  this  section  the  said  employee  or  personal 
representative  would  be  entitled,  but  such  employer  shall 
nevertheless  pay  over  to  the  injured  employee  or  personal 
representative,  all  sums  collected  from  such  other  person 
by  judgment  or  otherwise  in  excess  of  the  amount  of  such 
compensation  paid  or  to  be  paid  under  this  Act,  and  all 
costs,  attorneys'  fees  and  reasonable  expenses  incurred 
by  such  employer  in  making  such  collection  and  enforcing 
such  liability.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  25,  1917.] 
§  30.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  employer  within  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  to  send  to  the  Industrial  Board  in 
writing  an  immediate  report  of  all  accidental  injuries  aris- 
ing out  of  or  in  the  course  of  the  employment  and  re- 
sulting in  death;  it  shall  also  be  the  duty  of  every  such 
employer  to  report  between  the  15th  and  the  25th  of  each 
month  to  the  Industrial  Board  all  accidental  injuries  for 
which  compensation  has  been  paid  under  this  Act,  which 
injuries  entail  a  loss  to  the  employee  of  more  than  one 
week's  time,  and  in  case  the  injury  results  in  permanent 
disability,  a  further  report  shall  be  made  as  soon  as  it  is 
determined  that  such  permanent  disability  has  resulted  or 
will  result  from  such  injury.  All  reports  shall  state  the 


30 


THE  ACT 


Compensation 


Coatraet 
With  Others 


I'llt  >     tO 

Insnre 


Recorery 

Against 

Contractor 


Immediate 
Premises 


Invalidity    of 
Part  Bight 
of  Action 


date  of  the  injury,  including  the  time  of  day  or  night,  the 
nature  of  the  employer's  business,  the  name,  address, 
the  age,  sex,  conjugal  condition  of  the  injured  person,  the 
specific  occupation  of  the  injured  person,  the  direct  cause 
of  the  injury  and  the  nature  of  the  accident,  the  character 
of  the  injury,  the  length  of  disability,  and,  in  case  of  death, 
the  length  of  disability  before  death,  the  wages  of  the  in- 
jured person,  whether  compensation  has  been  paid  to  the 
injured  person,  or  to  his  legal  representatives  or  his  heirs 
or  next  of  kin,  the  amount  of  compensation  paid,  the 
amount  paid  for  physicians',  surgeons'  and  hospital  bills, 
and  by  whom  paid,  and  the  amount  paid  for  funeral  or 
burial  expenses,  if  known.  The  making  of  reports  as  pro- 
vided herein  shall  release  the  employer  covered  by  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  from  making  such  reports  to  any 
other  officer  of  the  State. 

§  31.  Any  one  engaging  in  any  business  or  enterprise 
referred  to  in  sub-sections  1  and  2  of  section  3  of  this  Act 
who  undertakes  to  do  any  work  enumerated  therein,  shall 
be  liable  to  pay  compensation  to  his  own  immediate  em- 
ployees in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and 
in  addition  thereto  if  he  directly  or  indirectly  engages  any 
contractor  whether  principal  or  sub-contractor  to  do  any 
such  work,  he  shall  be  liable  to  pay  compensation  to  the 
employees  of  any  such  contractor  or  sub-contractor  unless 
such  contractor  or  sub-contractor  shall  have  insured,  in 
any  company  or  association  authorized  under  the  laws  of 
this  State  to  insure  the  liability  to  pay  compensation  under 
this  Act,  or  guaranteed  his  liability  to  pay  such  compen- 
sation. 

In  the  event  any  such  person  shall  pay  compensation 
under  this  section  he  may  recover  the  amount  thereof  from 
the  contractor  or  sub-contractor,  if  any,  and  in  the  event 
the  contractor  shall  pay  compensation  under  this  section 
he  may  recover  the  amount  thereof  from  the  sub-contract- 
or, if  any. 

This  section  shall  not  apply  in  any  case  where  the  acci- 
dent occurs  elsewhere  than  on,  in  or  about  the  immediate 
premises  on  which  the  principal  has  contracted  that  the 
work  shall  be  done.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  28, 
1919.] 

§  32.  If  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act  providing 
for  compensation  for  Injuries  to  or  death  of  employees 
shall  be  repealed  or  adjudged  invalid  or  unconstitutional, 
the  period  intervening  between  the  occurrence  of  any  in- 
jury or  death  and  such  repeal  or  final  adjudication  of  in- 
validity, shall  not  be  computed  as  a  part  of  the  time 
limited  by  law  for  the  commencement  of  any  action  re- 
lating to  such  injury  or  death,  but  the  amount  of  any  com- 
pensation which  may  have  been  paid  for  any  such  injury 
shall  be  deducted  from  any  judgment  for  damages  recov- 


THE  ACT 


ered  on  account  of  such  injury.     Any  claim,  disagreement 
or  controversy  existing  or  arising  under  "An  Act  to  pro- 
claim Under         mote  the  general  welfare  of  the  people  of  this  State,  by 
Previous  Act         providing  compensation   for  accidental  injuries   or  death 
suffered  in  the  course  of  employment,"  approved  June  10, 
1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912,  shall  be. adjusted,  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  said  Act,  notwithstanding  the  repeal 
thereof,  or  may  by  agreement  of  the  parties  be  adjusted 
in  accordance  with  the  method  of  procedure  provided  in 
this  Act  for  the  adjustment  of  differences,  jurisdiction  to 
adjust  such  differences  so  submitted  by  the  parties  being 
hereby  conferred  upon  the  Industrial  Board  or  committee 
of  arbitration  provided  for  in  this  Act.     [Amended  by  Act 
t    approved  June  25,  1917.] 

§  33.  Any  wilful  neglect,  refusal,  or  failure  to  do  the 
things  required  to  be  done  by  any  section,  clause,  or  provi- 
sion of  this  Act,  on  the  part  of  the  persons  herein  required 
to  do  them,  or  any  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  or  re- 
quirements hereof,  or  any  attempt  to  obstruct  or  interfere 
with  any  court  officer,  or  any  other  person  charged  with 
the  duty  of  administering  or  enforcing  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  shall  be  deemed  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by 
a  fine  of  not  less  than  $10.00  nor  more  than  $500.00  at  the 
discretion  of  the  court. 

§  33%.  This  Act  may  be  cited  as  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act.  [Added  by  an  Act  approved  June  28,  1915.] 

§  34.  The  invalidity  of  any  portion  of  this  Act  shall  in 
no  way  affect  the  validity  of  any  other  portion  thereof 
which  can  be  given  effect  without  such  invalid  part. 

§  35.  That  an  Act  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of 
the  State  of  Illinois  by  providing  compensation  for  acci- 
dental injuries  or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employ- 
ment, approved  June  10,  1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912,  be, 
and  the  same  is,  hereby  repealed. 


S351 


TABLE  OF  COMPENSATION. 


To  find  the  present  value  of  any  sum  payable  weekly, 
multiply  that  sum  by  the  present  value  of  $1  payable  for 
thfi  number  of  weeks  for  which  such  sum  is  payable. 

Example. — To  find  the  present  value  of  $7.20  payable 
at  end  of  each  week  for  100  weeks  multiply  $7.20  by 
the  present  value  of  $1  payable  weekly  for  100 
weeks  (shown  in  the  tables  to  be  $97.1833). 
$7.20  X  97.1833  —  $699.72,  present  value. 


32 


THE  ACT 


PRESENT  VALUE  TABLES. 

Present  value  at  3  per  cent.,  compounded  annually  at 
$1  per  Week,  payable  at  the  end  of  each  week,  for  any 
term  from  one  week  up  to  eight  years. 


Term  —  weeks 

0  years 

1  year 
and  — 
weeks 

2  years 
and 
—  weeks 

3  years 
and 
—  weeks 

4  years 
and 
—  weeks 

5  years 
and 
—  weeks 

6  years 
and 
—  weeks 

7  years 
and 
—  weeks 

One 

O't'.i'M 

52.1947 

101.8989 

150.1554 

Mi7.oor.-J 

242.4928 

286.0543 

329.5296 

Two  

1.9983 

53.1645 

102.8405 

151.0695 

197.8930 

243.3544 

287.4908 

330.3417 

Three   

2.MM 

54.1337 

103.7814 

151.0881 

198.7808 

244.2155 

288.3200 

331.1534 

Four  

3.9943 

55.1024 

104.7219 

152.8962 

199.6673 

245.0762 

289.1625 

331.9647 

Five  

4.9915 

56.0705 

105.6618 

153.8087 

200.5533 

245.9364 

289.9976 

332.7755 

Six          

5J681 

.-•7.03S1 

106.6012 

154.7207 

201.4387 

246.7900 

290.8322 

333.5858 

Seven  

&9841 

58.0051 

107.5401 

155.6323 

202.3237 

247.6552 

29i.fir,04 

334.3957 

Eight  

7.9796 

58.9716 

108.4784 

156.5432 

203.2082 

248.5139 

292.  .'001 

335.2051 

Nine  
Ten  
Eleven  

8.9745 

•i.'ir.ss 
10.9026 

59.9375 
60.9029 
61.8677 

109.4162 
110.3534 
111.2901 

157.4537 
158.3637 
159.2731 

204.0921 
204.9756 
205.8585 

249.3721 
250.2298 
251.0871 

293.3333 

294.Ui<;<) 
294.9983 

336.0140 

330.8225 
337.6305 

Twelve      

11.9558 

62.8320 

112.2263 

160.18:0 

206.7410 

251.9438 

295.8301 

338.4381 

Thirteen  

12.9484 

63.7957 

113.1620 

161.0904 

207.6229 

252.8001 

290.0014 

339.2452 

Fourteen  

13.9405 

f.4.7.r.S'.» 

114.0971 

161.9983 

208.5043 

253.6558 

297.4922 

340.0518 

Fifteen  

14.9320 

65.7215 

115.0317 

162.9057 

209.3853 

254.5111 

uiis.3220 

340.8580 

Sixteen  

15.9229 

66.6836 

115.9658 

163.8125 

210.2657 

255.3659 

299.1525 

341.6637 

Seventeen  

16.9133 

67.6451 

116.8993 

164.7189 

211.1457 

256.2202 

299.0819 

342.4690 

Eighteen  

17.9031 

68.0061 

117.8323 

165.6247 

212.0251 

257.0741 

300.8109 

343.2738 

Nineteen  

18.8924 

69.5666 

118.7648 

166.5300 

21.2.9041 

257.9274 

301.6394 

344.0782 

Twenty  

I'.t.SSll 

70.5265 

119.6967 

167.4348 

213.7825 

258.7803 

302.4674 

344.8821 

Twenty-one   

L'O  Sf.92 

71.4858 

120.6281 

1C8.3391 

214.6605 

2.V.U1320 

303.2949 

34.-..C855 

Twenty-two  

21.8568 

72.4446 

121.5590 

169.2429 

215.5379 

200.4845 

304.1220 

346.4885 

Twenty-three 

22  X43S 

73  4029 

122.4894 

170.1461 

216.4148 

261.3359 

304.9486 

347.2911 

Twenty-four  

23  s:«>3 

74.3000 

123.4192 

171.9489 

217.2913 

262.1868 

305.7748 

348.0931 

Twenty-five  
Twenty-six  
Twenty-seven 

24.8161 
25.8015 

2'1.  7X''.2 

75.3178 
76.2744 
77.2305 

124.348.5 
125.2772 
126  2055 

171.6511 
172.8528 
173.7540 

218.1672 
219.0427 
219.9176 

263.0373 
203.8872 
264.7367 

300.0004 
307.4256 
308.2504 

348.8947 
349.0959 
350.4966 

Twenty-eight  

27.7705 

7S  IXMI 

127.1332 

174.6547 

220.7921 

268.5867 

309.0740 

351.2969 

Twenty-nine  

28.7541 

79.1410 

128.0004 

175.5549 

221.6661 

260.4342 

300.8984 

352.0967 

Thirty".  

29.7372 

XO.O'.l.V, 

128.9870 

176.4546 

222.5395 

267.2822 

310.7217 

352.8960 

Thirty-one  

30.7197 

81  0494 

129  9132 

177.3537 

223.4125 

268.1298 

311.5446 

353.6949 

Thirty-two  

31.7017 

82.0028 

130.8388 

178.2524 

224.2850 

208.9768 

312.3670 

354.4933 

Thirty-three  

:!2.r,K3i 

S2.'.I.V,li 

131.7638 

179.1505 

225.1569 

269.8234 

313.1889 

355.2913 

Thirty-four  

33.6640 

S3  .9079 

132.6884 

180.0481 

226.0248 

270.6695 

314.0103 

356.0888 

Thirty-five     

34.6443 

xi  X.V.H; 

133.6124 

180.9452 

226.8994 

271.5151 

314.8313 

3.r,o.8S59 

Thirty-six  

35.6240 

x:,  sio'.i 

134.5359 

181.8418 

227.7699 

272.3003 

315.6519 

357.6825 

3ii  r,032 

86  7615 

135  4589 

182.7379 

228.6399 

273.2049 

316.4719 

358.4787 

Thirty-eight.  .  . 

37  '.sis 

87  7116 

136  3814 

183.6335 

229.5094 

274.0491 

317.2915 

359.2744 

Thirty-nine  

3s  r,:,w 

xs  »;ti  12 

137.3033 

1X4  .VJSO 

230.3784 

274.8928 

318.1106 

300.0097 

Forty  

39.5374 

X'.i  r,io3 

138.2247 

185.4232 

231.2409 

275.7360 

318.9293 

3fiO.S64.-i 

Forty-one. 

40.5144 

'10  ••:,sx 

139.1456 

186.3172 

232.1149 

276.5787 

319,7475 

361.6589 

Forty-two  

41  4'.IOX 

'.U  MltlX 

140  0659 

187.2108 

232.9825 

277.4210 

320.5652 

302.4528 

Forty-three  

4J  4».'',7 

92  4.542 

140  <'8:,K 

188.1038 

233.8495 

278.2628 

«2  1.3825 

363.2462 

Forty-four  

43  14-.'0 

93  4011 

141.9051 

188.9964 

234.7160 

279.1041 

322.199:', 

364.0392 

Forty-five.  .    . 

44  4167 

'.14  3474 

142  8239 

IX1.  »  xxxi 

235.5821 

279.9449 

323.0156 

364.8318 

Forty-six  

4.'>  3'.»fr.t 

95  2933 

143  7421 

190  7799 

236.4476 

2S0.7S.V.' 

323.8315 

305.6239 

Forty-seven  

4'".  :i''.4."p 

96  2385 

144.6599 

191.6709 

237.3127 

281.6251 

324.6409 

306.4156 

Forty-eitht 

47  3376 

97  1833 

145  5771 

192.5714 

238.1773 

282.4645 

325.4618 

367.2068 

Forty-nine  .  . 

4S  3101 

9X  127", 

146  4938 

193.4514 

239.0414 

283.3034 

320.2763 

367.9975 

Fifty  

49  2821 

99  0711 

147  4100 

194.3409 

239.9049 

284.1419 

327.0903 

368.7878 

Fifty-one  

;V)  2."i3f 

UK)  01  43 

148.3257 

195.2299 

240.7080 

284.9788 

327.9039 

369.5777 

Fifty-two  

51.2244 

100.9569 

14'  1.2408 

196.1184 

241.6307 

285.8173 

328.7169 

370.3671 

THE  ACT 


33 


PRESENT    VALUE    TABLES— Continued. 

Present  value  at  3  per  cent,  compounded  annually,  of  $1 
semi-monthly  payable  at  the  end  of  each  half  month,  for 
any  term  from  one-half  month  up  to  eight  years. 

(For  method  of  computation,  see  example  given  under 
weekly  table.) 


Term-half 
Months 

0  years 

1  year 
and  — 
Months 

2  years 
and  — 
Months 

3  years 
and  — 
Months 

4  years 
and  — 
Months 

5  years 
and  — 
Months 

6  years 
and  — 
Months 

7  years 
and  — 
Months 

One-half  

.9978 

24.6020 

47.5272 

69.7927 

91.4194 

112.4242 

132.8254 

152.6394 

One  

1.9962 

25.5705 

48.4676 

70.7058 

92.3060 

113.2850 

133.6611 

153.4509 

One  and  one-half  .  .  . 
Two  

2.9925 
3.9875 

26.5378 
27.5040 

49.4068 
50.3450 

71.6178 
72.5288 

93.1915 
94.0761 

114.1449 
115.0038 

134.4961 
135.3301 

154.2616 
155.0714 

Two  and  one-half  .  . 
Three  

4.9812 
5.9738 

28.4090 
29.4329 

51.2821 
52.2172 

73.4388 
74.3477 

94.9597 
95.8423 

115.8619 
116.7190 

136.1633 
136.9956 

155.8805 
156.6887 

Three  and  one-half 
Four  

6.9651 
7.9552 

30.3956 
31.3571 

53.1520 
54.0858 

75.2556 
76.1624 

96.7240 
97.6047 

117.5752 
118.4305 

137.8270 
138.6576 

157.4961 
158.3027 

Four  and  one-half  .  . 
Five  

8.9441 
9.9317 

32.3175 
33.2767 

55.0186 
55.9502 

77.0683 
77.9731 

98.4844 
99.3631 

119.2848 
120.1383 

139.4873 
140.3162 

159.1085 
159.9134 

Five  and  one-half  .  . 
Six  

10.9182 
11.9034 

34.2348 
35.1917 

56.8807 
57.8102 

78.8769 
79.7796 

100.2409 
101.1177 

120.9908 
121.8425 

141.1442 
141.9713 

160.7176 
161.5210 

Six  and  one-half  .  .  . 
Seven  

12.8874 
13.8702 

36.1475 
37.1022 

58.7385 
59.6658 

80.6814 
81.5821 

101.9936 
102  8685 

122.6932 
123  5430 

142.7976 
143.6231 

162.3235 
163.1252 

Seven  and  one-half. 
Eight  

14.8517 
15.8321 

38.0557 
39.0081 

60.5921 
61.5172 

82.4818 
83.3806 

103.7424 
104.6154 

124.3920 
125.2400 

144.4477 
145.2714 

163.9262 
164.7263 

Eight  and  one-half  . 
Nine  

16.8113 
17.7893 

39.9593 
40.9094 

62.4413 
63.3643 

84.2783 
85.1750 

105.4875 
106.3585 

126.0871 
126.9334 

146.0943 
146.9163 

165.5257 
166.3242 

Nine  and  one-half.  . 
Ten  

18.7661 
19.7417 

41.8584 
42.8063 

64.2863 
65.2071 

86.0706 
86.9653 

107.2287 
108.0979 

127.7787 
128.6231 

147.7375 
148.5579 

167.1219 
167.9189 

Ten  and  one-half  .  .  . 
Eleven  

20.7161 
21.6894 

43.7530 

44.6986 

66.1270 
67.0457 

87.8590 
88.7517 

108.9661 
109  8334 

129.4667 
130.3094 

149.3774 
150.1961 

168.7150 
169.5104 

Eleven  and  one-half 
Twelve  

22.6614 
23.6323 

45.6431 

46.5857 

67.9635 
68.8786 

89.6434 
90.5319 

110.G998 
111.5625 

131.1512 
131.9887 

151.0139 
151.8271 

170.3050 

171.0944 

WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT. 


SCOPE. 

The  theory  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
is  that  the  question  of  compensation  for  injuries  of 
an  employee  shall  be  adjusted  speedily  through  the 
Industrial  Commission.  Central  Illinois  Public  Ser- 
vice Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  62,  66;  127 
N.  E.  80. 

By  the  Act,  the  legislature  intended  to  make  pro- 
vision for  a  speedy  disposition  and  settlement  of  the 
claim  of  the  injured  employee  and  the  Act  should  re- 
ceive a  liberal  construction  to  accomplish  that  pur- 
pose. Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  233,  239 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  takes  away 
the  cause  of  action  on  the  one  hand  and  the  ground 
of  defense  on  the  other  hand  and  merges  both  in  a 
statutory  indemnity  fixed  and  certain.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  176;  125 
N.  E.  748. 

The  Act  evidently  is  intended  as  a  settlement  of  a 
difficult  problem,  affecting  one  of  the  most  important 
of  social  relations  and  is  to  be  judged  in  its  en- 
tirety. G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  167,  174;  125  N.  E.  748. 

The  whole  doctrine  of  employer 's  liability  for  neg- 
ligence with  its  defenses  of  contributory  negligence, 
fellow  servants'  negligence  and  assumption  of  risk 

(35) 


36  SCOPE 

is  based  upon  fiction  and  is  inapplicable  to  modern 
conditions  of  employment.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167, 173;  125  N.  E.  748. 

The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  sets  aside  one 
body  of  rules  to  establish  another  system  in  its 
place.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  167,  174;  125  N.  E.  748. 

The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  takes  away  the 
cause  of  action  and  the  ground  of  defense  and 
merges  both  in  a  statutory  indemnity,  fixed  and  cer- 
tain. G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  167, 176;  125  N.  E.  748. 

The  modern  tendency  is  to  compensate  for  loss  of 
earning  power,  such  a  loss  stands  to  the  employee 
as  his  capital  in  trade.  His  loss  arises  out  of  the 
business  in  which  he  is  employed  and  this  is  an  ex- 
pense of  the  operation  just  as  the  cost  of  repairing 
broken  machinery  or  any  other  expense  that  ordi- 
narily is  paid  by  the  employer,  and  the  business 
should  bear  this  charge.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167,  174;  125  N.  E.  748. 

The  statute  under  consideration  sets  aside  one 
body  of  rules  to  establish  another  system  in  its  place. 
The  employee  or  his  personal  representative  is  no 
longer  able  to  recover  as  much  as  before  in  case  of 
an  injury  growing  out  of  the  employer's  negligence 
but  is  entitled  to  moderate  compensation  in  all  cases 
of  injury,  and  has  a  certain  and  speedy  remedy  with- 
out the  difficulty  and  expense  of  establishing  negli- 
gence or  proving  the  amount  of  damages.  G.  T.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167, 174 ; 
125  N.  E.  748. 


CONSTITUTIONALITY  37 


CONSTITUTIONALITY. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  declare  a  law  consti- 
tutional, regardless  of  how  desirable  or  beneficial  the 
legislation  is,  if  no  constitutional  limitation  has  been 
violated.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  167, 172;  125  N.  E.  748. 

Where  it  was  claimed  that  Section  2,  of  the  1915 
Act  was  unconstitutional,  it  was  held  that  the 
constitutional  question  had  already  been  decided  ad- 
versely to  the  party  claiming  its  invalidity  in  an- 
other case.  Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  353,  354;  124  N.  E.  552. 

The  scheme  of  the  Act  is  so  wide  a  departure  from 
the  common  law  standards  respecting  responsibility 
of  employer  to  employee  that  doubts  naturally  arise 
respecting  its  constitutional  validity.  G.  T.  W.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  173; 
125  N.  E.  748.  See  also:  Thornton  v.  Duffy  (Oh.) 
124  N.  E.  54. 

Foundation  on  Police  Power. 

The  test  of  the  validity  of  a  law  which  creates  lia- 
bility without  fault  and  under  which  the  property  of 
one  is  taken  without  compensation  to  pay  the  obliga- 
tions of  another  is  not  whether  it  does  objectionable 
things,  but  whether  there  is  any  reasonable  ground 
to  believe  that  the  public  safety,  health  or  general 
welfare  is  promoted  thereby.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  175;  125  N.  E. 
748. 


38  FOUNDATION  ON  POLICE  POWER 

9  The  public  has  a  direct  interest  in  respect  to  com- 
pensation for  human  life  lost  or  disability  incurred 
in  the  course  of  a  hazardous  employment  and  for 
that  reason,  it  is  proper  to  restrict  the  right  to 
contract  with  reference  to  this  subject  matter,  as  it 
affects  the  common  welfare.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167,  177 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

9  Under  the  police  power  the  legislature  exercises 
supervision  over  matters  affecting  the  common  weal 
and  enforces  the  observance  of  duties  of  members  of 
society  to  each  other  and  to  the  community  at  large 
and  prescribes  regulations  promoting  the  health, 
peace,  morals,  education  and  good  order  of  the  peo- 
ple and  legislates  so  as  to  increase  the  industries  of 
the  state,  develop  its  resources  and  add  to  its  wel- 
fare and  prosperity.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  167,  175 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

9  The  police  power  under  which  reasonable  regula- 
tions touching  the  health  and  safety  of  employees 
are  made,  is  a  power  inherent  in  every  sovereignty. 
G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
167, 175;  125  N.E.  748. 

Due  Process. 

9  The  legislature  has  the  power  to  bring  extra-haz- 
ardous employments  under  the  act  without  election, 
and  the  act  is  not  subject  to  the  objection  that  the 
employer  is  deprived  of  his  property  without  due 
process  of  law.     G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  167,  176;  125  N.  E.  748. 

Class  Legislation. 

10  The  question,  what  classes  of  persons  shall  be  en- 
173  titled  to  the  benefits  of  the  Act  is  legislative,  and  if 


CONSTITUTIONALITY— TRIAL  BY  JURY  39 

it  should  be  deemed  wise  to  include  officers  while 
performing  duties  beyond  the  scope  of  the  usual 
duties  of  an  officer,  such  a  provision  is  not  for  the 
courts  but  for  the  General  Assembly.  City  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  23,  27;  125 
N. E.  705. 

The  Right  to  Trial  by  Jury. 

12  As  the  right  of  jury  trial  is  incidental  to  a  right  of 
action,  to  destroy  the  latter,  is  to  leave  the  former 
nothing  upon  which  to  operate.  G.  T.  W.  E.  R.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  176;  125  N.  E. 

748. 

12  The    constitutional   provision   guaranteeing   that 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain  inviolate, 
guarantees  that  right  only  to  causes  of  action  rec- 
ognized by  law.     G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  167,  176 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

Delegation  of  Judicial  Powers. 

13  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  is  automatic 
in  practical  working  and  it  delegates  no  judicial 
powers  to  the  Commission.    G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167, 176 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

Impairment  of  Right  of  Contract. 

13  The  authority  of  the  State  to  prohibit  contracts 
made  in  derogation  of  a  lawfully  established  policy 
of  the  state  repecting  compensation  for  accidental 
death  or  disabling  personal  injury  is  perfectly  clear. 
G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
167, 177 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

20  The  legislature  under  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the 
police  power  of  the  State  may  limit  the  freedom  of 


40  SCOPE  OF  LEGISLATIVE   ENACTMENT 

the  employer  and  employee  relative  to  contracts 
without  being  in  violation  of  the  constitution.  G.  T. 
W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167, 
177;  125  N.  E.  748. 


SCOPE  OF  LEGISLATIVE  ENACTMENT. 

21  The  legislature  is  without  restriction  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  power,  except  as  restrictions  are  imposed 
by  the  Constitution.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  167,  172 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 

As  to  Regulating  Practice. 

21  The  liability  for  death  caused  by  wrongful  act 
both  within  and  without  the  relation  of  employer  and 
employee  is  a  modern  stautory  innovation,  the 
legislature  may  modify  this  right  of  action,  extend 
it  or  limit  it  or  even  abolish  it  altogether.  G.  T.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  173 ; 
125  N.  E.  748. 

Interpretation  of  Legislative  Intention. 

23  Although  an  injury  is  serious  and  claimant  should 
receive  the  full  amount  that  he  is  entitled  to  under 
the  law,  yet  the  courts  must  construe  the  laws  as  it 
finds  them.  Ballou  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111. 
434,  437;  129  N.  E.  755. 

23  The  reasoning  of  the  court,  in  construing  other 
provisions  of  the  Act,  supports  the  giving  of  a 
liberal  construction  to  the  Act,  in  order  to  accomplish 
the  legislative  intention.  Illinois  Indemnity  Ex- 
change v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  239; 
124  N.  E.  665. 


STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION  41 


STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION. 

24  The  courts  should  always  construe  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  liberally  in  favor  of  the  employee, 
but  it  can  not  create  a  liability,  where  the  law  cre- 
ates none  and  they  are  not  authorized  to  hold  an 
employer  where  the  accident  did  not  arise  out  of  the 
employment.     Morris  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  49,  53 ;  128  N.  E.  727. 

25  Craig  v.  Royal  Insurance  Co.,  8  B.  W.  C.  C.  339, 
discussed  and  pointed  out  that  the  provision  in  the 
English  Act  is  more  analogous  to  Section  31  of  the 
Illinois  Act  than  Section  28.    Illinois  Indemnity  Ex- 
change v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  239; 
124  N.  E.  665. 

25  The  construction  placed  upon  an  Act  worded  dif- 
ferently than  the  Illinois  Act  will  not  be  followed 
where  the  foreign  Act  is  different  from  the  Illinois 
Act.  IHinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  233,  239;  124  N.  E.  665. 

25  The  Act  in  force  in  British  Columbia  not  followed 
by  the  Court  in  construing  a  question  of  jurisdiction. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange. v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  239 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

27  The  court  should  construe  the  act  reasonably,  so 
436  that  each  part  of  it  will  be  given  effect,  and,  the  only 
way  that  it  can  be  given  effect,  is  to  construe  it  to 
mean  that  in  case  of  the  employer's  insolvency,  the 
insurance  company  can  be  substituted  and  required 
to  make  the  payments  to  the  employee  provided  for 
by  the  Act  and  require  it  to  pay  to  the  employee  in 
installments  as  required  by  the  Act.  Illinois  Indem- 


42  STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION 

nlty  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
233,238;  124  N.  E.  665. 

29  The  words  of  a  statute  will  be  construed  in  their 
ordinary  sense  and  with  the  meaning  ordinarily 
attributed  to  them.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  561,  569 ;  126  N.  E.  579. 

29  It  is  well  settled  that  in  construing  any  statute 
all  the  language  shall  be  considered  and  such  inter- 
pretation placed  upon  any  word  or  phrase  appear- 
ing therein  as  was  within  the  manifest  intention 
of  the  body  which  enacted  the  law.  Clark  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  569;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

29  The  extent  of  the  modification  of  the  statute  from 
the  common  law  in  its  attitude  towards  children 
born  out  of  wedlock  is  a  question  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  legislative  department  and  not  for  the 
courts.  Murrell  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
334,  337 ;  126  N.  E.  189. 

31  Statutes  will  not  be  construed  so  as  to  give  them 
a  retrospective  operation,  yet  when  the  change 
affects  the  remedy  or  procedure,  all  rights  of  action 
are  enforcible  under  the  new  procedure.  City  of 
Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409,  411; 
127  N.  E.  46. 

31  Statutes  will  not  be  construed  so  as  to  give  them 
retrospective  effect  unless  it  clearly  appears  that 
such  was  the  intent  of  the  legislature.  City  of  Chi- 
ccuin  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409,  411; 
127  N.  E.  46. 

31  Where  the  wording  of  a  statute  is  clear  and 
admits  of  but  one  interpretation,  there  is  no  need 
or  occasion  for  construction  of  a  statute  and  the 
court  will  give  effect  to  its  plain  meaning.  (Illinois 


STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION  43 

Electric  Co.  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  282  111.  468;  People 
v.  Stewart,  281  111.  365;  Wall  v.  Pfanschmidt,  265 
111.  180;  Caminetti  v.  U.  S.,  242  U.  S.  470.)  Clark 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  569;  126 
N.  E.  579. 

32  The  Act  is  a  humane  law  of  a  remedial  nature,  and 
wherever  construction  is  permissible  its  language 
should  be  liberally  construed.  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  23,  27;  125  N.  E.- 
705. 

32  The  intention  of  the  legislature  in  construing  this 
statute  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  necessity  or 
reason  of  the  enactment  and  the  meaning  of  the 
words,  enlarged  or  restricted  according  to  such 
intention  as  ascertained  from  a  consideration  of 
the  whole  act.  (Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Board,  282  111.  136.)  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539,  544;  127  N.  E. 
676. 

32  Generally,  statutes  operate  in  the  future,  only, 
and  do  not  affect  past  transactions.  A  retrospective 
effect  will  not  be  given  unless  the  intention  of  the 
legislature  is  clear.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  141,  143 ;  128  N.  E.  917. 

32  Section  4  of  law  on  statutes  construed  and  applied 
to  the  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act  and  the  section 
construed  as  not  applying  retrospectively  to  pend- 
ing claims  or  actions.  (Merlo  v.  Johnston  City  Coal 
Co.,  258  111.  328.)  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  141,  144;  128  N.  E.  917. 

32  The  words  of  a  statute  will  be  construed  in  their 
ordinary  sense  and  with  the  meaning  commonly 
attributed  to  them  under  such  construction,  unless 


44  STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION 

such  construction  will  defeat  the  manifest  intention 
of  the  legislature.  Murrell  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  334,  336;  126  N.  E.  189. 

32  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  must  receive 
a  liberal  construction  so  that  its  beneficent  intent 
and  purpose  may  be  reasonably  accomplished. 
United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  'Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

32  The  remedial  nature  of  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Act  and  its  beneficent  purpose  should  be  given 
due  weight  in  its  construction,  but  its  purpose  can 
only  be  realized  by  even-handed  justice  to  both 
employer  and  employed,  so  that  one  shall  receive 
that  to  which  he  is  entitled  and  the  other  one  shall 
pay  no  more.  Decatur  Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  290,  293;  129  N.  E.  738. 

32  A  liberal  interpretation  should  be  given  in  com- 
pensation cases,  but  such  interpretation  should  not 
go  to  the  extent  of  becoming  absurd.  McMorran  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  569,  571 ;  125  N.  E. 
284. 

32  The  court  will  not  place  a  construction  on  a  reme- 
dial act  which  will  deprive  it  of  all  practical  effect. 
For  this  is  not  in  keeping  with  the  intention  of  the 
Legislature.  Juerfjens  Bros.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  420,  423;  125  N.  E.  337. 

32  The  application  of  compensation  laws  should  not 
be  made  to  depend  upon  fine-spun  theories  based 
upon  scientific  technicalities.  Such  laws  should  be 
given  a  practical  construction  and  application. 
Juergens  Bros.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  420,423;  125  N.  E.  337. 


MISCELLANEOUS  INTERPRETATIONS        45 


PRESUMPTIONS. 

33  All  presumptions  are  in  favor  of  the  validity  of 
a  statute,  and  in  doubtful  cases  the  doubt  is  resolved 
in  favor  of  the  law.  The  motive  or  the  wisdom  of 
the  legislature  is  never  questioned,  unless  the  re- 
striction imposed  by  the  fundamental  law  has  been 
violated.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  167,  172 ;  125  N.  E.  748. 


MISCELLANEOUS  INTERPRETATIONS. 

34  Chapter  131  provides  that  all  phrases  and  expres- 
sions in  the  statute  shall  be  liberally  construed  in 
order  that  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  the  legis- 
lature may  be  fully  carried  out.  Clark  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  561,  569;  126  N.  E.  579. 


COMMON   LAW   RIGHTS    AS    AFFECTED    BY 
THE  ACT. 

35  The  courts  have  repeatedly  upheld  the  authority 
of  the  legislature  to  establish  departures  from  the 
common  law  rule  affecting  the  employer's  right  for 
personal  injuries  to  the  employee.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  174;  125 
N.  E.  748. 

35  The  matter  of  liability  for  death  is  a  modern 
statutory  innovation,  which  the  legislature  may 
modify  and  no  person  has  a  vested  interest  in  any 
rule  of  law,  entitling  him  to  insist  that  it  shall  not 


46  EXTRA-TERRITORIAL  EFFECT 

be  changed.    G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  167,  173;  125  N.  E.  748. 

35  No  person  has  a  vested  interest  in  any  rule  of 
law  entitling  him  to  insist  that  it  shall  remain  un- 
changed for  his  benefit.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  167,  173;  125  N.  E.  748. 

35  The  entire  matter  of  liability  for  death  caused 
by  wrongful  act  both  within  and  without  the  relation 
of  employer  and  employee  is  a  modern  statutory 
innovation.  Grand  Trunk  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167,  173;  125  N.  E.  748. 

35  The  employer  is  left  without  defense  respecting 
the  question  of  fault,  but  he  is  at  the  same  time 
assured  that  the  recovery  is  limited  and  that  it  goes 
directly  to  the  relief  of  the  designated  beneficiaries, 
and  just  as  the  employee's  assumption  of  ordinary 
risk  at  common  law  presumably  was  taken  into  ac- 
count in  fixing  the  rate  of  wages,  so  the  fixed  respon- 
sibility of  the  employer  will  be  reflected  in  the  wage 
scale.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  167,  174;  125  N.  E.  748. 

Extra-Territorial  Effect. 

39  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  has  no  effect 
beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State.  Union 
Bridge  &  Construction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
287  111.  396.  The  Indiana,  Michigan  and  Wisconsin 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  have  been  construed 
by  the  Commissions  and  the  Courts  in  these  states 
that  the  employee  must  seek  his  remedy  in  the  forum 
where  the  contract  of  employment  is  made.  Ha<i<'u- 
beck  v.  Randall,  (Ind.)  126  N.  E.  501  and  504.'  In 
some  instances  this  leaves  an  employee  without  a 
remedy.  A  contract  of  employment  may  be  entered 


EXTRA-TERRITORIAL  EFFECT  47 

into  in  Illinois  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment 
such  employee  may  be  sent  into  the  State  of  Indiana, 
where  he  sustains  accidental  injuries.  The  Indiana 
Commission  in  such  case  refuses  to  assume  juris- 
diction for  the  reason  that  the  contract  was  not 
entered  into  in  Indiana  and  remits  the  applicant 
to  his  remedy  in  Illinois.  The  Illinois  Commission 
can  not,  under  the  decision  in  Union  Bridge  &  Con- 
struction Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  (supra), 
assume  jurisdiction  and  enter  an  award,  because 
the  act  has  no  force  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of 
the  state. 

Conversely,  where  an  employee  enters  into  a  con- 
tract of  employment  in  the  State  of  Wisconsin  and 
is  injured  in  Illinois,  both  Commissions  claim  to 
have  jurisdiction.  The  contract  having  been  made 
in  Wisconsin,  that  state  claims  the  employee  should 
be  paid  compensation  in  accordance  with  the  terms 
of  the  Wisconsin  Act.  The  Illinois'!  Commission 
claims  to  have  jurisdiction  because  the  accident 
happened  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  State. 
In  a  case,  such  as  this,  the  employer  is  in  a  dilemma. 
If  a  settlement  is  made  in  accordance  with  the 
directions  of  the  Wisconsin  Commission  without 
obtaining  the  approval  of  the  Illinois  Commission, 
under  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  case  of  International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  524,  he  may  be  required  to  pay  the  employee 
compensation  under  the  provisions  of  the  Illinois 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  a  second  time  for 
the  same  injury.  The  same  situation  might  arise 
with  reference  to  a  settlement  made  in  Illinois.  So, 
too,  the  employer,  in  complying  with  the  laws  of 
Wisconsin,  might  find  himself  committing  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Illinois  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 


48  SEC.  1— LIABILITY 

for  which  he  would  be  subject  to  a  fine.  In  such  a 
case,  the  employer  is  impaled  on  the  two  horns  of 
the  dilemma. 

As  to  the  effect  of  the  New  Jersey  Compensation 
Act  in  the  state  of  New  York,  see  Barnhart  v.  Amer- 
ican Concrete  Steel  (N.  Y.),  125  N.  E.  675. 

SECTION  1. 

40  That  an  employer  in  this  State,  who  does  not  come  within  the 

classes  enumerated  by  section  three  (3)  of  this  Act,  may  elect 
to  proride  and  pay  compensation  for  accidental  Injuries  sus- 
tained by  any  employee  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  thereby 
rellere  himself  from  any  liability  for  the  recorery  of  damages, 
except  as  herein  provided. 

Liability. 

42  Where  the  cursing  and  abuse  of  an  employee 
toward  another  is  not  in  respect  to  anything  being 
done  at  the  time,  as  a  result  of  which  he  is  assaulted, 
there  is  no  liability  on  the  part  of  the  employer. 
Marion  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292  111.  463,  466;  127  N.  E.  84. 

42  There  is  a  line  beyond  which  the  liability  of  the 
employer  can  not  continue,  and  the  question  where 
that  line  is  to  be  drawn  has  been  held  to  be  usually 
one  of  fact.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 294  111.  119,  123;  128  N.  E.  290. 

42  Where  an  employee  is  injured  in  an  employment 
different  from  that  which  he  was  originally  hired 
to  perform,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  the  element 
of  knowledge  or  acquiesence  or  whether  a  known 
custom  on  the  part  of  the  employer  exists,  in  order 
to  determine  liability.  Sunnyside  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  523,  526;  126  N.  E.  196. 


SBC.  1— LIABILITY  49 

43  "Where  employee  was  injured  through  horse-play 
with  an  air-hose  and  it  was  not  shown  that  there 
was  any  knowledge  or  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  the 
employer  and  that  the  hose  was  kept  in  a  place 
which  would  guard  against  danger,  the  employer  is 
not  liable.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111.  388,  394;  129  N.  E.  122. 

43  Where  an  employee  is  doing  something  not  re- 
quired in  his  employment  or  the  work  he  was  hired 
to  perform,  employer's  knowledge  of  existing  cus- 
tom must  be  shown  to  sustain  award.  (Sunny side 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  523.) 
Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  388,  393; 
129  N.  E.  122. 

43  Where  employee  was  killed  through  horse-play 
with  an  air-hose  and  the  employer  did  not  know  that 
the  hose  was  used  for  sky-larking  and  there  was 
no  reason  for  supposing  that  the  employer  might 
anticipate  that  the  hose  would  be  put  to  such  use, 
he  is  not  liable  for  the  injury.  Payne  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  388,  393;  129  N.  E.  122. 

43  Knowledge  of  the  foreman  that  an  employee  is 
working  at  a  forming  press  might  make  employer 
liable  for  an  accident  at  this  machine,  but  it  does 
not  fix  a  liability  for  work  at  a  cutting  machine 
where  the  foreman  had  no  knowledge  of  his  working 
there.  Henry  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  491, 
493;  127  N.  E.  714. 

43  There  must  be  a  line  beyond  which  the  liability 
of  the  employer  cannot  continue  (and  this  would 
apply  to  the  beginning  of  the  employee's  work  as 
well  as  to  the  ending).  Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  90,  93;  126  N.  E.  566. 


60         SEC.   1— "MAY  ELECT  TO  PROVIDE  AND  PAY" 

43  The  employer  who  comes  within  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  is  not  an  insurer  of  the  safety  of  the 
employee;  he  is  liable   only  for   an  injury  which 
occurs  to  the  employee  while  performing  some  act 
for  the  employer  in  the  course  of  his  employment 
and  incidental  to  it.    Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  284,  287;  127  N.  E.  732. 

44  A  declaration  which  contained  no  averment  that 
the  employer  or  employee  was  affected  by  the  Com- 
pensation Act  but  which  contained  an  averment  that 
the  employer  had  elected  not  to  be  bound  by  the 
Act,  does  not  permit  the  taking  of  evidence  showing 
that   the   parties   were   operating  under   the   Act. 
O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140,  146; 
127  N.  E.  389. 

"May  Elect  to  Proyide  and  Pay  Compensation." 

44  Employers  or  employees  who  have  elected  to  be 
bound  by  the  act,  or  who  by  reason  of  occupation 
are  presumed  to  have  so  elected,  are  affected  by 
the  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act.  0  'Brien  v.  Chi- 
cago City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140;  127  N.  E.  389. 

46  Where  the  employer  contended  that  there  was  no 
liability  on  account  of  failure  to  comply  with  the 
act,  but  it  was  agreed  to  do  something  for  the  em- 
ployee, payments  made  without'  reference  to  the 
Compensation  Act  did  not  bring  the  employer  under 
the  act.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  461,  466;  127  N.  E.  743. 

44      Where  partners  were  engaged  in  the  business  of 
134  buying  and  selling  horses  they  would  not  be  under 
322  the  act ;  but  where  they  wrote  a  letter  accepting  the 
act,  carried  insurance  and  made  a  settlement  ap- 
proved by  the  Commission,  there  was  evidence  to 


SEC.  1— "ACCIDENTAL  INJURIES"  51 

justify  the  finding  of  the  Commission  that  they  were 
under  the  Act.  Ellsworth  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  514;  125  N.  E.  246. 

46  The  subject  of  compensation  for  the  injuries  to 
employees  is  of  statutory  origin,  and  all  proceedings 
thereunder  are  purely  statutory.      Central  Illinois 
Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
62,  66;  127  N.  E.  80. 

"Accidental  Injuries." 

47  An  injury  is  accidental  if  it  occurs  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  unexpectedly  and  without  the 
affirmative   design  or  act  of  the   employee.     Steel 
Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  435, 
441;  127  N.  E.  698. 

47  The  term  "accidental  injury"  means  a  bodily 
injury  by  accident,  but  in  the  great  variety  of  cases 
which  the  courts  are  called  upon  to  review  it  is 
frequently  difficult  to  make  its  application.  (Pekin 
Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  285  111. 
31.)  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298 
111.  463,  465;  131  N.E.  649. 

47  The  injury  to  be  accidental  must  be  traceable  to 
a  definite  time,  place  and  cause.  Steel  Sales  Corp. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  435,  441 ;  127  N.  E. 
698. 

47  Where  doctors  testify  that  the  accident  did  not 
produce  the  nephritis ;  that  there  was  no  causal  con- 
nection between  the  fall  from  the  wagon  and  the 
death  of  the  employee;  and  that  the  accident  could 
not  produce  the  condition  from  which  the  employee 
died,  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  upon  which 
an  award  could  be  made.  Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  175;  131  N.  E. 
369. 


52  SEC.  1— DEFINITION  OF  ACCIDENT 

Definition  of  Accident. 

48  It  is  not  intended  and  not  possible  to  give  a  defi- 
nition of  the  words  used  in  the  act  as  applied  to  all 
possible  circumstances.  Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  435,  441;  127  N'.  E.  698. 

48  The  words  "accident"  and  "accidental  injury" 
defined  and  the  rule  laid  down  in  Matthiessen  & 
Hegeler  Zinc  Co.  case,  284  111.  378,  approved.  Chi- 
cago Rawhide  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  616,  620;  126  N.  E.  616. 

48  Anything  that  happens  without  design  is  com- 
monly called  an  "accident,"  and,  at  least  in  the 
popular  acceptation  of  the  word,  any  event  which 
is  unforeseen  and  not  expected  by  the  person  to 
whom  it  happens,  is  included  in  the  term.  Baggott 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  530,  533;  125  N.  E. 
254. 

48  The  happening  of  an  extraordinary  and  unfore- 
seen thing,  suddenly  and  unpremeditatedly,  such  as 
the  rupture  of  a  blood  vessel,  is  an  accident  within 
the  meaning  of  the  Act.  Baggott  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  530,  534;  125  N.  E.  254. 

48  The  words  "accident"  and  "accidental"  defined 
and  comparisons  made.    Baggott  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  530,  533;  125  N.  E.  254. 

49  A  sun-stroke  is  an  unexpected  and  unusual  hap- 
pening and  if  it  befalls  one  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  conduct,  it  is  an  accident.    City  of  Joliet  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  555,  560;  126  N.  E. 
618. 

50  The  meaning  of  the  word  "accident"  as  used  in 
the  Compensation  Act  is  influenced  by  the  various 


SEC.  1— THE  OCCURRENCE  53 

provisions  of  the  Act.    City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  HI.  555,  559;  126  N.  E.  618. 

50  In  construing  the  meaning  of  the  word  '  *  accident ' ' 
casualty  insurance  cases  will  not  be  followed  by  the 
court.  (Higgins  v.  Midland  Casualty  Co.,  281  111. 
431.)  City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  555,  560;  126  N.  E.  618. 

50  " Accident,"  as  used  in  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act,  should  not  be  construed  technically. 
Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  435,  439;  127  N.  E.  698. 

50  The  word  " accident"  was  meant  to  include  every 
injury  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment  for 
which  there  was  an  existing  right  of  action  at  the 
time  the  act  was  passed;  also  to  extend  the  liability 
of  the  employer  to  make  compensation  for  injuries 
for  which  he  was  not  previously  liable  and  to  limit 
such  compensation.  Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  435,  440,  441 ;  127  N.  E. 
698. 

50  The  injury  is  accidental  within  the  meaning  of  the 
act,  if  it  can  be  traced  to  a  definite  time,  place  and 
cause  and  occurs  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 
(Baggott  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  530.) 
Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
435,  441;  127  N.  E.  698. 

The  Occurrence. 

51      Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  that  there 
237  is  solid  union  of  the  bone  and  that  the  adhesions  in 
302  the  tendons  of  the  wrist  and  hand  can  be  broken  up 
by  a  simple  operation,  without  danger,  and  no  pain 
under  a  mild  and  safe  anaesthetic,  then  the  perma- 
nent  disability  is   due   to   the    refusal   to    submit 


64  SEC.  1— THE  OCCURRENCE 

to  the  operation  and  not  due  to  the  accident,  and 
an  award  for  a  permanent  disability  cannot  be  sus- 
tained. Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  429,  433;  129  N.  E.  103. 
52  Where  the  occurrence  is  sudden,  unexpected  and 
undesigned  by  the  workman,  all  the  characteristics 
of  an  accident  are  present.  Baggott  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  530,  534,  535 }  125  N.  E.  254. 

52  Relating  the  hemorrhage  to  physical  exertion, 
rupture  of  the  aorta  by  force  from  within  was  as 
distinctly  traumatic  as  if  the  canal  had  been  severed 
by  violent  application  of  a  sharp  instrument  from 
without,  which  gave  it  all  of  the  attributes  of  an 
accident,  of  something  extraordinary  and  unfore- 
seen. Baqgott  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
530,534;  125  N.  E.  254. 

55  Lifting  heavy  weights,  causing  cardiac  dilatation, 
entitles  employee  to  compensation  if  in  the  course 
of  employment.  (In  re  Gibbons,  168  N.  Y.  S.  412.) 
Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
463,466;  131  N.  E.  649. 

52  An  accident  to  be  within  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  must  have  had  its  origin  in  some  risk 
of  the  employment.  (Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  459.)  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  287 ;  127  N.  E. 
732. 

55  Paralysis  caused  by  exertion  of  traveling  sales- 
60  man  running  to  catch  train  while  carrying  a  heavy 
load  of  baggage  used  by  him  in  his  business  is  an 
accidental  injury  for  which  the  employee  is  entitled 
to  compensation.  (Grosby  v.  Thorp-Hawley  'Co., 
206  Mich.  250.)  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  463,  466;  131  N.  E.  649. 


SEC.  1— THE  OCCURRENCE  55 

55  Exertion  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  employment 
64  causing  an  attack  of  cerebral  hemorrhage  is  an  acci- 
dental injury  for  which  the  employee  is  entitled  to 
compensation.  (Mclnnes  v.  Dun-smair,  1  B.  W.  C.  C. 
226.)  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298 
111.  463,  466;  131  N.E.  649. 

53  An  injury  to  come  within  the  Compensation  Act 
need  not  be  an  anticipated  one,  nor  need  it  be  one 
peculiar  to  the  particular  employment  in  which  one 
is  engaged  at  the  time.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  256,  265 ;  126  N.  E.  144. 

53        If,  in  an  emergency  for  the  saving  of  life  and 
55    property,  great  and  long-continued  exertion  in  ex- 
60    cessive  heat  is  followed  by  exhaustion  and  heat- 
stroke, the  heat-stroke  would  be  ordinarily  regarded 
as  accidental.    City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  555,  559;  126  N.  E.  618. 

53  Where  the  time  and  place  of  a  sun-stroke  are 
certain  and  there  is  good  reason  to  say  that  the 
cause  was  the  employment  in  the  heat  of  an  engine 
room,  and  it  occurs  in  the  course  of  the  employment 
unexpectedly  and  without  any  affirmative  act  or 
design  on  the  part  of  the  employee,  then  there  is 
an  accident  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act.  City 
of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  555,  559, 
560;  126  N.  E.  618. 

48      One  Fox,  a  yard  foreman,  quarreled  with  a  team- 
66  ster  of  a  third  person  about  some  coal  that  he  had 
106  loaded  on  his  wagon.    The  teamster  became  abusive 
and  threatened  Fox,  saying  that  he  would  strike  him 
with  a  board.    No  blow  was  struck  and  a  few  minutes 
after  the  quarrel  Fox  started  to  fall.     The  doctor 
testified  that  Fox  had  a  paralytic  stroke  and  hemor- 
rhage of  the  brain.    He  was  never  able  to  resume 


56  SEC.  1— THE  OCCURRENCE 

work.  The  arbitrator  allowed  a  pension  for  life 
on  the  ground  that  Fox  was  permanently  disabled. 
This  was  affirmed  by  the  Commission  and  the  Cir- 
cuit Court:  Held,  the  fear  or  excitement  caused 
by  a  quarrel,  having  caused  the  clot  on  the  brain, 
there  is  no  proof  of  an  accidental  injury  and  the 
award  must  be  set  aside.  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  463;  131  N.  E.  649. 

53  Even  though  a  man  might  have  died  from  the  heat 
on  that  day,  yet  if  he  dies  from  the  heat  superin- 
duced by  the  additional  effect  of  his  work,  the  acci- 
dent arises  out  of  the  employment.  City\  of  Joliet  v. 
Indu-strial  Commission,  -291  111.  555,  558;  126  N.  E. 
618. 

53        Where  there  is  evidence  that  employee  was  so 

73  drunk  that  he  could  not  drive  automobile  of  em- 

74  ployer,  it  was  held  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  his 
drunken  condition  and  not  out  of  the  employment. 
Emery  Motor  Livery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  532,  534;  126  N.  E.  143. 

53  A  plumber  engaged  in  work  of  raising  pipe  from 
the  ground  to  the  sixth  floor  by  means  of  a  windlass. 
After  the  last  load  of  pipe,  weighing  about  250 
pounds,  was  landed  on  the  floor,  the  deceased  was 
seen  to  walk  away  from  the  windlass  and  began  to 
spit  up  blood.  Nothing  unusual  happened  while 
they  were  lifting  the  pipe.  Post-mortem  examina- 
tion disclosed  a  tear  in  the  walls  of  the  aorta.  There 
was  no  evidence  of  extraordinary  exertion  suddenly 
displayed.  Held,  that  there  was  ample  evidence  to 
justify  the  finding  that  the  deceased  came  to  his 
death  by  accident  and  the  Circuit  Court  did  not  err 
in  confirming  the  award.  Baggott  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  530;  125  N.  E.  254. 


SEC.  1— ILLUSTRATIONS  OP  ACCIDENTAL  INJURIES    57 

Illustrations  of  Accidental  Injuries. 

56  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  277  111. 
53,  where  employee  was  injured  by  horse-play  while 
getting  his  pay,  distinguished  on  the  ground  that 
getting  the  pay  was  incidental  to  the  work  and  that 
the  employer  knew  of  the  conditions  and  surround- 
ings.   Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  388, 
394;  129  N.  E.  122. 

57  It  cannot  be  contended  that  it  is  impossible  for 
sun-stroke  or  heat-stroke  to  be  the  result  of  an  acci- 
dent.   City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  555,559;  126  N.  E.  618. 

57  The  following  heat  stroke  cases  have  been  held  to 
be  accidents :  A  laborer  on  the  street  (State  v.  Dis- 
trict Court,  138  Minn.  250).  Employee  working  in  a 
gravel  pit  (in  re  McCarthy,  230  Mass.  429).  Em- 
ployee in  a  heated  sheet-iron  building  ( Walsh  v.  Riv- 
er Spinning  Co.,  41  R.  I.  490).  City  of  Joliet  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  555,  560 ;  126  N.  E.  618. 

57  A  wool  sorter  who  dies  as  the  result  of  becoming 
infected  with  anthrax  was  held  to  have  sustained  ac- 
cidental injuries.  Chicago  Rawhide  Manufacturing- 
Co,  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616 ;  126  N.  E. 
616. 

57  A  plumber  who  dies  as  the  result  of  a  ruptured 
aorta  occurring  while  winding  a  windlass  and  under 
some  strain  was  held  to  have  received  accidental  in- 
juries. Baqqott  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  530;  125' N.  E.  254. 

57  GUlHand  v.  Ash  Grove  Lime  &  Portland  Cement 
Co.,  104  Kan.  771;  180  Pac.  793,  where  a  workman 
in  apparent  good  health,  while  breaking  rock  in  a 


68  SEC.  1— INJURY  BY  DISEASE 

quarry,  suffered  a  pulmonary  hemorrhage  and  it 
was  held  that  the  breaking  down  of  the  man's  body 
was  an  accident,  was  approved.  Baggott  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  530,  533;  125  N.  E.  254. 

57  Schroetke  v.  Jackson-Church  Co.,  193  Mich.  616; 
160  N.  W.  383,  where  a  watchman  afflicted  with  heart 
disease  upon  discovering  a  fire  became  excited  and 
died  of  heart  disease,  which  death  was  held  to  be 
accidental,  approved.     Baggott  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  530,  533 ;  125  N.  E.  254. 

59  Evidence  discussed  and  held  that  the  proof  show- 
ing that  the  fear  or  excitement  might  have  caused 
the  blood  clot  was  not  sufficient,  for  the  proof  shows 
that  the  clot  might  result  from  other  causes,  or  oc- 
cur at  any  time.  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  463,  467;  131  N.  E.  649. 

Injury  by  Disease. 

58  Anthrax  is  a  disease,  but  where  it  is  accidentally 
contracted  in  the  course  of  employment  and  death 
results  it  is  within  the  Compensation  Act.    City  of 
Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  555,  559; 
126  N.  E.  618. 

58  Where  it  is  contended  that  sun-stroke  is  a  disease 
and  not  an  accident,  it  does  not  deprive  the  victim 
of  the  sun-stroke  to  the  right  to  compensation  under 
the  Compensation  Act,  if  the  disease  was  the  result 
of  accident.  City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  555,  558,  559;  126  N.  E.  618. 

58      Where  there  is  a  sequence  of  events  showing  the 

293  successive  steps  in  the  progress  of  the  disease  from 

the  time  of  the  innoculation  with  the  bacillus  to  the 

time  of  death,  an  inference  may  be  justifiably  drawn 


SEC.  1— SUICIDE  59 

from  the  events  tending  to  show  that  the  employee 
contracted  the  disease  from  an  accident  arising  out 
of  the  employment.  Chicago  Rawhide  Manufactur- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616,  619; 
126  N.  E.  616. 

Suicide. 

58      There  is  a  presumption  against  suicide  arising 
292  from  the  natural  love  of  life  and  the  human  instinct 
of  self-preservation.    Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  536,  541;  125  N.  E.  331. 

58  Facts  and  circumstances  in  the  evidence  consistent 
with  the  theory  of  suicide  refuted  by  the  record. 
Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  536,  541 ;  125  N.  E.  331. 

58  Where  there  is  evidence  that  an  employee  was  in 
fairly  good  health  and  there  is  an  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  suicide,  it  must  be  presumed  that  the 
death  was  accidental.     Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  295  111.  141, 148;  128  N.  E.  917. 

Pre-existing  Diseases. 

59  Where  an  award  was  made  for  partial  loss  of  vi- 
sion, it  cannot  be  sustained  where  it  appears  that 
the  loss  of  vision  is  due  to  a  disease.    Perry  County 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  117,  118; 
128  N.  E.  333. 

59  Where  the  weight  of  the  evidence  tended  to  show 
that  an  employee  was  suffering  from  sciatica  which 
was  not  connected  up  with  an  accident  arising  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment,  an  employee 
is  not  entitled  to  an  award.  St.  Louis  Smelting  & 
Refining*  Company  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
272,  278;  131  N.  E.  617. 


60  SEC.  1— PRE-EXISTING  DISEASES 

58  Even  though  employee  might  be  suffering  from  a 
pre-existing  disease  that  would  affect  his  eye-sight, 
still  he  is  entitled  to  compensation  if  blindness  is 
the  result  of  an  accidental  injury.     Rockford  City 
Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  358, 
360;  129  N.  E.  135. 

59  Where  a  person  is  suffering  from  a  pre-existing 
239  disease,  which  is  progressive,  and  the  accident  causes 
only  a  partial  loss  of  vision,  the  statute  provides  a 
different  measure  of  compensation.  Spring  Valley 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  315,  319; 
124  N.  E.  545. 

59  Compensation  may  be  awarded  although  there  is  a 
pre-existing  disease,  if  the  disease  is  aggravated  and 
accelerated  by  an  accidental  injury  in  the  course  of 
the  employment.     (Approving:    Big  Muddy  Coal  & 
Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  279  111.  235;  Wabash 
Railway  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  286  111.  194; 
Jakiib  v.  Industrial  Commission,  288  111.  87;  Spring 
Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
315.)      Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  358,  360;  129  N.  E.  135. 

59  Where  employee  was  found  dead  in  the  toilet  vault 
115  it  was  said  that  even  if  the  fall  were  occasioned  by 
heart  trouble  or  some  chronic  disease,  it  would  not 
necessarily  prevent  the  fall  from  being  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  death,  unless  the  proof  was  clear 
and  conclusive  that  he  was  dead  at  the  time  of  the 
fall.  Vulcan  Detinning-  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  141,  149;  128  N.  E.  917. 

60  Even  though  an  employee  has  a  diseased  aorta,  if 
there  is  a  causal  connection  between  the  work  and 
the  injury  that  caused  the  death,  the  accident  is  com- 


SEC.  1— PRE-EXISTING  DISEASES  61 

pensable.    Baggott  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290111.  530;  125  N.  E.  254. 

62  An  employee  working  as  a  yard-man,  in  answering 
a  'phone  call,  received  a  shock  in  taking  the  receiver. 
The  numbness  from  the  shock  continued  to  grow 
and  he  became  partially  paralyzed.  Physicians  tes- 
tified that  the  employee  was  suffering  from  arterio- 
sclerosis and  that  while  the  shock  may  have  aggra- 
vated the  condition,  the  real  cause  of  the  disability 
was  the  disease.  Held:  That  the  holding  of  the 
Commission  awarding  a  pension  for  life  cannot  be 
disturbed  by  the  reviewing  court.  McGarry  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  577;  125  N.  E.  318. 

61  In  the  case  of  Armour  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, Supreme  Court  No.  13149,  it  was  contended 
that  an  employee  who  sustained  accidental  injuries 
resulting  in  death  was  not  entitled  to  an  award.  The 
employee  while  working  on  a  platform  had  an  epi- 
leptic fit ;  and  while  in  the  throes  of  the  fit  fell  from 
the  platform,  sustaining  the  injuries  which  caused 
his  death.  The  Commission  made  an  award  which 
was  affirmed  by  the  Circuit  Court.  The  employer 
petitioned  for  a  writ  of  error  to  the  Supreme  Court 
on  the  ground  that  the  employee  did  not  die  as  the 
result  of  accidental  injuries.  The  Supreme  Court 
denied  the  writ  of  error,  thus  affirming  the  decision 
of  the  Commission.  Where  the  Supreme  Court  de- 
nies a  writ  of  error,  no  opinion  is  written  or  filed 
by  the  court. 

Industrial  or  Occupational  Diseases. 

Under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  Indus- 
trial or  Occupational  diseases  were  not  compensable 


62  SEC.  1—  OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES 

except  where  it  was  shown  that  the  disease  was  the 
result  of  an  accident.  By  an  amendment  to  section 
15  of  the  Occupational  Disease  Act,  in  force  July  1, 
1911,  the  disablement  of  an  employee  engaged  in  any 
of  the  occupations  enumerated  in  section  2  of  the 
Occupational  Disease  Act,  shall  be  treated  as  the 
happening  of  an  accidental  injury  within  the  terms 
and  meaning  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

The  wording  of  section  2  which  declares  certain 
employments  dangerous  to  health  is  as  follows: 

Section  i'.  Every  employer  in  this  State  engaged  in  the 
carrying  on  of  any  process  of  manufacture  or  labor  in  which 
sugar  of  lead,  white  lead,  lead  chromate,  lithrage,  red  lead, 
arsenate  of  lead,  or  paris  green  are  employed,  used  or  handled, 
or  the  manufacture  of  brass  or  the  smelting  of  lead  or  zinc, 
which  processes  and  employments  are  hereby  declared  to  be 
especially  dangerous  to  the  health  of  the  employees  engaged  in 
any  process  of  manufacture  or  labor  in  which  poisonous  chem- 
icals, minerals  or  other  substances  are  used  or  handled  by  the 
employees  therein  in  harmful  quantities  or  under  harmful  con- 
ditions, shall  provide  for  and  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  em- 
ployees engaged  in  any  such  process  or  manufacture  and  shall 
maintain  in  good  condition  and  without  cost  to  the  employees, 
proper  working  clothing  to  be  kept  and  used  exclusively  for  such 
employees  while  at  work,  and  all  employees  therein  shall  b<j. 
required  at  all  times  while  they  are  at  work  to  use  and  wear 
such  clothing;  and  in  all  processes  of  manufacture  or  labor  re- 
ferred to  in  this  section  which  are  unnecessarily  productive  of 
noxious  or  poisonous  dusts,  adequate  and  approved  respirators 
shall  be  furnished  and  maintained  by  the  employer  in  good  con- 
dition and  without  cost  to  the  employees,  and  such  employees 
sliiill  use  such  respirators  at  all  times  while  engaged  In  any  work 
proiiucthr  of  noxious  or  poisonous  dusts. 


This  section  is  very  limited  in  scope.  It  does  not 
include  any  of  the  occupational  diseases  character- 
istic of  mining,  such  as  beat  hand,  beat  knee,  etc. 
Nor  does  it  include  wool  sorter's  disease  (anthrax) 
and  a  host  of  other  occupational  diseases. 

The  amendment  to  section  15  of  the  Occupational 
Disease  Act,  reads  as  follows  : 


SEC.  1— OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES  63 


OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES. 

Sec.  1.  Amends  section  15,  Act 
of  1911. 

Sec.  15.  Disablement  by  acci- 
dent— employee's  right  to  re- 
coyer — limitation — extent  of 
amendment. 

(Honse  Bill  No.  786.    Filed  Jnly  18,  1921.) 

AN  ACT  to  amend  section  15  of  "An  Act  to  promote  the  public 
health  by  protecting  certain  employees  in  this  State  from  the 
dangers  of  occupational  diseases  and  providing  for  the  enforce- 
ment thereof,  approved  May  26,  1911,  in  force  Jnly  1,  1911." 

Section  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois, 
represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  Section  15  of  "An  Act  to 
promote  the  pnblic  health  by  protecting  certain  employees  in 
this  State  from  the  dangers  of  occupational  diseases  and  provid- 
ing for  the  enforcement  thereof,  approved  May  26,  1911,  in  force 
Jnly  1,  1911,"  be  and  the  same  is  hereby  amended  as  follows: 

Sect.  15.  (a)  Disablement  an  Accident.  The  disablement  of 
an  employee  engaged  in  occupations  covered  by  section  two  (2) 
of  this  Act  resulting  from  an  occupational  disease  arising  as  a 
result  of  the  work,  labor,  manufacture  or  process  referred  to  in 
said  section  two  (2),  shall  be  treated  as  the  happening  of  an  acci- 
dental injury  within  the  terms  and  meaning  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act. 

(b)  Definition.     The  term  disablement  means  the  state  of 
being  disabled  from  earning  full  wages  at  the  work  at  which  the 
employee  was  last  employed  by  the  employer  from  whom  he 
claims  compensation. 

(c)  Employee's  right  to  recover  compensation.    If  any  em- 
ployee employed  in  occupations  covered  by  section  two  (2)  of 
this  Act  is  disabled  or  dies  and  his  disability  or  death  is  caused 
by  a  disease  arising  out  of  the  occupations  referred  to  in  section 
two  (2)  of  this  Act  which  disease  arises  out  of  and  in  the  course 
of  his  employment,  he  or  his  dependents  shall  be  entitled  to  com- 
pensation for  his  death  or  for  the  duration  of  his  disability  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act. 

(d)  Limitation  of  right  to  recover  damages.    No  common  law 
or  statutory  right  to  recover  damages  for  injury  or  death  sus- 
tained by  an  employee  from  an  occupational  disease  other  than 
the  compensation  provided  in  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
shall  be  available  to  any  employees  engaged  in  any  work,  manu- 
facture or  process  referred  to  in  section  two  (2)  of  this  Act,  to 


64  SEC.  1— OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES 

anyone  wholly  or  partially  dependent  upon  him,  the  legal  repre- 
sentatives of  his  estate  or  to  anyone  otherwise  entitled  to  recover 
damages  for  such  injury. 

(e)  Extent  of  Amendment:  Except  as  amended  herein  said 
section  fifteen  (15)  shall  be  and  remain  in  foil  force  and  effect 
as  heretofore. 

FILED  .Iiilj    IS.  1921. 

NOTE :— The  Governor  baring  failed  to  return  this  bill  to  the 
General  Assembly  during  its  session,  the  General  Assembly  hav- 
Ing  adjourned  sine  die  on  June  30,  1921,  and  he  having  tiled  the 
same  in  my  office  on  this  date  without  signature  or  objections,  it 
has  therefore  become  a  law. 

Witness  my  hand  this  13th  day  of  July,  A.  D.  1921. 

Louis  L.  Emmerson,  Secretary  of  State. 

Case  of  Mathiessen-Hegeler  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  284  111.  378,  where  it  was  held  that  em- 
ployee died  as  the  result  of  accidental  injuries  and 
not  from  an  occupational  disease,  discussed.  La- 
banoski  v.  Hoyt  Metal  Co.,  292  HI.  218,  221 ;  126  N. 
E.  548. 

The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  the  Oc- 
cupational Disease  Act  were  passed  at  the  same  ses- 
sion of  the  Legislature,  but  were  intended  to  apply 
to  different  situations  and  conditions.  Labanoski  v. 
Hoyt  Meted  Co.,  292  111.  218,  221;  126  N.  E.  548. 

Anthrax,  which  is  commonly  known  as  an  occupa- 
tional disease,  if  incurred  fortuitously,  may  come 
within  the  definition  of  an  accidental  injury  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  where  there  is 
nothing  in  the  record  to  show  that  it  is  an  occupa- 
tional disease.  Chicago  Rawhide  Manufacturing 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616 ;  126  N.  E. 
616.  But  see  Eldridge  v.  Endicott  Johnson  Co.  (N. 
Y.),  126  N.  E.  254. 

Where  it  was  claimed  that  an  employee  died  of 
lead  poisoning  but  the  medical  testimony  showed 


SEC.  1— OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES  65 

that  he  was  suffering  from  a  local  infection  it  was 
held  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  sustain  the  award. 
St.  Louis  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  272,  278 ;  131  N.  E.  617. 

63  An  occupational  disease  such  as  lead  poisoning 
does  not  occur  suddenly  but  is  a  matter  of  slow  de- 
velopment, and  the  Occupational  Disease  Act  was 
passed  for  the  protection  of  employees  from  such 
diseases.  Labanoski  v.  Hoyt  Metal  Co.,  292  111.  218, 
221 ;  126  N.  E.  548. 

63  Employee  engaged  as  a  feeder  and  helper  for  a 
lead  smelting  concern  was  overcome  by  smoke  and 
gas  and  became  ill.  He  made  application  to  the  Com- 
mission alleging  that  a  pain  in  his  stomach  and  a 
pain  in  the  calf  of  his  right  leg  resulted  from  an  ac- 
cident arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment. There  was  much  medical  testimony  as  to 
whether  the  employee  was  suffering  from  lead  poi- 
soning. The  testimony  tended  to  show  that  he  was 
not  suffering  from  plumbism  but  from  a  local  infec- 
tion due  to  his  teeth,  tonsils  and  prostate.  The  ar- 
bitrator allowed  an  award  for  temporary  total  dis- 
ability for  28  weeks ;  on  appeal  to  the  Commission  he 
was  given  an  award  for  the  loss  of  thirty-three  and 
one-third  per  cent  of  the  use  of  his  right  leg.  Held: 
that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  sustain  the 
award  and  it  must  be  set  aside.  St.  Louis  Smelting 
&  Refining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
272,  278;  131  N.  E.  617. 

63  The  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act  does  not  apply 
to  Occupational  Diseases,  but  to  injuries  arising 
from  accidents  alone.  Labanoski  v.  Hoyt  Metal  Co., 
292  111.  218,  221;  126  N.  E.  548.  See  also  Wilcox  v. 
International  Harvester  Co.,  278  111.  465. 


66  SEC.  1— ELEMENTS— VIS  MAJOR 

63  If  employee  is  injured  in  health  as  a  result  of  wil- 
ful failure  of  employer  to  comply  with  Occupational 
Disease  Act,  remedy  is  under  that  Act;  if  he  is  in- 
jured accidentally,  remedy  is  under  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act.  LabanosJci  v.  Hoyt  Metal  Co., 
292  111.  218,  222;  126  N.  E.  548. 

External  Force. 

66  Jakub  v.  Industrial  Commission,  288  111.  87,  where 
no  award  was  made  on  the  ground  that  employee 
had  died  of  heart  disease  distinguished  on  the  ground 
that  there  was  no  evidence  that  any  part  of  the  body 
was  broken  and  also  for  the  further  reason  that 
the  case  was  decided  the  other  way  by  the  Commis- 
sion and  the  Supreme  Court  could  not  weigh  the 
evidence.  Baqgott  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
530,535;  125  N.  E.  254. 

Elements — Vis  Major. 

66  The  risk  of  being  injured  by  the  elements  must 
be  incidental  to  the  employment  and  not  common  to 
the  public.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  256,  262;  126  N.  E.  144. 

66  An  insurance  solicitor  who  was  frost-bitten,  while 
driving  on  a  cold  day,  was  allowed  compensation  on 
the  ground  that  his  duties  subjected  him  to  dangers 
from  the  elements  which  other  persons  in  ordinary 
pursuits  in  that  locality  were  not  subjected  to. 
(Larke  v.  Hancock  Life  Insurance  Co.,  90  Conn.  303.) 
C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256, 
263;126N.  E.  144. 

See  also:  Examples  of  Accidents  Arising  out  of 
and  in  the  Course  of  the  Employment,  page  77,  and 
Bisks  Common  to  Public  (post),  page  104. 


SEC.  1— "ARISING  OUT  OF  AND  IN  COURSE  OF"       67 

"Arising  out  of  and  in  the  Course  of  the  Employment." 

67  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  accidental  injury  occur 
in  the  course  of  the  employment,  but  it  must  arise 
out  of  the  employment.  Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  459,  462;  125  N.  E.  260; 
Morris  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  49, 
52, 128  N.  E.  727 ;  United  Disposal  &  Recovery  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E. 
183. 

67  "Arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of"  are  used 
conjunctively,  and  the  circumstances  of  the  accident 
must  satisfy  both  the  one  and  the  other.  Schweiss 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  97;  126  N.  E. 
566. 

67  An  employee  in  order  to  recover  for  an  injury 
must  show  that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  the  employment.  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  286;  127  N.  E. 
732. 

67  The  injury  suffered  by  the  employee  must  arise 
out  of  the  employment  as  well  as  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.     (Approving:     Dietzen  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Board,  279  111.  11 ;  Mepham  &  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  484;  Marion  County  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  463.)      Payne  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  388,  393;  129  N.  E. 
122. 

68  The  determination  of  the  question  whether  an  in- 
jury arose  out  of  the  employment  in  some  cases  pre- 
sents one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  in  connection 
with   the    enforcement    of   the   Compensation   Act. 
Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  97; 
126  N.  E.  566. 


68  SEC.  1— NEGLIGENCE 

68  The  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  cannot  be  extended  to  cover  injuries  which  do 
not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 
United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

Employee  injured  while  satisfying  curiosity.  Mar- 
anof sky's  Case  (Mass.),  125  N.  E.  565. 

68  Where  an  employee  in  violation  of  orders,  left  the 
place  he  was  told  to  stay  in  by  his  employer,  his 
death  does  not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.  West  Side  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  301,  303;  126  N.  E. 
218. 

Negligence. 

73  Negligence  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty  does  not  bar 
an  employee  from  recovering  compensation.  Walsh 
Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  536, 
541;  125  N.  E.  331. 

90  Although  walking  on  railroad  tracks  might  have 
73  constituted  contributory  negligence  at  common  law, 
still  this  does  not  bar  an  award  under  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act.  Western  Coal  &  Mini  tig 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408,  411 ;  129 
N.  E.  779. 

73  There  is  a  distinction  between  doing  a  thing  reck- 
lessly or  negligently  and  doing  a  thing  outside  and 
unconnected  with  what  he  is  employed  to  do,  and  if 
an  accident  happens  in  the  first  class,  it  arises  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment  but  not  in 
the  latter  case.  Sunny  side  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  523,  526;  126  N.  E.  196. 


SEC.  1— "ARISING  OUT  OF"  69 

91  Where  the  question  of  negligence  in  a  common  law 
73  action  for  injuries  depended  upon  whether  the  em- 
ployee was  under  the  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act, 
and,  if  so,  the  defendant  employer,  under  the  Act, 
then  in  force,  was  not  entitled  to  argue  the  question 
of  negligence,  it  was  held  that  a  conductor  who  left 
the  car  to  cross  the  tracks  to  tell  his  wife  to  pre- 
pare his  lunch  for  him,  was  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment when  he  left  the  car  for  that  purpose.  Rain- 
ford  v.  Chicago  City  Railway  Co.,  289  111.  427;  124 
N.  E.  643. 

"Arising  out  of." 

70  *  'Arising  out  of  "  indicates  a  causal  relation.    The 
accident  must  have  been  due  to  the  employment. 
Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  97; 
126  N.  E.  566. 

71  The  principles  of  law  are  generally  agreed  upon 
but  there  is  no  agreement  of  the  authorities  as  to 
the  application  of  the  principles  to  the  special  facts 
in  each  case.     Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292111.  90,97;  126  N.  E.  566. 

71  Whether  an  accidental  injury  arose  out  of  the  em- 
ployment is  difficult  to  determine;  the  injury  arises 
out  of  the  employment  when  there  is  apparent  to 
the  rational  mind  a  causal  connection  between  the 
conditions  under  which  the  work  is  performed  and 
the  injury.  Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  459,  462;  125  N.  E.  260. 

71        Where  the  uncontradicted  testimony  is  that  the 
88    employee  was  not  driving  the  truck  at  the  time  that 
he  was  injured,  the  injury  did  not  arise  out  of  the 
employment.     Morris  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  49,  51,  52;  128  N.  E.  727. 


70  SEC.  1— "ARISING  OUT  OF" 

71  The  words  "arising  out  of"  refer  to  the  cause  or 
origin  of  the  accident  and  indicate  that  the  accident 
must  happen  out  of  the  transaction  of  the  business 
in  which  the  workman  is  engaged.  United  Disposal 
and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

71  Notice  to  or  knowledge  of  an  agent  while  acting 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority  and  in  reference 
to  a  matter  over  which  his  authority  extends  is  no- 
tice to  the  principal,  but  in  order  to  be  binding  upon 
the  principal,  the  knowledge  must  be  acquired  while 
the  agent  is  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority. 
United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

71      Where  an  employee  was  found  dead  on  the  side- 

97  walk,  it  was  held  that  the  injury  arises  out  of  the 

115  employment,  when  the  accident  results  from  a  risk 

reasonably  incidental  to  the  employment.     Sparks 

Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  350, 

353;  127  N.  E.  737. 

72  Decisions  of  Illinois  Supreme  Court  not  necessari- 
ly controlling,  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  the  McNicol 
case,  215  Mass.  497,  frequently  approved  and  again 
adopted  in  preference  to  rulings  in  other  Illinois 
cases.    Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
90,97,  98;  126  N.  E.  566. 

72  The  rule  in  the  McNicol  case,  215  Mass.  497,  viz., 
that  the  injury  arises  out  of  the  employment  when 
there  is  apparent  to  the  rational  mind,  a  causal  con- 
nection between  the  conditions  under  which  the  work 
is  required  to  be  performed  and  the  resulting  injury. 
C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256, 
258;  126  N.  E.  144. 


SEC.  1— "ARISING  OUT  OF"  71 

The  determination  of  the  question  whether  an  in- 
jury arises  out  of  the  employment  is  attended  with 
difficulty  not  so  much  in  the  determination  of  the 
rule,  as  in  the  application  of  the  rule  to  the  case 
under  consideration.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  256,  258;  126  N.  E.  144. 

If  an  employee  is  accidentally  injured  on  the  prem- 
ises of  his  employer  in  going  from  his  work,  leaving 
within  a  reasonable  time  and  following  the  custom- 
ary or  permitted  route  off  the  premises,  the  acci- 
dent is  held  to  arise  out  of  the  employment.  West- 
ern Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
296  111.  408,  411 ;  129  N.  E.  779. 

If  the  injury  can  be  seen  to  have  been  a  natural 
incident  of  the  work  and  to  have  been  contemplated 
by  a  reasonable  person  as  a  result  of  the  exposure 
occasioned  by  the  nature  of  the  employment,  it  arises 
out  of  the  employment.  Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  459,  462 ;  125  N.  E.  260. 

Where  a  workman  chooses  to  go  to  a  dangerous 
place  where  his  employment  does  not  necessarily 
take  him,  and  where  he  incurs  a  danger  of  his  own 
choosing  outside  of  any  reasonable  exercise  of  his 
employment,  the  accident  does  not  arise  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment.  Michigan,  Central 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  503,  507; 
125  N.  E.  278. 

An  accident  arises  out  of  the  employment  when 
it  is  something  the  risk  of  which  might  have  been 
contemplated  by  a  reasonable  person  when  entering 
the  employment  as  incidental  to  it.  United  Disposal 
and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 


72  SEC.  1— "ARISING  OUT  OF" 

74  Whore  an  employee  engages  in  a  voluntary  act  not 
accepted  by  or  known  to  his  employer  and  outside 
the  duties  for  which  he  was  employed,  is  injured,  it 
cannot  be  said  that  his  injury  arose  out  of  his  em- 
ployment. (Central  Garage  v.  7.  C.,  286  111.  291.) 
r  nited  Disposal  a/nd  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  480,  486;  126  N.  E.  183. 

74  Where  an  accident  arises  out  of  the  employment, 
the  causative  danger  must  be  peculiar  to  the  work 
and  not  common  to  the  neighborhood,  incidental  to 
the  character  of  the  business  and  not  independent 
of  the  relation  of  master  and  servant,  it  need  not 
have  been  foreseen,  but  after  the  event  it  must  ap- 
pear to  have  had  its  origin  in  a  risk  connected  with 
the  employment.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256,  259;  126  N.  E.  144. 

74  If  the  injury  can  be  seen  to  have  followed  as  a 
natural  incident  of  the  work  and  to  have  been  con- 
templated by  a  reasonable  person  familiar  with  the 
situation  as  a  result  of  the  exposure  occasioned  by 
the  nature  of  the  employment,  then  it  arises  out  of 
the  employment.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256,  259;  126  N.  E.  144. 

74  An  accident  arises  out  of  the  employment  when 
it  is  something  the  risk  of  which  might  have  been 
contemplated  by  a  reasonable  person,  when  entering 
the  employment,  as  incidental  to  it.  Weis  Paper 
Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  287; 
127  N.  E.  732. 

74  The  rule  in  England  was :  that  if  the  character  of 
the  employment  was  such  as  to  create  or  intensify 
the  risks  that  arise  from  extraordinary  natural 
causes,  an  accident  under  such  circumstances  arises 


SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  NOT  ARISING  OUT  OF  73 

out  of  the  employment,  the  question  being  whether 
or  not  the  accident  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
employment,  was  merely  a  consequence  of  the  se- 
verity of  the  elements,  to  which  persons  in  the  lo- 
cality, whether  so  employed  or  not,  were  equally 
exposed.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  256,  260,  261 ;  126  N.  E.  144. 
74  To  bring  an  accident  within  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act,  it  must  arise  out  of  the  employment. 
The  origin  or  cause  of  the  accident  must  belong  to 
and  be  connected  with  the  contract  of  service.  Rain- 
ford  v.  Chicago  City  Railway  Co.,  289  111.  427,  430; 
124  N.  E.  643. 

Examples  of  Accidents  Not  Arising  Out  of  and  in 
the  Course  of  the  Employment. 

74  Where  the  danger  encountered  by  an  employee  in 
climbing  on  a  moving  freight  train  did  not  result 
from  the  obedience  to  any  direction  of  the  employer 
and  was  not  necessary  or  incident  to  the  business, 
the  accident  did  not  come  within  the  terms  of  the 
Act.  Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com-' 
mission,  290  111.  503,  506;  125  N.  E.  278. 

74  Bollard  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Co., 
128  Ky.  826 ;  Kirby  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad 
Co.,  187  Ala.  443,  approved,  where  it  was  held  that 
a  compressed  air  hose  which  caused  the  death  of 
employee  through  a  prank,  is  not  such  a  dangerous 
agency  that  the  employer  must  guard  it  from  ig- 
norant employees,  and  that  the  master  is  not  liable 
for  the  injury  as  it  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employ- 
ment. Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  388, 
392 ;  129  N.  E.  122. 


74  SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  NOT  ARISING  OUT  OF 

74  Federal  Rubber  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Havolic,  162  Wis.  341, 
approved,  where  it  was  held  that  the  purpose  of  the 
Compensation  Act  was  to  compensate  for  injuries 
resulting  from  industrial  accidents  and  there  is  lia- 
bility only  where  at  the  time  of  the  accident  the 
employee  is  performing  service  growing  out  of  and 
incidental  to  his  employment.  Payne  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  388,  392 ;  129  N.  E.  122. 

74  Willis  on  Workmen's  Compensation  (12th  ed.),  22, 
approved  where  it  was  said  that  it  is  not  within  the 
scope  of  employment  for  workmen,  whether  boys  or 
men,  to  indulge  in  horse-play,  and  injury  thereby 
sustained  by  a  workman,  even  though  he  is  not  a 
party  to  the  larking,  is  not  an  injury  by  accident 
arising  either  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment. Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  388, 
391 ;  129  N.  E.  122. 

74  Hoening  v.  Industrial  Commission,  159  Wis.  646; 
Tarpper  v.  Weston-Mott  Co.,  200  Mich.  275,  ap- 
proved, where  it  was  held  that  accidents  resulting 
from  larking  or  playing  with  machinery  cannot  be 
held  to  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Payne  v.  In- 
'dustrial  Commission,  295  111.  388,  392;  129  N.  E. 
122. 

74  Robinson  v.  Mellville  Manufacturing  Co.,  165  N. 
C.  495,  where  employer  permitted  the  compressed 
air  hose  to  lie  about  the  factory,  distinguished  on  the 
ground  that  the  employer  negligently  left  the  hose 
lying  around.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111.  388,  391 ;  129  N.  E.  122. 

74  In  re  Loper,  64  Ind.  App.  57,  where  employer  was 
held  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by  employee  by 
playing  with  compressed  air,  distinguished  on  the 
ground  that  playing  with  the  compressed  air  had  be- 


SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  NOT  ARISING  OUT  OF  75 

come  a  habit  which  was  known  to  the  employer 
through  his  superintendent.  Payne  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  388,  391 ;  129  N.  E.  122. 

74  Injuries  resulting  from  horse-play  are  not  the  re- 
sult of  performing  service  growing  out  of  and  inci- 
dental to  the  employment.    Payne  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  388,  892;  129  N.  E.  122. 

75  An  employee  whose  duty  it  was  to  drive  a  truck, 
had  delivered  his  load  to  the  various  customers,  had 
gone  to  the  plant  to  account  for  the  moneys  he  had 
collected  and  was  taking  the  truck  back  to  the  gar- 
age, when  he  fell  out  and  was  run  over.    There  was 
some  evidence  that  he  was  drunk.    There  was  some 
evidence  that  another  man  was  driving.    Held,  as 
the  employee  was  not,  at  the  time  that  he  sustained 
the  injuries,  engaged  in  the  performance  of  his  du- 
ties, the  accident  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employ- 
ment and  he  was  not  entitled  to  compensation.  Mor- 
ris &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  HI.  49;  128 
N.  E.  727. 

75  Where  it  is  clear  from  the  undisputed  evidence 
that  the  employee  was  in  an  unfit  condition  for  work, 
a  finding  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  the  employ- 
ment is  erroneous  and  will  be  reversed.  Emery  Mo- 
tor Livery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  532, 
534;  126  N.  E.  143. 

79  Where  an  employee  was  killed  while  resting  in  the 
shade  of  a  box-car  where  he  fell  asleep,  it  is  held 
that  the  accident  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment. 
Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
HI.  284;  127  N.  E.  732. 

79  An  employee  assigned  to  a  press,  which  stamped 
out  cups  for  lanterns,  went  to  the  machine  operated 


76  SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  NOT  ARISING  OUT  OF 

by  another  employee  and  out  of  curiosity  tried  to 
work  it.  Held,  as  the  employee  was  doing  a  vol- 
untary act,  the  accident  cannot  be  said  to  arise  out 
of  the  employment.  Adams  &  Westlake  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  292  111.  590;  127  N.  E.  168. 

79  Whore  the  undisputed  evidence  is  that  the  em- 
ployee \vns  not  engaged  in  performing  any  duty  of, 
or  connected  with  his  employment,  but  his  duties 
were  being  performed  by  another,  the  accident  did 
not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Morris  &  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  49,  53;  128  N.  E.  727. 

79  An  employee  whose  duty  it  was  to  work  at  a 
56  grease-pressing  machine,  which  was  operated  by 
compressed  air,  was  shot  in  the  anus  by  some  other 
boys  with  compressed  air.  Evidence  was  conflicting 
whether  he  had  indulged  in  the  horse-play  before  he 
was  shot.  Employer  knew  nothing  about  the  horse- 
play and  evidence  was  that  the  hose  was  kept  in  a 
locker.  1 1 '<•!/!,  that  the  accident  did  not  arise  out 
of  tho  employment,  although  it  happened  in  the 
course  of  the  employment  and  the  order  of  the  court 
setting  aside  the  award  was  affirmed.  Payne  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  295  111.  388;  129  N.  E.  122. 

79  ( 'ily  employee  doing  teaming  for  city  with  his  own 
97  cart  and  horse,  sat  down  to  eat  his  lunch  and  while 
leaning  against  a  car  on  the  railroad  track,  another 
car  struck  the  one  he  was  leaning  against.  Held, 
that  he  had  incurred  a  danger  of  his  own  choosing 
and  one  altogether  outside  of  any  reasonable  exer- 
cise of  the  employment  and  that  he  could  not  re- 
cover under  the  Compensation  Act.  (Han  yard's 
Case,  125  N.  E.  (Mass.)  565.)  Weis  Pun'  r  Mill  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  289;  127  N.  E. 
732. 


SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  ARISING  OUT  OF  77 

Examples  of  Accidents  Arising  Out  of  and  in  the 
Course  of  the  Employment. 

76  Where  a  workman  injured  in  trying  to   regain 
pipe,  it  was  held,  in  the  absence  of  any  prohibition 
against  smoking  that  the  injury  arose  out  of  the 
employment.    (McLaughlin  v.  Anderson,  4  B.  W.  C. 
C.  376.)    Steel  Sales  Corp  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  435,  438;  127  N.  E.  698. 

77  Morgan  v.  Owners  of  S.  S.  Zenaida,  25  S.  L.  446, 
approved,  where  man  overcome  by  sunstroke  while 
painting  ship  was  allowed  compensation.     C.  I.  P. 
S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256,  261; 
126  N.  E.  144. 

77  Anderson  &  Co.  v.  Adamson,  50  S.  L.  855,  ap- 
proved, where  employee  while  at  work  was  injured 
by  slate  blown  from  roof  by  a  gale.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256,  261;  126  N.  E. 
144. 

77  Dames  v.  GUlespie,  5  B.  W.  C.  C.  64,  approved, 
where  employee  while  working  on  steel  deck  of  ship 
for  five  hours  suffered  sunstroke  and  was  allowed 
compensation.  C.  L  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  256,  261 ;  126  N.  E.  144. 

77  Andrew  v.  Failsivorth  Industrial  Society,  2  K.  B. 
32,  approved,  where  bricklayer  was  killed  by  light- 
ning while  working  on  a  scaffold,  was  allowed  com- 
pensation. C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  256,  261 ;  126  N.  E.  144. 

77  Where  a  workman  lit  a  cigarette,  his  apron,  catch- 
ing on  fire,  the  employer  was  held  liable  under  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  (Dzikowska  v.  Su- 


78  SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  ARISING  OUT  OF 

perior  Steel  Co.,  259  Perm.  578.)  Steel  Sales  Corp. 
v.  Industrial  Commission-,  293  111.  435,  439 ;  127  N.  E. 
698. 

77  Employers  have  been  held  liable  for  injuries  aris- 
ing from  employees  striking  matches  and  the  like. 
Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  435,  439;  127  N.  E.  698. 

77  Where  flannel  shirt  of  employee,  soaked  with  oil, 
caught  fire,  the  employee  recovered  compensation. 
(Chludzinski  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  162  N.  Y.  Supp. 
225.)  Steel  Sales  Corp  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  435,  439;  127  N.  E.  698. 

77  But  where  the  employment  does  not  intensify  the 
risk  that  arises  from  natural  causes  so  as  to  expose 
the  employee  to  some  peculiar  danger,  the  accident 
does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Thus  in  War- 
ner v.  Couchman,  1  K.  B.  351,  where  a  baker  in  mak- 
ing his  rounds  got  a  chill,  it  did  not  arise  out  of  the 
employment.  In  Kelly  v.  Kerry  County  Council,  1 
B.  W.  C.  C.  194,  a  driver's  hand  affected  by  the  cold 
while  driving  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment. 
So  in  Keremaker  v.  Owners  of  S.  S.  Corsican,  4  B. 
W.  C.  C.  295,  where  seaman  was  frostbitten,  it  did 
not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  So  in  Robson,  Eck- 
ford  &  Co.  v.  Blakely,  5  B.  W.  C.  C.  536,  a  plumber 
overcome  by  heat  in  a  trench,  was  held  to  have  been 
subjected  to  the  same  risk  common  in  that  neigh- 
borhood. In  Kinghvrn  v.  Guthrie,  50  S.  L.  863,  a 
man  hurt  by  piece  of  iron  blown  from  roof,  did  not 
arise  out  of  employment.  Rogers  v.  School  Board 
(1912),  S.  C.  584,  it  was  held  that  being  struck  by 
lightning  was  a  risk  common  to  all.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256,  261,  262;  126 
N.  E.  144. 


SBC.  1— ACCIDENTS  ARISING  OUT  OF  79 

78  An  employee  contracted  anthrax  while  sorting 
hides  for  his  employer  who  was  engaged  in  the  tan- 
ning business.  There  was  evidence  that  the  bacillus 
came  in  contact  with  an  abrasion  on  the  neck  of  the 
employee.  Held:  That  there  was  evidence  in  the 
record  from  which  the  Commission  might  find  that 
the  employee  contracted  the  disease  and  that  this 
was  an  accidental  injury.  Chicago  Rawhide  Manu- 
facturing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616 ; 
126  N.  E.  616. 

78  Where  an  employee  was  injured  by  a  wall  being 
blown  in  by  a  tornado  and  it  appeared  that  his  du- 
ties took  him  among  steam  pipes  and  ammonia  coils, 
it  was  held  that  the  injuries  sustained  arose  out  of 
the  employment.    C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256;  126  N.  E.  144. 

79  Where  there  is  no  proof  to  show  that  the  alterca- 
tion grew  out  of  the  manner  of  performing  the  work 
or  had  any  connection  with  it,  there  is  no  evidence 
to  support  the  finding  that  the  injury  arose  out  of 
the  employment.     Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  459,  463;  125  N.  E.  260. 

65  Employee  while  working  as  a  woodworker,  crushed 
79  the  end  of  the  index  finger  and  made  a  blood  blister 
on  the  side  of  the  middle  finger.  This  was  cured. 
Later  he  scraped  the  callous  where  the  blood  blister 
had  become  sore  with  a  pocket  knife.  An  infection 
under  the  callous  developed  whereby  he  lost  two- 
thirds  of  the  use  of  the  hand.  There  was  no  evidence 
that  in  scraping  the  callous  the  employee  broke  the 
skin.  Doctors  testified  that  incision  was  necessary 
for  an  infection  and  that  the  infection  might  have 
been  due  to  the  original  accident.  Held:  That  there 


80  SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  ARISING  OUT  OF 

is  evidence  in  the  record  justifying  the  decision  of 
the  Commission.  Challenge  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  596;  127  N.  E.  83. 

79  Employee  teamster  employed  by  Walsh  T.  Co.  was 
92  at  the  time  of  the  accident  hired  out  to  the  Lynch 
T.  Co.  and  was  doing  some  hauling  for  them.  The 
load  which  the  employee  received  that  night  was  not 
to  be  delivered  until  the  next  morning.  It  was  part 
of  the  duties  of  the  teamster  to  take  a  receipt  to  the 
consignee.  The  teamster  was  killed  in  trying  to 
look  down  the  elevator  shaft  although  there  was  no 
eye-witness  to  the  accident.  Held:  That  there  is 
competent  evidence  in  the  record  tending  to  support 
the  finding  of  the  Commission  that  the  death  arose 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment.  Walsh 
Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  536, 
540;125N.E.331. 

79  Employee  was  a  machine  hand  and  while  in  the 
toilet  his  clothing  caught  on  fire  from  some  matches 
that  he  carried  in  his  pocket.  He  was  so  badly 
burned  that  he  died.  On  cross  examination,  brother 
of  deceased  said  that  he  was  told  before  his  death 
that  he  bumped  into  a  locker  and  that  matches  caught 
on  fire.  No  evidence  that  he  was  smoking.  Held: 
That  the  Commission  was  justified  in  inferring  that 
the  accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.  Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  435;  127  N.  E.  698. 

79  Evidence  showing  an  employee  injured  by  the  ig- 
nition of  matches  which  he  carried  held  to  justify 
finding  of  the  Commission  that  the  accident  arose 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment.  Steel 
Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  435, 
441;  127  N.  E.  698. 


SEC.  1— "IN  THE   COURSE    OF"  81 

79  Accidents  resulting  from  smoking  where  smoking 
has  not  been  prohibited  have  been  held  to  arise  out 
of  the  employment.  Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  435,  438;  127  N.  E.  698. 

79  It  cannot  be  implied  from  the  contract  of  employ- 
ment that  an  employee  might  rest  in  a  dangerous 
place  during  an  interval  in  the  work.  Weis  Paper 
Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  290; 
127  N.  E.  732. 

"In  the  Course  of." 

79  The  test  as  to  "in  the  course  of"  is  triple  and  re- 
lates to  time,  conduct  and  place.    Schweiss  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  90,  97 ;  126  N.  E.  566. 

80  An  employee  will  generally  be  considered  as  being 
within  the  course  of  the  employment  when  he  is  go- 
ing to  or  from  his  place  of  work  while  on  the  prem- 
ises of  the  employer,  if  he  is  following  the  customary 
or  permitted  route  in  going  to  or  coming  from  his 
work.    But  he  must  not  choose  a  needlessly  danger- 
ous path  to  and  from  his  work, — if  the  path  is  cus- 
tomarily used  for  those  purposes  and  is  not  spe- 
cially forbidden  by  the  master.    W abash  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119,  125;  128  N.  E. 
290. 

80        An  injury  occurs  in  the  course  of  employment 
98     when  it  occurs  during  the  period  of  employment  at 
84    the  place  where  the  employee  may  reasonably  be 
and  while  he  is  fulfilling  the  duties  of  his  employ- 
ment doing  something  incidental  to  it,  and  that  the 
question  of  whether  the  employee  in  going  to  and 
returning  from  his  place  of  employment  is  in  the 
line  of  his  employment  depends  upon  the  particular 
circumstances  of  each  case.    Western  Coal  &  Mining 


82  SEC.  1— "IN  THE  COURSE  OF" 

Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408,  410;  129 
N.  E.  779. 

80  In  determining  whether  an  injury  arose  in  the 
course  of  the  employment,  it  is  proper  to  show  the 
custom  of  employees  in  choosing  certain  routes  in 
going  to  and  from  work.  (In  re  Stacy,  225  Mass. 
174;  di  Salvio  v.  Menahan,  225  N.  Y.  766;  Bylow  v. 
St.  Regis  Paper  Co.,  166  N.  Y.  S.  874;  Nelson  Const. 
Co.  v.  Ind.  Com.,  286  111.  632.)  Schweiss  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  90;  126  N.  E.  566. 

82  The  accident  must  be  suffered  in  the  course  of  the 
employment  in  the  doing  of  something  which  the 
employee  may  reasonably  do  within  a  time  during 
which  he  is  employed  and  at  a  place  where  he  may 
reasonably  be,  during  the  time  to  do  that  thing.  Rain- 
ford  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  289  111.  427,  430;  124 
N.  E.  643. 

82  A  workman  is  said  to  be  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment when  within  the  time  covered  by  the  em- 
ployment he  is  doing  something  he  might  reasonably 
do  while  so  employed  at  a  place,  where  he  might  rea- 
sonably be  while  in  the  employment.  Schweiss  v. 
Ind.  Com.,  292  111.  90,  97;  126  N.  E.  566. 

82  An  accident  cannot  happen  in  the  course  of  the 
employment  where  there  is  no  employment.  Michi- 
gan Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  503,  506;  125  N.E.  278. 

82  An  accident  arises  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment, if  it  occurs  while  the  employee  is  doing  what 
a  man  so  employed  may  reasonably  do  within  a  time 
during  which  he  is  employed  and  at  a  place  where 
he  may  reasonably  be  during  that  time  to  do  that 
thing.  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  284,  286;  127  N.  E.  732. 


SEC.  1— DURATION  OF  EMPLOYMENT  83 

82  Even  though  an  accident  might  happen  in  the 
course  of  the  employment,  still  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  it  arose  out  of  the  employment.    Weis  Pop- 
per Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284. 

287;  127  N.  E.  732. 

• 

Duration  of  Employment. 

83  The  controlling  factor  in  determining  whether  an 
injury  arose  out  of  the  employment  is  whether  the 
employee  was  within  the  orbit,  area  or  sphere  of  his 
duty,  and  if  the  employee  is  injured  on  the  premises 
of  the  employer  in  going  to  or  from  work,  he  is  en- 
titled to  compensation  for  such  injuries.    Schweiss 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90.  92;  126  N.  E. 
566. 

83  The  act  of  getting  a  receipt  by  a  teamster  for 
goods  which  he  is  hauling  is  within  the  line  of  his 
employment.  Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  536,  541;  125  N.  E.  331. 

83  There  was  a  separate  employment  from  day  to 
day  and  the  relation  of  employer  and  employee 
ceased  when  he  was  told  that  there  was  no  work. 
Michigan  Central  B,y.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  503,  506;  125  N.  E.  278. 

83  The  employment  is  not  limited  to  the  exact  time 
when  the  workman  reaches  the  place  where  he  is  to 
begin  his  work  and  to  the  moment  when  he  ceases 
that  work.  Schiveiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292 
111.  90,92;  126  N.  E.  566. 


84         SEC.  1— COMMENCEMENT   AND   TERMINATION 

Commencement  and  Termination  of  the  Employ- 
ment. 

84  The  employment  includes  a  reasonable  amount  of 
time  and  space  before  and  after  ceasing  actual  em- 
ployment, having  in  mind  all  of  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  accident.  Schweiss  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  90,  92;  126  N.  E.  566;  W abash 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119,  123; 
128  N.  E.  290. 

84  A  man's  employment  does  not  begin  until  he  has 
reached  the  place  where  he  is  to  work  or  the  scene 
of  his  duty  and  does  not  continue  after  he  has  left 
the  premises  of  his  employer  and  it  is  held  that  if 
an  employee  is  injured  on  the  premises  of  the  em- 
ployer in  going  to  or  from  work,  he  is  entitled  to 
compensation  for  such  injuries.  Wabash  Railway 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119,  122 ;  128 
N.  E.  290. 

84  The  employment  does  not  begin  until  the  employee 
has  reached  the  place  where  he  has  to  work  or  the 
scene  of  his  duty,  and  it  does  not  continue  after  he 
has  left  unless  the  conveyance  in  which  he  travels 
to  or  leaves  the  premises  is  furnished  by  his  em- 
ployer. Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
90,  92;  126  N.  E.  566. 

84  Where  an  employee  is  working  as  an  extra  man, 
180  in  the  absence  of  the  regular  employee,  his  coming 
to  the  yards  to  see  whether  there  was  employment 
might  be  a  necessary  incident  of  the  work  but  where 
the  regular  employee  had  returned,  his  relation  as 
an  employee  to  the  employer  ceased  immediately. 
Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  503?  506 ;  125  N.  E.  278. 


SEC.  1— COMMENCEMENT   AND   TERMINATION         85 

84  The  usual  rule  is  that  a  man's  employment  does 
not  begin  until  he  has  reached  the  place  where  he  is 
to  work  or  the  scene  of  his  duty  and  does  not  con- 
tinue after  he  has  left  the  premises  of  his  employer. 
Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111. 
119,  122;  128  N.  E.  290. 

84  Where  an  employee  had  arrived  at  the  premises 
98  of  his  employer  and  was  going  to  the  wash-house 
preparatory  to  going  into  the  mine,  the  going  to 
work  was  incidental  to  the  contract  of  employment 
and  was  necessary  to  his  employment.  Western  Coal 
&  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408, 
410;  129  N.  E.  779. 

84  The  employment  is  not  limited  to  the  exact  time 
when  the  workman  reaches  the  place  where  he  be- 
gins his  work  or  to  the  moment  when  he  ceases  that 
work.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  119, 122, 123;  128  N.  E.  290. 

84  An  accident  arises  out  of  the  employment  where 
an  employee  is  injured  on  his  way  to  work,  for  go- 
ing to  work  is  an  incident  as  necessary  to  employ- 
ment as  quitting.  Western  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  408,  411;  129  N.  E.  779. 

84  A  machinist  who  repaired  engines  in  a  roundhouse 
was  killed  by  a  switch  engine  on  his  way  to  take  a 
train  home.  There  was  evidence  tending  to  show  a 
custom  on  the  part  of  employees  to  use  a  certain 
cinder  path.  Held,  the  accident  occurred  in  the 
course  of  the  employment  even  though  he  might  have 
avoided  walking  along  the  track.  Wabash  Railway 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119 ;  128  N.  E. 
290. 


86         SEC.  1— COMMENCEMENT   AND   TERMINATION 

307  Held,  that  there  was  evidence  in  the  record  to 
show  that  the  employer  did  not  furnish  transporta- 
tion but  that  the  men  when  they  got  on  the  car  were 
passed  by  the  conductor.  Wabash  Railway  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  HI.  119,  121. 

84        Where  an  employee  is  injured  on  the  premises  of 

98  the  employer  in  going  to  or  returning  from  his  em- 
ployment, he  is  then  in  the  employment  of  his  mas- 
ter because  the  thing  he  is  doing  is  necessarily  in- 
cident to  his  employment,  and  the  character  of  his 
employment  at  that  particular  time  is  determined  by 
the  character  of  the  employment  he  is  assigned  to 
do  when  he  goes  on  active  duty  or  the  character  of 
the  employment  which  he  has  just  left.  Payne  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  223,  227 ;  129  N.  E. 
830. 

84  Accidents  while  on  way  to  work,  held  to  have  been 
in  the  course  of  the  employment :  Workman  injured 
300  yards  from  nearest  building.  Nicol  v.  Young's 
Parafine  Oil  Co.,  52  S.  L.  354.  Miner  hurt  thirteen 
feet  from  entrance  to  mine.  Mackenzie  v.  Coltness 
Iron  Co.,  6  Sess.  Gas.  (5th  Series  Scot.  Ct.  of  Ses- 
sion) 8.  Miner  hurt  half  a  mile  from  the  bottom  of 
the  shaft,  after  work.  Sedlock  v.  Carr  Coal  Co.,  98 
Kan.  680.  Employee  hurt  in  elevator  after  whistle 
blew.  Nelson  v.  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  12  N.  &  C.  C. 
A.  660.  Engineer  tried  to  take  short  cut  after  whis- 
tle blew.  Bennett  v.  Russell  &  Sons  Co.,  12  N.  &  C. 
C.  A.  659,  note.  Laborer  stopped  by  storm  and  while 
on  way  home,  injured.  Taylor  v.  Jones,  1  B.  W.  C. 
C.  3.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  HI.  119, 123, 124;  128  N.  E.  290. 

86  Whether  an  employee  in  going  to  or  returning 
from  work  is  in  the  line  of  his  employment,  is  gov- 


SEC.  1— COMMENCEMENT   AND   TERMINATION         87 

erned  and  controlled  by  the  particular  circumstances 
and  facts  in  each  case.  Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  90,  93;  126  N.  E.  566. 

87  It  is  not  essential  that  an  employee  be  at  the  place 
where  his  work  is  to  be  done  in  order  that  an  acci- 
dent may  be  in  the  course  of  the  employment;  an 
employee  may  be  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act, 
although  an  accident  happens  on  his  way  to  or  from 
his  usual  place  of  employment.  Michigan  Central 
Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  503,  506; 
125  N.  E.  278. 

87  An  employee  who  is  in  continuous  service,  when 
on  the  employer's  premises  going  to  his  place  of 
work  is  performing  an  act  which  is  a  necessary  inci- 
dent of  his  work.  Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  503,  506;  125  N.  E. 
278. 

87  Even  though  there  might  have  been  casual  em- 
ployment, still  the  injury  would  not  be  compensable 
because  it  did  not  happen  while  in  the  employment 
but  on  his  way  home.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  294  HI.  388,  390;  128  N.  E.  524. 

87  Where  there  is  a  contract  to  take  certain  em- 
ployees on  trucks  from  a  certain  town  to  their  work, 
it  is  not  part  of  the  contract  of  hire  that  they  be 
furnished  trucks  to  be  taken  from  their  homes  to 
work.  United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  480,  486;  126  N.  E.  183. 

87  Where  employees  make  an  arrangement  among 
themselves  to  be  taken  from  one  place  to  another  in 
the  truck  belonging  to  their  employer,  such  arrange- 
ment cannot  affect  the  contract  that  the  employer 
made  with  them  about  being  hauled  from  a  certain 


88         SEC.  1— COMMENCEMENT   AND   TERMINATION 

place.    United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  480,  486;  126  N.  E.  183. 

88  Employer  operating  a  line  of  taxis  sent  a  chauf- 
feur to  drive  a  customer.    The  customer  complained 
of  the  drunken  condition  of  the  driver  and  refused 
to  ride  with  him.    On  the  return  of  the  driver  to  the 
garage,  the  employer  discharged  him.    The  employee 
left  the  building,  later  he  was  found  dead  on  the  ele- 
vator.   Held,  that  the  employment  ceased  when  the 
employee  left  the  building  and  that  the  accident  did 
not  occur  in  the  course  of  the  employment.    Emery 
Motor  Livery  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  532; 
126  N.  E.  143. 

89  On  January  11,  1917,  employee  who  was  a  street 
inspector  for  the  City  of  Chicago,  sustained  injuries 
as  the  result  of  a  fall  from  which  he  died.     There 
was   evidence   that  he  might  have   died  from   the 
sloughing  of  an  ulcer  of  the  stomach.    The  Court  as- 
sumed that  the  fall  might  have  caused  the  death.    It 
appeared  that  the  employment  ended  on  December 
7,  1916,  when  his  name  was  taken  from  civil  service 
list.    Held,  as  the  injury  did  not  occur  during  the 
employment,  the  award  must  be  set  aside.    City  of 
Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  388;  128 
N.  E.  524. 

87  Going  to  and  coining  from  work  cases  reviewed 
and  distinguished  on  the  facts  (Friebel  v.  Chicago 
City  Ry.,  280  111.  76;  Fairbank  Co.  v.  Ind.  Com.,  285 
111.  11;  Nelson  Const.  Co.  v.  Imd.  Com.,  286  111.  632; 
International  Harvester  Co.  v.  Ind.  Bd.,  282  111.  489; 
HiUs  v.  Blair,  182  Mich.  20;  Mclnerney  v.  Buffalo 
and  Susquehanna  R.  R.  Corp.,  225  N.  Y.  130;  Hos- 
kins  v.  Lancaster,  3  B.  "W.  C.  C.  476;  Leveroni  v. 


SEC.  1— INTERRUPTION  OF  EMPLOYMENT  89 

Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  219  Mass.  488 ;  Bylow  v.  St.  Regis 
Paper  Co.,  166  N.  Y.  S.  874;  In  re  Stacy,  225  Mass. 
174;  In  re  Sundine,  218  Mass.  1;  In  re  Hallett,  121 
N.  E.  (Mass.)  503;  Granite  Sand  &  Gravel  Co.  v. 
Willoughby,  123  N.  E.  (Mass.)  194).  Schweiss  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90;  126  N.  E.  566. 

Interruption  of  Employment. 

88  An  employee  has  the  right  to  go  to  the  toilet  any 
necessary  time  during  his  service.     Vulcan  Detin- 
ning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  141,  146; 
128  N.  E.  917. 

89  Where  an  employee  was  fatally  injured  while  rid- 
113  ing  on  an  elevator  after  delivering  some  mail  and 
while  on  his  way  to  lunch,  he  is  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce  and  not  entitled  to  compensation. 
C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  374,  376;  128  N.  E.  516. 

89  When  an  employee  leaves  the  premises  of  his  em- 

90  ployer  and  is  no  longer  fulfilling  any  duty  of  his 
employment,  he  is  not  employed  by  the  employer 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Compensation  Act.  Payne 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  223,  226;  129  N.  E. 
830. 

89  An  injury  arises  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment,  where  it  is  reasonably  necessary  and 
incidental,  that  the  employee  should  have  his  lunch 
at  the  time  and  place  allowed  by  the  employer.  Rain- 
ford  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  289  111.  427,  430;  124 
N.  E.  643. 

89  Employee  while  at  work  for  employer  may  do 
those  things  which  are  necessary  for  his  health  and 
comfort,  even  though  the  things  are  personal  to  him- 


90  SEC.  1— SCOPE  OF  EMPLOYMENT 

self,  and  such  acts  will  be  considered  incidental  to 
the  employment.  (Rainford  v.  Chicago  City  Ey.  Co., 
289  111.  427;  Nelson  Construction  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  286  111.  632.)  Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  435.,  437,  438;  127  N.  E. 
698. 

90  Accidents  happening  during  the  leisure  periods  of 
the  employee  in  attendance  on  personal  comforts 
or  necessities  may  or  may  not  arise  out  of  the  em- 
ployment, if  the  accident  occurs  on  the  employer's 
premises  or  about  his  property,  unless  the  workman 
is  doing  something  foreign  to  his  employment,  there 
would  be  no  break  in  the  employment  and  the  acci- 
dent would  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Weis  Pa- 
per Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284, 
287;  127  N.  E.  732. 

Employee  killed  while  asleep.  In  re  B  oilman 
(Ind.),  126  N.  E.  639.  See  also,  Indian  C.  C.  &  M. 
Co.  v.  Wehr  (Ind.),  128  N.  E.  765. 

Scope  of  Employment. 

90  Where  the  injury  results  from  an  assault,  while 
the  employee  was  engaged  in  the  performance  of  his 
duties,  so  that  the  employment  is  the  origin  of  the 
accident,  it  is  compensable.  (Ohio  Building  Safety 
Vault  Co.  v.  Ind.  Board,  277  111.  96;  C.  R.  I.  &  P.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ind.  Com.,  288  111.  126,  distinguished.) 
Marion  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292  111.  463?  465;  127  N.  E.  84. 

90  Whether  an  employee  in  going  to  and  from  his 
place  of  employment  is  in  the  line  of  his  employment 
will  depend  largely  upon  the  particular  facts  and 
circumstances  of  each  case.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  294  111.  119,  123 ;  128  N.  E.  290. 


SEC.  1— SCOPE  OF  EMPLOYMENT  91 

93  An  accident  befalling  a  workman  on  his  way  to 
or  from  work  cannot  be  held  to  arise  out  of  the  em- 
ployment where  he  has  not  yet  come  within  or  has 
left  the  sphere  of  his  employment,  and  where  an 
employee,  without  knowledge  of  the  employer,  uses 
a  way  other  than  that  provided  by  him,  an  accident 
thereon  cannot  be  said  to  arise  out  of  the  employ- 
ment. Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
90,  93 ;  126  N.  E.  566. 

90  The  fact  that  the  foreman  could  have  warned  the 
employee  has  no  bearing  on  the  case.  West  Side 
Coal  &  Mining  Go.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
301,  303;  126  N.  E.  218. 

Employee  injured  while  filling  bottle  at  bubble 
fountain  is  outside  of  scope  of  employment.  Bol- 
den's  Case  (Mass.),  126  N.  E.  668. 

90  The  scope  of  the  servant's  duties  is  to  be  defined 
by  what  he  was  employed  to  perform,  and  by  what, 
with  the  knowledge  and  approval  of  the  master,  he 
actually  did  perform.    Sunni/side  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  523,  526 ;  126  N.  E.  196. 

91  The  area  of  an  employee's  duty  is  much  more 
readily  ascertained  in  some  cases  than  in  others. 
Where  the  premises  are  confined  to  a  single  building 
or  plant  or  inclosure,  it  is  usually  held  that  the  ac- 
cident occurring  on  the  premises  arises  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment,  but  when  the  acci- 
dent occurs  on  the  right-of-way  of  a  railroad  which 
extends  for  miles  it  is  more  difficult  to  decide.    Wa~ 
basli  Hy.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119, 
123;  128  N.  E.  290. 

91  The  question  of  whether  an  employee  is  permitted 
to  ride  free  on  the  trains  of  his  master  is  not  con- 
trolling where  the  employee  was  injured  on  the  way 


92  SEC.  1— SCOPE  OF  EMPLOYMENT 

to  take  the  train  in  question.  Wabash  Ey.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119,  126;  128  N.  E. 
290. 

90  If  the  employee  receives  an  injury  in  the  act  of 
violating  an  instruction  of  his  employer,  by  which 
violation  he  is  taken  outside  of  the  scope  of  his  em- 
ployment, the  injury  does  not  arise  out  of  the  em- 
ployment. (Nelson  Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 286  111.  632;  United  Disposal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  480.)  Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  HI.  332,  336;  129  N.  E. 
142. 

90  The  controlling  factor  in  determining  whether  the 
employee  is  in  the  course  of  his  employment  is 
whether  the  employee  at  the  time  of  the  accident 
was  within  the  orbit,  area,  scope  or  sphere  of  the 
employment.  Wabash  Railway  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 294  111.  119,  122;  128  N.  E.  290. 

90  Where  an  employee  is  shown  to  be  outside  of  the 
scope  of  his  employment,  the  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  make  an  award.  West  Side  Coal  & 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  301; 
126  N.  E.  218. 

90  It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  the  employment  to 
use  a  compressed  air  hose  on  another  employee  in  a 
spirit  of  horse-play.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  388,  394;  129  N.  E.  122. 

90  Where  an  employee  contrary  to  orders  did  work 
he  was  told  not  to  do,  such  evidence  shows  that  he 
was  not  engaged  in  any  duty  he  was  employed  for  or 
in  any  work  incident  thereto  and  he  is  therefore  out- 
side of  the  scope  of  the  employment.  West  Side  Coal 
&  Minwq  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  301; 
126  N.  E.  218. 


SEC.  1— VOLUNTEER  93 

Volunteer. 

90  Where  the  employer  does  not  know  the  practice 
or  custom,  the  employee  is  held  to  be  a  volunteer 
acting  outside  the  scope  of  his  authority,  and  if  the 
employer  does  know  and  acquiesces,  the  employee  is 
held  to  be  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority. 
Sunnyside  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  523,526;  126  N.  E.  196. 

92  Injuries  sustained  by  an  employee  while  doing 
something  other  than  that  for  which  he  was  em- 
ployed arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment. (Citing  Dietzen  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  279 
111.  11 ;  Harts  v.  Hartford  Faience  Co.,  90  Conn.  539 ; 
Sunnyside  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  523.)  Hafer  Washed  Coat<  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  578,  580;  129  N.  E.  521. 

91  Employee  was  engaged  to  operate  paint  mixers  in 
a  factory.    It  was  the  duty  of  the  employee  to  keep 
material  in  the  mixers  and  to  draw  it  off.     Mill- 
wrights were  employed  to  keep  the  belts  in  condi- 
tion.   A  belt  got  out  of  condition  and  in  putting  it 
back,  it  was  found  to  have  a  half -hitch.    One  of  the 
workmen  was  trying  to  straighten  it  out  with  a  piece 
of  gas  pipe,  when  the  employee  volunteered  to  take 
the  pipe  and  before  the  foreman  could  stop  him,  the 
employee  was  killed.    There  was  evidence  that  the 
foreman  shouted,  "Don't,  don't."    It  was  held  that 
the  employee  was  a  volunteer,  and,  as  there  was  no 
emergency,  there  can  be  no  recovery  under  the  Work- 
men's   Compensation   Act.     Mepham  v.   Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  484;  124  N.  E.  540. 

91  Where  a  servant  voluntarily  and  without  direction 
from  the  master  and  without  his  acquiescence  goes 


94  SEC.  1— VOLUNTEER 

into  hazardous  work  outside  of  his  contract  of  hire, 
he  puts  himself  beyond  the  protection  of  the  mas- 
ter's implied  undertaking  and  is  not  within  the  terms 
of  the  Compensation  Act.  Adams  &  Westlake  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  590,  592;  127  N.  E. 
168. 

91  Where  an  employee  exchanged  work  with  a  co-em- 
ployee and  this  practice  was  known  and  acquiesced 
in  by  the  employer,  such  servant  cannot  be  said  to 
be  a  mere  volunteer.  Sunnyside  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  523, 527 ;  126  N.  E.  196. 

91  An  injury  to  an  employee  while  engaged  in  a  vol- 
untary act,  not  accepted  by  or  known  to  the  employer 
and  outside  the  duties  for  which  he  is  employed,  can- 
not be  said  to  arise  out  of  his  employment.  Mepham 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  484,  488;  124  N.  E. 
540. 

91  Where  an  employee  was  neither  expected,  nor  re- 
quired to  assist  in  the  adjustment  of  a  belt,  and  there 
was  no  emergency  existing  and  the  condition  of  the 
belt  did  not  affect  the  condition  of  the  work  that 
the  employee  was  doing,  the  employee  must  be  con- 
sidered to  have  volunteered  and  is  not  entitled  to 
compensation.  Mepham  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  484,  489;  124  N.  E.  540. 

91  Where  it  appears,  from  the  testimony  of  fellow 
employees,  that  deceased  was  volunteering  his  ser- 
vices and  was  of  his  own  volition  intermeddling  with 
something  entirely  outside  the  work  for  which  he 
was  employed,  he  is  not  entitled  to  receive  compen- 
sation under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 
Mepham  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  484,  490 ; 
124  N.  E.  540. 


SEC.  1— VOLUNTEER  95 

91  A  "volunteer"  is  one  who  introduces  himself  into 
matters  which  do  not  concern  him.  and  does  or  un- 
dertakes to  do  something,  which  he  is  not  bound  to 
do,  which  he  has  not  been  in  the  habit  of  doing,  with 
his  employer 's  knowledge  or  consent,  or  which  is  not 
in  pursuance  of  any  interest  of  the  master,  and  which 
is  undertaken  in  the  absence  of  any  peril  requiring 
him  to  act  as  on  an  emergency.    Mepham  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  484,  489;  124  N.  E.  540. 

92  The  fact  that  an  employee  was  told  to  do  some 
work  on  a  different  machine  by  an  employee  having 
no  authority  to  give  orders,  does  not  change  the 
status  of  the  injured  employee  so  as  not  to  make  him 
a  volunteer.    Henri/  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  491,  493;  127  N.E.  714. 

92  There  is  no  liability  for  injury  to  a  workman,  un- 
less the  workman  was  at  the  time  of  the  injury  in 
the  performance  of  some  duty  for  which  he  was  em- 
ployed, and  if  a  workman  voluntarily  and  without 
his  employer's  direction  or  acquiescence  undertakes 
work  which  he  was  not  employed  to  do,  he  is  not,  as 
to  such  work,  within  the  protection  of  the  Act.  Henry 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  491,  493;  127  N.  E. 
714. 

91  Where  an  employee  whose  duty  it  is  to  drive  a 
truck  turns  over  the  wheel  to  another  person  to  do 
the  driving,  he  is  not  at  the  time  of  the  injury  en- 
gaged in  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  his  em- 
ployment and  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  accident 
arose  out  of  the  employment.  Morris  &  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  295  111.  49,  52 ;  128  N.  E.  727. 

93  The  voluntary  offer  of  a  willing  servant  to  make 
himself  useful  in  a  matter  not  covered  by  any  ex- 


96  SEC.  1— VOLUNTEER 

press  command,  when  the  proffered  service  is  ac- 
cepted by  the  superior  although  not  by  an  approval 
expressed  in  words,  cannot  be  said  as  a  matter  of 
law  to  put  the  servant  outside  the  limits  of  his  em- 
ployment. (Miner  v.  Franklin  County  Telephone 
Co.,  83  Vt.  311.)  Sunny  side  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  523,  527 ;  126  N.  E.  196. 

94  Man  employed  to  do  punch-press  work  was  put 
to  work  by  the  foreman  on  a  kicker.  There  were  two 
other  machines  in  the  room  where  employee  worked. 
After  working  at  the  kicker  for  an  hour,  he  was  put 
to  work  on  another  machine  by  some  other  employee 
and  later  was  switched  to  a  third  machine  where  the 
accident  happened.  The  foreman  had  no  knowledge 
that  the  employee  was  put  to  work  at  another  ma- 
chine. Held,  that  the  injury  did  not  arise  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment  and  that  the  award 
must  be  set  aside.  Henry  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  491 ;  127  N.  E.  714. 

94  An  injury  to  an  employee  while  engaged  in  a  vol- 
untary act  not  accepted  by  or  known  to  his  employer 
and  outside  the  duties  for  which  he  is  employed,  does 
not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Adams  &  West- 
lake  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  590,  592 ; 
127  N.  E.  168. 

97  Employee  was  engaged  as  a  rock  and  slate  picker. 
His  duty  was  to  sit  on  the  top  of  a  coal  chute.  Spe- 
cial men  known  as  car  trimmers  were  engaged  to 
move  the  cars;  employee  in  question  was  instructed 
never  to  move  a  car.  Car-trimmers  got  behind  in 
their  work  and  employee  left  seat  and  tried  to  move 
car  whereby  he  was  killed.  Held,  that  the  deceased 
was  not  engaged  in  any  part  of  his  duty  but  was  do- 


SEC.  1— DISOBEYING  ORDERS  97 

ing  an  act  he  was  told  not  to  do  and  his  death  did 
not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 
West  Side  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  301;  126  N.  E.  218. 

95  An  employee  cannot  choose  an  unnecessarily  dan- 
gerous place  to  do  things,  nor  can  he  do  them  in  an 
unnecessarily  dangerous  way.  (25  Harvard  L.  R. 
411  and  cases  cited.)  Wcis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  284,  290;  127  N.  E.  732. 

95  But  where  the  duties  of  the  employee  required  him 
continually  to  work  near  the  tracks,  the  result  might 
be  different.    Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  284,  290;  127  N.  E.  732. 

Disobeying  Orders. 

96  Where  an  employee  disobeys  instructions  and  does 
something  for  his  own  convenience,  he  is  acting  out- 
side of  his  employment  and  the  injury  that  he  re- 
ceives does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.    United 
Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  480,  486;  126  N.  E.  183. 

95  A  direction  to  an  employee,  not  to  go  to  a  certain 
place,  is  not  merely  a  prohibition  limiting  the  sphere 
of  the  employment,  but  deals  with  the  conduct  of 
the  employee  within  that  sphere.  Mississippi  River 
Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353,  355, 
356;  124  N.  E.  552. 

92  The  mere  fact  that  the  deceased  employee  dis- 
obeyed instructions  does  not  of  itself  make  the  in- 
jury one  that  does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment. 
Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111.  332,  336;  129  N.  E.  142. 


98  SEC.  1— DISOBEYING  ORDERS 

96  Where  the  employee  is  clearly  outside  of  the  line 
of  his  employment  or  is  doing  things  not  incident  to 
it,  and  against  instructions  which  are  given  by  the 
employer,  or  if  he  abandons  the  employer's  employ- 
ment, he  is  not  entitled  to  compensation.  (Dietzen, 
Northern  Illinois  Traction  and  Central  Garage  cases 
distinguished  from  the  case  at  bar.)  Walsh  Team- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  536,  541; 
125  N.  E.  331. 

96  Where  a  rule  was  in  force  prohibiting  smoking,  it 
is  not  a  violation  of  that  rule  to  carry  matches 
around  on  the  person.  Steel  Sal&s  Corporation  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  435,  440 ;  127  N.  E.  698. 

96  Where  there  is  evidence  that  employee  knew  of  a 
rule  and  had  been  warned  not  to  use  the  motor,  but 
it  was  shown  to  be  the  custom  of  employees  to  use 
the  motors  and  that  none  of  the  restrictions  applied 
to  the  deceased  employee,  it  was  held  that  there  was 
no  evidence  to  show  that  the  employee  was  killed 
in  consequence  of  the  violation  of  a  rule  of  his  em- 
ployer. Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
296111.  11, 15;  129  N.E.  536. 

96  Where  the  evidence  shows  that  a  rule  with  respect 
to  the  use  of  certain  instrumentalities  is  a  mere  pa- 
per rule  which  is  not  enforced,  the  employee  is  not 
barred  from  recovering  compensation  because  of  the 
violation  of  such  a  rule.    Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  11,  15;  129  N.  E.  536. 

97  An  employee  must  not  increase  the  risk  of  the  in- 
jury to  himself  and  so  the  risk  of  liability  of  his  mas- 
ter, beyond  that  contemplated  in  his  contract  of  em- 
ployment.      Weis    Paper    Mill    Co.    v.    Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  284,  290;  127  N.  E.  732. 


SEC.  1— DISOBEYING  ORDERS  99 

97  An  employee  was  engaged  in  making  repairs  to  a 
transmission  line.  He  had  been  directed  not  to  go 
over  to  the  side  where  the  live  wires  were.  It  was 
held,  that  the  prohibition  against  going  near  the  live 
wire  referred  to  his  conduct  in  doing  his  work  and 
that  there  was  no  evidence  that  he  had  undertaken 
to  do  anything  outside  of  his  employment  and  his 
contributory  negligence  in  failing  to  observe  the  di- 
rection not  to  go  near  the  live  wire,  did  not  relieve 
his  employer  from  liability  to  pay  compensation. 
Mississippi  Riv&r  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  353;  124  N.  E.  552. 

97  Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  tending  to 
establish  a  custom  of  employee  to  go  to  the  window 
to  get  the  air,  the  facts  do  not  bring  it  within  the  rule 
laid  down  by  the  court  which  applies  to  those  cases 
where  an  employee  was  disobeying  orders  or  mis- 
conducting himself.  Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  350,  356;  127  N.  E.  737. 

97  Where  an  employee  was  ordered  by  superintend- 
ent of  a  mine  to  get  some  timbers  and  bring  them 
to  a  certain  place.  He  was  employed  as  a  eager 
and  trapper  and  not  required  to  drive  mules.  The 
other  employee  asked  him  to  drive.  Held,  as  em- 
ployee was  assisting  in  the  execution  of  the  order 
and  was  injured  while  obeying  the  order,  it  is  not 
such  a  departure  from  his  line  of  employment  as 
would  preclude  him  from  compensation.  Hafer 
Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
578,  580;  129  N.  E.  521. 

97  Carrying  of  matches  by  an  employee,  unless  ex- 
pressly prohibited,  is  not  an  unreasonable  thing  for 
an  employee  to  do.  Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  435,  441;  127  N.  E.  698. 


100         SEC.  1— RISK  INCIDENTAL  TO  EMPLOYMENT 

97  An  injury  does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment, 
where  employee  is  so  drunk  that  he  cannot  follow 
his  employment  (appr.  Hahnemann  Hospital  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  282  111.  316).    Emery  Motor 
Livery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  532, 
534;  126  N.  E.  143. 

The  Risk  Must  Be  Incidental  to  the  Employment. 

98  An  accident  to  be  within  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  must  have  had  its  origin  in  some  risk  of 
the  employment.     Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  459,  463;  125  N.  E.  260. 

98  An  accident  to  be  within  the  Act  must  have  had 
its  origin  in  some  risk  of  the  employment.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  establish  a  fixed  rule  to  determine  what  is  a 
risk  of  the  employment.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  406,  407;  127  N.  E.  49. 

98  A  risk  is  incidental  to  the  employment  when  it  is 
either  an  ordinary  risk  directly  connected  with  the 
employment  or  an  extraordinary  risk  which  is  only 
indirectly  connected  therewith.  Weis  Paper  Mill 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  287 ;  127 
N.  E.  732. 

98  The  causative  danger  must  be  peculiar  to  the  work 
and  incidental  to  the  character  of  the  business.  Edel- 
weiss Gardens  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  459, 
462;  125  N.  E.  260. 

98  A  risk  is  incidental  to  the  employment  when  it  be- 
longs to  or  is  connected  with  what  a  workman  has  to 
do  in  fulfilling  his  contract  of  service.  (Dietzen  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Board,  279  111.  11;  International  Har- 
vester Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  282  111.  489.)  United 


SEC.  1— RISK  INCIDENTAL  TO  EMPLOYMENT         101 

Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  480,  485,  486 ;  126  N.  E.  183. 

98  A  risk  is  incidental  to  the  employment  when  it 
belongs  to  or  is  connected  with  what  a  workman  has 
to  do  in  fulfilling  his  contract  of  service.  Weis  Pa- 
per Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284, 
287;  127  N.  E.  732. 

98  If  the  injury  was  sustained  by  an  employee  in  the 
performance  of  any  act  incidental  to  his  employ- 
ment, it  arises  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment. Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  536,  540;  125  N.  E.  331. 

98  Where  an  employee  of  his  own  free  will  exposes 
himself  to  risks  not  incidental  to  the  work  at  which 
he  was  employed  he  cannot  recover  compensation. 
Henry  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  491,  493; 
127  N.  E.  714. 

98  To  recover  on  the  ground  that  an  accident  arose 
out  of  the  employment,  it  must  be  held  that  what  the 
employee  was  doing  was  reasonably  incident  to  the 
employment.  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  284,  289;  127  N.  E.  732. 

98  Where  an  employee  was  killed  while  resting  from 
his  work  by  laying  down  in  the  shade  of  a  freight 
car.  on  a  switchtrack,  which  might  be  moved  at  any 
time.  Held,  it  is  not  a  reasonable  incident  of  the 
employment,  that  the  employee  would  lie  down  on  a 
switchtrack  on  which  engines  ran  during  the  day, 
and  go  to  sleep  and  therefore  the  award  had  to  be 
quashed.  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  284;  127  N.  E.  732. 

98  An  injury  resulting  from  inexcusable  horse-play 
does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment  nor  is  it  inci- 


102        SEC.  1— RISK  INCIDENTAL  TO  EMPLOYMENT 

dental  to  the  employment,  and  an  award  for  such  in- 
juries must  be  set  aside.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  388,  394,  395;  129  N.  E.  122. 

98  Fairbank  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  285  111. 
11,  approved  where  there  is  inference  that  if  the  em- 
ployee is  doing  anything  incidental  to  the  employ- 
ment, then  there  is  evidence  tending  to  show  that  he 
is  in  the  scope  of  the  employment.  Wabash  Railway 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  119,  122;  128 
N.  E.  290. 

98  Where  an  employee  is  not  performing  any  duty 
or  protecting  any  property  and  was  not  hired  to 
carry  on  a  quarrel,  the  interests  of  the  employer  are 
not  being  aided,  protected  or  advanced  and  an  in- 
jury sustained  as  the  result  of  such  a  quarrel  has 
no  reasonable  connection  with  the  work.  Marion 
County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
463, 466;  127  N.  E.  84. 

98  Such  an  act  as  procuring  lunch  is  reasonably  in- 
cidental to  the  performance  of  the  work  of  any  em- 
ployee, being  one  of  the  necessities  imposed  by  na- 
ture. Rainford  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  289  111.  427, 
430;  124  N.  E.  643. 

98  That  which  is  reasonably  necessary  to  the  health 
and  comfort  of  the  employee,  although  personal  to 
him,  is  incidental  to  the  employment  and  service. 
Rainford  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  289  111.  427,  430; 
124  N.  E.  643. 

98  The  claimant  must  furnish  evidence  from  which 
the  inference  can  logically  be  drawn  that  the  injury 
arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment; 
that  it  must  rest  upon  something  more  than  mere 
guess  or  conjecture,  but  that  the  proof  of  such  facts 


SEC.  1— RISK  INCIDENTAL  TO  EMPLOYMENT         103 

may  be  established  by  circumstantial  as  well  as  di- 
rect evidence,  and  the  greater  or  less  probability, 
leading  on  the  whole  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion,  is 
all  that  can  be  required  to  establish  controverted 
facts.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  141, 147 ;  128  N.  E.  917. 

98  The  risk  of  the  injury  may  be  incidental  to  the 
employment  when  it  is  an  ordinary  risk  directly 
connected  with  the  employment  or  an  extraordinary 
risk  which  is  only  indirectly  connected  therewith. 
(Bryant  v.  Fissell,  84  K  J.  L.  72.)  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256,  259;  126  N.  E. 
144. 

98  The  employer  is  not  an  insurer  for  all  injuries 
arising  during  the  time  of  the  employment,  but  only 
those  arising  out  of  the  employment,  or  which  are 
reasonably  incidental  to  it.  Payne  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  388,  393,  394;  129  N.  E.  122. 

98  Where  an  employee  chooses  to  go  to  a  dangerous 
place  where  his  employment  does  not  necessarily 
carry  him  and  where  he  incurs  a  danger  of  his  own 
choosing,  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  act  was  an  inci- 
dent of  the  employment.  (Nelson  Construction  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  286  111.  632.)  United  Dis- 
posal and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  480,  486;  126  N.  E.  183. 

98  The  accident  must  result  from  a  risk  reasonably 
incidental  to  the  employment.  United  Disposal  and 
Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  480, 
485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

98  In  order  to  recover  for  an  accident  under  the 
"Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  it  must  result  from 
a  risk  reasonably  incidental  to  the  employment. 


104  SEC.  1— RISKS  COMMON  TO  PUBLIC 

Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  284,  286;  127  N.  E.  732. 

98  It  is  immaterial  where  the  danger  originates— 
whether  it  be  from  the  employment  or  outside  of  it 
— so  long  as  it  is  incident  to  it.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  256,  265;  126  N.  E. 
144. 

98  It  is  not  reasonably  incident  to  the  employment 
that  an  employee  during  an  interval  of  the  unload- 
ing of  wagons  would  lie  down  on  a  switch  track  and 
run  the  risk  of  going  to  sleep  when  the  track  was 
known  to  be  used  by  switch  engines.  Weis  Paper 
Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  290 ; 
127  N.  E.  732. 

Risks  Common  to  Public  (see  Street  Risks). 

98  Although  the  risk  of  being  injured  by  a  cyclone 
might  have  been  a  risk  common  to  the  public  in  that 
vicinity,  regardless  of  employment,  yet  if  there  was 
in  the  circumstances  of  the  employment  an  unusual 
risk  or  danger  of  injury  from  the  destruction  by  the 
storm  of  the  building  in  which  the  employee  was 
employed,  such  risk  would  then  be  an  incident  of 
the  employment  of  the  deceased  and  arises  out  of 
the  employment.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256,  265;  126  N.  E.  144. 

74  An  injury  which  cannot  be  fairly  traced  to  the 
employment  as  a  contributing  proximate  cause  and 
which  comes  from  a  hazard  to  which  the  workman 
would  have  been  equally  exposed  apart  from  the 
employment  is  excluded  from  arising  out  of  the 
employment.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  256,  259;  126  N.  E.  144. 


SEC.  1— RISKS  COMMON  TO  PUBLIC  105 

98  In  La  Veck  v.  Parke  Davis  &  Co.,  190  Mich.  604, 
an  employee  was  overcome  by  heat  while  working 
in  a  room  where  boiling  was  done.  The  weather 
was  hot  and  a  large  amount  of  bouillon  was  being 
made  on  this  occasion.  Held:  That  owing  to  the 
unusual  hours  of  work  and  conditions  surrounding 
the  employment,  the  employee  was  subjected  to  risks 
not  common  to  others  and  that  the  accident  arose 
out  of  the  employment.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  256,  263;  126  N.  E.  144. 

98  In  State  v.  District  Court,  129  Minn.  502,  a  driver 
105  of  an  ice  wagon  was  struck  by  a  bolt  of  lightning, 
either  while  seeking  shelter  from  the  storm  under 
a  tree,  or  while  soliciting  orders.  Held:  Employee 
entitled  to  compensation  because  the  risk  of  being 
struck  by  lightning  was  increased  by  reason  of  the 
employment  over  the  risk  of  the  public  in  that  vicin- 
ity for  the  reason  that  his  employment  required 
him  to  cover  a  certain  route  each  day,  regardless  of 
weather  conditions.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  256,  263,  264;  126  N.  E.  144. 

98  The  cases  are  not  in  harmony  on  the  rule  that  all 
persons  similarly  situated  are  not  entitled  to  com- 
pensation. C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  256,  263;  126  N.  E.  144. 

98  Risks  to  which  all  persons  similarly  situated  are 
equally  exposed  and  not  traceable  in  some  special 
degree  to  the  particular  employment  are  excluded. 
C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
256,  263;  126  N.  E.  144. 

98      There  are  numerous  cases  where  the  employee  was 

101  not  entitled  to  compensation  under  similar  facts.    In 

Burke  v.  Balentine  &  Co.,  38  N.  J.  L.  105.  a  brewery 

employee  who  died  as  the  result  of  being  overheated 


106  SEC.  1— EXPOSED  TO  HAZARD 

was  considered  to  have  been  subjected  to  the  same 
atmospheric  conditions  as  other  persons  working  in 
that  locality  and,  therefore,  not  entitled  to  compen- 
sation. In  Klawitvski  v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  185 
Mich.  643,  a  railway  employee  killed  by  lightning 
while  in  a  barn  where  he  had  gone  for  protection 
was  not  awarded  compensation.  So,  in  Hoenig  v. 
Industrial  Compensation,  159  Wis.  646,  the  court 
sustained  a  finding  where  an  employee  was  killed 
by  lightning,  but  said  that  if  it  had  to  pass  on  the 
question  it  would  have  made  a  different  finding  than 
the  Commission.  C.  I.  P.  S.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256,  264;  126  N.  E.  144. 

Exposed  to  the  Hazard. 

99  A  milk-wagon  driver,  whose  duty  it  is  to  harness 
157  a  horse,  get  his  milk  and  deliver  it  to  customers, 
who  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  washing  of  bottles 
or  machinery  of  the  plant,  is  not  within  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act  in  an  extra-hazardous  employment. 
Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292 
111.  284;  126  N.  E.  596. 

105  If  the  deceased,  by  reason  of  his  employment,  was 
exposed  to  a  risk  of  being  injured  by  a  storm  which 
was  greater  than  the  risk  to  which  the  public  in 
that  vicinity  was  subject,  or  if  his  employment  accen- 
tuated the  hazard  from  the  storm,  which  increased 
hazard  contributed  to  the  injury,  it  was  an  injury 
arising  out  of  the  employment,  although  unexpected 
and  unusual.  C.  I.  P.  8.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  256,  265;  126  N.  E.  144. 

105  A  longshoreman  who  froze  his  hands  was  awarded 
compensation  for  the  reason  that  the  circumstances 
surrounding  his  employment  put  him  in  a  peculiar 


SEC.  1— ASSAULTS  107 

position  of  hazard.  (Re  McManaman,  224  Mass. 
554.)  C.  I.  P.  8.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  256,  263;  126  N.E.  144. 

105  An  injury  not  fairly  traceable  to  the  employment 
as  the  contributing  proximate  cause  and  which 
comes  from  a  hazard  to  which  the  employee  would 
have  been  equally  exposed  apart  from  the  employ- 
ment, does  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  Edel- 
weiss Gardens  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  459, 
462;  125  N.  E.  260. 

105  Regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  employment  or 
the  risk  being  common  to  the  general  public,  the 
employee  must  have  been  exposed  to  it  in  a  greater 
degree  than  other  persons  by  reason  of  his  employ- 
ment.    C.  I.  P.  8.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  256,  263;  126  N.  E.  144. 

Assaults. 

106  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
285  111.  31,  where  employee  was  injured  as  a  result 
of  quarrel  over  staves,  distinguished  on  the  ground 
that  the  employer  knew  of  the  practice  which  re- 
sulted in  the  injury.    Payne  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  388,  394;  129  N.  E.  122. 

109  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
285  111.  31,  and  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
287  111.  564,  distinguished  on  the  grounds  that  the 
altercation  grew  out  of  matters  connected  with  the 
employee 's  work  and  was  not  purely  a  personal  one, 
entirely  outside  the  scope  of  his  employment.  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  406, 
407,408;  127  N.  E.  49. 

106  There  is  no  doubt  that  an  employee  is  entitled  to 
compensation  where  there  has  been  an  actual  encoun- 


108  SEC.  1— ASSAULTS 

ter  and  physical  violence  between  two  employees 
or  between  an  employee  and  someone  else.  (Marion 
County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
463 ;  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
277  111.  53 ;  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 285  111.  31;  Swift  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 287  111.  564;  Ohio  Building  Vault  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Board,  277  111.  96;  Chicago,  Rock  Island 
&  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  288  111. 
126.)  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298 
111.  463;  131  N.  E.  649. 

106  Where  a  felonious  assault  is  made  upon  an  em- 
ployee without  any  excuse  and  it  has  no  connection 
with  the  work  in  which  the  employee  is  engaged, 
then  there  is  no  causal  relation  with  the  work  and 
the  assault  and  compensation  cannot  be  awarded. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
406,408;  127  N.  E.  49. 

109  A  miner  who  dug  and  loaded  coal  got  into  an  al- 
tercation with  the  driver  because  the  miner  had 
not  been  given  the  same  number  of  cars  on  that 
day  as  the  other  man.  The  car  which  was  de- 
livered to  the  miner  had  a  chain  on  it  which  he 
insisted  be  taken  out.  The  driver  told  him  he  did 
not  have  to  remove  the  chain.  The  driver  told  the 
miner  that  if  he  did  not  shut  up  that  he  would  hit 
him.  Thereupon  the  miner  made  a  jump  for  the 
driver,  who  struck  and  killed  the  miner  with  a  sprag. 
Held :  As  the  quarrel  was  about  a  past  event  and  the 
miner  was  the  aggressor,  the  quarrel  had  no  con- 
nection with  the  work  and  the  award  was  not  justi- 
fied. Marion  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  463;  127  N.  E.  84. 


SEC.  1— ASSAULTS  109 

109  Where  a  quarrel  arose  as  the  result  of  a  chain 
being  left  in  a  coal  car  and  it  appeared  that  it  did 
not  impose  any  duty  on  the  employee,  the  injury 
sustained  as  a  result  of  the  quarrel  cannot  be  said 
to  arise  in  the  course  of  the  employment.    Marion 
County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
463,  464;  127  N.  E.  84. 

110  A  waiter  was  killed  by  a  bus-boy,  who  threw  a 
platter  at  his  head  suddenly  and  without  any  provo- 
cation being  displayed.     Held:   As   there   was  no 
proof  in  the  record  that  the  assault  had  its  origin 
in  or  any  connection  with  the  employment,  there 
was  no  evidence  to  sustain  the  award  and  the  cause 
was  remanded  to  the  Commission.    Edelweiss  Gar- 
dens v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  459,  463;  125 
N.  E.  260. 

111  Where  an  employee  is  assaulted  as  the  result  of  a 
personal  grudge  or  affair,  which  has  no  reference 
to  the  employment,  it  does  not  arise  out  of  the  em- 
ployment and  is  not  compensable.    City  of  Chicago 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  406,  408 ;  127  N.  E. 
49. 

110  A  laborer  who  was  unloading  sand  from  cars  into 
a  wagon  got  down  from  the  car  to  get  a  can  of  water. 
As  he  returned  with  the  water,  a  negro  employee 
asked  him  for  a  drink.  He  refused  it.  A  few 
moments  later  the  negro  struck  the  employee  over 
the  head  with  a  shovel,  killing  him.  Held,  the  in- 
jury did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment,  as  it  was 
not  incidental  to  the  character  of  the  business.  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  406; 
127  N.  E.  49. 

110  An  injury  done  by  one  to  another  on  account  of 
some  purely  personal  grudge,  which  the  proximity 


110  SEC.  1— STREET  RISKS 

of  the  employment  gives  an  opportunity  to  inflict, 
is  not  the  result  of  the  employment.  City  of  Chicago 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  406,  408;  127  N.  E. 
49.  See  also  7.  C.  v.  Pora  (Ohio),  125  N.  E.  662; 
Mueller  v.  Klingman  (Ind.),  125  N.  E.  464;  Ameri- 
can Steel  Foundries  v.  Melenik  (Ind.),  126  N.  E.  33. 

Street  Risks. 

Ill  An  employer  was  engaged  in  the  business  of  oper- 
93  ating  plants  for  the  disposal  of  garbage  and  waste 
materials.  It  employed  a  company  to  construct  an 
incinerator.  An  employee  of  the  garbage  disposal 
plant  drove  a  truck  every  day  to  the  place  where 
the  plant  was  being  built.  For  the  convenience  of 
the  employees,  the  truck  driver  would  take  employ- 
ees on  his  truck  to  the  place  where  the  work  was 
being  done.  The  truck  driver  later,  without  the 
consent  of  the  employer,  started  to  keep  the  truck 
in  another  place  and  would  take  a  route  other  than 
that  designated  by  his  employer.  While  on  this 
route  all  of  those  riding  in  the  truck  were  injured. 
The  shipping  clerk  knew  that  the  truck  was  being 
kept  in  a  different  place  but  did  not  object.  Held, 
that  the  employee  who  disobeyed  instructions  was 
acting  outside  his  employment  when  he  was  killed 
and  as  the  other  employees  were  being  transported 
from  a  place  other  than  that  agreed  upon,  their 
death  did  not  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment,  because  they  assumed  the  consequence 
of  their  own  act.  United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  480;  126  N.  E. 
183. 

Ill      Employee  was  a  chief  engineer  in  a  generating 
station.    A  tornado  blew  down  part  of  the  employ- 


SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  DURING  MEAL  HOURS,  ETC.     Ill 

er's  building.  The  tornado  injured  about  thirty 
people  and  killed  thirty-eight  in  the  town.  The  de- 
ceased was  found  just  inside  the  engine  room,  his 
body  scalded  and  bricks  piled  all  around.  Ammonia 
fumes  from  an  ice  machine  were  stifling.  Held, 
that  the  duties  of  the  deceased  took  him  among  the 
ammonia  pipes  and  subjected  him  to  a  risk  during 
the  storm  not  common  to  the  public  in  that  vicinity. 
Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v..  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  256;  126  N.  E.  144. 

Ill  Where  the  duties  of  an  employee,  killed  by  a  tor- 
nado, took  him  among  steam  and  ammonia  pipes,  it 
was  held  that  there  were  circumstances  of  the  em- 
ployment making  the  risks  not  common  to  the  public 
of  that  vicinity.  C.  I.  P.  8.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  256,  266;  126  N.  E.  144. 

Ill  Although  the  risk  from  the  action  of  the  elements, 
such  as  a  cyclone,  is  such  a  risk  as  all  people  of  the 
same  locality  are  subjected  to,  independent  of  em- 
ployment, yet  the  circumstance  of  a  particular  em- 
ployment may  make  the  danger  of  receiving  a  par- 
ticular injury  through  such  storm  an  exceptional  risk 
and  one  to  which  the  public  in  general  is  not  sub- 
jected. C.  I.  P.  8.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  256,  265;  126  N.  E.  144. 

Accidents  During  Meal  Hours  and  Other  Intervals. 

113  Where  a  ship's  engineer  was  asphyxiated  by  a 
stove  which  he  rigged  up  in  his  cabin,  in  an  intensely 
cold  place,  though  told  and  warned  not  to  use  it. 
Held,  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  the  employment. 
(Edmunds  v.  Owners  of  8.  8.  Peterson,  5  B.  W.  C. 
C.  157.)  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  284,  288;  127  N.  E.  732. 


112     SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  DURING  MEAL  HOURS,  ETC. 

113  Where  employee,  after  working  outside  in  the 
cold,  came  into  a  building  and  was  waiting  to  use 

,  an  elevator  to  carry  beef  for  his  employer,  sat  down 
in  front  of  the  fire-box  of  a  boiler  and  fell  asleep 
and  his  greasy  clothing  caught  on  fire.  Held,  that 
the  accident  arose  out  of  the  employment.  (Richards 
v.  Indianapolis  Abattoir  Co.,  92  Conn.  274.)  Weis 
Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission  293  111. 
284,  288;  127  N.  E.  732. 

113  Where  an  employee  was  engaged  in  dumping  cars 
loaded  with  briquettes.  He  blocked  one  of  the  cars 
to  get  the  warmth  from  the  briquettes  and  lay  down 
on  the  track,  the  night  being  very  cold.  While  lying 
there  he  was  injured.  Held,  that  he  was  entitled  to 
recover.  (Northwestern  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 160  Wis.  633.)  Weiss  Paper  Mill  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  288;  127  N.  E. 
732. 

113  Where  an  employee  for  the  sake  of  warmth  ate 
his  supper  while  seated  on  a  tank.  His  employers 
had  provided  a  dining  room  for  the  workmen,  but 
they  were  not  compelled  to  take  their  meals  there. 
Workman  fell  into  the  tank.  Held,  that  the  accident 
did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  (Brice  v. 
Lloyd,  2  B.  W.  C.  C.  26.)  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  289;  127  N.  E. 
732. 

113  Where  a  sailor  went  on  deck  from  his  cabin  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  on  a  hot  night  to  get 
fresh  air  and  his  body  was  found  the  next  day  in 
the  water.  Held,  that  it  was  not  shown  that  the 
accident  had  arisen  out  of  the  employment.  (Mar- 
shall v.  Owners  of  Ship  Wild  Rose,  2  B.  W.  C.  C. 
76.)  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  284,  289;  127  N.  E.  732. 


SEC.  1— ACCIDENTS  DURING  MEAL  HOURS,  ETC.     113 

113  A  workman  ordered  by  foreman  to  go  from  one 
part  of  the  works  to  the  other,  stopped  to  ease  him- 
self. Later  he  was  found  dead  in  a  hoist,  where  it 
was  unreasonable  for  him  to  go.  Held,  that  the 
accident  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.  (Rose 
v.  Morrison  et  al.,  4  B.  W.  C.  C.  277.)  Weis  Paper 
Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  284,  289 ; 

127  N.  E.  732. 

113  Acts  of  ministration  to  one's  self,  such  as  quench- 
ing the  thirst,  relieving  one's  hunger,  protecting 
one's  self  from  excessive  cold,  the  performance  of 
which  while  at  work  are  reasonably  necessary  to  the 
health,  or  comfort  of  the  work,  are  incidental  to  the 
employment.  Weis  Paper  Mill  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  284,  287;  127  N.  E.  732. 

88  Where  an  employee  was  injured  while  taking  an 
113  elevator  to  get  his  meal,  it  was  held  that  the  accident 
was  not  compensable  because  he  intended  to  engage 
in  some  work  having  to  do  with  interstate  com- 
merce after  he  had  the  meal.  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ey. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  374;  128  N.  E. 
516. 

88  A  teamster  was  killed  by  an  elevator  while  going 
to  get  a  receipt.  It  was  held  that  the  accident  was 
compensable.  Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  536;  125  N.  E.  331. 

88  An  employee  was  found  dead  in  a  toilet  vault, 
where  he  had  gone  during  working  hours,  it  was 
held  that  the  accident  was  compensable.  Vulcan  De- 
tinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  141; 

128  N.  E.  917. 

113  An  employee  was  killed  while  operating  the  ele- 
vator during  the  lunch  hour,  just  after  the  whistle 
had  blown  to  return  to  work.  Employees  were  for- 


114  SEC.  1— PROOF  OF  ACCIDENT 

bidden  to  run  the  elevator  except  truckers.  The 
deceased  was  a  trucker,  but  was  told  not  to  run 
elevator,  but  there  was  a  custom  for  all  old  employ- 
ees to  use  the  elevator.  Held,  there  was  some  evi- 
dence in  the  record  sufficient  to  sustain  a  finding 
that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.  Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  332;  129  N.  E.  142. 

114  Where  a  crew  of  a  train  was  relieved  from  duty 
and  then  were  told  to  dead-head  to  another  destina- 
tion, it  is  presumed  that  the  employer  wanted  the 
employee  at  the  other  station  available  for  service 
and  that  they  were  therefore  in  the  employ  of  the 
master  when  the  trip  was  made.    Payne  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  223,  228;  129  N.  E.  830. 

Proof  of  Accident. 

115  Liability  cannot  rest  upon  imagination,  specula- 
tion or  conjecture,  upon  a  choice  between  two  views 
equally  compatible  with  the  evidence;  it  must  be 
based  upon  facts  established  by  evidence  fairly  tend- 
ing to  prove  them.    Edehveiss  Gardens  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  459,  463;  125  N.  E.  260;  Was- 
son  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  217, 
220;  129  N.  E.  786. 

115  Liability  cannot  be  based  on  a  choice  between  two 
views  equally  compatible  with  the  evidence,  but  must 
be  based  on  facts  established  by  evidence  fairly 
tending  to  prove  them.    Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  298  111.  463,  467 ;  131  N.  E.  649. 

Found  Dead. 

116  An  employee  whose  duties  it  was  to  sweep  the 
58  floors.     On  the  floor  where  the  employee  was  last 


SEC.  1— FOUND  DEAD  115 

seen  were  sifters  which  worked  with  sufficient  force 
to  knock  a  man  over.  The  windows  were  found  open 
immediately  after  the  accident.  The  employee  was 
found  unconscious  on  the  sidewalk  below.  No  one 
saw  him  fall  and  he  made  no  statement.  Held,  where 
the  evidence  shows  the  deceased  to  have  been  in 
good  health  and  there  is  a  complete  absence  of 
evidence  showing  suicide,  it  must  be  presumed  that 
the  death  was  accidental.  (Wilkinson  v.  Aetna  Ins. 
Co.,  240  111.  205;  Wiscaless  v.  Hammond,  Standish 
&  Co.  (Mich.),  166  N.  W.  993.)  Sparks  Milling  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  350;  127  1ST.  E. 
737. 

116  Where  a  workman  was  found  in  a  trench  of  a 
306  toilet  vault  and  it  appeared  that  the  toilet  facilities 
did  not  have  the  regulation  toilet  seats  but  a  beam 
and  there  was  no  evidence  showing  how  the  employee 
came  to  his  death  except  the  fact  that  he  was  prob- 
ably answering  a  call  of  nature.  Held,  in  reversing 
the  Circuit  Court  and  confirming  the  Commission 
that  the  conclusion  that  the  deceased  met  his  death 
by  falling  into  the  vault  in  the  course  of  employment 
was  justified  by  the  evidence.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  141;  128  N.  E. 
917. 

116  An  employee  of  a  coal  mine  was  found  dead  on 
77  the  track  under  a  train.  There  was  no  evidence  as 
to  how  the  deceased  got  there.  He  was  not  dressed 
in  his  working  clothes,  but  there  was  evidence  that 
the  miners  came  to  work  on  a  train  which  used 
tracks  on  the  premises  of  the  employer,  or  walked 
the  track.  Held,  that  the  causal  connection  between 
the  resulting  injury  and  the  condition  under  which 
the  track  was  used  by  employees  is  apparent  and  the 


116  SEC.  1— FOUND  DEAD 

accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment. Western  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  408;  129  N.  E.  779. 

116  Application  for  adjustment  of  claim  for  the  death 
307  of  a  miner.    One  theory  that  he  was  electrocuted, 

another  that  he  died  of  heart  failure.  There  was 
no  evidence  of  a  burn  and  there  was  some  evidence 
that  the  employee  had  been  sick.  Held,  that  there 
was  evidence  to  support  the  finding  that  the  death 
was  the  result  of  electrocution;  that  the  theory  that 
death  resulted  from  "flu"  was  more  remote  and  less 
probable  than  that  it  resulted  from  contact  with  the 
electric  wire.  Wasson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  217;  129  N.  E.  786. 

117  Where  an  employee  was  found  dead  beside  rail- 
road tracks  and  there  were  no  eye-witnesses  to  the 
shooting  and  what  he  was  doing  at  the  time  he  was 
shot   was   determined   only   by   facts   and   circum- 
stances, the  finding  of  the  Commission  on  such  evi- 
dence was  sustained  by  the  courts.    G.  T.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167;  125  N.  E. 
748. 

117  Employee  was  a  mine  examiner  and  gas  brusher, 
and  was  killed  while  riding  an  electric  motor  in  the 
mine.  Employee  was  found  dead  on  the  rails.  There 
was  some  evidence  that  employee  might  have  been 
electrocuted.  Held,  the  facts  were  sufficient  to  jus- 
tify conclusion  that  the  employee  came  to  his  death 
by  accident.  Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  11;  129  N.  E.  536. 

117  Cases  in  which  employee  was  found  dead,  re- 
viewed and  approved  by  the  court:  (Ohio  Building 
Vault  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  277  111.  96;  Peoria 
Railway  Terminal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  279  111. 


SEC.  1— (a)    (b)  "EMPLOYER  WITHIN  PROVISIONS"     117 

352 ;  Smith-Lohr  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 286  111.  34;  Stephens  Engineering  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  88;  Walsh  Teaming 
Co.  v.  Industrial,  Commission,  290  111.  536;  in  re 
Van  Ette,  111  N.  E.  696),  and  cited  as  sustaining 
the  conclusion  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  the 
employment.  Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  350,  354,  et  seq_.;  127  N.  E.  737. 

118  (a).    Election  by  any  employer  to  provide  and  pay  compensa- 
tion according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  made  by  the 
employer   filing   notice   of   such    election   with   the    Industrial 
Board. 

119  (b).    Every  employer  within  the  provisions  of  this  Act  who 
has  elected  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  according  to  the 
provisions  of  this  Act,   shall  be   bound    thereby  as   to   all   Ids 
employees  until  January  1st  of  the  next  succeeding  year  and 
for  terms  of  each  year  thereafter;  Provided,  any  such  employer 
who  may  have  once  elected,  may  elect  not  to  provide  and  pay 
the   compensation  herein  provided   for   accidents   resulting   in 
either  injury  or  death  and  occurring  after  the  expiration  of  any 
such  calendar  year  by  filing  notice  of   such   election   with   the 
Industrial  Board  at  least  sixty  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of 
any  such  calendar  year,  and  by  posting  such  notice  at  a  con- 
spicuous place  in  the  plant,  shop,  office,  room,  or  place  where 
such  employee  is  employed,  or  by  personal  service,  in  written 
or  printed  form,  upon  such  employees,  at  least  sixty  (60)  days 
prior  to  the  expiration  of  any  such  calendar  year. 

Section  1  was  amended  by  striking  out  the  words 
"covered  by  this  act,"  in  paragraph  (b)  of  the  sec- 
tion. The  language  which  was  struck  out  by  the 
amendment  was  inconsistent  with  the  other  provi- 
sions of  the  Act. 

"Every  Employer  within  the  Provisions  of  this  Act." 

119  Where  an  employer  had  not  elected  to  pay  com- 
pensation to  all  of  his  employees  and  where  the  law 
existing  at  the  time  of  the  accident  did  not  bring 
the  employer  automatically  within  the  Act  as  to 
such  employees,  the  Board  is  without  jurisdiction, 
to  award  compensation  to  an  employee  whose  duties 


118  SEC.  1—  (c).  (d)— SECTION  3 

are  separate  and  apart  from  any  work  about  the 
power-driven  machinery.  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539,  545,  546;  127 
N.  E.  676. 

127  (c)     In  the  event  any  employer  mentioned  In  this  section, 
elects    to    provide    and    pay    the    compensation    provided    in 
this  Act,  then  every  employee  of  such  employer,  as  a  part  of  his 
contract  of  hiring  or  who  may  be  employed  at  the  time  of  the 
taking  effect  of  this  Act  and  the  acceptance  of  its  provisions  by 
snch  employer,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  accepted  all   the  pro- 
visions  of  this  Act  and  shall  be  bound  thereby  unless  within 
thirty  (30)  days  after  snch  hiring  or  after  the  taking  effect  of 
this  Act,  and  its  acceptance  by  snch  employee,  he  shall  file  a 
notice  to  the  contrary  with  the  Industrial  Board,  whose  duty  it 
shall  be  to  immediately  notify  the  employer,  and   until  snch 
notice  of  the  contrary  is  given  to  the  employer,  the  measure  of 
liability  of  snch  employer  shall  be  determined  according  to  the 
compensation  provisions  of  this  Act:  Provided,  however,  that 
any  employee  may  withdraw  from  the  operation  of  this  Act  upon 
filing  a  written  notice  of  withdrawal  at  least  ten  (10)  days  prior 
to  January  1st  of  any  year  with  the  Industrial  Board,  whose  duty 
It  shall  be  to  Immediately  notify  snch  employer  by  registered 
mail,  and,  until  such  notice  to  the  contrary    Is    given   to   such 
employer,  the  measure  of  liability  of  such  employer  shall  be  de- 
termined according  to  the  compensation  provisions  of  this  Act. 

128  (d)     Any  such  employer  or  employee  may,  without  prejudice 
to  any  existing  right  or  claim,  withdraw  his  election  to  reject 
this  Act  by  giving  thirty  (30)  days'  written  notice  in  such  man- 
ner and  form  as  may  be  provided  by  the  Industrial  Board. 

SECTION  3. 

133  The  provisions  of  this  Act  hereinafter  following  shall  apply 
automatically  and  without  election  to  the  State,  county,  city, 
town,  township,  Incorporated  village  or  school  district,  body  pol- 
itic or  municipal  corporation,  and  to  all  employers  and  all  their 
employees,  engaged  in  any  department  of  the  following  enter- 
prises or  businesses  which  are  declared  to  be  extra  hazardous, 
namely: 

Section  3  was  amended  by  inserting  the  word 
"all"  between  the  words  "and"  and  "their  em- 
ployees," and  by  inserting  the  word  "department" 
after  the  word  "any"  and  before  the  word  "of." 
The  legislature  intended  by  this  amendment  to  do 
away  with  the  question  of  liability  and  non-liability 


SECTION  3  119 

arising  in  cases  where  an  employee  was  not  engaged 
in  extra-hazardous  work,  at  the  time  that  he  sus- 
tained accidental  injuries.  Two  theories  had  been 
enunciated  by  the  Supreme  Court:  one  was  that 
the  liability  depended  upon  the  question  whether  the 
employer  was  engaged  in  an  extra-hazardous  enter- 
prise ;  the  other,  that  the  employee  must  be  engaged 
in  a  hazardous  employment  or  occupation  at  the 
time  that  he  sustained  the  accidental  injuries.  In 
support  of  these  views,  we  find  Pekin  Cooperage  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  277  111.  53 ;  Suburban  Ice 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  274  111.  630,  and  East  St. 
Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298  111.  61,  supporting  the  first  proposition;  and 
Brennan  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  49,  and 
Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  511,  supporting  the  second  proposition. 
In  the  case  of  Illinois  Publishing  &  Printing  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  Docket  No.  14012,  pending 
in  the  Supreme  Court  to  the  June,  1921,  Term,  the 
question  of  whether  liability  of  the  employer  de- 
pends upon  the  enterprise  of  the  employer  or  the 
occupation  of  the  employee,  is  placed  squarely  be- 
fore the  court.  An  opinion  in  this  case  will  prob- 
ably be  handed  down  in  October,  1921.  This  will 
decide  the  question  that  caused  so  much  trouble 
under  the  1919  Act. 

This  difficulty  is  probably  eliminated  by  the 
amendment  of  1921,  which  broadens  the  scope  of  the 
Act  so  that  it  applies  to  all  employees  if  in  the 
employment  of  an  employer  who  is  engaged  in  one 
of  the  extra-hazardous  enterprises  enumerated  in 
Section  3. 


120  SEC.  3— CONSTITUTIONALITY 

Constitutionality. 

133  The  provision  of  Section  3,  which  brings  an  em- 
ployer automatically  under  the  Act,  is  constitutional. 
G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
167,  172;  125  N.  E.  748. 

133  Section  3,  amended  by  Act  of  1917,  so  as  to  bring 
certain  employers  under  the  act,  automatically,  and 
without  election  when  engaged  in  an  extra-hazard- 
ous employment,  is  constitutional.    G.  T.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167 ;  125  N.  E. 
748. 

40      The  scope  and  effect  of  Section  1  and  Section  3 

134  explained.    Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  284,  291 ;  126  N.  E.  596. 

133  Where  it  is  contended  that  Section  3  is  unconsti- 
tutional because  it  creates  a  liability  without  fault, 
takes   the   property   of  the   employer  without  due 
process  of  law,  denies  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  and 
delegates  judicial  powers,  it  was  held  that  the  sec- 
tion is  constitutional.   G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  167;  125  N.  E.  748. 

"Enterprises  or  Businesses." 

134  Intimation  by  the  court  that  under  the  automatic 
provisions  of  the  Act  employees  engaged  in  an  oc- 
cupation entirely  independent  and  separate  from  the 
extra-hazardous  employment  would  come  within  the 
Act.     Court  indicates   that  under  the   amendment 
their  holding  would  be  different.    Oriental  Laundry 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539.  546;  127 
N.  E.  676. 

133  Where  partners  were  engaged  in  the  business  of 
buying  and  selling  horses  they  would  not  be  under 


SEC.   3— "ENTERPRISES   OR   BUSINESSES"  121 

the  Act ;  but  where  they  wrote  a  letter  accepting  the 
Act,  carried  insurance  and  made  a  settlement  ap- 
proved by  the  Commission,  there  was  evidence  to 
justify  the  finding  of  the  Commission  that  they  were 
under  the  Act.  Ellsworth  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  514,  518;  125  N.  E.  246. 

135  A  man  may  engage  in  two  kinds  of  businesses — 
one  not  extra-hazardous  or  within  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act,  unless  the  party  so  elects,  and 
the  other  may  be  within  the  Act  without  election 
because  it  is  extra-hazardous.  Davis  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  29,  32 ;  130  N.  E.  333. 

135  What  business  comes  within  the  classification  of 
extra-hazardous  is  to  be  determined  by  the  legisla- 
ture; the  courts  have  no  right  to  make  a  different 
classification  or  inject  into  the  Act  any  classification 
not  fairly  within  its  intent.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284,  287;  126  N.  E. 
596. 

135  R  was  employed  by  a  sewing  machine  company 
in  the  sales  department  to  set  up  machines  for  pur- 
chasers. R  was  sent  over  to  set  up  twenty  machines 
that  had  been  sold  to  another  company.  While 
fastening  the  legs  to  the  bottom  of  the  machine 
tables,  a  screw  driver  slipped  and  struck  him  in 
the  eye.  The  defense  was  that  he  was  not  engaged 
in  hazardous  employment.  The  Commission  made 
an  award  which  was  confirmed  by  the  court.  Held, 
that  the  business  of  selling,  delivering  and  setting 
up  sewing  machines  in  the  purchasers'  place  of 
business  is  not  included  in  any  of  the  classes  men- 
tioned in  Section  3  and  as  the  employment  was  not 
under  the  Act,  the  award  was  set  aside.  Singer 


122  SEC.  3— "ENTERPRISES    OR   BUSINESSES" 

Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296 
111.  511;  129  N.  E.  771. 

158      Where  the  business  of  the  employer  is  an  extra- 

134  hazardous  enterprise  within  the  terms  of  the  Act, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  whether  or  not  the 
employment  of  the  employee  at  the  time  of  his  death 
was  extra-hazardous.    East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Edu- 
cation v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  61,  63;  131 
N.  E.  123. 

137  The  erection,  maintaining,  removing,  remodeling, 
altering  or  demolishing  of  a  dwelling  house,  when 
it  is  not  the  occupation,  enterprise  nor  business  of 
the  owner,  does  not  bring  him  within  the  purview  of 
the  Act.  Alabach  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
338,339;  126  N.  E.  163. 

136  Junk  dealer  held  to  be  under  the  Act  where  em- 
ployee received  injury  to  eye  while  using  a  chisel 
and  sledge,  because  it  was  shown  that  at  times 
power-driven  shears  and  acetylene  torch  were  used. 
Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  523 ; 
125  N.  E.  286. 

136  Employer  engaged  in  the  business  of  manufactur- 
ing hydrogen  peroxide  and  other  chemical  prepara- 
tions and  using  power  driven  machinery  is  within 
the  classification  of  Section  3  as  to  extra-hazardous 
employment.  Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  579,  583 ;  126  N.  E.  564. 

135  Employer    was    eleemosynary    institution  which 
employed   a    president    and    furnished  him  with  a 
house,  which  belonged  to  the  college.     The  college 
called   Dolan,   a   plumber,   to   repair  a   leak.      He 
brought  Hvarfven.    In  looking  for  the  leak,  an  ex- 
plosion   occurred.     Dolan    was    insolvent    and  the 


SEC.  3— "DECLARED  TO  BE  EXTRA-HAZARDOUS"     123 

award  ran  against  the  college  under  Section  31. 
Held,  as  the  college  was  not  engaged  in  any  of  the 
extra-hazarduous  enterprises  enumerated  in  Section 
3  and  had  not  elected  to  come  under  the  Act,  it  is  not 
within  the  terms  of  Section  31.  Lombard  College  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  548 ;  128  N.  E.  553. 

"Declared  to  be  Extra  Hazardous." 

135  Where  an  employer  had  not  elected  to  come  under 
the  act  of  1915,  and  the  injury  sustained  by  the 
employee  did  not  arise  out  of  any  employment  de- 
clared by  the  Act  to  be  extra-hazardous,  such  em- 
ployee does  not  come  within  the  provisions  of  the 
Act.  Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  487,  489;  126  N.  E.  168. 

134  The  receiving  or  buying  of  junk  might  not  be 
extra-hazardous,  but  where  the  preparation  of  the 
junk  requires  the  use  of  an  electric  driven  shears 
and  an  acetylene  torch,  it  makes  it  a  hazardous  busi- 
ness within  the  meaning  of  the  Compensation  Act. 
Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  523 ; 
125  N.  E.  286. 

135  Whether  a  business  is  extra-hazardous  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact.     (Hahnemann  Hospital  v.  Industrial 
Board,  282  111.  316;  Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  521.)     Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  579,  583;  126  N.  E.  564. 

137  The  work  of  cleaning  the  walls  of  a  three-story 
building  is  maintaining  a  building  and  is  in  fact 
dangerous  and  extra-hazardous.  (Chicago  Cleaning 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  283  111.  177,  Approved.) 
Davis  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  29,  32, ;  130 
N.  E.  333. 


124     SEC.  3— "DECLARED  TO  BE  EXTRA-HAZARDOUS" 

136  Supreme  Court  fails  to  pass  on  the  question, 
whether  an  employee  killed  while  felling  a  tree  was 
engaged  in  an  extra-hazardous  occupation  or  in  an 
agricultural  employment.  La  May  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  76;  126  N.  E.  604. 

135  A  retail  grocer  entered  into  a  contract  with  a 
452  builder  to  put  a  foundation  under  his  dwelling-house 
and  an  employee  of  the  builder  was  injured.  The 
arbitrator  allowed  compensation  against  the  build- 
er and  the  Commission  entered  an  award  jointly 
against  the  builder  and  the  grocer  and  the  liability 
of  the  retail  grocer  was  questioned  where  it  was  not 
provided  that  the  builder  should  insure  under  Sec- 
tion 31.  Held,  that  the  enterprise  of  the  grocer  did 
not  include  providing  a  home  for  himself  and  there- 
fore, he  was  not  liable  to  pay  compensation.  Ala- 
bach  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  338;  126  N. 
E.  163. 

135  Where  the  employment  of  the  employee  does  not 
158  come  within  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  it  is 
error  to  enter  an  award  for  an  injury  sustained  by 
him.  (Uphoff  v.  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  312; 
Vaughan's  Seed  Store  v.  Simomni,  275  111.  477; 
Fruit  v.  Industrial  Board,  284  111.  154;  Brentwn  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  49;  Bowman  Dairy 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284) ;  Siuffp.r 
Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296 
111.  511,  513;  129  N.  E.  771. 

135  The  occupations  denned  as  hazardous  in  Section 
3,  must  be  either  hazardous  per  se  or  made  so  by 
surrounding  circumstances.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284,  291;  126  N.  E. 
596. 


SEC.  3— (1)   "MAINTAINING"  125 

136  1.  The  erection,  maintaining,  removing,  remodeling,  altering 
or  demolishing  of  any  structure,  except  as  provided  in  sub-para- 
graph 8  of  this  section. 

"Maintaining." 

138  The  fact  that  the  employer  maintained  a  structure 
and  had  machinery  at  its  plant  is  not  controlling, 
where  it  appears  that  the  employee  at  the  time  that 
he  was  injured,  was  not  engaged  in  any  occupation 
that  had  to  do  with  the  maintenance  or  operation  of 
the  plant  or  pipe-lines.  Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  487,  489;  126  N.  E. 
168. 

138  A  person  owning  a  building,  which  he  maintained 
134  together  with  others  for  income  which  he  derived 
therefrom  and  which  he  kept  in  repair  for  that  pur- 
pose, was  engaged  in  one  of  the  hazardous  businesses 
mentioned  in  the  Act,  even  though  his  regular  busi- 
ness was  a  paint  and  hardware  store.  Davis  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  297  111.  29,  32 ;  130  N.  E.  333. 

138  Even  though  employer  is  engaged  in  the  business 
of  maintaining  a  structure,  the  injury  might  not 
arise  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  the  employment  in 
that  business.    Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  487,  489;  126  N.  E.  168. 

139  Paragraph  1,    Section    3,   includes    only  persons 
engaged  in   the  business  or  enterprise  of  erection, 
maintaining,  removing,   remodeling  and  the  alter- 
ing of  a  dwelling  house,  did  not  bring  a  retail  grocer 
within  the  purview  of  the  Act.    Alabach  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  338,  339 ;  126  N.  E.  163. 

139  Intimation  that  city  might  be  engaged  in  main- 
taining structure,  where  employee  engaged  in  clean- 
ing streets  is  injured.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  291,  293;  129  N.  E.  112. 


126  SEC.  3— (2)  "ELECTRICAL  WORK" 

139  Employees  hired  by  a  contractor  to  clean  the  walls 
455  of  a  building  owned  by  a  third  person  were  injured 
by  the  breaking  of  a  scaffold.  The  contractor  was 
insolvent  and  they  sued  the  owner  of  the  building. 
The  hiring  was  done  by  the  father  of  the  owner  of 
the  building,  both  of  whom  were  engaged  in  a  paint 
and  hardware  business.  There  was  evidence  that 
the  owner  had  income  from  other  buildings.  The 
owner  contended  that  he  was  engaged  in  the  paint 
and  varnish  business  and  was  not  maintaining  build- 
ings. Held,  that  the  work  in  question  was  maintain- 
ing a  building  and  that  the  owner  was  liable  under 
the  Compensation  Act.  Davis  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 297  HI.  29;  130  N.  E.  333. 

141  2.    Construction,  excavating  or  electrical  work,  except  as  pro* 
Tided  In  sub-paragraph  8  of  this  Section. 

"Electrical  Work." 

142  Even  though  sewing  machines  containing  motors 
and  electric  wires  were  set  up  by  a  workman,  a 
showing  that  the  employee  would  not  test  the  motor 
and  that  there  was  no  electric  current  in  connection 
with  the  motor  that  he  worked  on,  did  not  bring  him 
under  the  Compensation  Act.    Singer  Sewing  Mach- 
ine Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  511,  512; 
129  N.  E.  771. 

142  8.  Carriage  by  land  or  water  and  loading  or  unloading  in  con* 
nectlon  therewith,  including  the  distribution  of  any  commodity 
by  horse-drawn  or  motor  driven  vehicle  where  the  employer  em- 
ploys more  than  three  employees  in  the  enterprise  or  business, 
except  as  provided  in  sub-paragraph  8  of  this  section. 

"Carriage  by  Land." 

146  Under  the  1915  Act,  the  delivery  of  the  employer 's 
goods  to  his  customers  does  not  constitute  carriage 


SEC.  3— (3)    "CARRIAGE  BY  LAND"  127 

by  land  or  water.  (Fruit  v.  Industrial  Board,  284 
HI.  154) ;  Bowman  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292 
111.  284,  288;  126  N.E.  596. 

146  Where  the  business  of  the  employer  is  that  of  sup- 
plying water  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  city,  the  hauling 
and  the  delivery  of  the  water  is  an  incident  to  the 
business  and  does  not  constitute  an  employer  a  car- 
rier by  land.    Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  487,  489;  126  N.  E.  168. 

147  4.    The  operation  of  any  warehouse  or  general  or  terminal 
storehouses. 

149       5.    Mining,  surface  mining  or  quarrying. 

149  6.  Any  enterprise  in  which  explosive-materials  are  manufac- 
tured, handled  or  used  in  dangerous  quantities. 

151  7.  In  any  enterprise  wherein  molten  metal,  or  explosive  or 
injurious  gases  or  vapors,  or  inflammable  vapors  or  fluids,  or 
corrosive  acids  are  manufactured,  used,  generated,  stored,  or 
conveyed  in  dangerous  quantities. 

151  8.    In  any  enterprise  in   which   statutory   or   municipal  ordi- 
nance regulations  are  now  or  shall  hereafter  be  imposed  for  the 
regulating,  guarding,  use  or  the  placing  of  machinery  or  appli- 
ances or  for  the  protection  and  safeguarding  of  the  employees 
or  the  public  therein;  each  of  which  occupations,  enterprises  or 
businesses  are  hereby  declared  to  be  extra-hazardous;  pro  Tided, 
nothing  contained  herein   shall  be   construed  to  apply   to   any 
work,  employment  or    operations    done,   had   or   conducted   by 
farmers  and  others  engaged  in  farming,  tillage  of  the  soil,  or 
stock  raising,  or  to  those  who  rent,  demise  or  lease  land  for  any 
such  purposes,  or  to  any  one  in  their  employ  or  to  any  work 
done  on  a  farm,  or  country  place,  no  matter  what  kind  of  work 
or  service  is  being  done  or  rendered. 

".Municipal  Ordinance  Regulations." 

152  In  order  to  bring  an  employer  under  the  1915  Act 
without  election,  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  the 
injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment in  which  ordinance  or  statutory  regulations 
are  imposed.    Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  487,  490 ;  126  N.  E.  168. 


128     SEC.  3— (8)  "MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCE  REGULATIONS" 

152  The  test  applied  in  determining  whether  an  ordi- 
nance brings  employer  within  the  classification  of 
hazardous  occupations,  is  whether  the  ordinance  pro- 
tects the  employee  against  accidental  injuries  or 
death.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 292  111.  284,  290;  126  N.  E.  596. 

152  A  milk  wagon  driver  while  driving  his  wagon  on 
the  streets  was  run  into  by  an  auto  and  killed.    A 
hearing  was  had.     The  arbitrator  found  that  the 
Commission   was   without   jurisdiction.    Later   the 
widow  having  been  appointed  administratrix  filed 
another  petition,  no  review  having  been  had  in  the 
proceeding   originally   commenced.     The   employer 
claimed  that  the  finding  of  the  arbitrator  was  res 
judicata  and  that  the  employer  was  not  conducting 
an  extra-hazardous  business  under  Section  3.    The 
employee  had  nothing  to  do  with  hazardous  machin- 
ery.   There  was  an  ordinance  regulating  the  width 
of  stalls.    Held,  that  the  ordinance  was  not  contem- 
plated for  the  safeguarding  of  employees  so  as  to 
bring  the  owner  under  the  Act  and  as  the  employee 
was  not  exposed  to  any  hazard,  he  was  not  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.    Bowman  Dairy 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284;  126  N. 
E.  596. 

153  Deceased  employee  was  a  janitor  employed  by  a 
public  body  in  a  two-story  school  building  which 
contained  a  boiler  used  for  heating  the  school  which 
was  subject  to  city  and  insurance  inspection.    While 
washing  windows  in  the  school,  the  janitor  fell  and 
was  killed.    He  left  a  widow  who  died  one  year  after 
his  decease  and  before  an  award  had  been  made. 
Held,  that  the  employee  was  engaged  in  one  of  the 
hazardous  enterprises  mentioned  in  Sub-paragraph 


SEC.  3— (8)    "GUARDING  OF  APPLIANCES"  129 

8,  of  Section  3,  and  that  lie  was  entitled  to  compen- 
sation. East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  61 ;  131  N.  E.  123. 

154  An  ordinance  regulating  the  width  of  stalls  in  all 
private  liveries,  sale  or  boarding  stables,  is  a  build- 
ing regulation  and  not  contemplated  for  the  protec- 
tion and  safe-guarding  of  employees  and  does  not 
bring  the  owner  of  a  stable  under  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act.    Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  284,  290;  126  N.  E.  596. 

"Guarding  of  Appliances." 

151  The  inspection  of  a  boiler  in  the  basement  of  a 
school-house  is  the  guarding  of  appliances  for  their 
protection  and  that  this  municipal  regulation  brings 
the  building  in  question  under  the  terms  of  the  Com- 
pensation Act.  East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  61,  63;  131  N.  E. 
123. 

155  An  employee  whose  duties  were  were  to  set  up  ma- 
chines and  who  was  employed  by  the  selling  agency 
where  there  was  no  dangerous  machinery  on  the 
premises,  cannnot  raise  the  question  whether  repair 
work  was  within  the  Act,  because  it  was  a  separate 
and  independent  branch  of  the  business.      Singer 
Seuring  Machine  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296 
111.  511,  512;  129  N.  E.  771. 

155  Where  there  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  indicate 
that  an  employee  had  anything  to  do  with  the  power 
driven  machinery,  and  the  employer  was  not  under 
the  act  by  election  prior  to  the  taking  effect  of  the 
automatic  provisions  of  the  Act,  such  employee  was 
not  entitled  to  compensation.  Oriental  Laundry  Co. 


130    SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION 

v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539,  546;  127  N. 
E.  676. 

155  Employee  solicited  laundry  business.  Called  at 
261  the  laundry  office  only  once  a  week.  While  solicit- 
ing, broke  her  leg  from  fall  on  sidewalk.  Employer 
used  power-driven  machinery  but  had  not  elected 
to  come  under  the  Act.  The  injury  occurred  before 
the  amendment  of  1917,  which  brought  all  employers 
automatically  under  act  who  had  power-driven  ma- 
chinery. Held,  that  the  Commission  did  not  have 
jurisdiction  to  award  compensation  to  an  employee 
whose  duties  were  separate  and  apart  from  the  pow- 
er-driven machinery,  where  employer  was  not  auto- 
matically under  the  act  and  had  not  elected  to  pay 
compensation.  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  539;  127  N.  E.  676. 

Hazard  in  Enterprise  or  Occupation. 

158  At  first  blush,  the  cases  of  the  Supreme  Court 
seem  to  be  in  conflict  on  this  doctrine.  As  already 
pointed  out  in  the  discussion  under  Section  3,  there 
were  two  lines  of  cases.  One  line  of  cases  held  that 
the  enterprise  of  the  employer  determined  the  lia- 
bility under  the  Compensation  Act,  the  other  cases 
seemed  to  indicate  that  the  occupation  or  the  em- 
ployment of  the  employee  was  the  determining  fac- 
tor. 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  all  of  the  cases  that 
refer  to  the  occupation  or  employment  of  the  em- 
ployee as  determining  the  liability  were  cases  that 
arose  under  the  1915  Act.  The  case  of  Oriental 
Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539, 
points  out  the  reason  for  reaching  different  results 
under  the  1915  Act  which  was  not  compulsory  and 
the  1917  Act  which  was  compulsory. 


SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION     131 

If  the  occupation  or  employment  of  the  employee 
must  be  determined  as  being  extra-hazardous  before 
such  employee  is  entitled  to  compensation,  it  would 
leave  the  particular  nature  of  the  work  being  done  at 
the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  determination  of  the 
Commission  or  court.  This  question  then  could  not 
be  determined  without  some  reference  to  statistics, 
because  occupations  or  employments  are  not  classi- 
fied under  the  Act  but  enterprises  or  businesses  are  so 
classified.  Thus  in  order  to  determine  whether  an 
employment  is  extra-hazardous,  evidence  would  have 
to  be  introduced  tending  to  prove  its  hazards.  In 
the  Singer  Sewing  Machine  case,  296  111.  511,  the 
court  held  that  the  employee  was  not  exposed  to  a 
hazard  and  therefore  could  not  recover  compensa- 
tion. Is  it  begging  the  question  to  say  that  the  fact 
of  the  injury  establishes  the  fact  that  the  employee 
was  exposed  to  a  hazard? 

Under  the  ruling  in  the  Singer  Sewing  Machine  Co. 
case  (supra)  it  might  be  argued  that  a  person  sus- 
taining accidental  injuries  as  the  result  of  an  elemen- 
tal force  is  not  entitled  to  compensation.  This  is  the 
only  view  that  can  be  taken  of  that  case  because  the 
enterprise  of  manufacturing  and  selling  sewing  ma- 
chines should  be  regarded  as  an  entirety.  At  any 
rate,  there  was  nothing  in  the  record  of  the  case  to 
show  that  the  selling  of  sewing  machines  was  a  sep- 
arate business,  so  as  to  bring  the  case  within  the  rule 
of  Vaughan  Seed  Store  Co.  v.  Simonini,  275  111.  477, 
in  which  two  separate  enterprises  were  conducted 
by  the  employer.  An  examination  of  statistical  re- 
ports from  safety  departments  throws  some  light  on 
this  question.  The  statistical  reports  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  show  that  44  per  cent  of  all 


132     SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION 

their  accidents  were  due  to  elemental  or  hand  forces 
whereas  only  5.6  per  cent  of  the  accidents  were  due 
to  machine-controlled  forces. 

The  one  argument  that  has  been  overlooked  in 
presenting  cases  involving  the  question  of  exposed 
to  the  hazard  to  the  Supreme  Court  is  the  point  that 
the  Illinois  Statute  does  not  refer  to  occupation  or 
employment.  The  statute  clearly  refers  to  enter- 
prise in  several  paragraphs  of  Section  3.  The  word 
"enterprise"  can  not  by  any  stretch  of  logic  or  of 
imagination  be  referred  to  what  the  employee  is  do- 
ing. Therefore,  the  question  whether  the  employee 
is  engaged  in  hazardous  work  at  the  time  he  is  in- 
jured is  of  no  consequence. 

In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  deci- 
sion of  the  New  York  Court  in  a  recent  case,  Europe 
v.  Addison  Amusement  Co.,  131  N.  E.  750.  Europe 
was  a  musical  composer,  director  and  orchestra 
leader.  He  was  traveling  with  the  band  of  the  356th 
Infantry  and  while  on  the  tour,  was  stabbed  and 
killed  by  the  drummer  of  the  band.  The  Indus- 
trial Commission  made  an  award  to  the  widow. 

Section  2  of  the  New  York  Act  classifies  certain 
employments  as  hazardous  and  gives  a  right  of  com- 
pensation to  employees  engaged  in  such  hazardous 
employments. 

By  an  amendment  to  subdivision  4  of  Section  3, 
an  employee — to  be  entitled  to  compensation — was 
not  required  to  be  himself  engaged  at  the  time  of  the 
accident  in  hazardous  work.  Under  this  amendment 
it  was  held  that  it  was  sufficient  that  the  employer 
was  engaged  in  a  hazardous  business.  Matter  of 
Dose  v.  Moehle  Lithographing  Co.,  221  N.  Y.  401, 
117  N.  E.  616.  It  was  held  that  Europe,  being  en- 


SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION     133 

gaged  in  an  enterprise  classified  as  hazardous,  was 
within  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act. 

In  this  connection  the  court  said  that  it  did  not  be- 
lieve that  the  legislature  exceeded  its  powers  of 
classification  by  this  extension  of  hazardous  employ- 
ments ;  that  a  business  not  ordinarily  hazardous  be- 
comes such  at  a  time  when  manual  work  is  done  or 
machinery  operated  in  connection  with  its  main  pur- 
pose. Europe  v.  Addison  Amusement  Co.  (supra). 

157  It  was  not  intended  to  extend  the  Act  to  occupa- 
tions not  having  any  connection  with  the  extra-haz- 
ardous occupations  mentioned  in  Section  3.     Bow- 
man Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
284,287,288;  126  N.  E.  596. 

158  The  mere  fact  that  an  employer  may  in  some  de- 
partments of  his  business  be  engaged  in  a  hazard- 
ous occupation  will  not  in  the  absence  of  averments 
as  to  what  the  nature  of  the  particular  occupation  is, 
raise  a  presumption  that  the  employee  was  engaged 
in  hazardous  work,  where  the  employer  likewise  en- 
gages in  a  business  that  is  not  hazardous.     O'Brien 
v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140,  146;  127  N.  E. 
389. 

158  The  act  refers  to  the  business  and  not  to  the  per- 
son of  the  employer,  and  does  not  extend  to  separate 
lines  of  business  having  no  connection  whatever  with 
extra-hazardous  occupations.  Bowman  Dairy  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284,  288;  126  N.  E. 
596. 

158  The  mere  fact  that  an  employee  of  the  sales  de- 
partment whose  duty  it  was  to  set  up  machines  for 
purchasers  went  into  the  shop  occasionally  and 


134     SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION 

ground  bobbins,  did  not  bring  him  under  the  Act  be- 
cause this  was  merely  incidental  and  casual  and  not 
a  part  of  his  general  employment.  (McLaughlin  v. 
Industrial  Board,  281  111.  100).  Singer  Sewing  Ma- 
chine Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  511,  513; 
129  N.  E.  771. 

158  A  person  employed  by  the  sales  department  of  a 
manufacturing  concern,  where  no  machines  were 
manufactured  and  who  had  no  connection  with  the 
repair  of  machines  and  who  occasionally  ground 
bobbin  winders,  but  who  generally  used  only  a  screw 
driver,  wrench  or  other  simple  tool  was  not  engaged 
in  a  hazardous  employment  so  as  to  bring  him  un- 
der the  Workmen's  Compensaion  Act.  Singer  Sew- 
ing Machine  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111. 
511,512,513;  129  N.  E.  771. 

134  The  employment  of  a  man  in  an  enterprise  which 
is  brought  under  the  Compensation  Act  by  being 
within  the  terms  of  sub-section  8  of  Section  3  brings 
the  employee  within  the  scope  of  the  Act.  East  St. 
Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298111.  61,  63;  131  N.E.  123. 

158  Employer  engaged  in  delivery  of  water  to  inhab- 
itants of  city.  Its  employee  hauled  water  at  a  stip- 
ulated sum  a  load.  He  furnished  the  horses  and 
harness  and  the  employer,  the  wagon.  Employee  fell 
from  wagon  resulting  in  a  permanent  injury.  Held, 
that  the  Commission  was  without  jurisdiction  as  the 
delivery  of  the  water  was  a  mere  incident  to  the 
business  and  did  not  bring  the  employer  in  the  classi- 
fication of  carriage  by  land;  that  the  employee  was 
not  exposed  to  any  hazard  in  connection  with  main- 
taining a  structure;  the  injury  did  not  arise  out  of 
and  in  the  course,  of  the  employment  in  which  stat- 


SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION     135 

utory  or  municipal  ordinance  regulations  applied. 
Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  487;  126  N.  E.  168. 

161  An  employee,  engaged  by  an  employer  who  man- 
ufactured chemical  preparations,  using  mixing  tanks 
run  by  electric  motors  and  mechanically  operated 
bottle  washers,  whose  duty  it  was  to  fill  bottles,  help 
shipping  clerk  and  as  an  all  around  man,  was  en^ 
gaged  in  extra-hazardous  employment  entitling  him 
to  compensation  under  the  Act.    Hydrox  Chemical 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  579;  126  N, 
E.  564. 

162  If  the  occupation  of  the  employer  is  extra-hazard- 
ous, it  must  arise  from  some  feature  of  the  business 
other  than  that  in  which  the  employee  was  engaged 
at  the  time  of  the  accident,  and  to  bring  the  em- 
ployee under,  his  employment  must  be  so  connected 
with  extra-hazardous  occupation  of  the  employer,  so 
as  to  expose  him  to  the  dangers  arising  out  of  such 
hazardous  employment.     Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  292  111.  284,  288;  126  N.  E. 
596. 

162  Some  part  of  department  of  the  business  of  the 
employer  may  be  extra-hazardous  under  the  statute, 
still  if  the  employee's  duties  were  not  connected 
with  or  incident  to  the  extra-hazardous  part  of  the 
business  of  the  employer  he  is  not  within  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Compensation  Act.  Bowman  Dairy 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  284,  287;  126 
N.  E.  596. 

169  The  fact  that  some  of  the  employees  of  an  em- 
ployer might  be  engaged  in  work  that  was  extra- 
hazardous,  does  not  change  the  character  of  the  em- 


136    SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION 

ployment  of  an  employee  driving  a  water  wagon. 
Mat-toon  Clear  Water  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  487,  489;  126  N.  E.  168. 

172  Where  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  from 
which  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  employee's  duties 
brought  him  into  any  place  about  the  building  where 
the  extra-hazardous  business  was  being  conducted, 
the  Commission  is  without  jurisdiction  to  pass  upon 
the  petition.     Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  284,  291 ;  126  N.  E.  596. 

173  It  is  for  the  General  Assembly  to  say  who  shall  be 
20  included  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the 

courts  are  not  authorized  to  bring  within  the  scope 
of  the  Act,  persons  who  are  excluded  by  its  express 
terms.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  23,  27;  125  N.  E.  705. 

174  The  preparation  of  the  junk  for  market  in  which 
machinery  is  used,  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  busi- 
ness of  buying  and  selling  the  junk  and  makes  the 
business  hazardous  so  as  to  bring  it  under  the  Act. 
Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  523 ; 
125  N.  E.  286. 

174  Providing  a  place  to  live  and  making  it  safe  or 
comfortable  by  putting  a  foundation  under  it,  does 
not  bring  the  owner  within  the  scope  of  the  Com- 
pensation Act.     Alabach  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  338,  339;  126  N.  E.  163. 

175  The  reasoning  in  Marshall  v.  City  of  Pekin,  276  111. 
187;  Brennan  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  49; 
Compton  v.  Industrial  Commission,  288  111.  41;  and 
Mattoon  Water  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  487,  discussed  and  by  implication  classified  as 
being  cases  which  apply  only  where  the  automatic 


SEC.  3— HAZARD  IN  ENTERPRISE  OR  OCCUPATION     137 

provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act, 
had  not  gone  into  effect.  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  539,  545 ;  127  N.  E. 
676. 

Whether  an  enterprise  or  business  which  is  not 
specifically  mentioned  in  the  Act  as  coming  automat- 
ically within  its  provisions  can  be  said  to  come  under 
the  Act,  is  still  a  moot  question.  Detective  agencies 
are  not  mentioned  in  Section  3  as  a  business  that 
comes  automatically  under  the  Act.  Recently,  the 
Industrial  Commission  entered  awards  against  two 
different  agencies.  In  the  case  of  Pinkerton's  Detec- 
tive Agency  v.  Industrial  Commission  (Chicago  Sav- 
ings Bank,  Administrator,  Applicant)  a  night  watch- 
man, furnished  by  the  agency,  was  killed  while  in  a 
building.  It  was  insisted  that  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission had  no  jurisdiction  to  enter  an  award  be- 
cause detective  agencies  were  not  enumerated  in  Sec- 
tion 3.  An  award  was  entered.  The  Circuit  Court 
affirmed  the  decision  of  the  Commission.  A  peti- 
tion for  writ  of  error  was  filed  in  the  Supreme 
Court ;  the  petition  was  denied.  This  was  an  affirm- 
ance of  the  ruling  of  the  Industrial  Commission  that 
the  enterprise  was  automatically  under  the  Act,  if 
the  enterprise  is  extra-hazardous  per  se.  See  Briefs 
in  Pinkerton's  Detective  Agency  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, Supreme  Court  No.  13892,  and  the  order  de- 
nying the  petition  for  the  writ  of  error. 

In  the  case  of  McGidre  &  White  Detective  Agency 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  an  operative  sent  by  the 
Agency  to  the  Village  of  Glencoe  to  assist  in  patrol 
work,  and  do  police  work  in  apprehending  some  high- 
waymen, was  shot  and  killed  by  a  police  officer  of  the 
village,  who  mistook  the  detective  for  a  highway- 


138  SECTION  3% 

man.  One  of  the  points  urged  by  the  Detective 
Agency  was  that  it  did  not  come  under  the  Act. 
The  Commission  entered  an  award,  which  was  af- 
firmed by  the  Circuit  Court.  A  petition  for  writ 
of  error  was  filed  in  the  Supreme  Court.  In  the 
briefs,  the  Pinkerton  case  (supra)  was  referred  to. 
The  Supreme  Court  denied  the  petition  for  the  writ 
of  error.  McGuire  v.  Industrial  Commission,  No. 
13978. 

SECTION  3%. 

175  (a)  If  the  plaintiff  in  any  action  mentioned  in  Section  3  shall 
in  his  declaration  or  in  his  other  pleading  allege  that  the  em- 
ployer has  filed  notice  of  Ids  election  not  to  provide  and  pay 
compensation  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  and  such  allegation  be  not  denied  by  a  verified 
pleading,  then  such  employer  shall  for  the  purpose  of  that 
action  be  conclusively  presumed  to  have  filed  his  notice  of  non- 
election. 

(b)  A  certificate  of  the  fact  of  the  filing  by  an  employer  of  the 
notice  of  non-election  provided  in  Section  2  and  of  the  non- 
withdrawal  thereof  shall  be  prima  facie  proof  in  any  action  men- 
tioned in  Section  3  of  the  fact  of  the  filing  of  such  notice  of 
non-election  and  of  the  non-withdrawal  thereof.  Such  certifi- 
cate may  be  under  the  seal  of  the  Industrial  Board  and  signed 
by  any  member  or  the  secretary  thereof,  of  which  seal  and  sig- 
nature as  such  officer  the  court  shall  take  judical  notice.  Said 
certificate  may  be  in  substantially  the  following  form: 

This  is  to  certify  that  the  attached  is  a  correct  copy  of  notice 

filed  with  the  Industrial  Board  by on  the 

day  of *  19 .  electing  not  to  provide  and  pay  com- 
pensation according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act  of  Illinois,  and  that  the  original  of  said  notice  is 
now  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  Industrial  Board  and  has  not  been 
withdrawn  since  the  date  of  the  filing  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof,  this  certificate  has  been  subscribed  and 
the  seal  of  the  Industrial  Board  affixed  this  .    . .  day  of  . 
19.. 


of  Industrial  Board. 

175  Where  the  declaration  was  amended  so  that  it 
stated  a  good  cause  of  action,  but  this  was  done  after 
bar  of  the  statute  of  limitations  was  complete,  the 


SECTION  3%  139 

Appellate  Court  properly  reversed  the  trial  court 
for  refusing  to  sustain  the  motion  in  arrest  of  judg- 
ment. Bishop  v.  Chcago  Ey.  Co.,  290  111.  194,  196 ; 
124  N.  E.  837. 

175  Where  it  is  claimed  that  the  employment  is  casual 
and  that  the  employee  is  not  operating  under  the 
Act,  the  declaration  must  affirmatively  allege  facts 
bringing  the  employee  within  the  exception.  Bishop 
v.  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  290  111.  194, 195 ;  124  N.  E.  837. 

175  When  the  declaration  contains  no  averment  which 
will  bring  the  plaintiff  under  the  Act,  the  Act  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  case  so  far  as  it  is  presented 
by  the  declaration.  O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co., 
293  111.  140,  145 ;  127  N.  E.  389. 

175  The  averment  in  the  declaration  that  the  employee 
was  employed  by  the  City  of  Chicago  does  not  raise 
a  presumption  that  he  was  operating  under  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  O'Brien  v.  Chicago 
City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140,  145;  127  N.  E.  389. 

175  In  a  tort  action,  the  declaration  must  aver  that  the 
employee  and  the  employer  are  bound  by  the  Act. 
The  court  cannot  take  judicial  notice  of  their  being 
under  the  Act;  in  the  absence  of  such  averments. 
O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140;  127  N. 
E.  389. 

175  The  mere  statement  in  a  declaration  that  the  em- 
ployee was  engaged  by  the  City  of  Chicago  did  not 
constitute  an  averment  that  the  employee  and  em- 
ployer were  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act.  O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  293  111.  140, 
146;  127  N.  E.  389. 

175  If  the  declaration  does  not  show  that  the  employee 
is  bound  by  the  Act,  the  averment  that  the  defend- 


140  SECTION  4 

ants  had  elected  not  to  be  bound  thereby  does  not 
make  the  case  one  brought  under  the  Act.  O'Brien  v. 
Chicago  City  Ry  Co.,  293  111.  140, 146;  127  N.  E.  389. 

175  It  is  essential  to  the  statement  of  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  a  negligent  injury  by  an  employee  against 
an  employer,  that  it  should  appear  that  either  the 
employee  or  tho  employer  or  both  were  not  governed 
by  the  provisions  of  the  act.    Bishop  v.  Chicago  Ry. 
Co.,  290  111.  194,  195 ;  124  N.  E.  837. 

176  Under  the  common  law,  a  cause  of  action  for  the 
death  of  a  human  being  did  not  exist,  and  the  statute 
could    give    whomsoever    it    designated    the    right 
to  recover  damages.    It  could  give  that  right  to  the 
administrator  or  to  the  widow  or  other  dependent 
of  the  deceased.     Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v. 
Indmtrial  Commission,  289  111.  353,  358,  359;  124  N. 
E.  552. 

SECTION  4. 

176         The  term  "employer"  as  used  in  this  Act  shall  be  construed 
to  be: 

First:  The  State,  and  each  county,  city,  town,  township,  in- 
corporated Tillage,  school  district,  body  politic,  or  municipal  cor- 
poration  therein. 

Second:  Every  person,  firm,  public  or  private  corporation,  in- 
cluding hospitals,  public  service,  eleemosynary,  religious  or, 
charitable  corporations  or  associations  who  has  any  person  in 
service  or  under  any  contract  for  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral 
or  written,  and  who  is  engaged  in  any  of  the  enterprises  or 
businesses  enumerated  in  section  three  (3)  of  this  Act,  or  who 
at  or  prior  to  the  time  of  the  accident  to  the  employee  for 
which  compensation  under  this  Act  may  be  claimed,  shall  in  the 
the  manner  provided  in  this  Act,  have  elected  to  become  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  who  shall  not,  prior  to  such 
accident,  have  effected  a  withdrawal  of  such  election  in  the  man- 
ner provided  in  this  Act.  [Amended  by  Act  approved  June  25, 
1917.J 


SEC.  4— "EMPLOYER"  141 

"Employer." 

176  Where  there  were  specific  orders  that  trucks  of 
an  employer  should  be  kept  at  a  certain  place,  the 
mere  knowledge  of  the  chief  clerk  that  the  truck 
was  being  kept  elsewhere,  did  not  bind  the  employer. 
United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

176  Where  notice  to  an  agent  is  relied  upon  to  bind 
a  corporation  the  nature  of  the  agency  must  be  such 
that  the  law  will  presume  that  the  principal  was 
given  notice  or  that  fact  must  be  shown  that  he  gave 
notice.    United  Disposal  and  Recovery  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  480,  485;  126  N.  E.  183. 

177  Where  a  contractor  was  hired  by  the  father  of  the 
455  owner  of  a  building  to  do  some  cleaning  on  the  walls 

of  the  building,  and  there  was  evidence  that  the  fa- 
ther had  authority  to  take  care  of  small  matters  for 
the  son.  Held,  that  there  was  evidence  warranting 
an  inference  that  the  act  in  hiring  the  contractor 
was  within  the  scope  of  the  authority  and  binding 
on  the  principal.  Davis  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297111.  29,31;  130  N.  E.  333. 

178  A  track  welder  employed  by  "A"  was  injured 
while  working  on  tracks  used  by  "B"  Company 
which  ran  cars  from  one  state  into  another.     The 
two  companies  were  operated  from  the  same  office. 
He  was  employed  and  paid  by  "A"  Company.  Held, 
as  "A"  Company  was  the  employer  and  it  was  not 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission had  jurisdiction.     Rockford  City  Traction 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111,  358 ;  129  N.  E. 
135. 


142  SEC.  4— "CONTRACT  OF  HIRE" 

"Contract  of  Hire." 

179  An  arrangement  between  two  traction  companies, 
one  engaged  in  intra-  and  the  other  in  interstate  busi- 
ness, cannot  affect  the  relation  existing  between  the 
employer  in  intrastate  business  and  its  employee. 
Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  358,  361 ;  129  N.  E.  135. 

179      Evidence  that  the  contractor  was  told  to  submit 
315  an  estimate  but  that  he  did  not,  but  went  to  work 

on  the  building,  held  to  be  sufficient  to  sustain  a 

finding  that  there  was  a  contract  of  employment. 

Davis  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  29,  31;  130 

N.  E.  333. 

SECTION  5. 

179  The  term  "employee"  as  used  in  this  Act,  shall  be  construed  to 
mean: 

First:  Every  person  in  the  service  of  the  State,  county,  city, 
town,  township,  incorporated  village  or  school  district,  body 
politic  or  municipal  corporations  therein,  under  appointment,  or 
contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written,  except  any 
official  of  the  State,  or  of  any  county,  city,  town,  township,  incor- 
porated village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  municipal  corpo- 
ration therein:  Provided,  that  any  such  employee,  his  personal 
representative,  beneficiaries  or  heirs,  who  is,  are  or  shall  be 
entitled  to  receive  a  pension  or  benefit  for  or  on  account  of  dis- 
ability or  death  arising  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  his  employ- 
ment from  a  pension  or  benefit  fund  to  which  the  State  or  any 
county,  town,  township,  incorporated  village,  school  district, 
body  politic  or  municipal  corporation  therein  is  a  contributor, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  only  such  part  of 
such  pension  or  benefit  as  is  In  excess  of  the  amount  of  compen- 
sation recovered  and  received  by  such  employee,  his  personal 
representative,  beneficiaries  or  heirs  under  this  Act,  and, 
provided,  further,  that  one  employed  by  a  contractor  who  has 
contracted  with  the  State,  or  a  county,  city,  town,  township, 
incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  municipal 
corporation,  therein,  through  its  representatives,  shall  not  be 
considered,  as  an  employee  of  the  State,  county,  city,  town,  town- 
ship, incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  munic- 
ipal corporation  which  made  the  contract. 

Second:  Every  person  In  the  service  of  another  under  any 
contract  of  hire,  express  or  Implied,  oral  or  written,  including 


SEC.  5— "EMPLOYEE"  143 

aliens,  and  minors  who  are  legally  permitted  to  work  under  the 
laws  of  the  State,  who,  for  the  purpose  of  this  Act,  shall  be  con- 
sidered the  same  and  have  the  same  power  to  contract,  receive 
payments  and  give  quittances  therefor,  as  adult  employees,  but 
not  including  any  person  who  is  not  engaged  in  the  usual  course 
of  the  trade,  business,  profession  or  occupation  of  his  employer: 
Provided,  that  employees  shall  not  be  included  within  the  provi- 
sions of  this  Act  when  excluded  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
relating  to  liability  of  employers  to  their  employees  for  personal 
injuries  where  such  laws  are  held  to  be  exclusive. 


"Employee." 

180  Where  during  his  life-time  a  person  is  not  an  em- 
ployee of  the  city  within  the  meaning  of  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act,  he  cannot  become  an  em- 
ployee after  death.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  188, 190;  127  N.  E.  351. 

180  Section  5,  "  Every  person  in  the  service  of  the 
state,  county,  city,  etc.  *  *  except  any  employee 
*  *  *  for  whose  accidental  injury  *  a  pen- 

sion shall  be  payable  to  him,"  construed  to  exclude 
battalion  chief  of  the  fire  department  who  is  killed 
while  responding  to  an  alarm.  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  188,  190;  127  N.  E. 
351. 

180  Where  an  employee  is  doing  piece  work  until  some 
time  in  the  future  when  he  is  to  be  paid  by  the  day, 
he  is  an  employee.  Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  521,  524;  125  N.  E.  286. 

180  Where  employee  testifies  that  he  is  employed  and 
paid  by  a  certain  company,  it  is  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish the  relationship  of  employer  and  employee.  Rock- 
ford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  358,  361;  129  N.  E.  135. 


144        SEC.  5— "ENTITLED  TO  RECEIVE  A  PENSION" 

"Entitled  to  receive  a  pension." 

180  Employee  was  a  fireman  battalion  chief,  and  while 
answering  a  fire  alarm  he  was  killed.  During  his 
life,  employee  contributed  to  pension  fund.  Held, 
employee  was  not  entitled  to  compensation  because 
he  was  especially  excepted  from  the  provision  of  the 
Act  by  Section  5  (which  excepted  employees  entitled 
to  pension).  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  188;  127  N.  E.  351. 

180  Whether  or  not  a  person  is  an  employee  within 
the  meaning  of  Section  5  must  be  determined  from 
the  situation  as  it  exists  during  his  lifetime.  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  188, 
190;  127  N.  E.  351. 

180  Where  a  city  employee  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Pension  Act  is  entitled  to  a  pension  during  his  life, 
and  his  beneficiaries  are  entitled  to  a  pension  upon 
his  death,  he  is  expressly  excluded  from  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  by  Sec- 
tion 5.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  188,  190;  127  N.  E.  351. 

180  The  fact  that  the  deceased  left  no  one  surviving 
entitled  to  receive  a  pension  under  the  Firemen's 
Pension  Fund,  could  not,  ipso  facto,  after  his  death 
bring  the  deceased  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
from  which  he  was  excluded  during  his  lifetime.  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  188, 
190;  127  N.  E.  351. 

"Except  any  Official." 

180  Under  Section  5,  a  policeman  was  held  to  be  an 
official  of  the  City  of  Chicago  and  excluded  by  the 
express  terms  of  the  Act  from  receiving  compensa- 


SEC.  5— "EXCEPT  ANY  OFFICIAL"  145 

tion.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  23;  125  N.  E.  705. 

180  The  duties  of  a  policeman,  viz.,  to  apprehend  any 
person  committing  a  crime,  to  suppress  riots  and  to 
serve  warrants,  writs,  etc.,  are  duties  which  can  only 
be  performed  by  officers  and  fix  the  status  of  a  po- 
liceman as  an  official.  Therefore,  a  police  officer  is 
an  official  and  not  entitled  to  compensation  under 
Section  5.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Com/mis- 
sion, 291  111.  23,  26;  125  N.  E.  705. 

180  Inasmuch  as  a  police  officer  is  an  official,  an  award 
by  the  Commission  cannot  be  sustained,  for  the  rea- 
son that  he  is  not  an  employee.  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  23,  27;  125  N.  E. 
705. 

180  A  policeman  of  the  City  of  Chicago  was  killed  by 
contact  with  an  electric  lamp  post  which  had  be- 
come an  obstruction.  Held,  not  to  be  an  employee  of 
the  city,  but  an  official  and  therefore,  not  entitled 
to  compensation.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  23;  125  N.  E.  705. 

180  Where  a  city  was  engaged  in  the  business  of  build- 
ing, maintaining  and  repairing  bridges,  but  had 
never  elected  to  come  under  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act,  a  policeman  killed  by  contact  with  an 
electric  lamp  post  was  not  entitled  to  compensation 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  an  official  and  not  an  em- 
ployee of  the  city.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  23;  125  N.  E.  705. 

"One  employed  by  a  Contractor  who   has   contracted   with   the 

State." 

180  The  proviso  of  Section  5  that  one  employed  by 
a  contractor  who  has  contracted  with  the  city  shall 


146       SBC.  6— CONTRACT  OF  EMPLOYMENT 

not  be  considered  as  an  employee  of  the  city,  which 
made  the  contract,  does  not  exclude  the  employee  of 
a  contractor  working  for  the  city  from  the  benefits 
of  Section  31  of  the  Compensation  Act.  City  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  291,  293 ;  129 
N.  E.  112,  contra;  Eckert's  case  (Mass.)  124  N.  E. 
421. 

Contract  of  Employment. 

180  Where  the  evidence  as  to  the  relationship  of  inde- 
pendent contractors,  or  employer  and  employee  is 
undisputed  and  susceptible  of  but  one  inference,  the 
question  of  the  relationship  is  then  one  of  law.    Cin- 
ofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  525 ;  125 
N.  E.  286. 

181  Where  an  employee  who  was  working  as  an  extra 
switchman,  was  told  that  there  was  no  work  and 
that  he  should  return  the  next  day,  whereupon  he 
climbed  on  a  freight  which  was  pulling  out,  in  order 
to  get  to  his  home,  was  injured.    Held,  that  the  acci- 
dent did  not  occur  in  the  course  of  the  employment, 
as  the  relation  of  employer  and  employee  did  not 
exist  at  the  time  of  the  accident.    Michigan  Central 
Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  503,  507; 
125  N.  E.  278. 

181  Although  an  employee  may  not  be  on  duty  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Hours  of  Service  Act  while  they 
are  dead-heading  under  the  master's  directions,  still 
they  could  be  in  the  employment  of  the  employer 
within  the  terms  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  223, 
227;  129  N.  E.  830. 


SEC.  5— CASUAL  EMPLOYMENT  147 

182  Facts  of  the  contract  of  employment  discussed  and 
held  to  show  that  the  employee  was  working  for  an 
independent  contractor.  La  May  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  76;  126  N.  E.  604. 

Casual  Employment. 

By  the  Amendments  to  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  passed  in  1917,  the  provision  as  to  casual 
employment  was  eliminated  from  the  Act.  These 
cases  here  cited  are  cases  that  arose  prior  to  this 
amendment. 

18.9  Even  though  employee  might  have  gone  to  look 
at  some  work,  the  employment  was  casual  and  not 
within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1915.  City  of 
Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  388,  390; 
128  N.  E.  524. 

192  Section  5,  of  the  1913  Act,  provided  that  an  em- 
ployee was  every  person  in  the  service  of  another 
under  any  contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral 
or  written,  but  not  including  any  person  whose  em- 
ployment is  casual.  Diamond  Livery  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  591,  594;  124  N.  E.  609. 

23  The  Legislature  intended  where  one  was  employed 
192  to  do  a  particular  kind  of  work,  which  employment 
recurs  with  regularity  and  where  there  is  reasonable 
ground  that  such  recurrence  will  continue  for  a  rea- 
sonable period  of  time,  such  employment  is  not 
casual.  Consumers  Mutual  Oil  Producing  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  423,  426;  124  N.  E.  608. 

192  Where  the  terms  of  the  contract  show  that  the 
employment  is  without  limitation  as  to  time,  it  can- 
not be  considered  casual.  (Schaeffer  v.  DeGrotiola, 
86  N.  J.,  page  505.)  Consumers  Mutual  Oil  Producing 


148  SEC.  5— CASUAL  EMPLOYMENT 

Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  423,  425 ;  124 
N.  E.  608. 

192  Where  all  the  testimony  in  the  record  is  that  nei- 
ther party  contemplated  that  the  employment  was 
to  extend  beyond  the  particular  work  of  pulling  cer- 
tain pumps,  it  amounts  to  casual  employment.  Con- 
sumers Mutual  Oil  Producing  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 289  111.  423;  124  N.  E.  608. 

192  "Casual"  is  that  which  comes  without  regularity 
and  is  occasional  and  incidental  as  contrary  to  "  reg- 
ular" and  "systematic."  Consumers  Mutual  Oil 
Producing  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  423, 
425;  124  N.  E.  608. 

192  Where  employment  for  a  job  occurs  by  chance, 
with  the  understanding  on  the  part  of  the  employer 
and  employee  that  it  shall  not  be  continuous,  it  is 
casual.  Consumers  Mutual  Oil  Producing  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  423,  426;  124  N.  E. 
608. 

192  Where  there  is  nothing  in  the  contract  or  in  the 
relation  of  the  parties  which  would  indicate  that  the 
employment  is  to  be  continuous  or  recurring,  it  is 
casual.  Consumers  Mutual  OH  Producing  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  423,  426;  124  N.  E.  608. 

192  An  employee  who  was  not  on  the  pay-roll  but  who 
slept  in  the  barn  of  a  livery  stable-keeper  and  was 
around  the  premises  most  of  the  time,  but  was  not 
required  to  do  any  work  except  when  he  wanted  to, 
was  injured  while  walking  across  the  floor  to  do  some 
dusting.  It  was  held  that  the  employment  was  so 
irregular  that  it  was  casual  employment  within  the 
meaning  of  the  1913  Act  and  that  he  was,  therefore, 


SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE     149 

not  entitled  to  compensation.    Diamond  Livery  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  591 ;  124  N.  E.  609. 

192  Casual  employment  is   that  which   is   irregular, 
occasional  or  incidental.    Diamond  Livery  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  591,  595 ;  124  N.  E.  609. 

Employees  Engaged  in  Interstate  Commerce. 

193  Employee  who  worked  as  a  freight  trucker  and 
laborer  for  a  railroad,  was  required  to  look  after 
the  United   States  mail,   sweep  the  freight  house, 
clean  the  lanterns,  load  and  unload  the  freight  both 
inter-  and  intra-state.    The  employee  had  taken  the 
mail  from  one  station  to  the  other  and  had  left  it  on 
the  platform.    He  was  on  his  way  to  eat  his  lunch 
and  was  going  to  assist  in  handling  both  inter-  and 
intra-state  freight  when  he  got  through.     He  was 
killed  while  riding  on  the  elevator,  on  his  way  to 
lunch.    Held,  that  the  return  trip  was  an  incident  to 
and  a  part  of  his  work  of  delivering  the  mail,  that 
he  was   engaged  in  interstate   commerce   and  not 
entitled  to  compensation  under  the  Workmen 's  Com- 
pensation Act.    C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  294  111.  374;  128  N.  E.  516. 

193  The  transmission  and  receiving  of  messages  and 
correspondence  discussed  in  the  light  of  the  deci- 
sions bearing  on  inter-state  commerce.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  374-, 
378,379;  128  N.  E.  516. 

193  A  railroad  company  is  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce in  transporting  mails  for  hire.  C.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  374, 
378;  128  N.  E.  516. 

193  Note. — The  Central  Law  Journal  Jan.  14,  '21 — 35  discusses  at 
length  the  decision  in  C.  C.  C.  rf  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 294  111.  374;  128  N.  E.  516. 


160     SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE 

193  Employees  engaged  in  the  operation,  maintenance 
or  repair  of  any  of  the  instrumentalities  used  by  a 
carrier  in  the  transportation  of  goods  from  one  state 
into  another,  are  engaged  in  inter-state  commerce. 
Hines  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  231,  233 ;  129 
N.  E.  175. 

193  Where  the  evidence  is  that  employee  was  repairing 
a  railroad  bridge  used  by  inter-state  trains,  there 
can  be  but  one  finding:     That  he  was  engaged  in 
inter-state  commerce.    Hines  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  231.  233;  129  N.  E.  175. 

194  Where  the  employer  and  employee  were  engaged 
in    inter-state    commerce,    the    Federal    Employ- 
er's Liability  Act  controls  and  cannot  be  supple- 
mented by  a  state  statute.    P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  396,  399;  126 
N.  E.  128. 

195  Where  an  employer  is  engaged  in  both  inter-state 
and  intra-state  commerce  the  burden  is  on  him  to 
show  that  the  employee  was  at  the  time  of  the  injury 
engaged  in  interstate  commerce  to  relieve  him  of  lia- 
bility under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.    G. 
T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
167,  171;  125  N.  E.  748. 

199  Where  an  employer  is  engaged  in  both  inter-  and 
intrastate  commerce,  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to 
show  that  the  work  being  done  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  was  interstate  commerce.  Payne  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  223,  225,  226;  129  N.  E.  830. 

195  The  burden  is  on  the  employer  to  show  that  the 
employee  was  engaged  in  interstate  commerce,  at  the 


SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE     151 

time  of  the  injury,  if  he  seeks  to  avoid  liability  under 
the  Compensation  Act.  Rockford  City  Traction  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  358,  361;  129  N. 
E.  135. 

195  The  burden  is  upon  the  person  asserting  that  the 
Federal  Act  applies  to  show  that  the  facts  at  the 
time  of  the  accident  abated  the  original  and  primary 
sovereignty  of  the  State,  and  permitted  the  excep- 
tional and  limited  power  of  the  Federal  government 
to  attach.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  599,  602;  125  N.  E.  378. 

195  Both  the  employer  and  the  employee  must  at  the 
time  of  the  injury  be  engaged  in  interstate  commerce 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Federal  Employers'  Lia- 
bility Act,  in  order  to  oust  the  Commission  from 
jurisdiction.  Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  358,  361;  129  N.  E.  135. 

197  The  mere  expectation  that  the  employee  would 
presently  be  called  upon  to  perform  a  task  in  inter- 
state commerce  is  not  sufficient  to  bring  the  case 
within  the  Act.  Chicago  &  A.  R,.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  599,  602;  125  N.  E.  378. 

197  If  the  particular  act  in  which  the  injured  per- 
son is  engaged  at  the  time  of  his  injury  is  in  any 
substantial  part  within  the  interstate  field  then  the 
Federal  law  rules  the  situation.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  396,  399 ; 
126  N.  E.  128. 

197  The  true  test  is  that  at  the  time  of  the  injury  the 
employee  was  engaged  in  interstate  transportation, 
or  in  work  so  closely  related  to  it  as  to  be  practi- 
cally a  part  of  it.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  599,  602 ;  125  N.  E.  378. 


152     SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE 

197  Not  every  employee  of  an  interstate  carrier  is  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce.  The  work  of  the 
employee  must  constitute  a  real  and  substantial  part 
of  the  interstate  commerce  in  which  the  carrier  is 
engaged.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission,  290  111.  599,  602;  125  N.  E.  378. 

197  Where  none  of  the  business  of  the  employer  is 
interstate  business,  the  Commission  has  jurisdiction 
over  an  accident,  even  though  the  tracks  on  which 
the  employee  was  working  were  used  for  interstate 
commerce.  Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  358,  361;  129  N.  E.  135. 

200      Locomotive  engineer  directed  to  take  a  train  of 

344  cars  from  A  to  B ;  some  of  the  cars  were  interstate. 

323  They  reached  S,  where  they  were  held  for  five  hours. 

370  He  was  relieved  from  duty  because  of  the  Hours 
of  Service  Act.  Permission  was  obtained  to  dead- 
head into  B.  While  eating  in  a  restaurant  the  train 
to  B  came  along  and  all  of  the  crew  started  to  get  on 
as  it  slowed  down ;  the  engineer  lost  his  left  leg  and 
compensation  was  awarded.  Held,  taking  the  train 
to  B  must  be  presumed  to  have  been  in  the  interest 
of  the  employer,  and  as  it  is  not  shown  whether  the 
service  to  be  performed  was  interstate  and  the  Com- 
mission found  that  the  employment  was  intrastate, 
the  court  will  not  disturb  the  decision.  Payne  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  223 ;  129  N.  E.  830. 

200  The  test  as  to  whether  an  employee  is  engaged 
in  interstate  commerce  is:  that  at  the  time  that  he 
received  the  injury  the  employee  was  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce  or  in  work  so  closely  related  to 
it,  as  to  be  practically  a  part  of  it.  G.  T.  W.  R.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  171;  125  N. 
E.  748. 


SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES   IN   INTER-STATE  COMMERCE     153 

201  The  test  of  employment  in  interstate  commerce  is, 
was  the  employee  at  the  time  of  the  injury  engaged 
in  interstate  transportation  or  in  work  so  closely  re- 
lated to  it  as  to  be  practically  a  part  of  it.  C.  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  374, 
379;  128  N.  E.  516. 

201  An  employee  was  killed  while  repairing  a  bridge. 
The  railroad  maintained  a  wagon  and  a  railroad 
bridge,  the  latter  used  by  inter  and  intrastate  trains, 
the  employee  was  using  sixteen-foot  stringers  which 
were  used  in  the  railroad  bridge  and  no  work  was 
done  on  the  wagon  bridge.    The  two  bridges  looked 
like  one  structure.    Held,  there  is  no  evidence  in  the 
record  to  sustain  finding  that  the  work  was  not  inter- 
state work  and  that  the  Commission  had  no  jurisdic- 
tion in  the  case,  as  it  involved  interstate  commerce. 
Hines  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  231 ;  129  N. 
E.  175. 

202  An  employee  whose  duties  were  to  guard  certain 
trains  in  interstate  commerce  and  who  was  ordered 
to  go  ahead  of  a  certain  train  and  hide  in  a  certain 
spot,  whose  duties  were  to  apprehend  all  thieves, 
while  waiting  for  this  train  to  come  along,  tried  to 
stop  some  men  carrying  coal  from  the  railroad  prem- 
ises.    He  was  shot  by  these  men  before  the  train 
he  was  supposed  to  guard  came  along.    Held,  that 
the  employee  was  not  at  the  time  that  he  was  in- 
jured, engaged  in  interstate  commerce  and  that  he 
was  entitled  to  an  award.    Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  599,  602;  125  N.  E. 
378. 

202  Railroad  watchman  was  killed  at  a  certain  place 
where  he  used  to  watch  for  thieves.  His  orders 


154     SEC.  6— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE 

were  to  watch  a  certain  interstate  train  from  this 
particular  point  when  it  appeared.  He  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  movement  of  trains  or  instrumentali- 
ties connected  with  the  movement.  There  was  no 
direct  proof  that  he  was  engaged  in  interstate  com- 
merce at  the  time  he  was  killed,  except  for  an  infer- 
ence which  arose  from  the  fact  that  he  was  standing 
in  the  place  where  he  generally  watched  a  certain 
interstate  train.  Held,  that  the  employer  had  not 
proved  that  the  employee  was  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce  and  the  award  of  the  Commission  was 
affirmed.  Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  590,  593;  125  N.  E.  380. 

202  Where  a  special  officer  of  a  railroad  company  was 
115  found  dead  with  two  bullet  wounds  in  his  body  there 
being  evidence  that  he  was  guarding  an  interstate 
train  and  also  that  he  was  guarding  goods  of  his 
employer  stored  in  the  railroad  yards  and  the  Com- 
mission found  that  he  was  under  the  act,  it  was 
held  that  there  was  evidence  in  the  record  to  sus- 
tain the  conclusion  of  the  Commission.  G.  T.  W.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Industrial-  Commission,  291  111.  167;  125 
N.  E.  748. 

202  Evidence  proving  that  a  railroad  watchman  was 
injured  at  a  place  where  he  might  have  been  watch- 
ing for  thieves  on  an  interstate  train  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  his  being  engaged  in  the  general  duties 
of  a  watchman  which  would  bring  him  within  the 
purview  of  the  Compensation  Act.  Atchison  T.  & 
S.  F.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  590, 
593;  125  N.  E.  380. 

202  If  the  railroad  company  employer  fails  to  prove 
that  the  employee  was  engaged  in  interstate  com- 


SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE     155 

merce,  an  award  made  by  the  Commission  will  stand. 
Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  590,  593 ;  125  N.  E.  380. 

201  Employee  who  was  a  crossing  flagman  and 
whose  duties  required  him  to  stop  teams,  persons 
and  other  traffic  when  a  train  approached,  and  to  flag 
trains  when  for  their  protection.  He  kept  the  tracks 
clear  for  inter-  and  intrastate  trains.  He  was  run 
down  by  an  intrastate  train  while  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  duties.  Held,  as  the  employee  was  en- 
gaged in  the  protection  of  interstate  instrumentali- 
ties the  accident  is  within  the  scope  of  the  Federal 
Employers'  Liability  Act,  and  not  within  the  Com- 
pensation Act.  P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  396 ;  126  N.  E.  128. 

201  Where  employee  is  engaged  in  protecting  the  in- 
strumentalities of  interstate  commerce   and  he  is 
killed  in  the  course  of  the  employment,  his  injuries 
arise  out  of  his  employment  and  the  case  is  one  with- 
in the  scope  of  the  Federal  Employers '  Liability  Act, 
regardless  of  who  inflicts  the  injury  causing  the 
death.    P.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  396,  399;  126  N.  E.  128. 

202  The  burden  is  on  the  employer  to  show  that  the 
employee  at  the  time  of  his  injury  was  engaged  in 
interstate  commerce,  where  part  of  an  employee's 
duties  are  connected  with  interstate  commerce  and 
part  of  them  not,  if  the  employer  seeks  to  avoid  lia- 
bility under  the   Compensation   Act   of  the  state. 
Atchison  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  HI.  590,  593;  125  N.  E.  380. 

202  The  expectation  that  an  employee  would  be  called 
upon  presently  to  perform  a  task  in  interstate  com- 


156     SEC.  5— EMPLOYEES  IN  INTER-STATE  COMMERCE 

merce,  docs  not  bring  him  within  the  purview  of  the 
interstate  commerce  laws.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  167,  171;  125  N.  E.  748. 

202  Where  an  injury  occurs  to  an  employee  while  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce,  there  is  no  choice  of 
remedy,  because  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability 
Act  is  exclusive,  and  all  state  laws  covering  the  same 
character  of  facts  are  superseded.  Hines  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  231,  234;  129  N.  E.  175. 

202  Where  some  of  the  duties  of  the  employee  had  no 
connection  with  interstate  commerce,  although  he 
was  employed  by  an  interstate  carrier,  such  work, 
if  not  a  real  and  substantial  part  of  interstate  trans- 
action, did  not  take  him  out  of  the  protection  of  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  171 ;  125  N.  E. 
748, 

The  Act  of  Congress  which  attempted  to  reserve 
to  the  states  the  right  to  award  compensation  to 
employees  sustaining  accidental  injuries  while  on 
boats  engaged  in  maritime  commerce  was  held  un- 
constitutional in  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  Stewart, 
253  U.  S.  149.  The  Industrial  Commission  has  no 
jurisdiction  to  enter  awards  in  favor  of  employees 
engaged  on  vessels  plying  navigable  waters,  such  as 
the  Mississippi  River,  Ohio  River  and  the  Great 
Lakes. 

Independent  Contractor. 

204  That  the  employer  may  at  any  time  terminate  the 
performance  of  the  work  by  discharging  the  em- 
ployee is  of  considerable  weight  as  tending  to  show 
that  the  employee  is  not  an  independent  contractor. 


SEC.  5— INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR  157 

(Messmer  v.  Bell,  et  al.,  19  Ann.  Gas.  (Ky.)  1) ;  Bris- 
tol &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16. 
22;  126  N.  E.  599. 

204  Employee  while  using  a  planer  lost  the  use  of 
some  fingers.  Award  made  by  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission, which  was  set  aside  by  the  Circuit  Court. 
Controversy  was  whether  he  was  an  employee  or 
independent  contractor.  Held,  on  the  facts  that  he 
was  an  employee.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  329;  129  N.  E.  811. 

204  Where  it  appeared  in  the  evidence  that  the  wife 
of  an  employee  engaged  in  the  express  business  on 
her  own  account,  and  that  her  husband  did  work  for 
a  corporation,  not  proof  that  he  is  an  independent 
contractor.  Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  16,  20;  126  N.  E.  599. 

204  Employee  had  at  various  times  worked  for  the 
employer  in  whose  employ  he  was  at  the  time  of  the 
injury.  He  was  hired  to  strip  some  engines  by  a 
junk  dealer  at  $4.00  per  engine  until  some  cars  came 
in  and  while  doing  this  work  his  eye  was  struck  by 
a  piece  of  flying  metal  causing  the  loss  of  the  eye. 
Held,  that  the  employee  was  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion; that  he  was  not  an  independent  contractor. 
Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  522 ; 
125  N.  E.  286. 

A  corporation  engaged  in  the  business  of  dealing 
204  in  farm  machinery  used  a  five-story  building  in  their 
business.  No  manufacturing  or  assembling  was 
done.  There  was  an  elevator  in  the  building.  The 
deceased  employee  was  paid  for  the  services  of  his 
horse  and  wagon.  The  name  of  the  employer  was 
painted  on  the  sides  of  the  wagon.  The  employee 's 


158  SEC.  5— INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR 

wife  owned  an  express  business,  in  which  she  used 
other  horses  and  wagons.  The  employee  never  went 
near  the  elevator  but  got  his  load  at  a  platform.  He 
had  no  regular  hours,  but  worked  exclusively  for 
the  corporation.  The  corporation  controlled  his 
work ;  could  discharge  employee  and  required  him  to 
work  every  day.  Held,  there  is  evidence  from  which 
it  can  be  found  that  he  was  an  employee.  Bristol  & 
Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16,  25; 
126  N.  E.  599. 

205  Employee  was  killed  while  engaged  in  cutting 
down  trees  with  a  cross-cut  saw,  by  one  of  the  trees 
falling  on  him.  Employee  had  been  working  for 
La  May  and  later  made  a  contract  with  one  Reed 
for  whom  the  employee  continued  to  work.  Reed 
was  paid  $11.00  a  thousand  for  the  lumber.  A  con- 
tract had  been  entered  into  between  La  May  and 
Reed,  but  by  the  contract  La  May  had  no  control  of 
the  men  working  for  Reed.  Held,  that  the  contract 
created  the  relation  of  independent  contractor  and 
that  La  May  was  not  the  employer  and  not  liable 
to  the  intestate  of  the  deceased  employee.  La  May 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  76;  126  N.  E.  604. 

204  The  furnishing  of  tools  and  the  mode  of  payment 
throw  some  light  on  determining  the  relationship  of 
employee  or  independent  contractor,  but  do  not  con- 
trol. Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292111.  16,  22;  126  N.E.  599. 

204  It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  a  rule  by  which  the 
status  of  men  working  and  contracting  together  can 
be  definitely  defined  as  employees  or  independent 
contractors.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  329,  333;  129  N.  E.  811. 


SEC.  5— INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR  159 

204  The  principal  consideration  in  determining 
whether  a  worker  is  an  employee  or  independent 
contractor  is  the  right  to  control  the  manner  of 
doing  the  work.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  329,  333;  129  N.  E.  811. 

204  The  fact  that  payment  is  to  be  made  by  the  piece, 
or  the  job,  or  the  day  or  the  hour,  is  not  necessarily 
controlling,  where  the  workman  is  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  employer  as  an  employee  and  not  a 
contractor.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  329,  334;  129  N.  E.  811. 

204  Even  though  little  or  no  direction  or  oversight  of 
employees  is  required,  yet  where  the  work  is  done 
on  the  premises  of  the  employer,  with  materials  fur- 
nished by  him,  and  the  employee  is  subject  to  be 
called  upon  for  other  work,  such  employee  is  not  an 
independent  contractor.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  329,  334;  129  N.  E. 
811. 

204  It  is  not  material  that  a  contractor  be  informed  at 
the  time  he  is  employed  who  the  principal  is  at  the 
time  that  he  is  employed.  Davis  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  29,  31;  130  N.  E.  333. 

204  An  independent  contractor  is  one  who  renders 
service  in  the  course  of  an  occupation  representing 
the  will  of  his  employer  only  as  to  the  result  of  his 
work  and  not  as  to  the  means  by  which  it  is  accom- 
plished. La  May  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
76,  79;  126  N.  E.  604. 

204  An  independent  contractor  is  one  who  undertakes 
to  produce  a  given  result  without  being  in  any  way 
controlled  as  to  the  method  by  which  he  attains  that 


180  SEC.  5— INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR 

result.    Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  329,  334;  129  N.  E.  811. 

204  It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  a  hard  and  fast  gen- 
eral rule  or  state  definite  facts  by  which  the  status 
of  men  working  and  contracting  together  can  be  defi- 
nitely defined  in  all  cases  as  employees  or  independ- 
ent contractors.  Each  case  must  depend  on  its  own 
facts.  Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292  111.  16,  22;  126  N.  E.  599. 

204  Where  there  is  a  conflict  of  evidence  as  to  whether 
a  workman  is  an  employee  or  independent  con- 
tractor, but  there  is  some  evidence  tending  to  show 
that  the  employee  was  not  an  independent  con- 
tractor, a  conclusion  by  the  Commission  that  he  is 
an  employee  is  justified  and  the  decision  of  the  Com- 
mission is  conclusive  on  the  court.  Franklin  Coal 
&  C.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  329,  334, 
335;  129  N.  E.  811. 

204  It  is  not  the  actual  exercise  of  the  right  by  inter- 
fering with  the  work  but  the  right  to  control,  which 
constitutes  the  test.  Franklin  Coal  &  C.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  329,  333,  334;  129  N.  E. 
811. 

204  The  test  of  relationship  is  the  right  to  control.  It 
is  not  the  fact  of  actual  interference  with  the  control 
but  the  right  to  interfere  that  makes  the  difference 
between  an  independent  contractor  and  a  servant. 
Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
16,22;  126  N.E.  599. 

204  The  right  to  control  the  manner  of  doing  the  work 
is  the  principal  consideration  which  determines 
whether  the  worker  is  an  employee  or  independent 


SEC.  5— INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR  161 

contractor.    Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  16,  22;  126  N.  E.  599. 

204  Generally  if  a  person  is  not  under  the  control  of 
the  employer,  he  is  an  independent  contractor.  The 
decisions  in  cases  determining  who  is  an  independent 
contractor  discussed  and  analyzed.  Bristol  &  Gale 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16,  20,  21 ;  126 
N.  E.  599. 

204  The  test  as  to  whether  one  is  an  independent  con- 
tractor or  an  employee  lies  in  the  degree  of  control 
retained  and  exercised  by  the  person  for  whom  he 
is  working.  Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  521,  524;  125  N.  E.  286. 

204  In  simple  work,  where  the  slightest  control  is  exer- 
cised, even  up  to  indicating  where  the  work  should 
be  done,  it  brings  an  employee  under  the  Act  and 
precludes  the  possibility  of  classifying  him  as  an  in- 
dependent contractor.  Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  521,  524;  125  N.  E.  286. 

204  Held  to  be  Employees:  A  man  employed  to  draw 
stone  from  quarry.  There  was  evidence  of  control 
being  exercised  by  employer.  (O'Donnell  v.  Clare 
County  Council,  6  B.  W.  C.  C.  457.)  A  man  hauling 
dirt  in  his  own  wagon  and  team,  but  the  employer 
retaining  supervision.  (Van  Simaeys  v.  Cook 
County,  201  Mich.  540.)  A  teamster  hauling  coal  in 
own  wagon  but  subject  to  control  of  employer,  it  was 
immaterial  whether  he  was  paid  by  the  load. 
(Waters  v.  Pioneer  Fuel  Co.,  38  Am.  St.  Rep. 
(Minn.)  564.)  Where  person  was  employed  by  the 
hour  to  haul  material,  but  he  could  be  discharged 
at  any  time.  (Columbia  School  Co.  v.  Lewis,  116  N.  E. 
(Ind.)  1.)  Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 


162  SECTION  6 

sion,  292  111.  16,  23,  24;  126  N.  E.  599;  (Semble:  Ivis- 
sen  v.  Miller,  (Ind.),  125  N.  E.  652.) 

204  Independent      Contractors:    Person     furnishing 
teams  at  a  stipulated  sum  per  day.     (Western  In- 
demnity Co.  v.  Pillsbury,  172  Cal.  807.)    A  man  con- 
tracting to  supply  a  yawl  and  crew  for  pilotage  pur- 
poses.   (Walsh  v.  Waterford  Harbor  Commrs.,  7  B. 
W.  C.  C.  960.)    A  man  engaged  to  drag  timber  under 
no  obligation  to  come  on  any  certain  day.    (Chisholm 
v.  Walker  &  Co.,  2  B.  W.  C.  C.  261.)  Bristol  &  Gale 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16,  22,  23 ;  126 
N.  E.  599. 

SECTION  6. 

205  No  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover  damages  for 
injury  or  death  sustained  by  any  employee  while  engaged  in  the 
line  of  his  duty  as  such  employee  other  than  the  compensation 
herein  provided  shall  be  available  to  any  employee  who  is  cov- 
ered by  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  to  any  one  wholly  or  partially 
dependent  upon  him,  the  legal  representatives  of  his  estate,  or 
any  one  otherwise  entitled  to  recover  damages  for  such  injury. 

205  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  takes  away  all 
of  the  causes  of  action  for  the  death  of  an  employee 
and  provides  compensation  according  to  an  estab- 
lished scale.    Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  353,  359;  124  N.  E.  552. 

206  Section  6  takes  away  all  right  to  recover  damages 
for  the  death  of  an  employee  who  is  covered  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Act.    Mississippi  River  Power  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353,  358;  124  N. 
E.  552. 

205  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  provides  that 
no  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  injury  sustained  by  an  employee  while 
in  the  line  of  his  duty,  other  than  the  compensation 
provided  for  by  the  Act  shall  be  available  to  any 


SEC.  7— "THE  AMOUNT   OP  COMPENSATION"         163 

employee  who  is  governed  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Act.  Bishop  v.  Chicago  Ey.  Co.,  290  111.  194,  195; 
124  N.  E.  837. 

SECTION  7. 

206  The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid  for  an  injury 
to  the  employee  resulting  in  death  shall  be : 

The  Amount  of  Compensation." 

206  The  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  is  fixed; 
the  person  to  whom  it  is  due  is  fixed.  The  estate  of 
the  deceased  has  no  interest,  for  under  no  circum- 
stances can  any  part  of  the  compensation  be  paid 
for  its  benefit.  Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  353,  359;  124  N.  E.  552. 

206  The  Act  declares  to  whom  the  compensation  shall 
be  paid  and  authorizes  the  employer  of  the  workman 
who  has  been  killed  to  pay  the  compensation  either 
to  the  employee 's  administrator  or  to  the  beneficiary 
entitled  to  it.    Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  353,  359 ;  124  N.  E.  552. 

207  Under  Section  7,  the  right  to  compensation  con- 
ferred upon  the  dependents  of  a  deceased  workman 
is  a  right  which  vests  in  the  dependent  and  is  trans- 
mitted to  his  legal  representatives  upon  death,  not- 
withstanding that  the  dependent  has  died  before  an 
award  or  even  without  having  made  a  claim  for  it. 
East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  298  111.  61,  64;  131  N.  E.  123. 

206  The  various  paragraphs  of  Section  7  fix  the  com- 
pensation for  an  injury  resulting  in  death.  Missis- 
sippi River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  353,358;  124  N.  E.  552. 


164  SEC.  7— (a)    "CHILDREN" 

20*  (a)  If  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child  or  children  whom 
he  was  under  legal  obligations  to  support  at  the  time  of  his 
Injury,  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the  average  annual  earnings 
of  the  employee,  but  not  less  In  any  event  than  one  thousand 
six  hundred  fifty  dollars  and  not  more  in  any  event  than  three 
thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty  dollars.  Any  compensation 
payments  other  than  necessary  medical,  surgical  or  hospital  fees 
or  services  shall  be  deducted  in  ascertaining  the  amount  payable 
on  death. 

Section  7,  paragraph  (a)  was  amended  by  in- 
creasing the  maximum  from  thirty-five  hundred  dol- 
lars to  thirty-seven  hundred  and  fifty  dollars. 

"Children.* 

207  Where  an  employee  was  killed  leaving  him  sur- 
viving illegitimate  children,  it  was  held  that  the  word 
" children"  used  in  Section  7  of  the  Compensation 
Act  did  not  embrace  illegitimate  children,  so  as  to 
entitle  them  to  an  award.  Murrell  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  334;  126  N.  E.  189. 

207  The  word  ' ' child  "  or  ' '  children '  '  means  legitimate 
child  or  children  and  will  not  be  extended,  by  impli- 
cation, to  embrace  illegitimate  children  unless  such 
construction  is  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the 
manifest  purpose  of  the  legislature.  Murrell  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  334,  336 ;  126  N.  E.  189. 

207  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  mentions  only 
children  and  this  must  be  taken  to  mean  legitimate 
children.  Murrell  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
334,  336;  126  N.E.  189. 

209  The  parent  of  an  illegitimate  child  is  under  no 
legal  obligation  to  support  it.  Murrell  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  HI.  334,  336;  126  N.  E.  189. 

207  When  words  have  a  well  settled  meaning  through 
judicial  interpretation,  they  must  be  understood. 


SEC.  7— (a)  "UNDER  LEGAL  OBLIGATION  TO  SUPPORT"  165 

when  used  in  a  statute,  to  have  that  meaning  unless 
a  different  meaning  is  unmistakably  indicated.  Mur- 
rell  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291*111.  334,  336;  126 
N.  E.  189. 

"Under  Legal  Obligation  to  Support.* 

209  The  right  to  compensation  under  the  Statute  of 
1915  does  not  rest  upon  dependency  or  support  as  a 
member  of  the  family,  but  upon  the  existence  of  the 
relation  specified  in  the  statute  and  the  legal  obliga- 
tion to  support  or  actual  contribution.  MurreU  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  334,  337;  126  N.  E. 
189. 

Parent  of  illegitimate  child  is  under  no  legal  obli- 
gation to  support  it.  MurreU  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  334,  336;  126  N.  E.  189. 

207  The  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act  is  intended  for 
the  benefit  of  dependents  and  the  dependency  of  a 
wife  is  presumed.  East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Educa- 
tion v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  61,  64;  131 
N.  E.  123. 

209  Employee  was  killed  leaving  him  surviving  one 
son  twenty  years  old  residing  in  Montana.  Commis- 
sion found  that  deceased  was  under  legal  obligation 
to  support  this  son  and  made  award  of  $3,500  under 
Section  7  (a).  Held,  unless  the  employer  produces 
evidence  to  show  that  the  son  was  emancipated,  a 
parent  is  under  legal  obligation  to  support  his  child 
and  an  award  will  stand.  Auburn  &  Alton  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  568;  130  N.  E.  322. 

209  The  mere  fact  of  the  minority  of  a  child  without 
nothing  more  imposes  upon  the  parent  a  legal  obli- 


166  SEC.  7— (a)  "UNDER  LEGAL  OBLIGATION  TO  SUPPORT" 

gation  to  support.    Auburn  &  Alton  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  568,  569;  130  N.  E.  322. 

209  Where  a  son  twenty  years  old  has  lived  in  a  dis- 
tant state,  there  must  be  some  proof  in  the  record 
that  he  is  supporting  himself  and  that  his  father  had 
not  been  contributing  to  his  support  to  make  a  suffi- 
cient showing  that  he  was  emancipated  and  that  the 
father  was  not  under  legal  obligation  to  support. 
Auburn  &  Alton  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
296  111.  568;  130  N.  E.  322. 

209  Where  a  son  supports  himself,  controls  his  own 
income  and  is  without  the  control  of  his  parents,  he 
is  emancipated  and  the  obligation  to  support  such 
child  ceases.  Panther  Creek  Mines  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  565,  567;  130  N.  E.  321. 

209  A  deceased  employee  left  him  surviving  a  son  who 
attained  his  majority  during  the  pendency  of  the 
proceedings.  He  left  a  daughter  over  eighteen.  He 
had  been  divorced  from  his  wife,  a  property  settle- 
ment having  been  made,  and  the  wife  being  given 
custody  of  the  children.  No  alimony  was  awarded 
in  the  decree.  It  was  contended  that  this  decree  re- 
leased the  deceased  from  all  obligation  to  support 
the  son.  Held,  the  father  is  not  discharged  from  the 
obligation  to  support  his  minor  children,  even  though 
a  gross  sum  had  been  allowed  for  alimony  and  that 
the  divorce  decree  does  not  affect  the  legal  liability 
of  the  father  to  support  his  son.  Panther  Creek 
Mines  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  HI.  565;  130 
N.  E.  321. 

209  A  workman  was  killed  leaving  him  surviving  a  di- 
vorced wife,  a  son  twenty-two  years  old  and  a  son 
twenty  years  old.  It  appeared  that  at  the  time  the 


SEC.  7— (a)  "UNDER  LEGAL  OBLIGATION  TO  SUPPORT"  167 

divorce  was  entered  the  wife  was  given  the  care  and 
custody  of  the  children  and  deceased  was  ordered 
to  pay  a  certain  sum  each  week  for  the  support  of 
the  youngest  boy  then  fifteen  years  old.  The  boy 
then  went  to  room  with  the  father,  who  paid  the  room 
rent,  and  the  boy  kept  the  money  that  he  made.  Later 
he  enlisted  in  the  army.  There  was  some  evidence 
that  the  father  sent  him  money  from  time  to  time, 
but  that  the  boy  got  his  board,  lodging  and  all  the 
necessaries  from  the  army.  Held,  that  the  son  was 
not  dependent  on  the  father  for  support,  nor  was  the 
father  under  legal  obligation  to  support  the  son. 
Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111. 
106;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  Where  there  is  nothing  in  the  record  to  show  that 
the  minor  son  is  able  to  support  himself  or  is  sup- 
porting himself,  the  court  cannot  go  into  the  ques- 
tion and  presumes  that  he  is  under  legal  obligation 
to  support  the  child.  Panther  Creek  Mines  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  565,  567;  130  N.  E.  321. 

209  The  obligation  to  support  his  son  ceases  when  the 
son  attains  the  age  of  majority  or  becomes  emanci- 
pated, unless"  it  is  shown  that  the  son  is  unable  to 
support  himself,  then  under  the  Pauper  Act  the  par- 
ent is  required  to  contribute  to  his  support.  Pan- 
ther Creek  Mines  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111. 
565,  567;  130  N.E.  321. 

209  When  a  child  reaches  the  age  of  majority,  the 
parent  is  no  longer  under  legal  obligation  to  support 
it.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294 
111.  106,  108;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  The  parent  is  usually  under  obligation  to  support 
his  minor  children.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  294  111.  106, 109;  128  N.  E.  289. 


168  SEC.  7— (a)    EMANCIPATION  OF  CHILD 

209  When  a  child  who  is  physically  and  mentally  able 
to  care  for  himself  voluntarily  abandons  the  parental 
roof  and  leaves  its  protection  and  influence  and  goes 
out  to  fight  the  battle  of  life  on  his  own  account,  the 
parent  is  no  longer  under  legal  obligation  to  support 
him.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  106, 109;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  The  question  whether  a  father  is  under  legal  obli- 
gation to  support  his  son  is  a  question  of  law  for 
the  court  to  determine.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  294  111.  106, 109;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  A  minor  who  is  in  the  U.  S.  army  at  the  time  of 
the  death  of  his  father  is  not  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion under  any  provision  of  Section  7,  as  the  father 
is  not  under  legal  obligation  to  support  him.  Iro- 
quois Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  106 ; 
128  N.  E.  289. 

209  Where  the  emancipation  is  brought  about  by 
the  voluntary  act  of  the  parent  and  child,  the  parent 
was  under  no  legal  obligation  to  support.  Iroquois 
Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  106,  109 ; 
128  N.  E.  289. 

Emancipation  of  Child. 

209  When  a  minor  enlists  in  the  military  service  of  his 
country,  he  ceases  to  be  a  part  of  the  father's  fam- 
ily and  puts  himself  under  the  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  is  consequently  emancipated  so  long  as 
his  service  continues.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  294  111.  106,  109;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  Emancipation  works  a  severance  of  the  filial  rela- 
tion as  completely  as  if  the  child  were  of  age. 
Whether  there  has  been  an  emancipation  is  a  ques- 


SEC.  7— (a)   MARRIAGE  169 

tion  of  fact,  but,  what  is  emancipation,  is  a  question 
of  law.  Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  106,  109;  128  N.  E.  289. 

209  Emancipation  is  inferred  where  the  child  contracts 
for  his  services  and  collects  and  uses  his  own  earn- 
ings.   Iroquois  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  106,  109;  128  N.  E.  289. 

Marriage. 

210  Testimony  of  a  widow  that  she  and  the  deceased 
277  were  married  and  had  lived  together  as  husband 

and  wife ;  that  the  license  had  been  lost  in  a  cyclone 
is  sufficient  to  establish  a  marriage,  as  marriage  may 
be  shown  by  reputation,  circumstances  or  the  testi- 
mony of  witnesses.  Western  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408,  411;  129  N.  E. 
779. 

210  In  civil  cases,  record  or  direct  evidence  of  a  mar- 
riage is  not  required  and  proof  of  the  same  by  other 
testimony  is  competent.  Western  Coal  &  Mining 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408,  411 ;  129 
N.  E.  779. 

210  A  transcript  of  an  order  of  the  Probate  Court 
281  finding  that  a  certain  person  is  the  widow  of  the 
deceased,  whom  he  was  under  legal  obligation  to 
support  and  that  she  is  entitled  to  compensation  is 
not  admissible  in  evidence  against  the  employer. 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
594,  595;  125  N.  E.  252. 

210  Where  an  employee  was  killed  by  an  accident  aris- 
ing out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment,  and 
the  arbitrator  decided  that  the  applicant  was  not 
the  widow  of  the  deceased,  which  finding  was  re- 


170  SEC.  7— (a)    MARRIAGE 

versed  by  the  Commission,  which  later  finding  was 
confirmed  by  the  Circuit  Court.  Held,  that  an  order 
of  the  Probate  Court  that  a  certain  woman  was  the 
widow  of  the  deceased  was  not  even  prima  facie 
evidence  against  the  employer  as  to  the  fact  of  her 
being  the  widow  and  the  cause  was  reversed  with 
directions  to  set  aside  the  award.  Illinois  Steel  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  594,  596;  125  N. 
E.  252. 

210  Cohabitation,  illicit  in  its  inception,  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  continue  so,  and  the  party  asserting  the 
marriage  has  the  burden-  of  showing  affirmatively, 
not  only  that  the  illegal  relation  terminated,  but  that 
it  terminated  by  the  parties  entering  into  an  affirma- 
tive agreement  to  become  husband  and  wife.  Illinois 
Steel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  594,  598; 
125  N.  E.  252. 

210  Where  there  was  evidence  that  a  man  and  woman 
lived  together  from  time  to  time  for  a  period  of 
years,  that  she  knew  that  he  was  married,  but  that 
she  went  about  using  his  name  and  there  is  nothing 
to  show  a  marriage,  it  is  insufficient  to  find  that  the 
claimant  was  the  common  law  wife  of  the  deceased 
employee.    Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  594;  125  N.  E.  252. 

211  (b)    If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  of  this  sec- 
tion and  the  employee  leaves  any  parent,  husband,  child  or  child- 
ren, who  at  the  time  of  injury  were  totally  dependent  upon  the 
earnings  of  the  employee,  then  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the 
average  annual  earnings  of  the  employee,  but  not  less  in  any 
event  than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars,  and  not  more 
in  any  event  than  three  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars. 

Section  7  (b)  was  amended  by  increasing  the 
maximum  of  thirty-five  hundred  dollars  to  thirty- 
seven  hundred  and  fifty  dollars. 


SEC.  7— (b)  "LEAVES  PARENT,  TOTALLY  DEPENDENT"  171 

"Leaves  any  Parent,  etc.,  Totally  Dependent." 

211  Where  the  basis  of  a  claim  for  compensation  was 
that  the  employee  had  a  mother  living  in  Servia,  it 
was  held  that  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  alleged 
beneficiaries  was  the  first  essential  to  the  recovery 
of  compensation.  Keystone  Steel  &  Wire,  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587,  589;  124  N.  E. 
542. 

211  The  existence  of  the  alleged  beneficiaries  lying  at 
the  very  foundation  of  the  right  to  compensation,  it 
should  not  rest  on  a  mere  presumption  advanced  by 
one  who  does  not  represent  them,  but  only  knows 
that  they  were  living  some  years  before  the  accident. 
Keystone  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  587,  590;  124  N.  E.  542. 

211  Under  the  1915  Act,  the  parent  did  not  have  to  be 
dependent,  it  was  sufficient  if  the  employee  contrib- 
uted to  the  parents'  support  within  four  years  prior 
to  the  injury.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E.  603. 

211  Where  it  is  claimed  under  Section  7  (b),  that  con- 
298  tribution  is  being  made  to  a  parent,  the  claimant 
has  the  burden  of  proving  the  elements  necessary  to 
bring  the  beneficiary  within  the  provisions  of  the 
Act.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E.  603. 

211  Where  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  mother  or 
wife  of  deceased  employee  was  living  after  Novem- 
ber, 1912,  and  it  appeared  that  Servia,  where  they 
lived,  was  in  a  state  of  war,  the  fact  that  they  were 
living  was  not  sufficiently  proved.  Keystone  Steel  & 
Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587,  589; 
124  N.  E.  542. 


172  SEC.  7— (b)  "LEAVES  PARENT,  TOTALLY  DEPENDENT" 

212  It  would  be  unreasonable  to  presume  the  contin- 
uance of  life  until  it  was  overcome  by  a  presump- 
tion of  death,  where  compensation  depends  on  con- 
tinued existence.  National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  598,  603;  127  N.  E.  135. 

214  Where  the  existence  of  certain  beneficiaries  was  in 
dispute,  the  court  took  judicial  knowledge  of  the  fact 
that  Poland,  where  they  lived,  was  overrun  by  hostile 
armies.    National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292  111.  598,  601 ;  127  N.  E.  135. 

215  Where  it  appeared  that  a  deceased  employee  had 
contributed  to  the  support  of  his  mother  for  four 
years,  the  fact  that  she  had  made  a  will  is  not  mate- 
rial, where  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  will  was 
the  result  of  an  agreement  to  give  him  all  her  prop- 
erty.    Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  353,  355 ;  124  N.  E.  552. 

215  Son  between  the  age  of  nineteen  and  twenty  was 
killed.  The  father  was  sixty,  mother  fifty-six.  They 
lived  on  a  15-acre  farm,  had  house  and  barn  and 
raised  vegetables,  hay,  grain  and  corn.  Enough 
raised  to  support  family.  He  paid  for  his  room  and 
board  and  gave  mother  money  to  buy  his  clothes 
and  other  things.  The  boy's  services  were  worth 
about  thirty  dollars  a  month  on  the  farm.  The 
money  from  the  son  was  used  for  the  support  of  the 
whole  family.  Held,  that  the  Commission  had  a 
right  to  consider  all  of  the  testimony  on  the  question 
of  dependency  and  the  court  cannot  interfere  with 
that  finding.  Richardson  Sand  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  335,;  129  N.  E.  751. 

215  The  test  of  dependency  is  not  whether  the  family 
could  support  life  without  the  contributions  of  the 


SEC.  7— (c)    "PARTIALLY  DEPENDENT"  173 

deceased,  but  whether  they  depended  upon  such  con- 
tributions as  a  part  of  their  income  or  means  of 
living.  Richardson  Sand  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  335,  339 ;  129  N.  E.  751. 

215  Award  made  under  Section  7  (b),  equal  to  four 
times  the  average  annual  earnings.     A  finding  of 
total  dependency  being  made.    It  appeared  that  the 
deceased  was  sixteen  years  old  and  lived  with  mother 
and  three  brothers.    The  father  had  been  arrested 
for  failure  to  support.    Held,  that  the  award  should 
have  been  made  under  Section  7  (c),  for  a  partial 
dependency.    Keller  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  314;  126  N.E.  162. 

216  (c)     If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  or  (b)  of 
this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  any  parent,  child,  or  child- 
ren, grandparent  or  grandchild,  who  at  the  time  of  injury  were 
dependent  upon  the  earnings  of  the  employee,  then  such  pro- 
portion of  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the  average  annual  earnings 
of  the  employee  as  such  dependency  bears  to  total  dependency, 
but  not  less  in  any  event  than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty 
dollars  and  not  more  in  any  event  than  three  thousand  seven 
hundred  fifty  dollars.    Any  compensation  payments  other  than 
necessary  medical,  surgical  or  hospital  fees  or  services  shall  be 
deducted  in  ascertaining  the  amounts  payable  on  death. 

Section  7  (c)  was  amended  by  increasing  the  max- 
imum of  thirty-five  hundred  dollars  to  thirty-seven 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars. 

"Partially  Dependent." 

217  In  the  absence  of  a  showing  of  emancipation,  the 
father  is  bound  to  support  his  minor  children  where 
he  is  able  to  do  so.    Panther  Creek  Mines  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  565,  567;  130  N.  E.  321. 

217  Partial  dependency  may  exist  even  though  the 
claimant  could  have  subsisted  without  the  contribu- 
tions of  the  deceased.  It  is  not  necessary  to  show 


174  SEC.  7— (c)   "PARTIALLY  DEPENDENT" 

that  the  claimant  would  have  been  without  the  neces- 
saries of  life  in  the  absence  of  such  contributions, 
nor  is  it  necessary  to  show  that  the  dependent  was 
without  other  means  of  support.  Richardson  Sand 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  335,  338;  129 
N.  E.  751. 

217  The  test  is  whether  the  contributions  were  relied 
on  by  the  defendant  for  his  or  her  means  of  living, 
judging  this  by  the  position  in  life  of  the  dependent, 
or  whether  the  dependent  was  to  a  substantial  de- 
gree supported  by  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  his 
death.  Richardson  Sand  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  335,  338 ;  129  N.  E.  751. 

217  Evidence  held  to  justify  finding  of  the  Commission 
that  the  mother  was  partially  dependent  and  case  re- 
manded with  directions  to  enter  award  for  $1,650.00. 
Keller  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  314.  315; 
126  N.  E.  162. 

218  Deceased  employee  lived  with  father,  mother,  and 
two  sisters.    He  gave  his  wages  to  his  mother,  who 
mingled  the  same  with  the  money  she  got  from  the 
father  and  one  sister.    All  the  money  was  used  for 
the  upkeep  of  the  home.    Out  of  the  fund  she  pur- 
chased clothes  for  the  deceased  employee  and  clothes 
for   the   rest   of   the  family.     Deceased  employee 
helped  his  father  cultivate  some  land.     Held,  that 
there  was  evidence  to  support  a  finding  that  the 
mother  and  younger  sister  were  partially  dependent 
and  the  award  was  valid.    Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  332;  129  N.  E.  142. 

218  A  dependent  is  one  who  is  sustained  by  another  or 
who  relies  upon  another  for  support  or  for  reason- 
able necessaries  consistent  with  the  dependent's  po- 


SEC.  7— (c)   "AT  TIME  OF  INJURY  WAS  DEPENDENT"  175 

sition  in  life.    Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  332,  334;  129  N.  E.  142. 

218  A  dependent  is  one  who  is  sustained  by  another 
or  relies  for  support  upon  the  aid  of  another;  who 
looks  to  another  for  support  and  relies  upon  another 
for  reasonable  necessaries  consistent  with  the  de- 
pendent 's  position  in  life.  Keller  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  314,  316;  126  N.  E.  162. 

"who  at  the  time  of  the  injury  was  dependent  upon  the  earnings 
of  the  employee." 

218  A  dependent  is  one  who  is  sustained  by  or  relies 
for  support  on  the  aid  of  another,  or  looks  to  an- 
other for  support  and  relies  on  another  for  reason- 
able necessaries  consistent  with  the  dependent's  po- 
sition in  life.  Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  597,  599;  127  N.  E.  641. 

218  The  question  of  dependency  is  one  of  fact  and  the 
court  will  not  interfere  with  the  decision  of  the  Com- 
mission if  there  is  evidence  tending  to  sustain  it. 
Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  597, 
599;  127  N.  E.  641. 

218  Where  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  tending 
to  show  that  the  mother  needed  or  received  aid  from 
her  son  but  that  after  her  husband's  death,  the 
mother  provided  for  herself,  a  finding  of  dependency 
cannot  be  sustained.  Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  597;  127  N.  E.  641. 

218  The  dependency  must  be  actual  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  and  evidence  of  a  proposed  arrangement 
which  might  result  in  a  condition  of  dependency  in 
the  future  does  not  tend  to  show  an  actual,  existing 
dependency.  Alden  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  597,  599,  600;  127  N.  E.  641. 


176  SEC.  7— (c)    "AT  TIME  OF  INJURY  WAS  DEPENDENT" 

218  Where  an  administrator  does  not  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  certain  beneficiaries,  the  presumption  that 
they  are  still  living  cannot  be  relied  upon.    National 
Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598,  601 ; 
127  N.  E.  135. 

219  Where  a  son  contributed  toward  the  payments  on 
a  home,  paid  the  taxes  and  paid  his  mother  $7.00 
a  week  for  board,  gave  her  spending  money  and 
money  for  clothes.    Held,  that  the  evidence  sustained 
a  finding  of  the  Board  that  the  mother  was  partially 
dependent  under  Section  7  (c).    Henry  Pratt  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  367;  127  N.  E.  754. 

219  Where  it  appeared  that  a  son  paid  the  father  $8.00 
a  week,  but  it  did  not  appear  what  use  the  father 
made  of  the  money,  but  that  he  was  regularly  em- 
ployed. Held,  that  the  father  is  not  under  the  facts 
dependent  upon  his  son  for  support.  Henry  Pratt 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  367;  127  N. 
E.  754. 

219  Where  a  husband  supports  his  wife,  but  one  of  the 
366  sons  contributes  to  her,  the  question  of  support  is 
a  question  of  fact  and  if  there  is  a  finding  by  the 
Commission  that  the  mother  is  partially  dependent, 
this  finding  cannot  be  reviewed  by  a  court.  Henry 
Pratt  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  367,  369 ; 
127  N.  E.  754. 

219  Partial  dependency  may  exist  even  though  the  evi- 
dence shows  the  claimant  could  have  subsisted  with- 
out the  contributions  of  the  deceased  employee.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  claimant  would 
have  been  without  the  necessities  of  life,  nor  is  it 
necessary  to  show  that  the  dependent  was  without 
other  means  of  support.  (Appeal  of  Hotel  Bond  Co., 


SEC.  7— (d),   (e),  (f)  177 

89  Conn.  143,  93  Atl.  245;  Havey  v.  Erie  Railroad 
Co.,  (N.  J.)  95  Atl.  124;  Kenney  v.  City  of  Boston, 
222  Mass.  401,  111  N.  E.  47.)  Henry  Pratt  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  367,  369;  127  N.  E. 
754. 

219  The  test  is  whether  the  contributions  were  relied 
on  by  the  dependent  for  his  or  her  means  of  living, 
judging  this  by  the  position  in  life  of  the  dependent, 
or  whether  the  dependent  is  to  a  substantial  degree 
supported  by  the  employee  at  the  time  of  the  em- 
ployee's death.  The  problem  presented  by  this  test 
is  largely  one  of  fact.  (Miller  v.  Riverside  Storage 
and  Cartage  Co.  (Mich.),  155  N.  W.  462 ;  Rock  Island 
Bridge  and  Iron  Works  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
287  111.  648 ;  Keller  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  id. 
314.)  Henry  Pratt  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  367,  369 ;  127  N.  E.  754. 

Other  cases  on  the  question  of  dependency,  see: 
Cronin's  case  (Mass.),  124  N.  E.  669;  Moran's  case 
(Mass.),  125  N.  E.  157;  Skarpeletzos  v.  Counes  (N. 
Y.),  126  N.  E.  268;  Re  Stewart  (Ind.)  126  N.  E.  42. 

219  (d)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraphs  (a),  (b)  or  (c) 
of  this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  collateral  heirs  depend- 
ent at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee  upon  his  earnings, 
snch  a  percentage  of  the  sum  provided  in  paragraph  (a)  of  this 
section  as  the  average  annual  contributions  which  the  deceased 
made  to  the  support  of  such  dependent  collateral  heirs  during 
the  two  years  preceding  the  injury  bears  to  his  average  annual 
earnings  during  such  two  years. 

219  (e)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraphs  (a),  (b),  (c) 
or  (d)  of  this  section,  a  sum  not  to  exceed  one  hundred  and  fifty 
dollars  for  burial  expenses  to  be  paid  by  the  employer  to  the 
undertaker  or  to  the  person  or  persons  incurring  the  expense  of 
burial. 

219  (f)  All  compensation,  except  for  burial  expenses  provided  in 
this  section  to  be  paid  in  case  injury  results  in  death,  shall  be 
paid  in  installments  equal  to  the  percentage  of  the  average  earn- 
ings as  provided  for  in  Section  8  of  this  Act,  at  the  same  inter- 
vals at  which  the  wages  or  earnings  of  the  employees  were  paid ; 


178  SEC.  7— (g) 

or  If  this  shall  not  be  feasible,  then  the  Installments  shall  be 
paid  weekly:  ProTlded,  snch  compensation  may  be  paid  in  a 
lump  sum  npon  petition  as  provided  in  Section  9  of  this  Act. 

219  Section  7  (f )  was  amended  by  inserting  the  words 
"to  the  percentage"  after  the  word  "equal"  and 
before  the  words  "of  the  average"  and  by  inserting 
after  the  word  "earnings"  the  words  "as  provided 
for  in  Section  8  of  this  Act. ' '    Prior  to  this  amend- 
ment in  death  cases  the  beneficiary  received  fifty  per 
cent  of  the  average  earnings  without  any  limitation 
as  to  the  maximum.    In  some  cases,  during  the  era 
of  high  wages,  a  widow  collected  the  maximum  in  less 
than  three  years.    The  amendment  fixes  a  maximum 
in  death  cases  so  that  it  is  the  same  as  in  cases  where 
the  employee  collects  the  compensation  himself  and 
it  cannot  exceed  seventeen  dollars  a  week,  which  is 
the  maximum  allowed  under  Section  8. 

220  (g)     The  compensation  to  be  paid  for  injury  which  results 
in  death,  as  provided  in  this  section,  shall  be  paid  to  the  persons 
who  form  the  basis  for  determining  the  amount  of  compensa- 
tion to  be  pa'd  by  the  employer,  the  respective  shares  to  be  in 
the  proportion  of  their  respective  dependency  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  on  the  earnings  of  the  deceased;  provided,  that  the  Indus- 
trial Commission   or  an  arbitrator  thereof  may,  in  Its  or  his 
discretion,  order  or  award  the  payment  to  the  parent  or  grand- 
parent of  a  child  for  the  lattcr's  support  the  amount  of  compen- 
snUon  which  but  for  snch  order  or  award  would  have  been  paid 
to  such  child  as  its  share  of  the  compensation  payable,  which 
order  or  award  may  be  modified  from  time  to  time  by  the  Com- 
mission in  its  discretion  with  respect  to  the  persons  to  whom 
shall  be  paid  the  amount  of  said  order  or  award  remaining  un- 
paid at  the  time  of  said  modification. 

The  payments  of  compensation  by  the  employer  in  accord- 
ance with  the  order  or  nward  of  the  Industrial  Commission  shall 
discharge  such  employer  from  all  further  obligation  as  to  such 
compensation. 

In  a  case  where  any  of  the  persons  who  would  be  entitled  to 
compensation  is  living  at  any  place  outside  of  the  United  States, 
tl:on  payment  shall  be  nmde  to  the  personal  representative  of 
the  deceased  employee.  The  distribution  by  such  personal  rep- 
resentative to  the  persons  entitled  shall  be  made  to  such  per- 
sons and  in  such  manner  as  the  Commission  shall  order. 


SEC.  7— (g)  "COMPENSATION  SHALL  BE  PAID  TO"    179 

220  Where  award  is  made  to  administrator  under  the 
1913  Act,  compensation  must  be  distributed  pursuant 
to  order  of  court  appointing  him.    National  Zinc  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598,  600;  127  N. 
E.  135. 

"Compensation  shall  be  paid  to  the  persons." 

221  The  existence  of  a  beneficiary  at  the  time  of  the 
hearing  furnished  the  sole  basis  of  a  claim  for  com- 
pensation, and  an  award  can  only  be  made  upon 
affirmative  proof  of  that  fact.    National  Zinc  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598,  600;  127  N.  E. 
135. 

221  Where  there  is  no  voluntary  payment  on  the  part 
of  the  employer  the  Commission  must  determine  the 
compensation  and  it  is  the  further  duty  of  the  Com- 
mission to  determine  the  person  or  persons  entitled 
to  the  compensation.  Keller  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  314,  316;  126  N.  E.  162. 

221  The  question  of  who  is  entitled  to  compensation 
under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  is  of  no 
concern  to  the  Probate  Court.    Illinois  Steel  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  594,  595;  125  N.  E. 
252. 

222  Section  7,  Par.  (g),  which  was  (f)  of  1915  Act, 
provides  that  compensation  for  an  injury  resulting 
in  death,  shall  be  paid,  at  the  option  of  employer,  to 
the  personal  representative  of  the  deceased  employee 
and  that  payment  shall  relieve  the  employer  of  all 
obligations  as  to  the  distribution  and  that  the  repre- 
sentative  shall  make  distribution  pursuant  to  the 
order  of  court  appointing  him.     Mississippi  River 
Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353, 
357;  124  N.  E.  552. 


180  SEC.  7— (g)   "COMPENSATION  SHALL  BE  PAID  TO" 

221  An  amendment  to  a  statute  designating  one  per- 
son for  another  as  a  proper  person  to  bring  the 
action  is  a  mere  matter  of  procedure  not  affecting 
the  substantial  rights  of  the  parties.     Mississippi 
River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
353,359;  124  N.  E.  552. 

222  Where  a  person  to  whom  the  deceased  employee 
owed  some  money  was  appointed  administrator,  an' 
objection  to  the  appointment  of  the  administrator 
before  the  Commission  was  overruled,  it  was  held, 
that  the  Probate  Court  having  jurisdiction,  the  order 
of  appointment  was  not  void,  whether  erroneous  or 
not,  and  could  not  be  questioned  collaterally  in  a 
proceeding  before  the  Commission.    Keystone  Steel 
&  Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587; 
124  N.  E.  542. 

225  Where  there  is  no  voluntary  payment  on  the 
part  of  the  employer  and  the  Industrial  Commission 
must  determine  the  compensation,  it  is  the  further 
duty  of  the  Commission  to  determine  the  person  or 
persons  entitled  to  the  compensation.  (Keller  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  314;  Smith-Lohr 
Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  286  111. 
34) ;  Henry  Pratt  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
HI.  367,  370;  127  N.E.  754. 

225  Section  7,  paragraph  (g),  of  amendment  to  Act  of 
June  28,  1919,  construed  in  dissenting  opinion  to 
indicate  that  the  provision  relative  to  "personal  rep- 
resentative" was  not  a  wise  one.  Mississippi  River 
Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353, 
363;  124  N.  E.  552. 

220  "Personal  representative"  ordinarily  means  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator,  but  its  use  in  Section  19 


SEC.  7— (h)  181 

of  1915  Act  does  not  determine  who  is  entitled  to 
file  a  petition  with  the  Commission.  Mississippi 
River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
353,  358;  124  N.  E.  552. 

226  (h).  1.  Whenever  in  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  a  mini- 
mum of  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars  is  provided,  such 
minimum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following  cases  to  the  follow- 
ing amounts: 

One  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars  in  case  of  a  widow 
and  one  child  under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  death 
of  the  employee. 

One  thousand  eight  hundred  fifty  dollars  in  case  of  a  widow 
and  two  or  more  children  under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time 
of  the  death  of  the  employee. 

2.  Wherever  in  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  a  maximum  of 
three  thousand  seven  hundred  fifty  dollars  is  provided,  such 
maximum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following  cases  to  the  follow- 
ing amounts: 

Four  thousand  dollars  in  case  of  a  widow  and  one  child  under 
the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  the  employee. 

Four  thousand  two  hundred  fifty  dollars  in  case  of  a  widow 
and  two  or  more  children  under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time 
of  the  death  of  the  employee. 

Section  1,  paragraph  (h)  sub-paragraph  2,  was 
amended  by  inserting  the  words  "three  thousand 
seven  hundred  fifty  dollars"  in  lieu  of  thirty-five 
hundred  dollars,  the  following  paragraph  was 
amended  by  inserting  the  words,  "four  thousand 
dollars ' '  in  lieu  of  thirty-seven  hundred  and  fifty  dol- 
lars and  in  the  paragraph  in  which  the  maximum  was 
fixed  at  four  thousand  dollars  the  words  ' '  four  thou- 
sand two  hundred  and  fifty"  were  inserted  and  the 
words  four  thousand  dollars  stricken  out. 


182     SEC.  8— "THE  AMOUNT  OF  COMPENSATION  PAID" 

SECTION  8. 

226  The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid  to  the  em- 
ployee  for  an  injury  not  resulting  in  death  shall  be: 

"The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid." 

In  using  the  word  " compensation"  the  legislature 
made  no  distinction  between  medical  services  and 
money  payments.  Central  Locomotive  Works  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436,  438;  125  N.  E. 
369. 

226  In  order  to  entitle  an  employee  to  compensation, 
the  accident  must  occur  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment, the  contract  relation  of  employer  and  em- 
ployee must  exist  at  the  time  of  the  accident  and  the 
employee  must  be  doing  something  within  the  scope 
of  the  employment,  so  that  the  act  is  in  the  course 
of  the  employment.  Michigan  Central  Ry.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  503,  507;  125  N.  E.  278. 

226  The  compensation  allowed  under  the  Act  is  re- 
quired to  be  paid  only  for  accidents  which  arise  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  injured  person 's  employ- 
ment.   Henry  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  491, 
493;  127  N.  E.  714. 

227  Where  an  injury  resulted  in  hernia  and  there  was 
evidence  that  operation  could  be  performed  without 
endangering  life  and  that  the  employee  could  be 
cured,  the  employee  would  not  be  entitled  to  com- 
pensation until  he  submitted  to  the  operation.    (Ap- 
proving: O'Brien  v.  Albrecht  Co.,  6  A.  L.  B.  Ann. 
1257;  206  Mich.  101) ;  Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  182,  185;  129  N.  E.  176. 

226  (a)  The  employer  shall  provide  the  necessary  first  aid  medical 
and  surgical  services;  all  necessary  hospital  services  during  the 
period  for  which  compensation  may  be  payable;  also  all  neces- 
sary medical  and  surgical  services  for  a  period  not  longer  than 
eight  weeks,  not  to  exceed,  however,  an  amount  of  two  hundred 


SEC.  8— (a)    "MEDICAL,  ETC.,  SERVICES"  183 

dollars,  and  in  addition  such  medical  or  surgical  services  in 
excess  of  snch  limits  as  may  be  necessary  during  the  time  snch 
hospital  services  are  furnished.  All  the  foregoing  services  shall 
be  limited  to  those  which  are  reasonably  required  to  cure  and  re- 
lieve from  the  effects  of  the  injury.  The  employee  may  elect  to 
secure  his  own  physician,  surgeon  or  hospital  services  at  his 
own  expense. 

"Medical,  et<%,  Services  for  a  Period  of  eight  weeks." 

227  Section  8  (a)  does  not  require  that  the  hospital 
services  be  rendered  or  requested  within  eight  weeks 
from  the  date  of  the  injury.  Chicago-Sandoval  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  351,  354;  128 
N.  E.  567. 

227  The  employer  is  not  in  a  position  to  insist,  be- 
cause of  his  refusal  to  pay  hospital  expenses,  that 
he  did  not  have  knowledge  of  the  necessity  of  such 
services  or  that  he  did  not  have  a  request  therefor 
from  the  employee.  Chicago-Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  351,  353,  354;  128 
N.  E.  567. 

"and  in  addition  thereto  medical,  surgical  and  hospital  services 
for  a  period  not  longer  than  eight  weeks." 

227  Does  not  confine  the  eight  weeks  to  the  time  imme- 
diately following  the  injury  and  the  liability  arises 
for  these  services  when  rendered  at  any  time  in  con- 
nection with  an  injury.  Chicago-Sandoval  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  351,  354;  128  N. 
E.  567. 

227  The  employer  is  required  to  provide  medical,  sur- 
gical and  hospital  services,  but  the  employee  may 
elect  to  provide  his  own  physician,  etc.,  at  his  own 
expense;  and  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  em- 
ployer knew  of  the  necessity  for  the  treatment,  so 
the  applicant  should  show  knowledge  on  the  part  of 
the  employer  of  facts  from  which  it  might  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  knew  or  ought  to  have  believed  the 


184  SEC.  8—  (b) 

services  necessary;  or  employee  should  show  a  re- 
quest for  the  services.  Chicago-Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  351,  353;  128  N.  E. 
567. 

227  Coal-digger  received  injury  in  September  in  try- 
ing to  lift  coal  car.    He  reported  the  injury  within 
the  thirty  days  and  continued  to  work  until  January, 
when  he  notified  the  superintendent  that  he  was 
going  to  the  hospital,  who  told  him  that  he  could  go, 
but  that  the  company  would  not  pay  for  it.    Arbi- 
trator awarded  $200.00  for  hospital  services.    Held, 
employer  is  liable  under  Section  8  (a)  for  medical, 
surgical,  and  hospital  services  even  though  rendered 
four  months  after  the  injury  was  sustained.     Chi- 
cago-Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294111.  351;  128  N.E.  567. 

228  (b)    If  the  period  of  temporary  total  Incapacity  for  work  lasts 
for  more  than  six  working  days,  compensation  equal  to  fifty 
percentum  of  the  earnings,  but  not  less  than  $7.50  nor  more  than 
$14.00  per  week,  beginning  on  the  eighth  day  of  such  temporary 
total  incapacity  and  continuing  as  long  as  the  temporary  total 
incapacity  lasts,  but  not  after  the  amount  of  compensation  paid 
equals  the  amount  which  would  hare  been  payable  as  a  death 
benefit  under  paragraph  (a),  Section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died 
as  a  result  of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  sur- 
viving as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  Section  7:  Provided, 
that  in  the  case  where  temporary  total  incapacity  for  work  con- 
tinues for  a  period  of  four  weeks  from  the  day  of  the  injury, 
then  compensation  shall  commence  on  the  day  after  the  Injury. 

Paragraph  (b)  of  Section  8  was  amended  by  in- 
serting the  figures  "$7.50"  in  lieu  of  the  figures 
"$7.00,"  and  the  figures  "$14.00"  in  lieu  of 
"$12.00." 

"Period  of  temporary  total  incapacity." 

229  Where  the  only  evidence  in  the  record  as  to  the 
temporary  total  incapacity  was  the  evidence  of  the 
employee  that  he  got  well  in  ten  weeks,  it  was  held, 
that  there  was  no  evidence  in  the  record  to  justify 


SEC.  8—  (b)  "PERIOD  OF  TEMPORARY  INCAPACITY"     185 

the  finding  that  the  period  of  temporary  total  inca- 
pacity was  54  weeks.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  429,  432;  129  N.  E.  103. 

229  Where  one-sixteenth  of  the  phalange  of  a  finger 
is  lost,  the  Commission  cannot  enter  an  award  for 
permanent  partial  disability,  as  it  is  not  the  loss  of 
a  phalange  and  the  award  should  be  for  temporary 
total  disability  only.  McMorran  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  569,  572;  125  N.  E.  284. 

229  The  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  de- 
scribed, as  the  period  during  which  the  employee 
cannot  work  because  of  the  broken  bone  in  his  arm. 
Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
429,431;  129  N.  E.  103. 

229  Where  an  injured  workman  had  a  fractured  arm, 
and  thereafter  the  bone  knitted  and  the  soreness 
and  stiffness  disappeared,  the  period  of  the  tempor- 
ary incapacity  had  ended.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  295  111.  429,  432 ;  129  N.  E.  103. 

229  The  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  is  that 
temporary  period  immediately  after  the  accident, 
during  which  the  injured  employee  is  totally  in- 
capacitated for  work  by  reason  of  the  illness  attend- 
ing the  injury.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  429,  431 ;  129  N.  E.  103. 

229  Where  a  coal  miner  received  a  green  stick  frac- 
ture. The  question  considered  was  the  meaning  of 
the  words  "temporary  total  incapacity,"  whether 
there  was  evidence  in  the  record  to  sustain  a  finding 
that  the  incapacity  lasted  54  weeks ;  whether  the  evi- 
dence showed  a  refusal  to  submit  to  an  operation; 
what  is  the  effect  of  the  unreasonable  refusal  of  an 
employee  to  submit  to  an  operation!  Held,  the  dis- 


186  SEC.  8— (c)   "FOR  AN\  PERMANENT  DISFIGUREMENT" 

ability  that  prevented  the  employee  from  returning 
being  the  stiff  condition  of  the  hand,  cannot  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  temporary  total  disability 
where  the  employee  testified  that  he  got  well  in  ten 
weeks.  M t.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295111.  429;  129  N.E.  103. 

230  (c)  For  any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement  to  the  hand, 
head  or  face,  the  employee  shall  be  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion for  such  disfigurement,  the  amount  fixed  by  agreement 
or  by  arbitration  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act, 
which  amount  shall  not  exceed  one-quarter  of  the  amount  of 
the  compensation  which  would  have  been  payable  as  a  death 
benefit  under  paragraph  (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died 
as  a  result  of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  sur- 
viving, as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7:  Provided, 
that  no  compensation  shall  be  payable  under  this  paragraph 
where  compensation  is  payable  under  paragraph  (d),  (e)  or  (f) 
of  this  section:  And,  provided  further,  that  when  the  disfigure- 
ment is  to  the  hand,  head  or  face  as  a  result  of  any  injury,  for 
which  injury  compensation  is  not  payable  under  paragraph  (d), 
(e)  or  (f)  of  this  section,  compensation  for  such  disfigurement 
may  be  had  under  this  paragraph. 


"For  any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement." 

230  Section  8,  paragraph  (c),  providing  for  compen- 
sation for  disfigurement.    Where  there  is  evidence 
of  powder-marks  on  the  face  and  of  a  scar  on  the 
jaw  and  the  hands  are  scarred  by  powder-marks, 
it  is  sufficient  evidence  on  which  to  base  an  award 
for  disfigurement.    International  Coal  &  Mining  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  531 ;  127  N. 
E.  703. 

231  Laundress  caught  her  hand  in  a  mangle  requiring 
amputation  of  her  fingers.    Later  tetanus  developed 
which  impaired  her  ability  to  masticate  food  and 
left  a  noticeable  disfigurement  of  the  face.    She  was 
awarded  150  weeks  for  the  loss  of  the  hand  and  $6.00 
a  week  for  104  weeks  for  serious  and  permanent  dis- 


SEC.  8— (c)   "DISFIGUREMENT  TO  HAND,  HEAD,"  ETC.  187 

figurement  of  the  face.  Held,  under  paragraph  (c) 
of  Section  8,  a  person  who  is  disabled  and  disfigured 
by  the  same  injury  is  not  entitled  to  compensation 
for  the  injury  and  disfigurement.  (Smith-Loh-r  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  355,  followed; 
Wells  Bros.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  285  111.  647; 
International  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  524;  dist.);  Chicago  Home  of  the  Friendless  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  286 ;  130  N.  E.  756. 

231  Where  an  award  is  made  for  disfigurement,  the 
amount  of  such  award  shall  not  exceed  one-quarter 
of  the  amount  of  compensation  which  would  have 
been  payable  as  a  death  benefit.    Stubbs  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  525,  526;  124  N.  E.  527. 

232  Paragraph  (c)   of  Section  8  does  not  entitle  an 
employee  to  an  award  for  permanent  partial  inca- 
pacity and  for  disfigurement  resulting  from  the  same 
injury.    (Wells  Bros.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  285 
111.  647,  distinguished) ;  Smith-Lohr  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  355,  357;  126  N.  E.  164. 

"Disfigurement  to  hand,  head  or  face." 

230  Where  an  employee  received  two  injuries,  one  that 
disables  him  and  another  that  causes  disfigurement 
of  the  hands,  face  or  head,  he  is  entitled  to  compen- 
sation for  the  disability  and  the  disfigurement.  Chi- 
cago Home  for  the  Friendless  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 297  111.  286,  287;  130  N.  E.  756. 

230  Paragraph  (c)  Section  8  of  1915  Act  does  not 
authorize  compensation  for  a  disfigurement  result- 
ing from  an  injury  for  which  compensation  has  been 
paid  under  paragraph  (e)  of  Section  8.  Chicago 


188          SEC.  8— (d)  "PARTIALLY  INCAPACITATED" 

Home  for  the  Friendless  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  286,  288 ;  130  N.  E.  756. 

231  Where  the  question  of  permanent  disfigurement 
is  before  the  Commission,  it  has  jurisdiction  to  say 
what  the  compensation  should  be,  subject  to  the  limi- 
tations of  the  statute.    Stubbs  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  525,  527;  124  N.  E.  527. 

232  Where  there  is  an  award  for  disfigurement  of  the 
face  and  for  loss  of  use  to  the  eyes  and  arms,  it  does 
not  contravene  the  rule  that  compensation  cannot  be 
awarded  for  the  disfigurement  of  a  member  and  also 
for  the  loss  of  use  of  such  member.    International 
Coal  and  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  524,  531;  127  N.E.  703. 

233  (d)    If,  after  the  injury  had  been  sustained,  the  employee  as  a 
result  thereof  becomes  partially  incapacitated  from  pursuing  his 
usual  and  customary  line  of  employment,  he  shall,  except  in  the 
cases  coTered  by  the  specific  schedule  set  forth  in  paragraph  (e) 
of  this  section,  receive  compensation,  subject  to  the  limitations 
as  to  time  and  maximum  amounts  fixed  in  paragraphs  (b)  and 
(h)  of  this  section,  equal  to  fifty  percentum  of  the  difference  be- 
tween the  average  amount  which  he  earned  before  the  accident, 
and  the  average  amount  which  he  Is  earning  or  is  able  to  earn  in 
some  suitable  employment  or  business  after  the  accident. 

"Partially  Incapacitated." 

233  Where  an  employee  is  partially  incapacitated,  he 
shall  receive  fifty  per  cent  of  the  difference  between 
the  average  amount  which  he  earned  before  the  acci- 
dent and  the  average  amount  which  he  is  earning. 
Pedbody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
449,  453;  124  N.E.  566. 

233  Section  8  (d)  authorizes  award,  where  employee, 
by  reason  of  injuries,  becomes  partially  incapaci- 
tated, in  all  cases  except  those  covered  by  the  spe- 
cific schedule  in  (e)  of  the  section.  Slago  Coal  Co.  v. 


SEC.  8— (d)   "PARTIALLY  INCAPACITATED"  189 

Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  271.  273;  127  N. 
E.  751. 

233  Employee  was  a  coal  miner  who  received  a  frac- 
ture of  the  skull  requiring  a  surgical  operation  to 
remove  part  of  the  skull.  An  award  was  made  for 
temporary  total  incapacity  for  a  permanent  partial 
loss  of  earning  capacity  and  for  disfigurement. 
Held,  that  the  award  must  be  reversed  for  the  rea- 
son that  compensation  cannot  be  awarded  for  both 
loss  of  earning  capacity  and  disfigurement  resulting 
from  the  same  injury.  Smith-Lohr  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  355 ;  126  N.  E.  164. 

233      In  determining  the  reduction  in  earning  capacity, 

277  the  Commission  is  not  limited  to  evidence  of  the 
amount  actually  earned  after  the  injury.    Other  mat- 
ters than  the  amount  earned  may  be   considered. 
(O'Callaghan   v.    Industrial    Commission,    290    111. 
222) ;  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
296  111.  229,  232;  129  N,  E.  722. 

233      The  Commission  is  allowed  latitude  in  determin- 

278  ing  from  the  condition  of  the  applicant  and  the  cir- 
cumstances of  his  employment  subsequent  to  his  in- 
jury, what  reduction,  if  any,  in  his  earning  capacity 
has  taken  place,  but  in  determining  the  reduction 
the  award  must  rest  on  competent  legal  evidence 
and  not  on  conjecture  or  surmise.     (Peoria  Cord- 
age Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  284  111.  90 ;  Savoy 
Hotel  v.  Industrial  Board,  279  HI.  329;  Goelitz  v. 
Industrial  Board,  278  111.  164) ;  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.   229,  233;   129  N. 
E.  722. 

233      Employee  while  laying  a  switch  in  a  mine  sus- 
319  tained  an  injury  to  his  back.    The  arbitrator  awarded 


190    SEC.  8— (d)  "AVERAGE  AMOUNT  EARNED" 

$14.00  a  week  for  nine  weeks.  On  review  the  Com- 
mission allowed  $7.20  a  week  for  407  weeks,  or  sixty 
per  cent  of  the  difference  in  his  earning  capacity, 
he  having  two  children.  Employee  testified  that  he 
could  earn  $18.00  after  the  injury.  Before  the  in- 
jury he  made  $26.53.  The  Commission  fixed  present 
earning  capacity  at  $14.25,  $12.42  less  than  he  was 
able  to  earn  before  the  accident.  Held,  although  the 
amount  actually  earned  since  the  injury  is  not  con- 
clusive in  determining  the  reduction  of  earning  ca- 
pacity, yet  where  it  is  the  only  competent  evidence 
in  the  record  tending  to  show  the  extent  of  the  re- 
duction in  earning  capacity,  it  is  error  on  the  part 
of  the  Commission  to  ignore  it.  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  229;  129  N.  E.  772. 

233  Where  the  temporary  partial  incapacity  for  work 
for  which  an  award  is  made  arises  out  of  the  same 
injury  which  caused  the  permanent  partial  loss  of 
the  use  of  an  arm,  the  award  for  the  temporary  par- 
tial incapacity  must  be  set  aside.  Slago  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  271,  272;  127  N. 
E.  751. 

"Average  amount  earned,  etc." 

233  The  measure  of  the  compensation  under  this  par- 
agraph is  fixed  at  one  half  the  difference  between 
the  average  amount  earned  before  the  accident  and 
the  amount  which  the  employee  is  earning  or  is 
able  to  earn  in  some  suitable  employment  after  the 
accident.  Voiqht  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
109,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

233      There  is  no  intent  expressed  in  the  statute  that 
236  he  should  or  ought  to  recover  for  pain  and  suffer- 


SEC.  8— (d)  "AVERAGE  AMOUNT  EARNED"     191 

ing  merely.     Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
111.  109,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

233  Employee  sustained  injury  resulting  in  fracture 
of  protuberances  of  lumbar  vertebrae  and  a  contu- 
sion of  lumbar  muscles  on  October  10,  1918.  April 
1,  1919,  employee's  doctor  said  he  could  work  and 
that  in  his  opinion  he  was  back  to  normal.  A  chiro- 
practor testified  that  two  vertebrae  were  affected 
and  that  there  was  a  subluxation  in  the  lower  lum- 
bar region.  April  15,  1919,  employer  stopped  pay- 
ing compensation.  In  July,  1919,  he  was  earning 
$11.70  a  week  and  October  24, 1919,  he  began  to  earn 
$24.00  a  week.  Held,  under  section  8  (d)  employee 
was  not  entitled  to  compensation  for  partial  inca- 
pacity after  October  24,  1919.  Voight  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  109;  130  N.  E.  470. 

233  The  amount  actually  earned  since  the  injury  is  not 
conclusive  in  the  matter  of  determining  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  earning  capacity  but  if  there  is  compe- 
tent evidence  in  the  record  showing  the  reduction 
of  the  earning  capacity,  the  Commission  cannot  ig- 
nore it.  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  229,  233;  129  N.  E.  722. 

233  There  is  sufficient  evidence  in  the  record  to  sup- 
port an  award  for  $7.00  a  week  for  413  weeks  for  a 
permanent  partial  disability  under  Section  8  (d),  for 
hernia.    Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
323,  325 ;  125  N.  E.  250. 

234  Employee,   a  mule   driver,   was   knocked  uncon- 
scious and  his  eye,  shoulder  and  chest  were  hurt. 
The  cut  over  the  eye  left  a  scar.     The  award  gave 
him  temporary  total,  for  partial  incapacity  under 
Section  8    (d) ;  four  weeks  for  disfigurement  and 


192    SEC.  8—  (d)  "EQUAL  TO  FIFTY  PERCENTUM" 

twenty-five  per  cent  for  loss  of  use  of  right  arm. 
There  was  no  evidence  in  the  record  showing  that  the 
temporary  partial  loss  was  due  to  any  other  injury 
than  the  one  for  which  compensation  was  allowed 
for  permanent  partial  loss  of  the  right  arm.  Held, 
as  double  compensation  cannot  be  allowed,  it  was 
error  to  allow  8  3/7  weeks  for  partial  incapacity, 
and  that  part  of  the  award  is,  therefore,  modified. 
Slaqo  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
271;  127  N.  E.  751. 

"Equal  to  fifty  percentnm,  etc." 

234  Section  8  (d)  which  entitles  one  to  recover  for  par- 
tial incapacity  compensation  "  Equal  to  fifty  per 
centum  of  the  difference  between  the  average  amount 
which  he  earned  before  the  accident  and  the  average 
amount  which  he  is  earning  or  able  to  earn  in  some 
suitable  employment  or  business  after  the  accident" 
does  not  warrant  giving  any  compensation  after  the 
time  when  his  original  earning  capacity  has  re- 
turned. Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
109,  113,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

234  Where  there  is  evidence  that  the  employee  is 
earning  the  same  amount  that  he  earned  before  the 
accident,  he  is  not  entitled  to  any  further  compen- 
sation. Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
109,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

234  Employee  is  physically  able  to  work  when  he  can 
do  so  without  seriously  endangering  his  health  or 
life.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  109, 
115;  130  N.  E.  470. 


SEC.  8— (d)   "EARNING  OR  IS  ABLE  TO  EARN"      193 

"Earning  or  is  able  to  earn." 

234  Section  8  (d),  "earning  or  is  able  to  earn"  cannot 
be  construed  as  if  the  word  "or"  meant  "and"  and 
it  does  not  mean  that  the  injured  employee  should 
still  receive  compensation  although  he  is  able  to 
earn  in  a  suitable  occupation  as  much  wages  after 
the  injury  as  before,  if  in  earning  those  wages  he 
is  not  physically  able  to  do  so  without  suffering 
pain.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
109,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

234  Section  8  (d)  "or  able  to  earn"  added  to  express 
the  idea  that  an  employee  cannot  loaf  or  refuse  to 
work  and  recover  compensation  if  he  is,  in  fact  phys- 
ically able  to  earn  full  wages.  Voight  v.  Industrial 
Commsision,  297  111.  109,  115;  130  N.  E.  470. 

234  The  word  "or"  is  considered  to  mean  "and"  only 
where  there  is  an  apparent  repugnance  or  inconsist- 
ency in  a  statute  that  would  defeat  its  main  intent 
and  purpose.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
HI.  109,  114;  130  N.  E.  470. 

234  The  meaning  of  this  section  is  so  obvious  that 
the  court  is  not  warranted  in  interpreting  the  word 
"or"  as  if  it  had  been  written  "and."  Voight  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  109,  114;  130  N. 
E.  470. 

236  Where  an  award  is  made  for  partial  incapacity 
under  Section  8  (d),  it  is  error  to  make  an  award 
under  (e)  of  Section  8  for  a  percentage  of  loss. 
Slago  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
271,  273;  127  N.E.  751. 

236  (e)  For  injuries  in  the  following  schedule,  the  employee 
shall  receire  in  addition  to  compensation  during  the  period  of 
temporary  total  incapacity  for  work  resulting  from  such  in- 
jury, in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  (a)  and 
(b)  of  this  section,  compensation,  for  a  further  period,  subject 


194      SEC.  8— (e)  "TEMPORARY  TOTAL  INCAPACITY" 

to  the  limitations  as  to  time  and  amounts  fixed  In  paragraphs 
(b)  and  (h)  of  this  section,  for  the  specific  loss  herein  men- 
tioned, as  follows,  but  shall  not  receive  any  compensation  for 
such  injuries  under  any  other  provisions  of  this  Act. 


"Temporary  Total  Incapacity." 

236  Temporary  as  distinguished  from  permanent  dis- 
ability is  a  condition  that  exists  until  the  injured 
workman  is  as  far  restored  as  the  permanent  char- 
acter of  the  injuries  will  permit.  Mt.  Olive  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  429,  431;  129 
N.  E.  103. 

236  The  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  is  the 
period  of  the  healing  process.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  429,  431 ;  129  N. 
E.  103. 


236  Payments  made  beyond  the  amounts  accrued  by 
the  employer  in  the  nature  of  a  lump  sum  settle- 
ment are  illegal  and  unauthorized.  International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.524,533;  127  N.  E.  703. 

236  Although  an  employer  has  no  right  to  make  a 
lump  sum  settlement,  still  he  may  make  payment  of 
the  installments  of  compensation  as  they  accrue,  and 
is  entitled  to  credit  for  such  payments  up  to  the 
time  of  the  final  determination  of  the  award  by  the 
Commission.  International  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  532;  127  N.  E. 
703. 

236  The  specific  cases  of  (e)  of  Section  8  are  not  con- 
strued as  excluding  other  cases.  He  is  entitled 
to  an  award  under  (f )  if  the  evidence  shows  that  ha 


SECTION  8— (e)  1-6  195 

is  totally  permanently  disabled.      Ballon  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  434,  437;  129  N.  E.  755. 

236  In  order  to  entitle. an  employee  to  compensation 
for  a  disability  and  a  disfigurement,  it  must  appear 
that  there  were  two  separate  injuries.  Chicago 
Home  for  the  Friendless  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  286,  287 ;  130  N.  E.  756. 

1.  For  the  loss  of  a  thumb,  or  the  permanent  and  complete 
loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  dur- 
ing sixty  weeks; 

2.  For  the  loss  of  a  first  finger,  commonly  called  the  index 
finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per- 
centnm  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  thirty-five  weeks; 

3.  For  the  loss  of  a  second  finger,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage 
during  thirty  weeks ; 

4.  For  the  loss  of  a  third  finger,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage 
during  twenty  weeks; 

5.  For  the  loss  of  a  fourth  finger,  commonly  called  the  little 
finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per- 
centum of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  fifteen  weeks; 

6.  The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  the  thumb,  or  of  any  finger 
shall  be  considered  to  be  equal  to  the  loss  of  one-half  of  such 
thumb  or  finger  and  compensation  shall  be  one-half  the  amounts 
above  specified; 

"Loss  of  Phalange." 

236  Clause  6,  paragraph  (e),  Section  8,  providing  for 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  a  phalange  refers  to 
Clause  2  of  Paragraph  (e),  Section  8,  for  the  ascer- 
tainment of  the  amounts  and  a  reasonable  interpre- 
tation cannot  go  as  far  as  to  say  that  the  loss  of  a 
one-sixteenth  part  of  a  phalange  is  the  loss  of  the 
phalange.  McMorran  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  569,  570;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  Clause  6,  paragraph  (e),  Section  8,  construed  in 
the  light  of  in  Re  Pctri,  215  N.  Y.  335,  109  N.  E.  549, 
where  it  was  said  that  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 


196  SEC.  8— (e)    6  "LOSS  OF  PHALANGE" 

ute  become  operative  and  applicable  when  it  appears 
that  substantially  all  of  the  portion  of  the  finger 
so  designated  has  been  lost.  McMorran  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  569,  571;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  Geigher  v.  Gotham  Can  Co.,  177  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.) 
29 ;  163  N.  Y.  Supp.  678,  where  it  was  held  that  the 
loss  on  one-eighth  of  an  inch  of  the  bone  of  the  first 
phalange  of  the  second  finger  did  not  constitute  the 
loss  of  a  phalange  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act ;  ap- 
proved. McMorran  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  569,572;  125  N.~E.  284. 

236  Thompson  v.  Sherwood  Shoe  Co.,  178  (N.  Y.)  App. 
Div.  319;  164  N.  Y.  Supp.  869,  the  loss  of  one-fourth 
of  an  inch  from  the  tip  of  one  of  the  fingers  not  the 
loss  of  a  phalange,  approved.  McMorran  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  569,  572;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  M odder  v.  Hawkes,  173  (N.  Y.)  App.  Div.  333 ;  158 
N.  Y.  Supp.  759,  holding  that  the  loss  of  the  tip  of 
a  finger  which  could  only  be  seen  with  x-ray,  was 
not  the  loss  of  the  first  phalange,  approved.  Mc- 
Morran v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  569,  572; 
125  N.  E.  284. 

236  Packer  v.  Olds  Motor  Works,  195  Mich..497;  162 
N.  W.  80,  holding  that  the  loss  of  a  part  of  the  first 
part  of  the  first  phalange  of  the  thumb  is  not  the  loss 
of  the  entire  phalange  of  the  thumb,  approved.  Mc- 
Morran v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  569,  572; 
125  N.  E.  284. 

236  Where  the  evidence  is  undisputed  that  the  em- 
ployee lost  a  one-sixteenth  part  of  the  distal  pha- 
lange, it  is  error  to  make  an  award  for  the  loss  of 
the  first  phalange.  McMorran  &  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  569,  572;  125  N.  E.  284. 


SEC.  8— (e)  7-12  197 

236  In  Re  Petri,  215  N.  Y.  335;  109  N.  E.  549,  distin- 
guished on  the  ground  that  in  the  Petri  case  the 
employee  lost  one-third  of  the  distal  phalange  and  in 
the  case  at  bar  he  had  lost  only  one-sixteenth  and 
had  the  use  of  the  distal  joint  and  it  did  not  inter- 
fere with  the  rest  of  the  finger.  McMorran  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  569,  571 ;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  Ide  v.  Faul  &  Timmons,  179  App.  Div.  (N.  Y.)  567 ; 
166  N.  Y.  Supp.  858,  where  workman  lost  one-fourth 
of  an  inch  of  the  bone  of  the  index  finger  and  one- 
eighth  of  an  inch  of  the  bone  of  the  second  finger,  an 
award  for  permanent  partial  disability  was  set  aside 
because  it  did  not  justify  the  loss  of  the  first  pha- 
lange, approved.  McMorran  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  569,  571;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  The  loss  of  one-sixteenth  of  an  inch  of  the  first 
joint  of  a  finger  cannot  reasonably  be  said  to  be  the 
loss  of  the  first  phalange.  McMorran  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  569,  571 ;  125  N.  E.  284. 

236  7.  The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  considered 
as  the  loss  of  the  entire  finger  or  thumb;  Provided,  however, 
that  in  no  case  shall  the  amount  received  for  more  than  one 
finger  exceed  the  amount  provided  in  this  schedule  for  the  loss 
of  a  hand ; 

8.  For  the  loss  of  a  great  toe,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  thirty  weeks; 

9.  For  the  loss  of  one  toe  other  than  the  great  toe,  fifty  per- 
centum of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  ten  weeks,  and  for 
the  additional  loss  of  one  or  more  toes  other  than  the  great  toe, 
fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  an  additional 
ten  weeks ; 

10.  The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  any  toe  shall  be  con- 
sidered to  be  the  equal  to  the  loss  of  one-half  of  such  toe,  and 
compensation  shall  be  one-half  of  the  amount  above  specified; 

11.  The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  considered 
as  the  loss  of  the  entire  toe; 

12.  For  the  loss  of  a  hand,  or  the  permanent  and  complete 
loss  of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  dur- 
ing one  hundred  fifty  weeks; 


198  SEC.  8—  (e)  12  "LOSS  OF  HAND" 

"Loss  of  a  Hand." 

237  Compensation  allowed  for  the  loss  of  a  hand  dis- 
tinguished from  temporary  total  incapacity.  Mt. 
Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
429,  432;  129  N.  E.  103. 

237  If  a  workman  should  lose  his  hand,  the  period  of 
temporary  total  disability  would  be  the  physical 
state  of  the  patient  until  the  stump  was  healed. 
Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111.  429,  432;  129  N.  E.  103. 

237  Paragraph  (c),  Section  8,  does  not  authorize  an 
award  for  disfigurement  as  the  result  of  lockjaw, 
where  compensation  has  been  paid  for  the  loss  of  a 
hand.     Chicago  Home  for  the  Friendless  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  297  111.  286,  288;  130  N.  E.  756. 

238  The  fact  that,  by  some  substitute  for  the  hand,  an 
employee  is  able  to  perform  maual  labor  to  some 
extent,  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  complete  loss  of 
the  use  of  the  hand.      (Mark  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  286  111.  620.)      Juergens  Bros.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  420,  423;  125  N.  E. 
337. 

237  13.    For  the  loss  of  an  arm  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss 
of  Its  use,  fifty  percentnm  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during 
two  hundred  weeks; 

238  Where  the  evidence  shows  that  the  partial  incapac- 
ity arises  solely  out  of  an  injury  to  the  shoulder  and 
that  the  permanent  partial  loss  of  use  of  the  right 
arm  arises  out  of  the  same  injury  an  award  on  such 
evidence  for  partial  incapacity   and   for  the   per- 
manent partial  loss  of  the  use  of  a  member,  is  double 
compensation  and  must  be  set  aside.     Slago  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  271,  273;  127  N. 
E.  751. 


SEC.  8— (e)  14-15  199 

238  14.  For  the  loss  of  a  foot,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss 
of  its  nse,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage,  during 
one  hundred  and  twenty-fire  weeks; 

238  15.  For  the  loss  of  a  leg,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss 
of  its  use,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  one 
hundred  and  seventy- five  weeks; 

238  Section  8  (e),  15,  providing  that  compensation 
shall  be  paid  for  the  loss  of  a  leg  or  the  permanent 
or  complete  loss  of  its  use  does  not  make  any  dis- 
tinction between  the  loss  of  the  whole  leg  or  the  loss 
of  the  part  of  the  leg.  Therefore  the  loss  of  any 
substantial  portion  of  the  leg  constitutes  the  loss 
of  the  leg  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act,  and  the  am- 
putation of  the  leg  ten  inches  above  the  ankle  joint 
entitles  one  to  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the  leg 
and  does  not  require  the  Commission  to  find  the  loss 
of  a  foot.  Payne  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111. 
223,  229;  129  N.  E.  830. 

238  Where  there  is  nothing  to  show  in  the  record  that 
the  employee  was  before  the  Commission  and  that  it 
examined  the  leg,  an  award  as  to  the  loss  of  the 
use  of  the  leg  cannot  be  made.  St.  Louis  Smelt- 
ing &  Refining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
272,  277 ;  131  N.  E.  617. 

238  Paragraph  (e),  Section  8,  of  the  1915  Act  was  not 
applicable  to  a  case  where  there  was  not  a  complete 
loss  of  use  of  a  leg  and  it  was  wrong  to  award  a  per- 
centage of  the  use  of  the  leg  under  this  schedule. 
Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
449,454;  124  N.  E.  566. 

238      To  the  end  that  justice  may  be  done  there  should 

360  be  a  hearing  on  the  question  of  the  loss  of  the  use 

of  his  legs  if  he  desires  such  hearing.      Decatur 

Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290, 

294;  129  N.  E.  738. 


200  SEC.  8— (e)   16 

238  16.  For  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye  or  for  the  permanent 
and  complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  one  hundred  weeks; 

238  Employee  sustained  injury  to  eye  while  breaking 
59  coal,  the  particle  lodged  in  the  outer  coating  of  the 
eye,  but  did  not  go  through  the  sclerotic  coat.  The 
doctor  testified  that  the  defect  in  the  eye-sight  was 
due  to  exudates  which  had  no  relation  to  the  acci- 
dent; that  the  accident  was  not  such  as  to  aggra* 
vate  the  existing  condition.  Held,  as  the  defective 
vision  was  not  caused  by  the  accident,  the  award 
could  not  stand.  Perry  County  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  294  111.  117;  128  N.  E.  333. 

238  The  Supreme  Court  refused  to  adopt  the  reason- 
ing of  the  New  York  court  in  F rings  v.  Pierce  Ar- 
row Motor  Car  Co.,  169  N.  Y.  Supp.  309,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  based  upon  remote  speculation  as 
to  the  happening  of  another  event,  which  in  itself 
would  be  an  additional  misfortune.  Juergens  Bros. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  420,  424;  125 
N.  E.  337. 

238  When  a  person  has  lost  the  sight  of  an  eye,  he  has 
lost  the  eye  and  to  say  that  the  Compensation  Act 
does  not  apply  because  of  the  remote  possibility  of 
his  losing  his  good  eye,  whereby  he  can  through 
artificial  means,  gain  a  certain  amount  of  use  of  the 
injured  member,  is  to  place  a  construction  on  a  reme- 
dial act  which  deprives  it  of  all  practical  effect. 
Juergens  Bros.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  420,  423;  125  N.  E.  337. 

238  Under  paragraph  (e)  of  Section  8,  it  cannot  be 
argued  that  if  the  employee  should  lose  the  sight  of 
his  good  eye,  the  sight  of  the  injured  eye  would 
be  restored  by  the  use  of  lenses,  as  the  only  ques- 
tion to  be  decided  is  whether  the  employee  lost  the 


SEC.  8— (e)   16  201 

sight  of  his  eye  for  all  practical  purpose^.  Juer- 
gens  Bros.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
420,  424;  125  N.  E.  337. 

238  Employee  struck  in  the  eye  by  piece  of  steel.  An 
operation  to  remove  a  cataract  performed,  which 
necessitated  penetrating  the  cornea  and  iris  and 
removing  the  lens  from  the  eye.  After  this,  it  was 
impossible  to  bring  the  vision  of  the  injured  eye  to 
harmonize  with  the  other  eye,  which  was  normal. 
At  different  focal  distances,  it  was  necessary  to  use 
different  focal  lenses.  The  power  of  accomodation 
was  lost.  Testimony  that  the  loss  was  three-fourths 
of  the  normal  eye  with  such  lenses.  Employee  was 
earning  the  same  wages  as  he  earned  before  the  acci- 
dent. Award  for  50%  of  his  wages  for  one  hundred 
weeks.  Held,  that  the  employee  has  lost  the  practi- 
cal use  of  his  eye,  which  in  effect  amounted  to  the 
loss  of  an  eye,  and  he  was  entitled  to  an  award  under 
paragraph  (e),  of  Section  8.  Juergens  Bros.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  420,  424;  125  N.  E. 
337. 

See,  also:  Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Indus* 
trial  Commission,  295  111.  358;  129  N.  E.  135. 

238  By  this  provision,  the  compensation  for  the  loss 
of  an  eye  is  fifty  per  cent  of  the  average  weekly  wage 
during  100  weeks  and  for  a  permanent  partial  loss  of 
the  use  of  an  eye,  50  per  cent  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  for  that  proportion  of  the  number  of  weeks  pro- 
vided for  the  total  loss  which  the  partial  loss  bears 
to  a  total  loss.  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  315,  316;  124  N.  E.  545. 

238  Although  an  eye  might  not  be  perfect,  if  the  em- 
ployee always  had  the  normal  use  of  it,  and  the  sight 
was  lost  as  the  result  of  an  accident,  he  would  be 


202  SEC.  8— (e)    17 

entitled  to  full  compensation.  Spring  Valley  Coal 
Co:v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  315,  319;  124 
N.  E.  545. 

238  Where  the  employee  has  lost  all  practical  use  of 
an  eye,  which  practical  use  cannot  be  restored  so 
long  as  he  has  his  other  eye,  such  amounts,  in  effect, 
to  the  loss  of  an  eye  and  compensation  should  be 
paid  under  paragraph  (e)  of  Section  8.  Juergens 
Bros  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  420,  424 ; 
125  N.  E.  337. 

On  the  question  of  color  blindness,  see :  Fallin  v.  L. 
E.  M.  L.  &  A.  Ins.  Assn.,  102  S.  E.  177. 

238  17.  For  the  permanent  partial  loss  of  use  of  a  member  or  sight 
of  an  eye,  fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  daring 
that  portion  of  the  number  of  weeks  in  the  foregoing  schedule 
provided  for  the  loss  of  such  member  or  sight  of  an  eye  which 
the  partial  loss  of  use  thereof  bears  to  the  total  loss  of  use  of 
such  member  or  sight  of  eye. 

238  Where  an  award  for  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye» 
was  entered  on  evidence  that  justified  only  an  award 
in  proportion  that  the  partial  loss  bore  to  the  total 
loss,  the  case  was  remanded  to  the  Commission  for 
a  correction  of  the  award.  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  315,  319;  124  X. 
E.  545. 

238  Where  the  only  evidence  in  the  record  as  to  the 
percentage  of  loss  of  use  of  a  member  is  the  opinion 
evidence  of  the  claimant,  which  is  not  competent, 
there  is  no  evidence  from  which  the  Commission  can 
determine  the  percentage  of  loss  and  the  case  should 
be  remanded  for  further  hearing.  International  Coal 
&  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524, 
532;  127  N.  E.  703. 

238  Clause  17  of  (e),  Section  8,  authorizes  an  award 
for  a  permanent  partial  loss  of  use  of  a  member  of 


SEC.  8— (e)    18  203 

the  body  or  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye.  Slago 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  271,  273 ; 
127  N.  E.  751. 

237  Whether  the  loss  of  eighty  per  cent  use  of  the  hand 

238  is  attributable  to  the  accident  or  to  the  refusal  of 
the  employee  to  have  the  adhesions  in  the  tendons 
of  the  hand  broken  up,  is  a  question  for  the  Commis- 
sion to  determine.    Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  429;  129  N.  E.  103. 

238  Cl.  17,  par.  (e),  Section  8^  held  to  justify  award 
on  the  facts  for  33  1/3  per  cent  loss  of  use  of  arm. 
Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission* 
295  111.  578,  580,  581 ;  129  N.  E.  521. 

239  18.    The  loss  of  both  hands,  or  both  arms,  or  both  feet,  or  both 
legs,  or  both  eyes,  or  of  any  two  therof,  or  the  permanent  and 
complete  loss   of  nse  thereof,  shall  constitute  total  and  per- 
manent disability,  to  be  compensated  according  to  the  compensa- 
tion fixed  by  paragraph  (f)  of  this  section:   Provided,  that  these 
specific  cases  of  total   and  permanent   disability   shall   not   be 
construed  as  excluding  other  cases. 

This  paragraph  read,  "the  loss  of  both  hands"  in 
1915.  This  required  actual  severance  of  the  hands  to 
bring  the  employee  within  this  provision.  It  now 
reads  "loss  of  use  of  both  hands."  The  decision 
in  Ballon  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  434, 
would  not  apply  to  the  1921  Act  on  the  same  facts. 

239  Section  8,  (e),  *  *  *  "The  loss  of  both 
hands,"  1915  Act — The  loss  of  use  of  both  hands  is 
not  the  same  as  the  loss  of  both  hands.  Incapacity 
to  use  a  member  is  not  tantamount  to  severance  of 
that  member.  It  is  enough  if  the  normal  use  is 
entirely  taken  away.  Ballou  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  HI.  434,  436;  129  N.  E.  755. 

239  Award  of  $10.67  per  week  for  a  period  of  270 
weeks  as  provided  in  paragraph  (e),  of  Section  8, 


204  SEC.  8— (f) 

for  the  reason  that  the  injuries  sustained  caused 
ninety  per  cent  of  the  loss  of  the  use  of  both  hands- 
criticized.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  18;  128  N.  E.  813. 

239  A  coal-digger  was   injured  by  an  explosion  of 
powder  whereby  he  sustained  a  disability  and  dis- 
figurement.    Case  reversed  and  remanded  for  the 
same  reasons  stated  in  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  18;  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  85;  128  N.  E.  815. 

240  (f)  In  case  of  complete  disability,  which  renders  the  employees 
wholly  and  permanent  incapable  of  work,  compensation  equal  to 
fifty  percentum  of  his  earnings  but  not  less  than  $7.50  nor  more 
than  $14.00  per  week,  commencing  on  the  day  after  the  injury, 
and  continuing  until  the  amount  paid  equals  the  amount  which 
would  li;m-  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  paragraph 
(a),  Section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result  of  the  in- 
jury at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving  as  provided  in 
said  paragraph  (a),  Section  7,  and  thereafter  a  pension  during 
life  annually  equal  to  8  per  cent  of  the  amount  which  would  have 
been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  paragraph  (a),  Section  7, 
If  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result  of  the  injury  at  the  time 
thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving,  as  provided  in  said  paragraph 
(a),  Section  7.    Such  pension  shall  not  be  less  than  $10.00  per 
month  and  shall  be  payable  monthly:  Provided,  any  employee 
who  receives  an  award  under  this  paragraph  and  afterwards  re- 
turns to  work,  or  is  able  to  do  so,  and  who  earns  or  is  able  to 
earn  as  much  as  before  the  injury,  payments  under  such  award 
shall  cease;  if  such  employee  returns  to  work,  or  is  able  to  do 
so  and  earns  or  is  able  to  earn  part  but  not  as  much  as  before 
the  Injury,  such  award  shall  be  modified  so  as  to  conform  to  an 
award  under  paragraph  (h*)  of  this  section:   Provided,  further, 
that  disability  as  enumerated  in  sub-division  18,  paragraph  (e) 
of  this  section  shall  be  considered  complete  disability. 

This  paragraph  was  amended  by  adding  the  sen- 
tence starting  with  the  word  " Provided"  in  the 
tenth  line  from  the  bottom,  to  the  end  of  the  para- 
graph. This  amendment  raises  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  modification  of  an  award  must  be  asked 
for  within  the  18  months  period  provided  for  in  Sec- 
tion 19  (h).  The  purpose  of  the  amendment  was 
to  prevent  employees  drawing  pension  payments 


*Typographical  error  in  law.    Should  be  (d). 


SEC.  8— (£)  205 

while  actually  working.  Thus,  in  a  complete  disability 
case,  the  ability  to  return  to  work  becomes  an  issue 
of  fact.  If  the  workman,  after  returning  to  work,  is 
compelled  to  stop  work,  the  pension  payments  are 
again  resumed  because  the  purpose  of  the  Act  is  to 
make  the  industry  bear  the  burden  of  providing  for 
the  injured  workman  and  his  family. 

The  words  "employees"  and  "permanent"  in  lines 
1  and  2  of  the  above  paragraph  appear  in  1921  Ses- 
sion Laws  and  are  obviously  typographical  errors. 

241  Under  the  1915  Act,  if  a  case  of  complete  disabil- 
ity existed,  which  rendered  the  employee  wholly  and 
permanently  incapable  of  work,  it  arose  from  other 
sources  than  (e)  of  Section  8.  Ballon  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  434,  436,  437;  129  N.  E.  755. 

241  Section  8,  (f ),  takes  care  of  cases  other  than  those 
in  (e)  of  8,  fracture  of  skull  and  paralysis  result- 
ing in  permanent  incapacity  come  under  (f)  and 
not  (e).  Ballou  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111. 
434,436,  437;  129  N.  E.  755. 

241  Section  8,  (f),  to  entitle  a  person  to  an  award  and 
pension  there  must  be  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
the  employee  is  totally  permanently  disabled,  render- 
ing him  wholly  and  permanently  incapable  of  work. 
Ballou  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  434,  436; 
129  N.  E.  755. 

241  The  finding  which  was  held  insufficient  in  Illinois 
Midland  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  277  HI.  333, 
distinguished.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  18,  21 ;  128  N.  E.  813. 

241  Where  the  continuance  of  the  permanent  disabil- 
ity is  due  not  to  the  original  accident  but  due  to  the 
unreasonable  refusal  of  the  employee  to  submit  to 


206  SEC.  8—  (g) 

the  proper  medical  treatment,  such  loss  of  time  is 
due  to  the  voluntary  act  of  the  employee  and  can- 
not be  attributed  to  the  accident,  therefore  the  time 
lost  by  the  employee  on  account  of  his  refusal  to 
submit  to  an  operation  must  be  credited  to  the 
employer.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  429,  432,  433;  129  N.  B.  103. 

241  Employee  while  oiling  machinery  got  caught  in  a 
239  revolving  shaft.    Evidence  that  there  was  a  75  per 

cent  loss  of  right  hand  and  66%  per  cent  of  left 
hand.  Commission  found  permanent  and  complete 
371  loss  of  both  hands  and  allowed  a  pension.  There 
was  testimony  by  the  employee  that  he  did  janitor 
work,  used  a  broom  and  wheelbarrow,  that  he  earned 
money  as  a  watchman,  that  he  worked  at  clam  fish- 
ing; poled  a  boat  with  his  two  hands;  although  he 
could  not  do  the  work  as  well  as  before  the  injury. 
Held,  that  the  evidence  negatives  the  idea  that  the 
employee  is  totally  incapable  of  performing  work 
and  as  there  was  no  competent  evidence  in  the  record 
tending  to  show  that  the  employee  was  totally  per- 
manently disabled,  the  award  must  be  set  aside.  Bal- 
lou  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  434;  129-N.  E. 
755. 

242  (g).    In  case  death  occurs  as  a  result  of  the  injury  before  the 
total  of  the  payments  made  equals   the   amonnt  payable   as   a 
death  benefit,  then  in  case  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child, 
or  children,  parents,  grandparents,  or  other  lineal  heirs,  entitled 
to  compensation  under  section  7,  the  difference  between  the  com- 
pensation for  death  and  the  sum  of  the  payments  made  to  the 
employee  shall  be  paid  to  the  beneficiaries  of  the  deceased  em- 
ployee, and  distributed  as  provided  in  paragraph  (f)  of  section 
7.  but  in  no  case  shall  the  amount  payable  under  this  paragraph 
be  less  than  $500.00. 

211  Section  7  (b),  the  words  "or  other  lineal  heir" 
seems  to  imply  that  the  child,  parent  or  grandpar- 
ent must  be  a  lineal  heir,  which  means  that  the  rela- 


SEC.  8— (h),  (i),  (J)  207 

tion  must  be  legitimate.    Murrell  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  334,  337 ;  126  N.  E.  189. 

242  (h).  In  no  event  shall  the  compensation  to  be  paid  exceed 
fifty  percentum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  or  exceed  $14.00  per 
week  in  amount;  nor,  except  in  case  of  complete  disability,  as 
defined  above,  shall  any  payments  extend  over  a  period  of  more 
than  eight  years  from  the  date  of  the  accident.  In  case  an  in- 
jured employee  shall  be  incompetent  at  the  time  when  any  right 
or  privilege  accrues  to  him  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  a 
conservator  or  guardian  may  be  appointed,  pursuant  to  law,  and 
may,  on  behalf  of  such  incompetent,  claim  and  exercise  any  such 
right  or  privilege  with  the  same  force  and  effect  as  if  the  em- 
ployee himself  had  been  competent  and  had  claimed  or  exercised 
said  right  or  privilege;  and  no  limitations  of  time  by  this  Act 
provided  shall  run  so  long  as  said  incompetent  employee  is  with- 
out a  conservator  or  a  guardian. 

Section  8  paragraph  (h)  the  figures  "$14.00"  was 
inserted  in  lieu  of  "$12.00." 

248  (i).  All  compensation  provided  for  in  paragraphs  (b),  (c), 
(d),  (e)  and  (f)  of  this  section,  other  than  case  (cases)  of  pen- 
sion for  life,  shall  be  paid  in  installments  at  the  same  intervals 
at  which  the  wages  or  earnings  of  the  employee  were  paid  at  the 
time  of  the  injury,  or  if  this  shall  not  be  feasible,  then  the  in- 
stallments shall  be  paid  weekly. 

(j)  1.  Wherever  in  this  section  there  is  a  provision  for  fifty 
percentnm,  such  percentum  shall  be  increased  five  percentum 
for  each  child  of  the  employee  under  16  years  of  age  at  the  time 
of  the  injury  to  the  employee  until  such  percentum  shall  reach  a 
maximum  of  sixty-five  percentnm. 

244  This  provides  for  an  increase  of  5  per  cent  for 
each  child  under  sixteen  years  of  age  until  the  per 
centum  shall  reach  a  maximum  of  65  per  cent.  Spring 
Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
315,  317;  124  N.  E.  545. 

2.  Wherever  in  this  section  a  weekly  minimum  of  $7.50  is 
provided,  such  minimum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following 
cases  to  the  following  amounts: 

$8.50  in  a  case  of  any  employee  having  one  child  under  the 
age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee; 

$9.50  in  a  case  of  an  employee  having  two  children  under  the 
age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee; 

$10.50  in  a  case  of  an  employee  having  three  or  more  children 
under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  em- 
ployee. 


208  SEC.  8— (J)  3 

8.  Wherever  in  this  section  a  weekly  maximum  of  $14.00  Is 
provided,  such  maximum  shall  be  increased  in  the  following 
cases  to  the  following  amounts: 

$15.00  in  case  of  an  employee  with  one  child  under  the  age  of 
16  years  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee; 

$16.00  In  case  of  an  employee  with  two  children  under  the  age 
of  16  years  at  the  time  of  injury  to  the  employee; 

$17.00  in  case  of  an  employee  with  three  or  more  children 
under  the  age  of  16  years  at  the  time  of  injury  to  the  employee. 

By  an  amendment  passed  in  1921,  Section  8,  para- 
graph (j)  was  changed.  In  sub-paragraph  2,  the 
figures  "$7.50"  were  inserted  in  lieu  of  the 
figures  "$7.00."  In  the  three  succeeding  para- 
graphs the  figures  "$8.50"  "$9.50"  and  "$10.50" 
were  inserted  in  lieu  of  "$8.00"  "$9.00"  and 
"$10.00"  and  in  sub-paragraph  three  the  figures 
"$14.00"  were  inserted  in  lieu  of  "$12.00"  and  in 
the  paragraphs  which  succeed  it  the  figures  "$15.00" 
"$16.00"  and  "$17.00"  were  inserted  in  lieu  of 
"$13.00"  "$14.00"  "$15.00."  Sub-paragraph  4  of 
the  1919  Act  which  limited  time  of  payment  to  chil- 
dren under  the  age  of  sixteen,  was  eliminated  from 
the  section. 

The  method  of  applying  the  provisions  of  sub-par- 
agraph (j)  is  as  follows:  If  an  employee's  wages 
are  found  to  be  $15.00  a  week  or  less,  he  would  be  en- 
titled to  compensation  at  the  rate  of  $7.50  a  week  and 
one  dollar  in  addition  for  each  child,  up  to  $10.50; 
or,  if  his  wages  are  $28.00  a  week  or  over  the  em- 
ployee would  be  entitled  to  $14.00  a  week  with  an  in- 
crease of  one  dollar  for  each  additional  child,  up  to 
$17.00. 

If  the  employee's  wages  are  between  $15.00  and 
$28.00  a  week,  the  percentage  computation  is  used— 
for  example :  An  employee,  who  earns  $26.00  a  week, 
would  be  entitled  to  $13.00  a  week — 50  per  cent  of 


SECTION  9  209 

his  average  weekly  wages ;  $14.30  in  case  of  one  child, 
$15.60  in  case  of  two  children,  and  so  on  up  to  65 
per  cent.  In  other  words  where  50  per  cent  of  his 
wages  equals  an  amount  more  than  $7.50  and  less 
than  $14.00  the  correct  computation  is  to  multiply 
the  weekly  wages  by  50  per  cent,  55  per  cent,  60  per 
cent  or  65  per  cent  as  the  case  may  be  and  not,  as  is 
frequently  done,  add  one  dollar  for  each  child. 

An  employee  is  entitled  to  the  minimum  of  $7.50 
even  though  he  is  actually  earning  less  than  this 
amount. 

It  is  contrary  to  law  to  pay  him  only  50  per  cent  of 
his  wages  if  the  employee's  earnings  are  $14.00  a 
week  or  less. 

SECTION  9. 

244  Any  employer  or  employee  or  beneficiary  who  shall  desire  to 
have  snch  compensation,  or  any  nnpaid  part  thereof,  paid  in  a 
lump  snm,  may  petition  the  Industrial  Board,  asking  that  snch 
compensation  be  so  paid,  and  if,  npon  proper  notice  to  the  inter- 
ested parties  and  a  proper  showing  made  before  snch  board,  it 
appears  to  the  best  interest  of  the  parties  that  such  compensation 
be  so  paid,  the  board  may  order  the  commutation  of  the  com- 
pensation to  an  equivalent  lump  sum,  which  commutation  shall 
be  an  amount  which  will  equal  the  total  sum  of  the  probable 
future  payments  capitalized  at  their  present  value  upon  the 
basis  of  interest  calculated  at  three  per  centum  per  annum  with 
annual  rests:  Provided,  that  in  cases  indicating  complete  dis- 
ability no  petition  for  a  commutation  to  a  lump  sum  basis  shall 
be  entertained  by  the  Industrial  Board  until  after  the  expira- 
tion of  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  injury,  and  where  nec- 
essary, upon  proper  application  being  made,  a  guardian,  con- 
servator or  administrator,  as  the  case  may  be,  may  be  appointed 
for  any  person  under  disability  who  may  be  entitled  to  any  such 
compensation,  and  an  employer  bound  by  the  terms  of  this  Act, 
and  liable  to  pay  snch  compensation,  may  petition  for  the 
appointment  of  the  public  administrator,  or  a  conservator,  or 
guardian,  where  no  legal  representative  has  been  appointed  or 
is  acting  for  snch  party  or  parties  so  under  disability.  Either 
party  may  reject  an  award  of  a  lump  snm  payment  of  compen- 
sation, except  an  award  for  compensation  under  section  7 
or  paragraph  (e)  of  section  8  or  for  the  injuries  defined  In  the 
last  paragraph  of  paragraph  (e)  of  section  8  as  constituting  total 


210        SEC.    9— "COMMUTATION    OP    COMPENSATION" 

and  permanent  disability,  by  filing  his  written  rejection  thereof 
with  the  said  board  within  ten  days  after  notice  to  him  of  the 
award,  in  which  event  compensation  shall  be  payable  in  install* 
ments  as  herein  provided. 

244  An  employer  who  has  paid  more  than  the  amount 
due  and  accrued  to  an  employee  by  means  of  an 
attempted  lump  sum  settlement  is  not  entitled  to 
credit  for  the  amount  that  he  has  paid  the  employee, 
except  for   the   amount  that  is  due  and   accrued. 
International  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  524,  532,  533;  127  N.  E.  703. 

245  This  section  provides  the  method  by  which  a  lump 
sum  settlement  can  be  made.    If  no  petition  is  filed 
and  no  evidence  heard  by  the  Commission  whether  it 
is  for  the  interest  of  the  employee  to  make  the  settle- 
ment, then  the  settlement  is  not  valid.    International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
524,  530;  127  N.  E.  703. 

245  Even  though  the  court  might  thing  that  it  is  not 
for  the  best  interests  of  the  beneficiary  to  have  the 
money  paid  in  a  lump  sum,  nevertheless  this  ques- 
tion should  be  determined  by  the  Commission,  and 
not  by  the  court.    Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  561,  568;  126  N.  E.  579. 

Lump  sum  settlements  under  Ohio  Law,  State  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  126  N.  E.  317. 

"Commutation  of  Compensation." 

246  Commutation  means  the  substitution  of  a  specific 
sum  of  money  for  conditional  payments,  usually  a 
substitution  of  a  less  thing  for  a  greater.    Clark  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  566;  127  N. 
E.  579. 

246      Where  an  employer  consents  in  writing  to  the 
payment  of  compensation  "commuted  in  accordance 


SEC.  9— "PROBABLE  FUTURE  PAYMENTS"  211 

with  Section  9",  it  is  construed  as  a  declaration 
that  he  would  be  bound  by  the  law,  and  it  becomes 
necessary  to  determine  the  method  of  arriving  at 
the  present  value  of  the  compensation.  Clark  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  568;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

246  Before  compensation  can  be  commuted,  it  must 
have  been  previously  determined  by  agreement  or 
arbitration.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,  566;  126  N.  E.  579. 

246  In  order  to  give  the  Commission  authority  to  con- 
sider a  case  hereunder,  a  pre-determined  amount  as 
compensation  must  be  agreed  upon.  Clark  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  566;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

246  Commutation  is  the  substitution  of  one  kind  of  pay- 
ment or  service  for  another;  a  reduction  or  change 
of  the  penalty  imposed  by  judicial  sentence.  Clark 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  566;  126 
N.  E.  579. 

"Probable  future  payments." 

246  "Probable  future  payments"  can  mean  but  one 
thing,  and  that  is,  such  payments  as  would  ordinarily 
become  payable  in  the  natural  course  of  events,  tak- 
ing into  consideration  the  expectancy  of  the  benefi- 
ciary, her  age,  health,  and  other  similar  elements 
which  would  enter  into  that  consideration.  Clark 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  569;  126 
N.  E.  579. 

246  "Probable  future  payments"  construed  in  the 
light  of  Chapter  131  of  Illinois  statutes  which  pro- 
vides that  all  phrases  and  expressions  in  the  statute 
shall  be  liberally  construed  in  order  that  the  true  in- 


212       SEC.  9—  "AMOUNT  WHICH  WILL  EQUAL,  ETC." 

tent  and  meaning  of  the  legislature  may  be  fully  car- 
ried out.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
561,  569;  126  N.  E.  579. 

246  Where  a  beneficiary  is  extremely  old,  it  is  proper 
to  consider  the  expectancy  of  the  beneficiary.  Clark 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  569;  126 
N.  E.  579. 

246  It  is  not  improbable  to  presume  that  the  benefi- 
ciary would  live  longer  than  the  period  over  which 
the  payments  extend,  and  so  the  probable  future 
payments  would  amount,  in  such  case,  to  all  the 
payments.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,  569;  126  N.E.  579. 


"Shall  be  an  amount  which  will  equal  the  total  sum  of  the  prob- 
able future  payments  capitalized  at  their  present  value  upon 
the  basis  of  interest  calculated  at  three  per  cent  per  annum, 
with  annual  rests." 

246  Where  the  board  determines  the  present  value  of 
the  weekly  $4.62  extending  over  a  period  of  444.44 
weeks,  it  must  take  into  account  the  probable  future 
payments.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,  568,  569;  126  N.  E.  579. 

246  The  willingness  of  the  employer  to  pay  compensa- 
tion in  a  lump  sum  is  not  a  waiver  of  the  right  to 
object  to  the  method  of  commutation.    Clark  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  568;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

247  The  Commission  must  determine  what  persons  are 
entitled  to  compensation,  but  this  cannot  be  deter- 
mined in  a  proceeding  for  a  lump  sum  settlement 
under  Section  9.    Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  561,  565  ;  126  N.  E.  579. 

247  Before  compensation  can  be  commuted,  it  must 
have  been  previously  determined  by  agreement  or 


SEC.  9— MISCELLANEOUS  CONSTRUCTIONS  213 

arbitration.     Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  561,  566;  126  N.  E.  579. 

Miscellaneous  Constructions. 

247  No  lump  sum  settlement  is  authorized  to  be  made, 
in  any  other  way  except  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Commission,  and  any  contract  that  makes  such 
settlement  otherwise  is  an  illegal  contract,  and  the 
court  will  not  aid  in  the  enforcement  thereof,  but 
will  leave  the  parties  as  it  finds  them.  International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
524,533;  127  N.  E.  703. 

See  also:  Eanstock  v.  Long,  (Ind.)  124  N.  E.  509. 

247  Where  the  Commission  on  hearing  of  a  petition  for 
a  lump  sum  settlement  made  an  award  to  the  mother 
and  the  aunt  of  the  deceased  jointly,  it  was  held 
error  because  the  Commission  cannot  determine  on 
a  petition  under  Section  9  what  persons  are  entitled 
to  compensation.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  HI.  561 ;  126  N.  E.  579. 

247  The  employer  in  seeking  to  limit  his  liability  by 
settlement  in  the  nature  of  a  lump  sum  payment, 
cannot  do  this  without  the  approval  of  the  Commis- 
sion.   International  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  524,  530;  127  N.  E.  703. 

248  Employee,   a  miner,   was   injured  by   a  powder 
explosion.    The  sum  of  $115.14  was  paid  before  the 
hearing  by  the  arbitrator.    On  the  hearing  the  arbi- 
trator awarded  $2801.14.    Thereafter  the  employer 
petitioned  for  a  review  and  at  the  same  time  paid  the 
employee  the  sum  of  $1615.14  and  took  a  release  for 
all  damages  on  account  of  the  accident  in  question. 
A  stipulation  was  signed  by  the  employee  dismissing 
the  proceeding  before  the  Commission.     Attached 


214  SEC.   9— MISCELLANEOUS  CONSTRUCTIONS 

to  the  basis  of  settlement  was  a  final  receipt  duly 
executed.  On  the  review  hearing  objection  was 
made  to  dismissal  of  the  case  on  the  ground  that 
the  matters  could  not  be  agreed  upon  without  the 
consent  of  the  Commission.  The  commissioner  made 
an  award  for  $3296.00,  credited  the  employer  with 
$115.14  and  set  aside  the  award.  Held,  that  the 
employer  cannot  limit  his  liability  by  a  settlement 
in  the  nature  of  a  lump  sum  payment  without  the 
approval  of  the  Industrial  Commission.  Interna- 
tional Coal  and  Mining  Company  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  524;  127  N.  E.  703. 

249  Where  an  employer  attempted  to  pay  the  employee 
an  amount  less  than  the  arbitrator  found  due,  it  will 
be  construed  to  be  a  lump  sum  settlement  and  it  must 
be  petitioned  for  as  provided  in  Section  9  of  the 
Act.  International  Coal  and  Mining  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  524,  529;  127  N.  E.  703. 

249  There  is  an  element  of  public  interest  in  acci- 
dents occurring  from  industrial  conditions  and  the 
State  is  concerned  in  preventing  dissipation  of  the 
money  paid  in  lump  sum  settlements.  (Goelitz  Co. 
v.  /.  C.,  278  111.  164),  International  Coal  &  Mining 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  529;  127 
N.  E.  703. 

249  The  contention  that  a  lump  sum  settlement  should 
be  allowed  because  the  $4.62  a  week  is  not  sufficient 
to  keep  the  beneficiary  is  not  of  much  force  where 
it  is  equivalent  to  half  the  wages  earned  by  the  de- 
ceased.    Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,567;  126  N.  E.  579. 

250  Section  9  gave  the  parties  the  benefit  of  cash  pay- 
ments in  lump  sums  instead  of  carrying  the  award 


SEC.  9— MISCELLANEOUS  CONSTRUCTIONS  215 

as  an  obligation  to  be  paid  in  continuous  install- 
ments. Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.177,  180;  125  N.  E.  1. 

251  Where  the  Commission  commutes  a  lump  sum 
there  must  be  some  evidence  in  the  record  on  which 
to  base  the  amount  fixed  by  the  Commission  as  the 
proper  amount.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  561,  566;  126  N.  E.  579. 

251  Where  it  is  shown  that  a  lump  sum  should  be  al- 
lowed for  the  reason  that  the  beneficiary  has  debts, 
it  is  not  sufficient  as  the  purpose  of  the  Act  is  not  to 
provide  funds  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  of  the 
beneficiaries  of  the  deceased.  Clark  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  291  111.  561,  567 ;  126  N.  E.  579. 

251  To  order  the  payment  of  compensation  in  a  lump 
sum  on  a  showing  that  the  money  is  needed  for  im- 
provements to  property  and  the  payments  of  debts, 
is  not  evidence  that  it  is  for  the  best  interest  of  the 
parties.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,  570;  126  N.E.  579. 

251  A  lump  sum  settlement  to  a  widow  eighty-seven 
years  of  age  who  is  in  poor  health  should  be  set 
aside  where  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  show- 
ing that  the  commutation  was  made  on  her  expec- 
tancy of  life.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
291  111.  561,  567;  126  N.  E.  579. 

251  If  a  stipulation  is  sufficient  to  give  the  Commis- 
sion jurisdiction  to  consider  a  certain  amount  as  the 
determined  compensation,  then  it  becomes  necessary 
by  evidence  to  show  that  it  is  for  the  best  interest 
of  the  parties  that  the  compensation  be  paid  in  a 
lump  sum.  Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  561,  566;  126  N.  E.  579. 


216      SEC.  9— REVIEW  OF  LUMP  SUM  SETTLEMENTS 

251  On  a  hearing  by  the  Commission  of  a  petition  for 
a  lump  sum,  it  was  stipulated  that  the  deceased  left 
him  surviving  his  mother  and  sister,  both  widows, 
that  they  lived  in  a  house  owned  by  the  mother,  that 
the  deceased  paid  some  of  the  house-hold  expenses 
and  contributed  towards  the  repairs;  that  his  earn- 
ings were  $480.00  per  annum.  In  the  petition  it  was 
alleged  that  they  needed  the  lump  sum  for  the  pur- 
pose of  paying  for  repairs  to  the  house,  a  monument, 
funeral  bill  and  hospital  bill.  The  Commission  com- 
muted $1920  to  $1755.26.  Held,  in  determining  future 
payments,  the  Commission  should  have  considered 
evidence  as  to  the  age,  health,  and  other  elements 
bearing  on  the  expectancy  of  the  beneficiary.  Clark 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561 ;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

251  In  determining  probable  future  payments,  the  board 
must  receive  and  consider  evidence  from  which  the 
future  payments  could  be  reasonably  determined. 
Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561, 
570;  126  N.  E.  579. 

Review  of  Lump  Sum  Settlements. 

252  Section  9  contains  no  language  that  forecloses  any 
392  rights  of  the  parties  to  have  the  award  of  the  Com- 
mission reviewed  upon  the  grounds  set  forth  in  Sec- 
tion 19  (h).    Peoria  Ey  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  177, 180;  125  N.  E.  1. 

252      The  payment  of  a  lump  sum  settlement  would  not 
392  estop  the  employee  to  file  his  petition  under  Sec- 
tion 19,  (h),  for  a  recurring  and  increased  injury 
as  therein  provided.     Peoria  Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  177,  180;  125  N.  E.  1. 


SEC.  9— EVIDENCE  AND  ORDERS  217 

252  A  petition  for  review  for  an  original  award  for 
392  compensation  payable  in  installments  can  be  main- 
tained under  paragraph  (h),  Section  19,  where  such 
petition  for  review  is  filed  within  eighteen  months 
of  the  original  award,  and  after  an  order  for  com- 
mutation to  a  lump  sum,  has  been  entered  by  the 
Commission,  and  not  rejected  by  either  party  within 
ten  days.  Peoria  Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  HI.  177,  180;  125  N.  E.  1. 

252  Where  a  lump  sum  settlement  is  made  under  Sec- 
392  tion  9,  a  petition  may  thereafter  be  filed  by  the  em- 
ployer under  Section  19,  (h),  for  a  review  of  the 
original  award  for  the  reason  that  the  disability  had 
diminished.  Peoria  Ey.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  HI.  177,  179;  125  N.  E.  1. 

252  Under  Section  9,  if  the  proceedings  are  not  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  section,  the  sum  awarded  not 
being  computed  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  this  section  and  no  effort  is  made  to  determine 
the  extent  of  the  injuries,  it  is  reviewable.  Ells- 
worth v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  514,  518 ;  125 
N.  E.  246. 

252  The  fact  that  a  lump  sum  settlement  had  been 
made  under  Section  9,  did  not  preclude  the  Com- 
mission from  reviewing  the  same  under  Section  19, 
(h).  Ellsworth  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
514,518;  125  N.  E.  246. 

Evidence  and  Orders. 

252  Where  a  settlement  is  made  in  good  faith  and 
under  circumstances  showing  it  to  have  been  for  the 
best  interests  of  the  parties,  such  facts  may  be  shown 
before  the  Commission,  on  a  petition  for  a  lump 


218  SECTION  10— (a) 

sum  settlement  and  may  properly  be  considered  in 
determining  whether  or  not  a  lump  sum  settlement 
should  be  authorized.  International  Coal  &  Mining 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  533 ;  127 
N.  E.  703. 

252  Where  it  appears  that  it  is  improbable  that  the 
future  payments  will  amount  to  the  whole  of  the 
compensation  payments  in  installments,  on  account 
of  the  advanced  age  of  the  beneficiary,  an  order 
awarding  a  lump  sum  settlement  is  error.    Clark  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  570;  126  N. 
E.  579. 

SECTION  10. 

2o3  The  basis  for  computing  the  compensation  prorided  for  in 
sections  7  and  8  of  the  Act  shall  be  as  follows : 

253  Section  10  of  the  Act  provides  the  basis  for  com- 
puting the  compensation  provided  for  in  Sections 
7  and  8  of  the  Act,  while  paragraph  (f )  provides  for 
compensation  for  certain  employees  not  subject  to 
paragraphs  (a),  (b),  (d),  (e).    Centralia  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  513,  516;  130  N. 
E.  725. 

See,  also :  King's  Case  (Mass.)  125  N.  E.  153 ;  Mar- 
vin's Case  (Mass.)  125  N.  E.  154. 

2't't  (a)  The  compensation  shall  be  computed  on  the  basis  of  the 
annual  earnings  which  the  injured  person  receircd  as  salary, 
wages  or  earnings  if  in  the  employment  of  the  same  employer 
continuously  during  the  year  next  preceding  the  injury. 

"Salary,  Wages  or  Earnings." 

255  The  words  "salary",  "wages"  and  "earnings" 
are  all  used  in  referring  to  the  money  or  other  com- 
pensation to  be  paid  the  employee  for  his  services 
rendered.  The  three  terms  were  evidently  used  by 


SEC.  10— (a)   "SALARY,  WAGES  OR  EARNINGS"      219 

the  legislature  to  cover  any  and  all  terms  that  var- 
ious employers  and  employees  might  use  to  desig- 
nate their  wages  and  earnings.  Springfield  Coal 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408, 
411;  126  N.  E.  133. 

255  Labor  is  remunerated  by  wages  and  by  salaries, 
wages  being  the  remuneration  of  subordinates  and 
salaries  of  officials.  Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408,  412;  126  N.  E. 
133. 

255  The  word  "earnings"  is  denned  as  money  or  other 
compensation  to  which  one  has  a  claim  for  services 
rendered;  wages;  desert;  reward.  .Springfield  Coal 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408, 
412;  126  N.  E.  133. 

255  The  word  "earnings"  in  its  general  acceptation, 
does  not  mean  net  earnings  unless  qualified  in  some 
way.  (Smith  v.  Bates  Machine  Co.  182  111.  166.) 
Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  408,  412;  126  N.  E.  133. 

255  Section  10,  (a),  defines  earnings  and  provides 
how  they  shall  be  computed.  Springfield  Coal  Mining 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408,  410;  126 
N.  E.  133. 

255  Deceased  employee  was  a  miner.  Coal  mined  by 
use  of  machinery  owned  by  miners  and  powder  used 
in  blasting  was  bought  by  the  miners.  The  carbide 
and  black-smithing  were  furnished  to,  the  miners 
by  the  employer,  but  were  paid  for  by  the  miners 
by  deductions  from  their  wages  on  pay  days.  Union 
dues  and  fines  were  also  deducted  from  their  wages. 
Deceased  was  paid  $.617  per  ton  for  mining  coal. 
Earnings  were  figured  by  multiplying  the  number 


220      SEC.  10— (a)   "SALARY,  WAGES  OR  EARNINGS" 

of  tons  of  coal  mined  by  him  by  the  price  per  ton,  and 
the  price  paid  to  him  each  pay  was  such  amount  less 
deductions  for  dues,  assessments  and  other  items 
enumerated.  Held,  That  the  gross  earnings  of  the 
deceased  should  be  used  in  computing  the  amount 
of  compensation  to  be  awarded.  Springfield  Coal 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408; 
126  N.  E.  133. 

255  It  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Act 
to  base  compensation  on  actual  earnings  where  the 
actual  earnings  are  made  less  through  the  action 
of  the  employer  in  giving  the  employee  difficult 
work.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  513,  519;  130  N.  E.  725. 

255      The  gross  earnings  of  the  deceased  are  the  proper 
258  basis  for  fixing  the  compensation,  unless  the  pro- 
visions of  paragraph  (g)   require  a  different  con- 
struction.   Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  408,  412;  126  N.  E.  133. 

255  The  making  of  a  contract  by  the  operator  to  sell 
or  furnish  any  one  or  more  of  said  articles,  to  be  paid 
for  out  of  the  miner's  wages,  cannot  have  the  effect 
to  reduce  their  compensation  under  said  paragraph 
when  the  same  would  not  be  the  case  if  the  miners 
bought  the  same  articles  from  an  outsider.  Spring- 
field Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Ind>ustrial  Commission,  291 
111.  408,  414;  126  N.  E.  133. 

255  Stoppages  due  to  break-down  of  machinery  and 
public  holidays  are  normal  and  recognized  incidents 
of  employment  and  should  not  be  deducted  in  deter- 
mining annual  earnings.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  297  111.  513,  517 ;  130  N.  E.  725. 


SECTION  10— (b)  221 

255  In  Bought  on  v.  Button  Heath  and  Lea  Green  Col- 
liers Co.  3  B.  W.  C.  C.  173,  it  was  held  that  where 
sixpence  a  week  was  deducted  from  a  miner 's  wages 
to  pay  for  the  oil  of  his  lamp,  the  court  held  the 
deduction  to  be  a  part  of  his  earnings,  saying :  ' '  His 
wages  were  subject  to  this  deduction,  but  that  did 
not  make  his  earnings  or  wages  any  less."    Spring- 
field Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.408,415;  126  N.  E.  133. 

See :  Cambra  v.  Santos,  123  N.  E.  503 ;  In  re  How- 
ard, 125  N.  E.  215. 

256  (b)     Employment    by    the    same    employer    shall    be    taken 
to  mean  employment  by  the  same  employer  in  the  grade  In  winch 
the  employee  was  employed  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  uninter- 
rupted by  absence  from  work  dne  to  illness  or  any  other  nn- 
avoidable  cause. 

"Grade"  denned.     King's  case  (Mass.) ,  125  N.  E. 
153. 

256  Where  the  inability  to  earn  as  much  as  the  average 
miner  is  due  to  a  condition  imposed  by  an  employer, 
such  employee  is  entitled  to  compensation  based 
upon  the  average  wage  of  the  adults  employed  in  said 
mine  in  the  same  class  or  grade  of  employment. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
111.  513,  518;  130  N.  E.  725. 

256  Where  an  employee  is  shown  to  be  in  a  certain 
grade  or  class  of  employment,  there  would  be  no 
reason  for  adopting  the  average  wage  of  employees 
employed  by  the  same  employer  in  such  class  or 
grade  of  employment  as  a  basis  for  computation 
where  the  income  of  the  employee  depends  upon  his 
ability  and  diligence  in  his  work  and  not  upon  con- 
ditions which  were  not  normal  or  recognized  inci- 
dents of  the  employment.  Centralia,  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  513,  518;  130  N.  E. 
725. 


222  SECTION  10—  (c),  (d),  (e) 

256  Where  an  employee  is  unable  to  earn  the  average 
amount  by  reason  of  his  own  inability  or  lack  of 
industry  he  is  not  entitled  to  have  his  compensa- 
tion computed  upon  a  basis  of  the  average  earnings 
of  miners  in  that  mine,  because  it  would  place  a 
premium  upon  idleness  and  inefficiency.  Centralia 
Coed  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  513,  518 ; 
130  N.  E.  725. 

256  (c)  If  the  Injured  person  has  not  been  engaged  in  the  em- 
ployment of  the  same  employer  for  the  full  year  Immediately 
preceding  the  accident,  the  compensation  shall  be  computed  ac- 
cording to  the  annual  earnings  which  persons  of  the  same  class 
in  the  same  employment  and  same  location,  (or  if  that  be  im- 
practicable, of  neighboring  employments  of  the  same  kind)  have 
earned  dnring  such  period. 

256  In  paragraph  (c)  the  annual  earnings  of  the  em- 
ployees are  the  same  as  those  of  persons  of  the  same 
class  in  the  same  employment  and  same  location, 
etc.    Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  408,  411 ;  126  N.  E.  133. 

257  (d)     As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the  cus- 
tom to  operate  throughout  the  working  days  of  the  year,  the  an- 
nual earnings,  if  not  otherwise  determinable,  shall  be  regarded 
as  300  times  the  average  daily  earnings  in  such  computation. 

257  In  paragraph  (d)  the  annual  earnings,  if  not  other- 
wise determinable,  are  300  times  the  average  daily 
earnings.  Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  408,  411 ;  126  N.  E.  133. 

257  (e)  As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the  cus- 
tom to  operate  for  a  part  of  the  whole  number  of  working  days 
in  each  year,  such  number,  if  the  annual  earnings  are  not  other- 
wise determinable,  shall  be  used  instead  of  300  as  a  basis  for 
computing  the  annual  earnings:  Provided,  the  minimum  num- 
ber of  days  which  shall  be  so  used  for  the  basis  of  the  year's 
work  shall  not  be  less  than  200. 

257  For  employees  mentioned  in  paragraph  (e)  the 
annual  earnings  are  the  average  daily  earnings 
multiplied  by  the  actual  number  of  days  employed, 
such  actual  days  to  be  not  less  than  200.  Springfield 


SECTION  10— (f),   (g)  223 

Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
408,  411 ;  126  N.  E.  133. 

258  (f)  In  the  case  of  injured  employees  who  earn  either  no  wage 
or  less  than  the  earnings  of  adult  day  laborers  in  the  same  line 
of  employment  in  that  locality,  the  yearly  wage  shall  be  reck- 
oned according  to  the  average  annual  earning  of  adults  of  the 
same  class  in  the  same  (or  if  that  is  impracticable  then  of 
neighboring)  employments. 

258  It  will  be  noted  that  in  paragraph  (f)  " yearly 
wage"  is  used  as  the  equivalent  of  the  words  "an- 
nual earnings."  Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  408,  411;  126  N.  E. 
133. 

258  For  the  employees  mentioned  in  paragraph  (f) 
"the  yearly  wage  shall  be  reckoned  according  to 
the  average  annual  earnings  of  adults  of  the  same 
class  in  the  same"  employment,  etc.  Springfield 
Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
408,  411;  126  N.  E.  133. 

258  Where  an  adult,  experienced  and  able-bodied 
work-man  is  made  to  work  under  conditions  by  the 
employer,  which  prevent  him  from  making  as  much 
as  the  average  man,  such  circumstances  justify  the 
computing  of  compensation  on  the  average  earnings 
of  adults  of  the  same  class  in  the  same  employment. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
111.  513,  516;  130  N.  E.  725. 

258  (g)  Earnings,  for  the  purpose  of  this  section,  shall  be  based 
on  the  earnings  for  the  number  of  hours  commonly  regarded  as  a 
day's  work  for  that  employment,  and  shall  exclude  overtime 
earnings.  The  earnings  shall  not  include  any  sum  which  the 
employer  has  been  accustomed  to  pay  the  employee  to  cover  any 
special  expense  entailed  on  him  by  the  nature  of  his  employ- 
ment. 

258  Section  10,  (g),  defines  how  earnings  shall  be 
computed.  Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial  Commission,  291  111.  408,  410;  126  N.  E.  133. 


224  SECTION  10— (h),  (i) 

258  Where  an  employee  did  not  earn  as  much  as  the 
average  miner  but  it  is  due  to  a  condition  created 
by  the  employer  and  not  by  lack  of  industry  of  the 
employee,  such  a  normal  and  recognized  incident  is 
not  to  be  considered  in  computing  the  earnings  of 
the  employee.  Centralia  Coed  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  513,  517;  130  N.  E.  725. 

258  Paragraph  (g)  requires  no  reduction  of  the  com- 
pensation allowed  by  the  Commission  in  this  case 
on  account  of  the  various  items  deducted  from  his 
wages  on  pay-days  by  plaintiff  in  error.  Spring- 
field Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  408,  412;  126  N.  E.  133. 

258  Paragraphs  (a)   and  (g),  of  Section  10,  govern 
the  computation  of  the  compensation  in  Sections  7 
and  8  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.    Spring- 
field Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.408,410;  126  N.E.  133. 

See:  In  re  Harvard  (Ind.)  125  N.  E.  215;  Gillen 
v.  D.  A.  &  G.,  215  Mass.  96;  L.  R.  A.  1916A,  371. 

259  (h)     In  computing  the  compensation  to  be  paid  to  any  em- 
ployee, who,  before  the  accident  for  which  he  claims  compensa- 
tion, was  disabled  and  drawing  compensation  under  the  terms  of 
this  Act,  the  compensation  for  each  subsequent  injury  shall  be 
apportioned  according  to  the  proportion  of  incapacity  and  dis- 
ability caused  by  the  respective  injuries  which  he  may  have  suf- 
fered. 

259  (1)  To  determine  the  amount  of  compensation  for  each  in- 
stallment period,  the  amount  per  annum  shall  be  ascertained 
pursuant  hereto,  and  such  amount  divided  by  the  number  of  in- 
stallment periods  per  annum. 

258  English  rule:  That  in  computing  compensation, 
the  circumstances  which  are  normal  and  recognized 
incidents  of  the  employment  are  not  to  be  considered 
in  computing  the  earnings  of  the  employee,  as  for 
instance  the  closing  down  of  the  business  (White  v. 


SECTIONS  11-12  225 

Wiseman,  5  B.  W.  C.  C.  654;  Anslow  v.  Cannock,  2 
id.  365)  followed.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  513,  517;  130  N.  E.  725. 

SECTION  11. 

259  The  compensation  herein  provided,  together  with  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  shall  be  the  measure  of  the  responsibility  of 
any  employer  engaged  in  any  of  the  enterprises  or  businesses 
enumerated  in  section  three  (3)  of  this  Act,  or  of  any  employer 
who  is  not  engaged  in  any  such  enterprises  or  businesses,  but 
who  has  elected  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  for  accidental 
injuries  sustained  by  any  employee  arising  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  the  employment  according  to  the  provisions  of  this 
Act,  and  whose  election  to  continue  under  this  Act,  has  not  been 
nullified  by  any  action  of  his  employees  as  provided  for  in  this 
Act. 

259  Section  11  declares  that  the  compensation  pro- 
vided by  the  Act  shall  be  the  measure  of  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  employer  who  is  within  its  terms. 
Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  353,  358;  124  N.  E.  552. 

259  Section  11  of  the  Compensation  Act  fixes  the  meas- 
ure of  responsibility  of  the  employer  and  10  (a) 
and  (g)  fixes  the  basis  for  computing  the  compen- 
sation. Springfield  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  408,  410;  126  N.  E.  133. 

SECTION  12. 

259  An  employee  entitled  to  receive  disability  payments  shall  be 
required,  if  requested  by  the  employer,  to  submit  himself,  at  the 
expense  of  the  employer,  for  examination  to  a  duly  qualified 
medical  practitioner  or  surgeon  selected  by  the  employer  at  a 
time  and  place  reasonably  convenient  for  the  employee,  as  soon 
as  practicable  after  the  injury,  and  also  one  week  after  the  first 
examination  and  thereafter  at  intervals  not  oftener  than  once 
every  four  weeks,  which  examination  shall  be  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  the  nature,  extent  and  probable  duration  of  the 
injury  received  by  the  employee,  and  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining the  amount  of  compensation  which  may  be  due  the  em- 
ployee from  time  to  time  for  disability  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act:  Provided,  however,  that  such  examination 


226  SECTION  12 

shall  be  made  in  the  presence  of  a  duly  qualified  medical  prac- 
titioner or  surgeon  provided  and  paid  for  by  the  employee,  if 
such  employee  so  desires:  Provided,  further,  that  such  exami- 
nation shall  not  be  made  on  the  day  of  the  hearing.  In  all  cases 
where  the  examination  is  made  by  a  surgeon  engaged  by  the 
employer,  and  the  injured  employee  has  no  surgeon  present  at 
such  examination,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  surgeon  making  the 
examination  at  the  instance  of  the  employer  to  deliver  to  the 
injured  employee,  upon  his  request,  or  that  of  his  representative, 
a  statement  in  writing  of  the  condition  and  extent  of  the  injury 
to  the  same  extent  that  said  surgeon  reports  to  the  employer. 
If  the  employee  refuses  so  to  submit  himself  to  examination  or 
unnecessarily  obstructs  the  same,  his  right  to  compensation  pay- 
ments shall  be  temporarily  suspended  until  such  examination 
shall  have  taken  place,  and  no  compensation  shall  be  payable 
under  this  Act  for  such  period.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  sur- 
geons treating  an  injured  employee  who  is  likely  to  die,  and 
treating  him  at  the  instance  of  the  employer  to  have  called  in 
another  surgeon,  to  be  designated  and  paid  for  by  either  the 
injured  employee  or  by  the  person  or  persons  who  would  become 
his  beneficiary  or  beneficiaries,  to  make  an  examination  before 
the  death  of  such  injured  employee.  [As  amended  by  an  Act  in 
force  July  1,  1921.] 

Section  12  was  amended  by  inserting  after  the 
word  " desires"  in  the  first  proviso  of  said  section, 
the  words  "  provided,  further,  that  such  examina- 
tion shall  not  be  made  on  the  day  of  the  hearing." 

The  rule  in  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  18,  was  responsible  for  this  amend- 
ment. 

260  Employer  is  entitled  to  obtain  opinion  as  to  the 
employee's  condition,  for  the  purpose  of  settling 
the  claim  and  for  the  purposes  of  presenting  the  evi- 
dence to  the  arbitrator.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  429;  127  N.  E. 
752. 

260  The  request  of  the  employer  for  an  examination 
of  the  employee  should  be  made  at  a  reasonable 
time,  ordinarily  before  the  case  is  called  for  a  hear- 
ing. Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  425,  429;  127  N.  E.  752. 


SEC.   12— "ENTITLED  TO  DISABILTY   PAYMENTS"     227 

260  Where  an  employer  had  requested  the  employee 
two  months  before  the  hearing  to  submit  himself  to 
a  doctor  for  an  examination,  and  had  advanced  mon- 
ey to  cover  the  expense  of  the  trip  to  the  doctor  and 
when  the  case  was  called  for  hearing,  the  employer 
again  requested  that  the  employee  submit  to  the 
examination;  it  was  held  error  by  the  Commission 
not  to  require  the  employee  to  submit  to  the  exam- 
ination. Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  425,  429;  127  N.  E.  752. 

260  The  employee  must  comply  with  the  provisions 
of  the  section  to  entitle  him  to  the  benefits  of  the 
Act.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  18,  20;  128  N.  E.  813. 

260  Section  12  is  not  intended  to  afford  the  employer 
opportunity  to  harass  or  oppress  the  employer  by 
unnecessary  examinations  and  reasonable  safe- 
guards are  provided.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  18,  20;  128  N.  E.  813. 

260  The  fact  that  the  request  for  a  physical  examina- 
tion is  not  made  until  at  the  time  of  the  hearing 
by  the  Commission  does  not  prove  that  it  is  not 
made  in  good  faith.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  18,  20;  128  N.  E.  813. 

"Entitled  to  Receiye  Disability  Payments." 

260  This  provision  cannot  be  construed  as  giving  the 
employee  the  right  to  refuse  to  submit  to  examina- 
tion, where  the  employer  is  denying  that  the  em- 
ployee is  entitled  to  receive  compensation.  Jackson 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  18;  128 
N.  E.  813. 


228  SEC.  12— "SUBMIT  TO  EXAMINATION" 

260  The  provision  of  Section  12  requiring  the  em- 
ployee to  submit  to  physical  examination  applies  to 
all  cases  where  the  employee  is  entitled  to  receive 
disability  payments,  and  whether  he  is  entitled  to 
them  is  not  dependent  on  whether  the  employer 
acknowleges  liability  by  making  payments.  Jackson 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  18,  21; 
128  N.  E.  813. 

260  Under  Section  12,  if  the  making  of  the  examina- 
tion at  the  time  of  the  hearing  before  the  Commis- 
sion placed  the  employee  at  a  disadvantage,  it  would 
be  proper  to  continue  the  hearing  to  enable  employee 
properly  to  present  his  case,  on  a  proper  showing. 
Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
18,  20;  128  N.  E.  813. 

260      Allowing  employer  to  make  a  physical  examina- 
496  tion  of  injured  employee  is  not  restricted  to  cases 

where  the  employer  acknowledges  his  liability  and 

makes  compensation  payments.     Jackson  Coal  Co. 

v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  18,  20;  128  N.  E. 

813. 

"Submit  to  Examination." 

260  Where  a  demand  was  made  by  the  employer  to 
have  the  injured  employee  examined  at  the  hearing 
before  the  Industrial  Commission  and  the  Com- 
mission denied  the  request  of  the  employer  for  the 
examination,  such  action  was  held  to  be  error  on  the 
part  of  the  Commission  which  warranted  a  reversal 
of  the  award.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  18;  128  N.  E.  813. 

260  The  limitation  placed  on  the  time  for  the  request 
for  the  examination,  is  that  it  must  be  a  time,  rea- 
sonably convenient  for  the  employee.  Jackson  Coal 


SECTIONS  13-14  229 

Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  18,  20;  128 
N.  E.  813. 

SECTION  13. 

260  (a)    There  is  hereby  created  a  board  which  shall  be  known  as 
the  Industrial  Board  to  consist  of  five  members  to  be  appointed 
by  the  Governor,  by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  two 
of  whom  shall  be  representative  citizens  of  the  employing  class 
operating  nnder  this  Act,  and  two  of  whom  shall  be  representa- 
tive citizens  of  the  class  of  employees  operating  nnder  this  Act, 
and  one  of  whom  shall  be  a  representative  citizen  not  identified 
with  either  the  employing  or  employee  classes  and  who  shall  be 
designated  by  the  Governor  as  chairman.    Appointment  of  mem- 
bers to  places  on  the  first  board  or  to  fill  vacancies  on  said 
board  may  be  made  during  recesses  of  the  Senate,  but  shall  be 
subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Senate  at  the  next  ensuing  session 
of  the  Legislature. 

(b)  When  there  shall  become  effective  the  Act  known  as  "The 
Civil  Administrative  Code  of  Illinois,"  being  an  Act  entitled  "An 
Act  in  relation  to  the  civil  administraton  of  the  State  Govern- 
ment,'* there  shall  thereupon  be  vested  in  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission and  the  industrial  officers  thereof  by  said  Act  created, 
all  of  the  powers  and  duties  vested  in  the  Industrial  Board  by 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  and  thereupon  wherever  in 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  reference  shall  be  made  to  the 
Industrial  Board,  the  board  or  to  any  member  thereof,  it  shall  be 
construed  as  referring  and  shall  apply  to  the  said  Industrial 
Commission,  the  said  commission,  and  any  industrial  officer 
thereof,  respectively.  (Amended  by  Act  approved  June  25, 
1917.) 

SECTION  14. 

261  The  salary  of  each  of  the  members  of  the  Commission  ap- 
pointed by  the  Governor  shall  be  six  thousand  dollars  ($6,000.00) 
per  year,  except  that  the  salary  of  the  chairman  shall  be  seven 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars   ($7,500.00)  per  year.     The  Com- 
mission shall  appoint  a  secretary,  whose  salary  shall  be  five 
thousand  dollars   ($5,000.00)   per  year,  and  shall  employ  such 
assistants  and  clerical  help  as  may  be  necessary. 

The  salary  of  the  arbitrators  designated  by  the  Commission 
shall  be  at  the  rate  of  four  thousand  two  hundred  dollars  per 
year. 

The  members  of  the  Commission  and  the  arbitrators  shall 
have  reimbursed  to  them  their  actual  traveling  expenses  and 
disbursements  made  or  incurred  by  them  in  the  discharge  of 
their  official  duties  while  away  from  their  places  of  residence  in 
the  performance  of  their  duties.  The  Commission  shall  provide 
itself  with  a  seal  for  the  authentication  of  its  orders,  awards 


230  SECTION  15 

and  proceedings  upon  which  shall  be  Inscribed  the  name  of  the 
Commission  and  the  words  "IllinoIs-SeaL" 

In  Section  14  the  salaries  of  the  members  of  the 
Commission  were  raised  to  six  thousand  dollars 
per  year,  except  that  the  Chairman  was  to  receive 
seven  thousand  five  hundred  dollars  per  year.  The 
salary  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Commission  was  fixed 
at  five  thousand  dollars  per  year  and  the  salaries  of 
.the  Arbitrators  at  four  thousand  two  hundred  dol- 
lars per  year. 

SECTION  15. 

261  The  Industrial  Board  shall  li:m-  jurisdiction  over  the  opera* 
tion  and  administration  of  this  Ad,  and  said  board  shall  perform 
all  the  duties  imposed  upon  it  by  this  Act,  and  such  further 
duties  as  may  hereafter  be  imposed  by  law  and  the  rules  of  the 
board  not  inconsistent  therewith. 

261  On  August  23,  1915,  employee  slipped  and  in- 
jured his  knee.  He  was  paid  compensation  for  nine 
weeks.  The  last  payment  was  in  October,  1915. 
In  March,  1917,  employee  entered  into  negotiations 
and  made  a  settlement  which  was  approved  by  the 
Commission.  July  23,  1918,  employee  filed  a  peti- 
tion under  Section  19  (h),  on  the  ground  that  the 
injury  had  recurred  and  increased  so  as  to  derange 
the  hip  and  on  March  5,  1919,  the  Commission  found 
for  the  employee  and  gave  him  an  award.  Employer 
contends  that  as  there  was  no  demand  within  six 
months  that  there  was  no  jurisdiction.  Held,  that 
by  the  settlement  agreement  both  parties  submitted 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  and  the  ques- 
tion of  jurisdiction  on  the  six  month's  provision 
of  Section  24,  was  waived.  Tribune  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111  402,  406;  125  N.  E.  351. 

261  Where  there  is  no  attempt  to  secure  the  approval 
of  the  Commission,  an  agreement  made  by  the  em- 


SECTION  15  231 

ployee  with  the  employer  to  dismiss  the  matter  and 
to  accept  a  lesser  amount  in  settlement,  cannot  de- 
prive the  Commission  of  jurisdiction.  International 
Coal  <&  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
524,530;  127  N.  E.  703. 

260  The  Industrial  Commission  is  an  administrative 
body  and  has  no  judicial  functions.     G.  T.  W.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  176;  125 
N.  E.  748. 

261  The  Industrial  Commission  is  not  a  court  but  a 
ministerial  body  having  jurisdiction  over  the  opera- 
tion and  administration  of  the  act  with  power  to 
make  rules  and  orders  for  carrying  out  the  duties 
imposed  upon  it  by  law  and  the  staute  provides 
that  the  process  and  procedure  before  it  shall  be  as 
simple  and  summary  as  reasonably  may  be.     Mis- 
sissippi River  Poiver  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  353,  359;  124  N.  E.  552. 

261  Any  controversy  arising  concerning  the  mere  ad- 
ministration of  the  act  may  be  decided  in  such  sum- 
mary manner  as  the  legislature  shall  prescribe.  G. 
T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
167,  176;  125  N.  E.  748. 

261  The  Industrial  Commission  had  jurisdiction  un- 
432  der  a  rider  contract  to  enforce  the  payment  of  a 
claim  against  an  insurance  carrier,  regardless  of  the 
provisions  of  the  original  insurance  policy.  Illinois 
Indemnity,  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  233,  241 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

261      The  Industrial  Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  en- 

436  force  a  claim  of  an  employee  against  an  insurance 

carrier  where  the  employer  has  become  insolvent. 


232  SECTION  15 

Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  241,  242;  124  N.  E.  665. 

261  Section  15  provided  that  the  Industrial  Commis- 
sion shall  have  jurisdiction  over  the  operation  and 
administration  of  the  act.     Illinois  Indemnity  Ex- 
change v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  238; 
124  N.  E.  665. 

262  To  sustain  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  it 
is  necessary  to  show  that  the  employer  was  engaged 
in  an  extra-hazardous  business  and  that  the  em- 
ployee was  also  engaged  in  an  extra-hazardous  oc- 
cupation and  that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  employment  in  such  extra-hazardous  oc- 
cupation.    Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 292  111.  284,  287 ;  126  N.  E.  596. 

262  Under  the  1915  Act,  where  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  employment  of  the  employee  is  one  of  the  extra- 
hazardous  occupations  enumerated  in  Section  3,  in 
the  absence  of  an  election  by  the  employer,  the  Com- 
mission is  without  jurisdiction  to  make  an  award  for 
injuries  sustained.  Mattoon  Clear  Water  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  487,  490;  126  N.  E. 
168. 

262  Even  though  the  contract  to  make  a  settlement 
may  be  entered  into  in  good  faith,  yet  the  purpose 
of  the  Compensation  Act  is  that  the  economic  loss 
from  accidents  does  not  rest  on  the  public  but 
should  be  absorbed  by  the  industry  and  to  carry  out 
this  purpose  the  Commission  alone  has  jurisdiction 
to  authorize  settlement.  International  Coal  &  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  533; 
127  N.  E.  703. 

262  The  Commission  will  not  interfere  where  a  set- 
tlement is  made  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 


SECTION  16  233 

the  Act,  yet  where  it  has  taken  jurisdiction,  it  can- 
not be  taken  away  from  it  by  action  of  the  parties, 
unless  such  action  is  in  conformity  with  the  Act. 
International  Coal  &  Mining  Company  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  524,  529;  127  N.  E.  703. 

SECTION  16. 

266  The  board  may  make  rules  and  orders  for  carrying  ont  the 
duties  imposed  upon  it  by  law,  which  rules  and  orders  shall  be 
deemed  prima  facie  reasonable  and  valid;  and  the  process  and 
procedure  before  the  board  shall  be  as  simple  and  summary  as 
reasonably  may  be.  The  board  upon  application  of  either  party 
may  issue  dedimus  potestatem  directed  to  a  commissioner,  notary 
public,  justice  of  the  peace  or  any  other  officer  authorized  by  law 
to  administer  oaths,  to  take  the  depositions  of  such  witness  or 
witnesses  as  may  be  necessary  in  the  judgment  of  such  applicant. 
Such  dedimus  potestatem  may  issue  to  any  of  the  officers  afore* 
said  in  any  state  or  territory  of  the  United  States  or  in  any  for- 
eign country.  The  board  shall  have  the  power  to  adopt  necessary 
rules  to  govern  the  issue  of  such  dedimus  potestatem.  The 
board,  or  any  member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by 
said  board  shall  have  the  power  to  administer  oaths,  subpoena 
and  examine  witnesses,  to  issue  subpoenas  duces  tecum,  requiring 
the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  records  and  documents  as 
may  be  evidence  of  any  matter  under  inquiry,  and  to  examine  and 
inspect  the  same  and  such  places  or  premises  as  may  relate  to 
the  question  in  dispute.  Said  board,  or  any  member  thereof,  or 
any  arbitrator  designated  by  said  board,  shall,  on  written  request 
of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  issue  subpoenas  for  the  attendance 
of  such  witnesses  and  production  of  such  books,  papers,  records, 
and  documents  as  shall  be  designated  in  said  applications,  pro- 
viding, however,  that  the  parties  applying  for  such  subpoena 
shall  advance  the  officer  and  witness  fees  provided  for  in  suits 
pending  in  the  Circuit  Court.  Service  of  such  subpoenas  shall 
be  made  by  any  sheriff  or  constable  or  other  person.  In  case  any 
person  refuses  to  comply  with  an  order  of  the  board  or  subpoena 
issued  by  it  or  any  member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated 
by  said  board,  or  to  permit  an  inspection  of  places  or  premises, 
or  to  produce  any  books,  papers,  records,  or  documents,  or  any 
witness  refuses  to  testify  to  any  matters  regarding  which  he  may 
be  lawfully  interrogated,  the  County  Court  of  the  county  in 
which  said  hearing  or  matter  is  pending,  on  application  of  any 
member  of  the  board  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by  the  board, 
shall  compel  obedience  by  attachment  proceedings,  as  for  con- 
tempt, as  in  a  case  of  disobedience  of  the  requirements  of  a  sub- 
poena from  such  court  on  a  refusal  to  testify  therein. 


234  SECTION  16 

The  board  at  its  expense  shall  provide  a  stenographer  to  take 
the  testimony  and  record  of  proceedings  at  the  hearings  before 
an  arbitrator,  committee  of  arbitration,  or  the  board,  and  said 
stenographer  shall  furnish  a  transcript  of  such  testimony  or  pro- 
ceedings  to  any  person  requesting  it  upon  payment  to  him  there- 
for of  fire  cents  per  one  hundred  words  for  the  original  and  three 
cents  per  one  hundred  words  for  each  copy  of  such  transcript. 

The  board  shall  have  the  power  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness and  fix  the  amount  of  any  fee  or  compensation  charged  by 
any  person  for  any  service  performed  In  connection  with  this 
Act,  or  for  which  payment  is  to  be  made  under  this  Act  or  ren- 
dered in  securing  any  right  under  this  Act. 

266  Section  16  provides  that  the  Commission  may 
make  rules  and  orders,  and,  this  is  the  only  indi- 
cation in  the  Act  as  to  the  manner  in  which  notifica- 
tion shall  be  given,  and  the  person  by  whom  it  shall 
be  given.  Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  353,  357;  124  N.  E.  552. 

266  The  Commission  has  power  to  formulate  rules  and 
to  determine  controversies  which  arise  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  Act  and  any  controversy  aris- 
ing concerning  the  administration  of  the  Act  may 
be  decided  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  shall 
prescribe.  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 291  111.  167,  176;  125  N.  E.  748. 

266  If  any  question  arises  as  to  who  is  entitled  to  the 
225  compensation,    the    Commission    may    require    all 

claimants  or  possible  claimants,  to  be  notified  and 
may  determine  who  is  entitled  to  it.  Mississippi 
River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
353,  360;  124  N.  E.  552. 

267  The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  gives  a  right 
to  compensation  to  certain  persons.     It  provides  for 
the  adjustment  of  a  right  by  an  administrative  body. 
Even  if  the  Commission  has  no  rule,  the  Commis- 
sion can  act  on  the  petition  of  the  beneficiary,  who 
alone  is  interested  in  the  claim.     Mississippi  River 


SECTIONS  17-18  235 

Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353, 
360;  124  N.  E.  552. 

Dedinms  may  issue  even  after  date  in  notice.  Haish 
v.  Dreyfus,  111  111.  App.  44. 

"^Reasonableness  of  any  fee." 

267  This  is  an  action  in  assumpsit  by  an  attorney  un- 
der the  Attorneys'  Lien  Law  against  an  employer 
for  a  $400  fee  allowed  by  the  Commission.  The  em- 
ployer demurs.  An  appeal  is  prayed  to  the  Su- 
preme Court.  Held,  no  franchise  or  freehold,  nor 
the  validity  of  a  statute  or  any  constitutional  ques- 
tion being  involved,  the  Supreme  Court  is  without 
jurisdiction  and  the  cause  is  transferred  to  the  Ap- 
pellate Court  under  Section  8  of  the  Appellate  Court 
Act.  Lasley  v.  Tazewell  Coal  Co.,  294  111.  399;  128 
N.  E.  475. 

SECTION  17. 

267  The  board  shall  cause  to  be  printed  and  furnish  free  of  charge 
upon  request  by  any  employer  or  employee  such  blank  form  as 
it  shall  deem  requisite  to  facilitate  or  promote  the  efficient  ad- 
ministration of  this  Act,  and  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  the 
board;  it  shall  pro  Tide  a  proper  record  in  which  shall  be  entered 
and  indexed  the  name  of  any  employer  who  shall  file  a  notice  of 
declination  or  withdrawal  under  this  Act,  and  the  date  of  the 
filing  thereof;  and  a  proper  record  in  which  shall  be  entered  and 
indexed  the  name  of  any  employee  who  shall  file  such  a  notice 
of  declination  or  withdrawal,  and  the  date  of  the  filing  thereof; 
and  such  other  notices  as  may  be  required  by  the  terms  and  in- 
tend  in  ent  of  this  Act;  and  records  in  which  shall  be  recorded  all 
proceedings,  orders  and  awards  had  or  made  by  the  board,  or  by 
the  arbitration  committees,  and  such  other  books  or  records  as  it 
shall  deem  necessary,  all  such  records  to  be  kept  in  the  office 
of  the  board. 

SECTION  18. 

268  All  questions  arising  under  this  Act,  if  not  settled  by  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  interested  therein,  shall,  except  as  otherwise 
provided,  be  determined  by  the  Industrial  Board. 


236  SECTION  19— (a) 

269  Section  18  provides  that  all  questions  arising  un- 
der the  Act,  if  not  settled  by  agreement,  shall  be  de- 
termined by  the  Commission.  Mississippi  River 
Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353, 
356;  124  N.  E.  552. 

271  The  proceedings  before  the  Industrial  Commission 
are  wholly  statutory  and  its  authority  is  limited  to 
that  granted  it  by  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  451,  454;  130  N.  E.  727. 

SECTION  19. 

269  Any  disputed  question  of  law  or  fact  shall  be  determined  as 
herein  provided. 

"Disputed  Questions  of  Law  or  Fact" 

269  "Any  disputed  questions  of  law  or  fact  if  not  set- 
tled by  agreement  of  the  parties  interested  therein" 
must  be  determined  by  the  Industrial  Commission 
and  the  proceedings  to  determine  these  questions  is 
not  judicial,  though  it  has  some  of  the  elements  of 
a  judicial  proceeding.  Mississippi  River  Power  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353,  359;  124  N.  E. 
552. 

269  Where  it  is  not  stipulated  what  person  or  per- 
sons are  entitled  to  the  compensation,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  Commission  to  determine  that  fact.  (Paul  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  288  111.  532.)  Clark  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  565;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

271  (a)  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Industrial  Commission  upon 
notification  that  the  parties  have  failed  to  reach  an  agreement, 
to  designate  an  arbitrator:  Provided,  that  if  the  compensation 
claimed  is  for  a  partial  permanent  or  total  permanent  incapacity 
or  for  death,  then  the  dispute  may,  at  the  election  of  either  party, 


SECTION  19— (b)  237 

be  determined  by  a  committee  of  arbitration,  which  election  for 
determination  by  a  committee  shall  be  made  by  petitioner  filing 
with  the  commission  his  election  in  writing  with  his  petition  or 
by  the  other  party  filing  with  the  commission  his  election  in  writ- 
ing within  five  days  of  notice  to  him  of  the  filing  of  the  petition, 
and  thereupon  it  shall  be  the  duly  of  the  Industrial  Commission 
upon  either  of  the  parties  having  filed  their  election  for  a  com- 
mittee of  arbitration  as  above  provided,  to  notify  both  parties  to 
appoint  their  respective  representatives  on  the  committee  of 
arbitration.  The  commission  shall  designate  an  arbitrator  to  act 
as  chairman,  and  if  either  party  fails  to  appoint  its  member  on 
the  committee  within  seven  days  after  notification  as  above  pro- 
vided, the  commission  shall  appoint  a  person  to  fill  the  vacancy 
and  notify  the  parties  to  that  effect.  The  party  filing  his  elec- 
tion for  a  committee  of  arbitration  shall  with  his  election  de- 
posit with  the  commission  the  sum  of  twenty  dollars,  to  be  paid 
by  the  commission  to  the  arbitrators  selected  by  the  parties  as 
compensation  for  their  services  as  arbitrators,  and  upon  a  fail- 
ure to  deposit  as  aforesaid,  the  election  shall  be  void  and  the 
determination  shall  be  by  an  arbitrator  designated  by  the  com- 
mission. The  members  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  appointed 
by  either  of  the  parties  or  one  appointed  by  the  commission  to 
fill  a  vacancy  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  one  of  the  parties  to 
appoint,  shall  not  be  a  member  of  the  commission  or  an  employee 
thereof. 

"Commission  Designates  Arbitrator." 

272  Section  19  provides    that   the    Industrial    Board 
upon  notification  that  the  parties  have  failed  to  reach 
an  agreement,  shall  designate  an  arbitrator.     Mis- 
sissippi River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  353,  356,  357 ;  124  N.  E.  552. 

273  (b)     The  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  make 
such  inquiries  and  investigations  as  he  or  they  shall  deem  neces- 
sary, and  may  examine  and  inspect  all  books,  papers,  records, 
places,  or  premises  relating  to  the  questions  in  dispute,  and  hear 
such  proper  evidence  as  the  parties  may  submit.    The  hearings 
before  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  be  held 
in  the  vicinity  where  the  injury  occurred,  after  ten  days'  notice 
of  the  time  and  place  of  such  hearing  shall  have  been  given  to 
each  of  the  parties  or  their  attorneys  of  record.    The  decision  of 
the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  be  filed  with  the 
Industrial    Commission,   which    commission    shall   immediately 
send  to  each  party  or  his  attorney  a  copy  of  such  decision,  to- 
gether with  a  notification  of  the  time  when  it  was  filed,  and  unless 
a  petition  for  a  review  is  filed  by  either  party  within  fifteen  days 
after  the  receipt  by  said  party  of  the  copy  of  said  decision  and 
notification  of  time  when  filed,  and  unless  such  party  petitioning 


238     SEC.   19— (b)    APPLICATION  ADJUSTMENT  OF   CLAIM 

for  a  review  shall  within  twenty  days  after  the  receipt  by  him  of 
the  copy  of  said  decision,  file  with  the  commission  either  an 
agreed  statment  of  the  facts  appearing  upon  the  hearing  before 
the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration,  or  if  snch  party  shall 
so  elect,  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  proceedings  at  such 
hearings,  then  the  decision  shall  become  the  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Commission  and  In  the  absence  of  fraud  shall  be  con- 
clusive: Provided,  that  such  Industrial  Commission  may  for 
sufficient  cause  shown  grant  further  time  not  exceeding  thirty 
days,  In  which  to  petition  for  such  review  or  to  file  such  agreed 
statement  or  stenographic  report.  Snch  agreed  statement  of 
facts  or  correct  stenographic  report,  as  the  case  may  be,  shall 
be  authenticated  by  the  signatures  of  the  parties  or  their  attor- 
neys and  in  the  event  they  do  not  agree  as  to  the  correctness  of 
the  stenographic  report  it  shall  be  authenticated  by  the  signature 
of  the  arbitrator  designated  by  the  commission. 

Application  for  Adjustment  of  Claim. 

273  Under  the  1913  Act,  either  the  administrator,  a 
beneficiary  or  an  employer,  may  file  a  petition  for 
the  adjustment  of  claim.  (Hammond  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  288  111.  262;  Mississippi  River 
Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353.) 
National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
598,  600;  127  N.  E.  135. 

315  The  statutory  provisions  for  reducing  or  suspend- 
ing compensation  if  an  injured  employee  persists  in 
such  insanitary  practices  as  tend  to  either  imperil 
or  retard  a  recovery  or  shall  refuse  to  submit  to  such 
medical  or  surgical  treatments  as  will  reasonably 
be  essential  to  promote  his  recovery,  do  not  apply  to 
an  original  application  for  compensation.  (Joliet 
Motor  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  280  111.  148.)  Snyder 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175;  130  N.  E. 
517. 

491  The  petition  for  the  adjustment  of  claim  is  a  mat- 
ter of  procedure  and  is  governed  by  the  law  in  effect 
at  the  time  it  was  filed.  National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  598,  604;  127  N.  E.  135. 


SEC.  19— (b)  PROPER  EVIDENCE  239 

271  The  natural  person  to  file  the  petition  is  the  per- 
son to  whom  payment  should  be  made.  If  the  statute 
required  the  proceeding  to  be  commenced  in  the 
name  of  the  administrator,  he  alone  could  start  it. 
Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  IU.  353,  360;  124  N.  E.  552. 

"Proper  Evidence." 

277  A  person  cannot  be  affected  by  proceedings  to 
which  he  is  a  stranger  unless  the  judgment  is  upon 
some  subject  of  a  public  nature  or  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  proceeding  in  rem.  Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  594,  596;  125  N.  E.  252. 

277  A  judgment  cannot  be  introduced  in  evidence  to  es- 
tablish facts  upon  which  it  has  been  rendered,  except 
against  parties  to  the  suit  or  their  representatives. 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
594,  596;  125  N.  E.  252* 

277  Husband  or  wife  cannot  testify  as  to  any  admis- 
sions or  conversations  between  husband  and  wife 
or  by  either  with  third  persons.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  461,  465;  127  N.  E. 
743. 

277  The  wife  is  not  a  competent  witness  to  a  conversa- 
tion had  between  her  husband  and  a  third  person. 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461, 
465;  127  N.  E.  743. 

277  The  Commission  should  not  base  its  finding  on  tes- 
timony which  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  the 
record,  show  to  be  untrue.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  427 ;  127  N.  E. 
752. 

277      Exaggerated    statements    and  groundless  asser- 


240  SEC.  19— (b)    PROPER  EVIDENCE 

tions  that  have  no  foundation  in  fact  are  not  the 
character  of  evidence  which  the  law  recognizes  as 
worthy  to  support  any  legal  finding.  Hafer  Washed 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425, 
427;  127  N.  E.  752. 

277  Evidence  of  a  witness  who  testified  to  the  hand- 
writing in  a  letter  which  had  no  date  and  who  re- 
ferred to  a  certain  envelope,  which  was  not  pro- 
duced, but  which  would  show  when  the  letter  was 
written  is  of  no  probative  value.  Keystone  Steel 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587,  590;  124 
N.  E.  542. 

277  Evidence  in  record  and  facts  found  held  to  be  suf- 
ficient to  constitute  a  basis  for  a  proper  decision. 
Keller  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  314,  316; 
126  N.  E.  162. 

277  Evidence  held  to  warrant  conclusion  by  Commis- 
sion, that  deceased  contracted  anthrax  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  and  that  the  death  was  the  re- 
sult of  the  accident.  Chicago  Rawhide  Manufac- 
turing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616, 
620;  126  N.  E.  616. 

277  The  determination  of  the  per  cent  of  the  loss  of 
use  of  an  eye  or  an  arm  is  an  issue  of  the  ultimate 
fact  before  the  arbitrator  or  Commission.  Interna- 
tional Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  524,  532;  127  N.  E.  703. 

277  Evidence  proving  conditions,  such  as  comparative 
ability  to  do  certain  things  in  the  use  of  a  member 
before  and  after  an  accident,  or  any  other  fac^s 
from  which  an  inference  as  to  an  ultimate  fact  may 
be  drawn,  is  competent.  International  Coal  and 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524, 
532;  127  N.  E.  703. 


SEC.  19—  (b)   PROPER  EVIDENCE  241 

277  Where  there  is  evidence,  independent  of  opinion 
evidence,  as  to  the  loss  of  use  of  an  arm,  the  fact  that 
the  injury  was  exhibited  to  and  examined  by  the 
triers  of  fact,  such  evidence  is  entitled  to  some 
weight.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  578,  581;  129  N.  E.  521. 

277  Witnesses  must  state  facts  and  not  draw  conclu- 
sions or  give  opinions.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
draw  the  conclusions  from  the  evidence  and  to  form 
the  opinions  from  the  facts  proved.  International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  524,  532;  127  N.  E.  703. 

279  Where  the  only  evidence  in  the  record  as  to  the 
loss  of  use  of  the  eye,  and  of  the  arms  was  the  opin- 
ion of  the  applicant,  it  was  held  that  such  evidence 
was  not  competent  and  that  there  was  no  evidence 
in  the  record  to  sustain  the  finding  as  to  the  percent- 
age of  the  loss  of  use  of  the  eye  and  the  arms  and 
such  finding  was  erroneous.  International  Coal  & 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524, 
531;  127  N.  E.  703. 

277  Even  though  the  anthrax  bacillus  was  not  seen  to 
enter  the  body,  if  the  sequence  of  events  is  suscepti- 
ble of  only  one  explanation,  the  conclusion  that  the 
employee  got  the  infection  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment is  reasonable.  Chicago  Rawhide  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  616,  619;  126  N. 
E.  616. 

277  Where  facts  are  established  by  the  uncontroverted 
testimony  of  expert  witnesses,  the  fact  that  the  tes- 
timony is  opinion  evidence,  does  not  authorize  the 
Industrial  Commission  to  disregard  the  evidence. 
Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
449,  454;  124  N.E.  566. 


242  SEC.  19— (b)  PROPER  EVIDENCE 

277  Where  facts  are  proven  altogether  by  expert  wit- 
nesses, who  appear  fair  and  unbiased,  competent 
and  well  skilled  in  their  profession,  there  is  no  good 
reason  for  a  court  disregarding  the  evidence  as  not 
establishing  facts  because  much  of  the  evidence  is 
opinion  evidence.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  449,  454 ;  124  N.  E.  566. 

279  A  witness  though  not  qualified  as  an  expert  may 
testify  as  to  his  state  of  health,  that  he  is  suffering 
pain  or  as  to  his  physical  condition,  but  he  is  not 
allowed  to  testify  that  it  is  his  opinion  that  the  in- 
jury will  be  permanent.  Internatonal  Coal  &  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  531; 
127  N.  E.  703. 

277  The  testimony  of  a  chiropractor  is  admissible  in 
evidence  as  expert  testimony  if  there  is  a  showing 
that  he  has  special  skill  or  is  schooled,  educated  or 
trained  in  any  particular  system  for  the  treatment 
of  an  ailment  or  disease.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  109, 113 ;  130  N.  E.  470. 

277  The  weight  of  expert  testimony  should  be  deter- 
mined by  the  character,  capacity,  skill  and  opportu- 
nities for  observation  and  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
experts  themselves,  as  seen  and  heard  and  by  the 
nature  of  the  case  and  its  developed  facts.  Peabody 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  449,  454 ; 
124  N.  E.  566. 

277  Where  there  is  no  competent  evidence  showing 
that  an  employee  is  not  totally  permanently  dis- 
abled rendering  him  wholly  and  permanently  incapa- 
ble of  work,  a  pension  for  life  cannot  be  allowed 
under  Section  8,  (f).  Ballou  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  434,  438;  129  N.  E.  755. 


SEC.  19— (b)    PROPER  EVIDENCE  243 

277  Where  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
an  employee  was  an  independent  contractor,  it  is  the 
exclusive  duty  of  the  Commission  to  weigh  the  evi- 
dence and  thus  make  the  question  one  of  fact.  Cin- 
ofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521,  525 ;  125 
N.  E.  286. 

277      Where  testimony  is  not  objected  to,  the  triers  of 

319  the  facts  and  the  attorneys  are  lulled  into  the  belief 

300  that  the  evidence  is  competent,  and,  so,  if  objections 

348  are  not  made  upon  the  trial  before  the  Commission, 

such  questions  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  in 

the  Circuit  Court.    Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 

Commission,  289  111.  449,  452;  124  N.  E.  566. 

277  An  employee  while  starting  a  fire  to  give  the  men 
233  a  warm  place  to  eat  was  burned  on  the  hands  and 
323  legs.  The  arbitrator  made  an  award  of  50  per  cent 
loss  of  use  of  legs  and  the  Commission  cut  this 
down  to  35  per  cent.  Applicant  testified  as  to  the 
percentage  of  loss  of  use  of  his  legs  and  there  was 
testimony  as  to  what  he  could  do  with  his  legs  and 
the  pains  that  he  felt.  The  doctor  testified  that  the 
injuries  were  negligible,  that  the  disability  at  a  maxi- 
mum was  about  15  per  cent..  The  award  of  the  Com- 
mission was  between  the  opinion  of  the  doctor  and 
the  claimant.  Held,  as  the  finding  of  the  Commis- 
sion as  to  the  percentage  of  loss  of  use  of  the  legs 
was  not  based  on  competent  evidence,  the  award 
must  be  set  aside  and  the  case  remanded  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  extent  of  loss  of  use  of  his  legs.  Decatur 
Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290 ;  129 
N.  E.  738. 


244  SEC.  19— (b)  STATEMENTS  OF  INJURED 

Statements  of  Injured. 

278      Statement  made  by  employee  to  various  co-work  - 
307  ers  that  he  had  stepped  on  a  nail,  sufficient  to  sup- 
port a  finding  that  he  sustained  injury  arising  out  of 
the  employment.     Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  175,  179;  130  N.  E.  517. 

277  Testimony  that  deceased  told  another  that  matches 
were  ignited  by  striking  against  a  locker,  held  suffi- 
cient where  it  was  elicited  from  a  witness  on  cross- 
examination  without  objection.  Steel  Sales  Corp.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  435,  439;  127  N.  E. 
698. 

280  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  449;  International  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  524;  both  holding  that  an  applicant 
cannot  testify  as  to  what  he  believes  is  the  percent- 
age of  loss  of  use  of  a  member  distinguished  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  competent  to  prove  the  compara- 
tive ability  to  do  certain  things  before  and  after  the 
accident  or  any  other  fact  enabling  the  Commission 
to  draw  an  inference  as  to  the  ultimate  fact  to  be 
determined.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  578,  581 ;  129  N.  E.  521. 

280      Evidence  of  a  claimant  that  his  earning  capacity 
302  had  been  reduced  50  per  cent  is  incompetent  and 

does  not  form  a  sufficient  basis  in  legal  evidence  for 

the  finding  of  the  Commission,  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v. 

Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  229,  232;  129  N.  E. 

722. 

280      Testimony  of  an  employee  that  he  can  lift  less 
277  than  before  the  injury;  that  his  hip  seems  stiff  in 
233  walking;  that  his  back  is  stiff,  is  competent  testi- 
mony to  be  considered  in  determining  the  present 


SEC.  19— (b)   DOCTORS— EXPERTS  245 

earning  ability.  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  229,  233  ;129  N.  E.  722. 

280  Where  the  applicant  himself  testified  that  he  had 
suffered  a  fifty  per  cent  loss  of  the  vision  of  both 
eyes,  the  opinion  evidence  was  error  and  the  award 
based  on  this  evidence  was  reversed.  Hafer  Washed 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  427, 
428;  127  N.  E.  752. 

280      It  is  error  for  the  Commission  to  permit  the  claim- 

238  ant  to  express  an  opinion  as  to  the  loss  of  use  he 
suffered  on  account  of  his  injuries.  Decatur  Const. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290,  294;  129 
1ST.  E.  738. 

277  Where  there  is  no  evidence  as  to  the  permanent 
loss  of  the  use  of  the  leg  and  the  amount  awarded  is 
based  on  the  opinion  of  the  injured  employee  as  to 
the  per  cent  of  loss,  such  opinion  is  incompetent 
as  a  basis  for  an  award.  St.  Louis  Smelting  &  Re- 
fining Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  272,  277; 
131  N.  E.  617. 

280  WJiere  an  employee  testified  that  he  could  not  see 
as  well  after  the  accident,  that  he  could  not  read  by 
electric  light,  that  the  wind  made  his  eyes  water,  that 
light  and  heat  hurt  his  eyes ;  this  evidence  was  com- 
petent to  be  considered  by  the  Commission.  Hafer 
Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
425,  427;  127  N.E.  752. 

Doctors — Experts. 

287  Neither  an  expert,  nor  a  lay  witness  is  allowed  to 
declare  his  belief  as  to  an  ultimate  fact  under  the 
Illinois  rule.  (Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 289  111.  449 ;  Keefe  v.  Armour  &  Co.,  258  111. 
28 ;  I 'arbour  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  Ey.  Co.,  235  111.  589 ; 


246  SEC.  19—  (b)   DOCTORS— EXPERTS 

J.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  208  111.  608).  International 
Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
524,  532;  127  N.E.  703. 

287  Where  the  complaint  was  made  by  the  plaintiff  in 
error,  that  the  testimony  of  the  expert  witnesses  of 
the  employee  to  the  effect  that  the  partial  disability 
permanently  impaired  the  earning  capacity  25  per 
cent  was  inadmissible  because  an  ultimate  issue  of 
fact  before  the  Commission,  it  was  held,  that  this 
position  was  not  well  taken,  because  they  had  not 
objected  to  the  competency  of  this  evidence.  Pea- 
body  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  449, 
452;  124  N.  E.  566. 

287  Evidence  consisting  of  the  opinion  of  two  doctors, 
one  stating  that  acute  nephritis  may  result  from 
trauma  but  that  it  was  not  common ;  the  other  stat- 
ing that  the  injury  relegated  to  and  assisted  the 
patient  to  deplete  his  vitality  instead  of  gain  are  not 
opinions  that  the  fall  of  the  employee  caused  his 
death.    Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  175,  178,  179;  131  N.  E.  369. 

288  The  weight  of  the  testimony  of  a  particular  expert 
is  to  be  determined  by  the  character,  capacity,  skill 
and  opportunity  of  the  witness  to  know  and  under- 
stand the  matters  about  which  he  testifies  and  his 
state  of  mind  or  fairness  to  the  parties  litigant. 
Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  109,  113; 
130  N.  E.  470. 

288  Any  one  who  is  shown  to  have  special  knowledge 
and  skill  in  diagnosing  and  treating  human  ailments 
is  qualified  to  testify  as  an  expert  if  his  learning  and 
training  show  that  he  is  qualified  to  give  an  opnion 
on  the  particular  questions  in  issue.  Voight  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  297  111.  109, 112;  130  N.  E.  470. 


SEC.  19— (b)   INFERENCES  247 

As  to  inability  of  medical  profession  to  forecast 
results,  see:  Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  177,  179.  " 

288  Opinion  of  physician  that  employee  was  electro- 
cuted based  on  no  knowledge  of  authorities,  nor  of 
the  subject  of  electrocution,  and  no  actual  experi- 
ence, is  incompetent  as  he  was  not  qualified  to  give 
opinion.  Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
296  111.  11,  13,  14;  129  N.  E.  536. 

287  The  opinion  of  a  doctor  that  under  certain  condi- 
tions nephritis  might  have  been  set  up  by  the  fall  is 
nothing  more  than  an  opinion  that  there  was  a  possi- 
ble connection  between  the  accident  and  the  death, 
and  being  based  upon  a  hypothesis  unsupported  by 
any  evidence  it  is  not  admissible.     Lawrence  Ice 
Cream  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  175, 
178;  131  N.  E.  369. 

288  Expert  evidence  is  legal  and  competent  evidence 
196  and  is  to  be  received,  treated  and  weighed  precisely 

as  other  evidence  by  triers  of  fact  in  this  character 
of  cases  and  by  jurors  in  cases  of  law.  Peabody 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  449,  454 ; 
124  N.  E.  566. 

Inferences. 

291  Where  the  agency  likely  to  cause  death  is  present 
and  employee  is  found  where  the  deadly  agency  was 
in  effectual  operation  and  certain  to  cause  death, 
the  facts  warrant  an  inference  being  drawn.  Sesser 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  11,  14 ; 
129  N.  E.  536. 

291-6  Where  no  autopsy  is  held  and  the  proof  does  not 
show  with  certainty  what  caused  the  death  and  there 
is  present  an  agency  likely  to  cause  death  an  infer- 


248  SEC.  19— (b)   PRESUMPTION. 

ence  that  this  particular  agency  caused  the  death  is 
reasonable  even  though  there  is  some  evidence  that 
the  employee  was  suffering  from  flu.  Wasson  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  217,  222 ;  129 
N.  E.  786. 

291  Even  though  evidence  is  conflicting  on  the  question 
of  agency  still  it  might  warrant  the  conclusion  that 
he  was  acting  within  the  scope  of  the  employment  in 
making  the  employment.    Davis  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  29,  31,  32;  130  N.  E.  333. 

292  It  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  an  eye- 
witness to  the  accident.    Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  579,  582;  126  N.  E.  564. 

293  An  eye-witness  is  not  necessary  to  an  accident, 
where  there  are  facts  from  which  an  inference  can 
be  raised  or  it  can  be  presumed  that  the  accident 
arose  out  of  the  employment.    Sparks  Milling  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  350,  354,  356;  127 
N.  E.  737. 

Presumption. 

292  There  is  a  rebuttable  presumption  of  law  that,  if 
a  person  is  absent  from  his  usual  place  of  abode, 
and  no  intelligence  has  been  received  from  him 
within  seven  years,  and  no  account  can  be  given  of 
him,  he  is  presumed  to  be  dead.  Keystone  Steel  & 
Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587,  589 ; 
124  N.  E.  542. 

292  There  is  no  presumption  either  of  law  or  fact,  at 
what  time  during  the  period  of  seven  years  the  death 
occurred,  or  that  the  person  lived  during  any  partic- 
ular portion  of  the  period.  Keystone  Steel  &  Wire 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  587,  589;  124 
N.  E.  542. 


SEC.  19— (b)    PRESUMPTION  249 

292  There  is  a  presumption  of  fact  based  on  common 
experience,  as  to  the  continuance  of  life,  which  justi- 
fies a  conclusion  of  fact  that  a  person  is  alive  short- 
ly after  he  has  been  proved  to  be  living.    Keystone 
Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
587,  589;  124  N.  E.  542. 

295  Legal  presumptions  are  rules  established  either 
by  common  law  or  statute  founded  upon  the  first 
principles  of  justice  or  the  laws  of  nature  or  the  ex- 
perienced course  of  human  conduct  and  affairs  and 
the  connection  usually  found  to  exist  between  cer- 
tain things ;  where  one  fact  is  proved,  another  which 
uniformly   exists  is  presumed  without  proof.     Na- 
tional  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
598,  602;  127  N.E.  135. 

296  Where  one  pays  money  to  another  and  there  is  no 
207  explanation  of  the  cause  of  such  payment,  the  ordi- 
nary presumption  is  that  the  money  was  paid  be- 
cause it  was  due  and  owing  and  not  by  way  of  a  loan, 
but  where  the  relation  existing  between  the  parties 
is  different  than  business,  the  presumption  arises 
that  it  is  in  performance  of  a  legal  obligation  rest- 
ing upon  the  father  or  husband  to  support  the  wife 
or  child.    Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E.  603. 

296  A  presumption  as  to  the  payment  of  money  may 
be  one  of  fact  rather  than  one  of  law,  a  mere  rule 
of  evidence,  an  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  facts 
and  circumstances.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E.  603. 

293  There  is  a  general  presumption  of  fact  against  a 
change  under  established  and  settled  conditions.  Na- 
tional Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
598,  602;  127  N.E.  135. 


250  SEC.  19— (b)    PRESUMPTION 

295  There  is  no  presumption  of  continuance  of  life 
during  seven  years  or  at  what  time  during  the  period 
the  death  occurred.  National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  598,  602;  127  N.  E.  135. 

294  Presumptions  are  either  of  law  or  fact,  and  either 
conclusive  or  rebuttable.  National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  598,  601 ;  127  N.  E.  135. 

293  What  is  evidence  of  a  fact  and  what  is  merely 
guessing  at  the  fact  cannot  be  defined  by  any  formula 
that  one  can  invent.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  141,  147;  128  N.  E.  917. 

293  Where  an  employee  was  found  dead  on  a  track 
generally  used  by  miners  on  their  way  to  work,  it 
may  be  inferred  that  the  deceased  was  on  his  way 
to  work  when  he  was  killed.  Western  Coal  &  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  408,  410; 
129  N.  E.  779. 

293  Where  there  are  three  theories: — any  of  which 
may  account  for  the  death  of  the  employee,  murder, 
suicide  or  accident;  the  presumption  against  the 
commission  of  a  crime  or  suicide,  is  sufficient  to  sup- 
port a  finding  that  the  death  was  the  result  of  acci- 
dent. (Humphrey  v.  Industrial  Commission,  285  111. 
372;  in  re  Von  Ette  (Mass.)  Ill  N.  E.  696;  Steers  v. 
Dunnewald  (N.  J.)  89  Atl.  1007;  State  v.  District 
Court  (Minn.)  164  N.  W.  582;  Bekkedal  Lumber  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission  (Wis.)  169  N.  W.  561) ; 
Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  350,  353;  127  N.E.  737. 

299  The  mere  fact  that  the  cerebral  hemorrhage  oc- 
curred a  few  minutes  after  a  quarrel  would  not  jus- 
tify any  court  in  holding  that  it  was  caused  by  a 
quarrel,  when  the  proof  is  that  it  can  only  be  con- 


SEC.  19— (b)    PRESUMPTION  251 

jectured  it  was  so  caused.    Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  463,  467;  131  N.  E.  649. 

294  If  a  person  is  absent  for  seven  years,  a  rebuttable 
presumption  that  he  is  dead  is  raised.     National 
Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598,  602 ; 
127  N.  E.  135. 

295  No  rule  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  degree  of  proof 
sufficient  to  justify  an  inference  being  drawn.  Vul- 
can Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
141,  147;  128  N.E.  917. 

295  Until  there  is  proof  that  the  son  is  emancipated, 
the   liability   to    support   continues   until   the    son 
reaches  the  age  of  twenty-one  years.    Panther  Creek 
Mines  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  565,  567; 
130  N.  E.  321. 

296  Where  an  employee  was  killed  by  electric  shock 
by  going  over  to  a  side  where  a  live  wire  was,  con- 
trary to  directions,  the  conclusion  may  be  drawn 
from  the  evidence  that  through  his  inexperience  or 
carelessness,  he  moved  too  close  to  the  live  wires 
and  in  such  case,  the  determination  of  the  Commis- 
sion concludes  the  Court.    Mississippi  River  Power 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  353,  356;  124 
N.  E.  552. 

296  Where  it  is  shown  by  a  witness  that  a  son  con- 
tributed to  a  father  by  making  two  remittances  of 
money  to  him  in  the  old  country,  no  legal  presump- 
tion can  be  drawn  from  the  mere  payment  to  the 
father  that  it  was  made  to  assist  in  the  father's  sup- 
port rather  than  to  pay  an  ordinary  debt  for  services 
rendered,  or  for  money  loaned.  Pedbody  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E. 
603. 


252  SEC.  19— (b)   HEARSAY 

296  The  Commission  cannot  surmise,  conjecture  or 
guess  its  conclusion,  yet  it  may  draw  an  inference 
from  proven  facts,  as  long  as  the  inference  is  a 
legitimate  one.  Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  350,  354;  127  N.  E.  737. 

296  The  refusal  to  reply  with  a  request  for  an  autopsy 
after  the  body  has  been  buried,  where  after  the  un- 
dertaker's preparation,  the  cause  of  death  cannot 
be  shown,  should  not  be  treated  as  an  admission  or 
legal  presumption  one  way  or  the  other  as  to  the 
cause  of  death.    Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  141, 150;  128  N.  E.  917. 

Hearsay. 

297  Where  there  was  testimony  by  the  wife  of  the  de- 
ceased  employee   that   he   told   her   that   he   had 
scratched  his  neck  and  that  a  hide  fell  on  it,  this 
testimony  was  not  competent,  being  hearsay.    Chi- 
cago Rawhide  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 291  111.  616,  617;  126  N.  E.  616. 

297  Where  the  testimony  of  the  wife  as  to  a  conversa- 
tion her  husband  had  with  the  field  boss,  was  ad- 
mitted over  objection,  it  was  held  incompetent.  Ohio 
Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461,  465; 
127  N.  E.  743. 

297  Where  hearsay  evidence  is  brought  out  on  cross 
examination  and  no  objection  made  nor  motion  to 
strike  it  out,  the  evidence  is  competent  in  the  record. 
Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
435,  439;  127  N.  E.  698. 

Burden  of  Proof. 

298  It  is  incumbent  on  the  applicant  to  prove  by  direct 
and  positive  evidence  that  the  accident  arose  out  of 


SEC.  19— (b)  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  253 

the  employment,  or  by  evidence  from  which  such  an 
inference  could  be  drawn.  Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  459,  463 ;  125  N.  E.  260. 

295  The  claimant  has  the  burden  of  proving  that  the 
injury  occurred  in  connection  with  the  employment 
and  to  furnish  evidence  from  which  the  inference  can 
be  logically  drawn  that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and 
in  course  of  the  employment.  Hydrox  Chemicdl  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  579,  582 ;  126  N.  E. 
564. 

115  Where  the  cause  is  equally  consistent  with  an  ac- 
cident and  with  no  accident,  compensation  must  be 
denied.  (Barnabas  v.  Bersham  Colliery  Co.  4  B.  W. 
C.  C.  119) ;  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298  111.  463,  467;  131  N.  E.  649. 

293  The  burden  is  on  the  applicant  to  prove  that  the 
injury  was  accidental  and  its  cause,  but  to  make  this 
proof,  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses  is  not  neces- 
sary, as  the  proof  may  be  made  by  direct  or  cir- 
cumstantial evidence.  (Ohio  Building  Vault  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Board,  277  111.  96;  Mechanics  Furniture 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  281  111.  530;  Northern  Illi- 
nois Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  279  111.  565) ; 
Steel  Sales  Corporation  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  435,  437 ;  127  N.  E.  698. 

298  The  burden  is  on  the  claimant  to  show  that  the 
injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment, and  the  finding  can  not  rest  on  conjecture  or 
possibility.  Morris  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295111.  49,  52;  128  N.E.  727. 

298  The  burden  of  proving  that  the  accidental  injury 
arose  out  of  the  employment  is  on  the  claimant.  It 
must  be  shown  by  such  direct  and  positive  evidence 
from  which  such  inference  could  be  fairly  drawn. 


254  SEC.  19— (b)  BURDEN  OF  PROOF 

Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  350,  353,  354;  127  N.  E.  737. 

298  The  burden  of  proving  that  the  accident  arose 
out  of  the  employment  is  on  the  applicant.  (Wiscon- 
son  Steel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  288  111.  206 ; 
Peterson  v.  Industrial  Board,  281  111.  326 ;  Northern 
Illinois  Traction  Co.  v.  Industrial  Board,  279  111. 
565) ;  Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 295  111.  332,  335;  129  N.  E.  142. 

298      The  burden  is  on  the  applicant  to  prove  by  direct 

114  and  positive  evidence,  or  by  evidence  from  which 
such  inference  can  be  fairly  drawn,  without  being 
based  on  conjecture,  guess  or  surmise,  that  the  acci- 
dent arose  out  of  the  employment.  Wasson  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  2196  111.  217,  220?  129 
N.  E.  786. 

298  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  claimant  to  prove 
employment  and  injury,  but  the  burden  rests  upon 
the  employer  to  prove  that  the  employment  was  but 
casual.  Consumers  Mutual  Ofl,  Producing  OH  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  423,  424;  124  N.  E. 
608. 

298  It  is  incumbent  on  the  claimant  to  prove  that  an 
accident  occurred  in  the  course  of  his  employment 
and  arose  out  of  it  and  that  his  condition  for  which 
he  claimed  compensation  was  a  result  of  the  acci- 
dent. St.  Louis  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  272,  277 ;  131  N.  E.  617. 

298  The  burden  is  always  on  the  claimant  to  show  that 
the  injury  was  the  result  of  an  accident.    City  of 
Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  555,  558; 
126  N.  E.  618. 

299  It  is  incumbent  on  the  applicant  to  prove  that  loss 
of  sight  is  caused  by  the  accident.    Spring  Valley 


SEC.  19— (b)    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE          255 

Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  315,  317 ; 
124  N.  E.  545. 

298  It  is  necessary  that  the  injury  be  traceable  to 
something  tangible  by  proof.  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  298  111.  463,  466 ;  131  N.  E.  649. 

298      A  beneficiary,  under  the  1915  Act,  had  to  prove 

207  that  the  deceased  employee  contributed  to  his  sup- 
port within  four  years  and  hearsay  evidence,  as  to 
the  sending  of  money,  was  not  admissible  to  prove 
this  fact.  Keystone  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  587,  590;  124  N.  E.  542. 

298  While  facts  in  case  might  give  rise  to  conflicting 
inferences,  there  is  ground  for  comparing  probabili- 
ties at  their  respective  values  and  if  a  reasonable 
conclusion  can  be  reached,  it  will  stand  the  scrutiny 
of  the  reviewing  court.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  141,  148;  128  N.  E. 
917. 

298  Where  the  question  is,  whether  the  proof  tends  to 
show  that  the  death  of  the  employee  occurred  while 
he  was  reasonably  fulfilling  duties  of  his  employ- 
ment, or  doing  something  incidental  to  it,  the  bur- 
den is  on  the  applicant  to  prove  that  the  accident 
arose  in  the  course  of  and  out  of  the  employment  by 
direct  and  positive  evidence  or  by  evidence  by  which 
such  inference  can  be  fairly  drawn.    Mepham  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  484,  488;  124  N.  E.  540. 

Circumstantial  Evidence. 

299  Proof  of  the  facts  may  be  established  by  circum- 
stantial as  well  as  by  direct  evidence,  and  the  greater 
or  less  probability  leading  on  the  whole  to  a  satis- 
factory conclusion  is  all  that  can  be  reasonably  re- 
quired  to    establish   controverted   facts.     Hydrox 


256    SEC.  19— (b)  IMPROPER  EVIDENCE  MAY  BE  COMPETENT 

Chemical  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  579, 
582;  126  N.  E.  564. 

299  The  existence  of  a  beneficiary  must  be  proved  by 
the  administrator  and  not  by  the  employer,  and  the 
presumption  of  life  cannot  be  applied  where  there 
are  circumstances  which  materially  affect  the  chance 
of  existence  of  the  beneficiaries.  National  Zinc  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598,  603;  127  N.  E. 
135. 

299  The  circumstances  may  tend  to  show  that  an  acci- 
dent arose  in  a  certain  way.  Chicago  Rawhide  Man- 
ufacturing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
616,  620;  126  N.  E.  616. 

299  A  claimant  does  not  have  to  prove  the  case  by 
direct  evidence;  that  somebody  actually  saw  what 
took  place,  because  that  is  impossible.  Sparks  Mill- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  350,  354; 
127  N.  E.  737. 

299  Proof  that  an  injury  was  sustained  by  an  em- 
ployee in  the  performance  of  his  employment  may 
be  made  by  circumstantial  evidence.    Walsh  Team- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  536,  540; 
125  N.  E.  331. 

Improper  Evidence  May  Be  Competent. 

300  Where  incompetent  evidence  is  elicited  from  wit- 
nesses on  cross  examination  and  that  kind  of  evi- 
dence is  not  objected  to,  a  complaint  to  that  effect 
will  not  be  heeded  by  the  Supreme  Court.    Peabody 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  449,  452 ; 
124  N.  E.  566. 

300  Where  it  was  objected  that  the  testimony  of  one 
of  the  witnesses  was  hearsay,  it  was  held  that  coun- 
sel could  not  raise  this  point  for  the  reason  that  the 


SEC.   19— (b)    AWARD  OR  DECISION  257 

evidence  in  question  was  brought  out  by  counsel  on 
cross  examination.  Steel  Sales  Corp.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  435,  439;  127  N.  E.  698. 

Award  or  Decision. 

302  Miner  was  injured  by  a  fall  of  rock  from  the  ceil- 
360  ing  of  a  mine.  He  sustained  injuries  to  the  left  leg 
and  hip.  The  finding  of  the  arbitrator  was  based  on 
an  injury  to  the  left  leg.  In  the  final  order  of  the 
Commission  the  word  "right"  was  inserted  before 
"leg"  instead  of  "left."  Held,  the  award  will  be 
modified  by  striking  out  the  word  "right"  and  in- 
serting the  word  "left"  before  the  word  "leg." 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294 
111.  325;  128  N.  E.  554. 

302  But  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  as  to  notice 
311  and  there  is  a  finding  by  the  arbitrator  as  to  notice, 
the  court  is  not  authorized  to  disregard  the  finding 
as  to  the  fact,  because  in  doing  so  it  would  simply 
be  passing  on  the  weight  of  the  evidence.  Ridge 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  532,  535 ; 
131  N.  E.  637. 

302  Where  award  was  allowed  to  the  administrator, 
court  thought  it  was  apparent  that  payment  was 
intended  to  be  made  to  the  mother,  even  though 
Commission  did  not  state  in  its  finding  which  rela- 
tives were  dependent  upon  deceased.  Keller  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  314,  316;  126  N.  E. 
162. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  the  commission  to  make  a 
specific  finding  of  all  the  facts  where  there  is  evi- 
dence in  the  record  showing  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties  and  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  the  award. 
Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175;  130 
N.  E.  517. 


258  SEC.   19— (b)    AWARD  OR   DECISION 

302  The  Commission  should  find  specifically  the  nature 
and  effect  of  the  injury  for  which  an  award  is  made, 
rather  than  a  finding  that  an  award  is  made  of  a 
certain  amount  for  a  certain  period  under  a  certain 
provision  of  the  statute.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  18,  21;  128  N.  E.  813. 

302  The  findings  in  the  award  should  state  in  express 
terms  whether  the  injury  produced  partial  or  total, 
permanent  or  temporary,  disability  or  disfigure- 
ment. Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  18,21;  128  N.  E.  813. 

302  Even  though  the  findings  in  the  award  might  be 
insufficient  to  support  it,  it  does  not  require  a  re- 
versal where  the  particular  paragraphs  of  the  sec- 
tion under  which  the  award  was  made  are  referred 
to  in  the  finding.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  18,  21 ;  128  N.  E.  813. 

302  Where  the  employee  refuses  to  submit  to  a  physi- 
cal examination  the  award  can  be  set  aside  and  the 
case  remanded  to  the  Commission  with  directions 
for  further  proceedings.  Jackson  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  18,  21;  128  N.  E.  813. 

420  Where  there  is  an  award  and  a  finding  that  notice 
was  not  given,  the  award  could  only  be  sustained 
by  a  showing  that  the  word  "not"  is  a  clerical  error. 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

302  Where  the  interests  of  an  employer  are  not  being 
aided,  protected  or  advanced  by  an  employee,  and 
the  quarrel  and  consequent  injury  have  no  reason- 
able connection  with  the  work  then  being  done  for 
the  employer,  there  is  no  basis  for  an  award.  Marion 
County  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
463,466;  127  N.  E.  84. 


SEC.   19— (b)    AWARD   OR   DECISION  259 

420  Where  there  is  a  finding  that  notice  was  not  given 
and  an  award  made  and  in  order  to  sustain  the 
award  it  is  argued  that  notice  must  have  been  given 
or  the  arbitrator  could  not  have  made  the  award, 
such  position  is  fallacious  and  cannot  be  sustained. 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
532,  534;  131  N.E.  637. 

302  Where  an  award  is  entered  by  the  Commission,  it 
is  presumed  that  the  Commissioners  did  their  duty 
and  considered  the  evidence  submitted.  Stubbs  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  525,  527 ;  124  N.  E. 
527. 

302  Where  there  is  evidence  that  the  healing  process 
was  completed  and  that  the  ensuing  disability  was 
due  to  the  permanent  character  of  the  injuries  and 
not  to  the  temporary  illness  following  the  accident, 
it  is  error  to  make  an  award  covering  any  period 
of  the  time  when  the  healing  process  was  completed. 
Mt.  Olive  Cod>l  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111.  429,  432 ;  129  N.  E.  103. 

302  Employee  sustained  an  injury  rendering  him  per- 
manently, wholly  incapacitated  from  work.  He  was 
awarded  a  pension  for  life  based  on  an  annual  earn- 
ing of  $1248.00,  and  a  weekly  wage  of  $24.00.  The 
record  showed  the  earnings  to  be  $741.39,  or  $14.25 
weekly.  The  result  of  this  computation  was 
that  it  advanced  the  commencement  of  the  annual 
pension  by  200  weeks.  Evidence  showed  that  had  he 
been  permitted  by  the  nature  of  the  room  in  which 
he  was  working,  he  could  have  mined  as  much  coal 
as  the  average  miner.  The  Commission  computed 
the  compensation  under  par.  (f )  of  section  10,  and 
it  is  contended  by  the  employer  that  this  paragragh 
has  no  application;  that  he  was  an  adult  earning 


260  SEC.  19— (b)  "STENOGRAPHIC  REPORT" 

what  all  other  men  were  earning  in  the  same  line 
of  employment  in  that  locality  and  that  therefore 
the  actual  earnings  should  have  been  taken  into  con- 
sideration. Held,  that  the  basis  of  the  award  was 
correct  and  the  decision  was  affirmed.  Centralia 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  513 ;  130 
N.  E.  725. 

302  Employee,  a  stone  mason,  received  injuries  to  his 
forehead  by  a  fall  from  a  scaffold  and  was  allowed, 
in  addition  to  temporary  total  disability,  the  sum 
of  $11.55  for  50  weeks  for  disfigurement,  which  is 
claimed  to  be  contrary  to  the  mandate  of  the  Su- 
preme Court.  It  was  held  that  the  fact  that  the 
second  award  was  the  same  as  the  first  award  which 
was  reversed  did  not  establish  the  fact  that  the 
award  was  not  the  result  of  a  consideration  of  the 
evidence  by  the  Commission.  Stubbs  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  525;  124  N.  E.  527. 

"Statement  of  Facts." 

304  Where  it  is  stipulated  that  since  the  transcript 
of  the  testimony  could  not  be  obtained,  the  appli- 
cation may  be  tried  de  novo  upon  evidence  produced 
before  the  Commission.    Decatur  Const.  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  290,  292;  129  N1.  E. 
738. 

"Stenographic  Report." 

305  Where  a  stenographic  report  is  withdrawn  by 
the  Commission  because  it  is  inaccurate,  it  is  not 
error  for  the  Circuit  Court  to  allow  the  Commission 
to   withdraw   the    return   and   amend  it   to  corre- 
spond with  the  facts.    Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  175,  180;  131  N.  E. 
369. 


SEC.  19— (b)  "MAY  GRANT  FURTHER  TIME"  261 

305  On  an  assignment  of  cross-errors,  the  Supreme 
Court  considered  the  question  whether  the  steno- 
graphic report  was  filed  in  time  and  held  that  the 
authentication  could  be  made  after  the  stenographic 
report  had  been  filed,  if  the  report  had  been  filed 
within  the  time  allowed  by  the  statute.  Lawrence 
Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111. 
175,  180;  131  N.  E.  369. 

"May  Grant  Further  Time." 

305  Where  a  stenographic  report  is  filed  within  the 
time  extended,  as  provided  by  the  statute,  and  it  is 
corrected  and  authenticated  afterwards,  this  may 
be  lawfully  done.  Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  298  111.  175,  180;  131  N.  E. 
369. 

"Authentication." 

305  There  is  no  error  in  allowing  the  authentication 
of  a  stenographic  report  which  is  filed  within  the 
time  allowed  by  the  statute,  nor  in  allowing  the  Com- 
mission to  withdraw  the  return  and  amend  it  to 
correspond  with  the  facts.  Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  175, 180;  131  N.  E. 
369. 

Sufficiency  of  Evidence. 

307      Evidence  considered  and  weighed  and  held  to  be 

118  sufficient  to  sustain  finding  of  the  Commission  that 

the  accident  arose  out  of  the  employment.    Wasson 

Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  217 ;  129 

N.  E.  786. 

312  Evidence  held  to  show  circumstances  that  warrant 
Commission  in  finding  that  hemorrhage  was  due  to 
blood  pressure  intensified  by  vigorous  muscular 


262  SEC.  19    (b)    SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE 

action.    Baggott  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  III. 
530,  534;  125  N.  E.  254. 

314  To  sustain  an  award  for  compensation,  there 
must  be  some  competent  evidence  in  the  record  that 
the  accident  or  injury  arose  out  of  or  in  the  course 
of  the  employment.  Rockford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  332,  335 ;  129  N,  E.  142. 

314  Where  there  was  evidence  that  employee  was  re- 
pairing a  bridge  used  in  interstate  commerce  and 
some  that  he  was  repairing  a  bridge,  the  court  may 
review  the  evidence  to  ascertain  whether  the  injury 
was  received  in  interstate  commerce.  Hines  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  295  111.  231,  233;  129  N.  E. 
175. 

314  Evidence  in  the  record  held  to  warrant  conclusion 
of  Commission  that  death  was  due  to  infection  from 
a  rusty  nail  and  not  from  probing  the  wound  with 
a  pocket  knife,  where  doctor  testified  that  he  did 
not  think  the  infection  came  from  the  knife.  Snyder 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175, 182;  130  N.  E. 
517. 

314  Where  the  doctor  testified  that,  where  a  man  falls 
following  a  threat  to  strike  him,  the  blood  clot  might 
be  due  to  the  excitement  or  the  fall  or  many  different 
causes ;  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  determine  the 
cause  of  the  hemorrhage,  that  this  was  a  matter 
of  conjecture  from  the  evidence  and  that  he  would 
not  attempt  to  be  positive,  it  was  held  that  such 
proof  is  not  sufficient  to  show  that  the  accident  was 
caused  by  the  excitement.    Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  463;  131  N.  E.  649. 

315  The  courts  cannot  determine  the  weight  of  evi- 
dence on  controverted  questions   of  fact,  but  can 
examine  the  record  only  to  determine  whether  there 


SEC.  19— (b)   SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE  263 

is  competent  evidence  to  sustain  the  award.  Spring 
Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
315,  317 ;  124  N.  E.  545. 

315  Where  an  employee  in  a  mine  lost  the  sight  of 
his  eye  by  reason  of  his  being  struck  with  a  piece 
of  coal,  and  the  controversy  concerned  the  amount 
of  the  award,  which  depended  on  the  question 
whether  the  total  loss  of  sight  was  due  to  the  acci- 
dent, and  the  evidence  was  uncontradicted,  that  he 
had  a  pre-existing  disease,  known  as  choroiditis, 
which  caused  blindness,  and  that  the  accident  caused 
only  a  partial  loss  of  vision,  such  evidence  did  not 
sustain  an  award  for  the  total  loss  of  the  eye  as  the 
result  of  accident.  Spring  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus-- 
trial  Commission,  289  111.  315 ;  124  N.  E.  545. 

307  Where  doctors  testify  that  the  accident  did  not 
produce  the  nephritis ;  that  there  was  no  causal  con- 
nection between  the  fall  from  the  wagon  and  the 
death  of  the  employee;  and  that  the  accident  could 
not  produce  the  condition  from  which  the  employee 
died,  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  upon  which  an 
award  could  be  made.  Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  175,  178 ;  131  N.  E. 
369. 

315  An  engineer  employed  at  a  city  pumping  station 
was  killed  by  heat-stroke.  The  temperature  of  the 
building  in  which  the  engineer  worked  was  notice- 
ably warmer  than  outside.  Held,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
Commission  to  pass  on  the  evidence  and  where  it 
finds  that  an  employee  is  more  exposed  to  heat 
stroke,  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  sustain  the  find- 
ings. Cityi  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
555 ;  126  N.  E.  618. 


264  SEC.  19    (b)    SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE 

315  Employee,  while  driving  a  pit-car  in  a  mine,  was 
caught  between  some  low-hanging  coal,  breaking  his 
collar-bone  and  bruising  shoulder.  He  was  awarded 
temporary  total  and  SS1/^  per  cent  loss  of  use  of  left 
arm.  Employee  testified  that  he  believed  that  he  had 
lost  one-third  of  the  use  of  his  arm.  Before  the 
arbitrator  he  showed  the  various  movements  he 
could  make  with  the  arm  and  the  injury  was  exhib- 
ited to  and  examined  by  the  arbitrator  and  Commis- 
sion. Held,  even  though  the  testimony  as  to  the 
loss  of  use  might  be  incompetent,  yet  as  the  triers 
of  fact  (arbitrator  and  Commission)  saw  the  arm, 
there  was  sufficient  evidence  and  the  award  was  al- 
lowed to  stand.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Indies- 
trial  Commission,  295  111.  578;  129  N.  E.  521. 

307  Employee  was  a  driver  for  an  ice-cream  company 
and  as  the  result  of  slipping  from  the  wheel  sus- 
tained bruises  on  the  leg  and  back.  He  continued 
to  work  and  several  days  later  went  to  a  hospital. 
He  died  there  where  the  records  showed  that  death 
was  caused  by  nephritis  and  uraemia.  The  weight 
of  the  evidence  was  that  the  employee  died  from 
kidney  trouble  and  that  the  accident  did  not  con- 
tribute to  the  disease.  There  was  some  evidence  to 
show  that  the  death  was  superinduced  by  the  fall. 
Held,  as  the  evidence  amounted  only  to  an  expres- 
sion of  opinion  that  the  trauma  and  the  shock  low- 
ered the  vitality,  it  did  not  prove  that  the  death  was 
caused  by  accident  and  the  award  was  set  aside. 
Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298111.  175;  131  N.E.  369. 

307  Where  a  deceased  employee  left  him  surviving 
a  mother  who  permitted  the  son  to  work  for  her, 
but  who,  at  the  time  of  death,  had  been  supported 
by  a  second  husband.  Held,  that  there  was  no  evi- 


SEC.  19— (b)   SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE  265 

dence  in  the  record  going  to  show  that  the  mother 
was  dependent  on  her  son  for  support.  Alden  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  597 ;  127  N.  E. 
641. 

306  Where  the  testimony  of  various  witnesses  is  con- 
tradictory on  the  question  of  drunkenness,  the  Su- 
preme Court  can  not  weigh  the  testimony  and  review 
the  decision  of  the  Commission  and  the  judgment 
of  the  court  on  the  question  of  intoxication.  Morris 
&  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  49,  51 ;  128 
N.  E.  727. 

306  Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record,  tending  to 
prove  permanent  disfigurement,  which  affected  the 
ability  of  the  defendant  to  secure  employment,  and 
the  Supreme  Court  has  passed  on  the  question,  such 
decision  is  conclusive  and  operates  as  res  judicata. 
Stubbs  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  525,  527; 
124  N.  E.  527. 

312  Even  though  the  husband  may  be  under  legal 
obligation  to  support  the  mother,  the  question 
whether  she  received  support  from  her  son  or 
looked  to  him  for  support  is  a  question  of  fact, 
which  is  concluded  by  the  finding  of  the  Commission 
that  she  was  dependent  upon  the  son.  Keller  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  314,  316;  126  N.  E. 
162. 

There  is  a  presumption  of  fact  based  on  common 
experience  as  to  the  continuance  of  life,  which  justi- 
fies a  conclusion  of  fact  that  a  person  is  alive  shortly 
after  he  has  been  proved  to  be  living.  Keystone 
Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
587,  589;  124  N.  E.  542. 

That  the  proof  on  behalf  of  the  employer  was 
contradictory  to  that  of  the  employee  as  to  the  effect 


266  SEC.  19— (b)   SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE 

of  the  injury  on  his  ability  to  work  and  his  earning 
power  affords  no  basis  to  authorize  the  court  to 
review  the  decree  of  the  lower  court.  O'Callaffliaii 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  222,  226 ;  124  N.  E. 
811. 

Questions  of  dependency,  and  the  extent  of  it,  are 
questions  of  fact,  with  a  decision  of  which  by  the 
Commission  the  courts  cannot  interfere,  if  there  is 
evidence  to  sustain  the  finding.  Keller  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  291  111.  314,  316;  126  N.  E.  162. 

Where  the  only  evidence  as  to  the  accident  was 
the  testimony  of  the  manager  that  the  employee 
told  him  that  he  had  hurt  his  arm  and  the  testimony 
of  the  forelady  that  the  employee  showed  his  hand, 
which  was  covered  with  blood,  and  told  her  that  he 
hurt  it  at  the  table  back  there,  and  the  testimony 
of  doctors  as  to  a  cut  on  the  hand  and  an  infection. 
Held,  that  there  was  evidence  in  the  record  from 
which  the  Commission  could  find  that  the  accident 
arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 
Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  579;  126  N.  E.  564. 

The  question  of  dependency  and  the  extent  of  it 
is  a  question  of  fact ;  and  when  there  is  evidence 
to  sustain  the  finding  of  the  Commission,  the  court 
is  without  jurisdiction  to  review  the  finding.  Rock- 
ford  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
332,334;  129  N.  E.  142. 

On  a  review  by  the  Supreme  Court,  it  was  held 
that  the  evidence  in  the  record  did  not  sustain  an 
award  for  the  permanent  total  loss  of  a  coal  miner's 
eye  as  the  result  of  accident.  Spring  Valley  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  315,  317;  124 
N.  E.  545. 


SECTION  19— (c),  (d)  267 

815  (c)  The  Industrial  Commission  may  appoint,  at  its  own  ex- 
pense, a  duly  qualified,  impartial  physician  to  examine  the  in- 
jured employee  and  report  to  the  commission.  The  fee  for  this 
service  shall  not  exceed  live  dollars  and  traveling  expenses,  but 
the  commission  may  allow  additional  reasonable  amounts  in  ex- 
traordinary cases.  The  fees  and  the  payment  thereof  of  all  at- 
torneys and  physicians  for  services  authorized  by  the  commis- 
sion under  this  Act  shall,  upon  request  of  either  the  employer  or 
the  employee  or  the  beneficiary  affected,  be  subject  to  the  review 
and  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission. 

315  (d)  If  any  employee  shall  persist  in  insanitary  or  injurious 
practices  which  tend  to  either  imperil  or  retard  his  recovery  or 
shall  refuse  to  submit  to  such  medical,  surgical,  or  hospital 
treatment  as  is  reasonably  essential  to  promote  his  recovery, 
the  commission  may,  in  its  discretion,  reduce  or  suspend  the 
compensation  of  any  such  injured  employee. 

Section  19,  paragraph  (d),  amended  in  1921  by 
inserting  after  the  word  " surgical"  the  words  ''or 
hospital"  before  the  word  "treatment." 
315  The  statutory  provisions  for  reducing  or  suspend- 
271  ing  compensation  if  an  injured  employee  persists  in 
such  unsanitary  practices  as  tend  to  either  imperil 
or  retard  a  recovery  or  shall  refuse  to  submit  to 
such  medical  or  surgical  treatments  as  will  reason- 
ably be  essential  to  promote  his  recovery,  do  not 
apply  to  an  original  application  for  compensation. 
(Joliet  Motor  Co.  v.  Industrial  Bd.,  280  111.  148.) 
Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175,  182; 
130  N.  E.  517. 

315  The  court  does  not  feel  itself  committed  to  follow 
the  rule  that  where  the  continuation  of  the  disability 
is  due  to  the  refusal  to  take  treatment,  as  a  reason- 
able man  would  take,  the  payment  of  compensation 
should  be  discontinued.    Snyder  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  175,  182;  130  N.  E.  517. 

316  There  is  no  power  in  the  Industrial  Commission 
or  elsewhere  to  compel  an  employee  to  submit  to 
an  operation.    M t.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  429,  432 ;  129  N.  E.  103. 


268  SECTION    19— (d) 

316  Where  the  Commission  finds  that  an  employee 
has  lost  time  by  his  unreasonable  refusal  to  submit 
to  an  operation,  such  time  must  be  credited  to  the 
employer  in  awarding  compensation.  Mt.  Olive  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  429,  433 ;  129 
N.  E.  103. 

316  The  rule  relative  to  operations  generally  followed 
is  this :  If  the  operation  is  not  attended  with  danger 
to  life  or  health,  or  extraordinary  suffering,  and  if 
according  to  the  best  medical  or  surgical  opinion,  the 
operation  offers  a  reasonable  prospect  of  restoration 
or  relief  from  the  incapacity  from  which  the  work- 
man is  suffering,  then  he  must  either  submit  to  the 
operation  or  release  his  employer  from  the  obliga- 
tion to  maintain  him.  (Krcinovich  v.  American  Car 
&  Foundry  Co.  (Mich.),  159  N.  W.  362;  Jendrus  v. 
Detroit  Steel  Products  Co.  (Mich.)  144  N.  W.  563; 
Lesh  v.  Illinois  Steel  Co.  (Wis.),  157  N.  W.  539.) 
Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295 
111  429,  433;  129  N.  E.  103. 

316  In  compelling  an  employee  to  undergo  an  opera- 
tion, the  question  is  whether  the  party  who  declines 
to  submit  is  to  be  considered  as  a  sufferer  from  the 
effect  of  an  injury  or  whether  his  suffering  is  not 
attributable  to  his  action  in  declining  to  avail  him- 
self of  surgical  treatment ;  if  the  sufferer  is  willing 
to  live  on  the  pittance  allowed  him  under  the  Act 
and  refuses  to  be  operated  upon,  his  inability  to 
work  is  the  result  of  his  refusal  to  accept  treatment, 
and  he  is  not  entitled  to  further  compensation.  Ap- 
proving: Donnelly  v.  Baird,  1  B.  W.  C.  C.  95 ;  Walsh 
v.  Locke,  7  B.  W.  C.  C.  117 ;  Kricinovich  v.  American' 
Car  &  Foundry  Co.,  192  Mich.  687;  Lesh  v.  Illinois 
Steel  Co.,  163  Wis.  124;  Enterprise  Fence  &  Foun- 


SECTION    19—  (d)  269 

dry  Co.  v.  Majors,  121  N.  E.  (Ind.)  6.)  Rosenthal 
&  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  182,  185; 
129  N.  E.  176. 

316  The  cases  of  McNally  v.  Hudson  &  Manhattan 
Railroad  Co.,  87  N.  J.  L.  455,  and  Feldman  v.  Braun- 
stein,  87  N.  J.  L.  20,  distinguished.  Rosenthal  &  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  182, 186;  129  N.  E. 
176. 

316  Where  an  employee  suffering  from  a  permanent 
injury  submits  to  an  operation  and  it  proves  unsuc- 
cessful, the  employer  would  be  liable  for  whatever 
loss  of  use  of  his  hand  the  employee  suffers,  as  well 
as  the  surgical  and  hospital  services  necessary  for 
the  operation  and  for  treatment  received.  Mt.  Olive 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  429,  433 ; 
129  N.  E.  103. 

316      If  an  employee  submits  to  an  operation,  which  is 

227  successful,  the  liability  of  the  employer  would  be 
for  temporary  loss  of  time  and  for  treatments  had 
and  surgical  and  hospital  expenses  incurred  in  the 
operation.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  429,  433 ;  129  N.  E.  103. 

316  If  the  operation  is  one  that  any  reasonable  man 
would  take  advantage  of,  if  he  had  no  one  against 
whom  he  could  claim  compensation,  then  a  refusal 
to  submit  is  unreasonable.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  429,  432;  129  N.  E. 
103. 

316  Where  there  was  evidence  that  the  condition  re- 
sulting in  the  permanent  incapacity  was  due  to 
immobility  over  a  long  period  of  time  and  not  due  to 
the  fracture,  and  that  there  would  be  a  recovery  if 
adhesions  of  the  tendons  were  broken  up  by  opera- 
tion, and  the  operation  did  not  require  the  use  of 


270  SECTION    19— (d) 

surgical  instruments,  but  the  administering  of  some 
gas  which  would  make  the  operation  painless,  the 
refusal  to  submit  to  such  an  operation  was  held  to 
be  unreasonable  and  an  award  for  permanent  in- 
capacity was  reversed.  Mt.  Olive  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  HI.  429,  433;  129  N.  E.  103. 

316  Section  19,  (d),  vests  the  Commission  with  the 
right  to  suspend  compensation  of  an  employee  "if 
he  refuses  to  submit  to  such  surgical  treatment  as 
is  reasonably  essential  to  promate  his  recovery." 
Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
182,184;  129  N.  E.  176. 

316      The  statement  of  a  doctor  that  the  chances  are 

287  that  he  would  have  administered  serum  if  the  em- 
ployee had  submitted  his  case  to  him  is  not  sufficient 
to  warrant  a  finding  that  it  was  an  unreasonable 
refusal  to  take  treatment  of  a  physician.  Snyder 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175,  181,  182;  130 
N.  E.  517. 

316  Where  the  Commission  had  ordered  compensation 
suspended  on  account  of  the  refusal  of  the  employee 
to  submit  to  an  operation  for  hernia  upon  evidence 
that  the  employee  was  a  good  surgical  risk,  that  the 
hernia  could  be  corrected,  that  statistics  showed 
that  two-tenths  of  one  per  cent  were  fatal,  that  it 
was  a  superficial  operation  and  did  not  involve 
danger  to  life.  Held,  that  the  order  of  the  Commis- 
sion was  correct.  Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  295  111.  182 ;  129  N.  E.  176. 

316  Evidence  tnat  loss  of  sight  of  an  eye  is  due  to 
cataract  and  that  sight  could  be  restored  by  opera- 
tion does  not  warrant  awarding  compensation  for 
loss  of  sight  of  eye,  even  though  operation  cannot 
be  forced  on  employee.  (Joliet  Motor  Co.  v.  Indus- 


SECTION    19— (e)  271 

trial  Board,  280  111.  148,  approved.)  Rosenthal  & 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  182,  185;  129 
N.  E.  176. 

316  The  treatment  to  which  an  employee  must  subject 
himself  must  be  unattended  by  serious  suffering  or 
dangerous  consequence.  Snyder  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 297  111.  175,  182;  130  N.  E.  517. 

316  A  carpenter  employed  by  building  contractors  was 
307  doing  some  work  in  a  building  owned  by  a  third 
party  and  while  at  work  stepped  on  a  nail  which 
punctured  the  sole  of  his  foot.  Three  days  later  he 
went  to  a  doctor,  who  dressed  the  wound.  Eight 
days  later  lockjaw  developed  and  he  died.  It  was 
contended  that  the  death  was  due  to  the  unreason- 
able refusal  on  the  part  of  the  employee  to  take 
treatment.  Held,  that  there  was  evidence  in  the 
record  to  sustain  the  award  of  the  Commission  and 
that  there  was  no  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  em- 
ployee to  take  medical  treatment.  Snyder  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  297  111.  175;  130  N.  E.  517. 

817  (e)  If  a  petition  for  review  and  agreed  statement  of  facts  or 
stenographic  report  is  filed,  as  provided  herein,  the  Industrial 
Commission  shall  promptly  review  the  decision  of  the  arbitrator 
or  committee  of  arbitration  and  all  questions  of  law  or  fact 
which  appear  from  the  said  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic 
report,  and  snch  additional  evidence  as  the  parties  may  submit. 
After  such  hearing  upon  review,  the  commission  shall  file  in  its 
office  its  decision  thereon,  and  shall  immediately  send  to  each 
party  or  his  attorney  a  copy  of  snch  decision  and  a  notification 
of  the  time  when  it  was  filed. 

Snch  review  and  hearing  may  be  held  in  its  office  or  elsewhere 
as  the  commission  may  deem  advisable:  Provided,  that  the  tak- 
ing of  testimony  on  such  hearing  may  be  had  before  any  member 
of  the  commission  and  in  the  event  either  of  the  parties  may  de- 
sire an  argument  before  others  of  the  commission,  such  argu- 
ment may  be  had  upon  written  demand  therefor  filed  with  the 
commission  within  five  days  after  the  commencement  of  such 
taking  of  testimony,  in  which  event  such  argument  shall  be  had 
before  not  less  than  a  majority  of  the  commission:  Provided, 
that  the  commission  shall  give  ten  days'  notice  to  the  parties  or 


272  SECTION    19— (e) 

their  attorneys  of  the  time  and  place  of  such  taking  of  testimony 
and  of  such  argument. 

In  any  case  the  commission  in  its  decision  may  in  its  discre- 
tion find  specially  upon  any  question  or  questions  of  law  or 
fact  which  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  by  either  party,  whether 
ultimate  or  otherwise.  Any  party  may,  within  twenty  days  after 
receipt  of  notice  of  the  commission's  decision,  or  within  such 
further  time,  not  exceeding  thirty  days,  as  the  commission  may 
grant,  file  with  the  commission  either  an  agreed  statement  of  the 
facts  appearing  upon  the  hearing,  or,  if  such  party  shall  so  elect 
a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  additional  proceedings  pre- 
sented before  the  commission,  in  which  report  the  party  may 
embody  a  correct  statement  of  such  other  proceedings  in  the 
case  as  such  party  may  desire  to  have  reviewed,  such  statement 
of  facts  or  stenographic  report  to  be  authenticated  by  the  signa- 
tures of  the  parties  or  their  attorneys,  and  in  the  event  that  they 
do  not  agree,  then  the  authentication  of  such  stenographic  re- 
port shall  be  by  the  signature  of  any  member  of  the  commission. 
If  a  reporter  does  not  for  any  re'ason  furnish  a  transcript  of  the 
proceedings  before  the  arbitrator  in  any  case  for  use  on  a  hear- 
ing for  review  before  the  Industrial  Commission,  within  thirty 
(30)  days  of  the  filing  of  the  petition  for  review,  the  Industrial 
Commission  may,  in  its  discretion,  order  a  trial  de  novo  before 
the  Industrial  Commission  in  such  case,  upon  application  of 
either  party.  The  applications  for  adjustment  of  claim  and  other 
documents  in  the  nature  of  pleadings  filed  by  either  party,  to- 
gether with  the  decisions  of  the  arbitrator  and  of  the  Industrial 
Commission  and  the  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic  reports 
hereinbefore  provided  for  In  paragraphs  (b)  and  (c)  shall  be 
the  record  of  the  proceedings  of  said  commission,  and  shall  be 
subject  to  review  as  hereinafter  provided. 

Section  19,  paragraph  (e),  amended  1921  by  in- 
serting after  the  word  " Commission"  and  before 
the  words  "The  applications"  the  following  sen- 
tence, "If  a  reporter  does  not  for  any  reason  fur- 
nish a  transcript  of  the  proceedings  before  the 
arbitrator  in  any  case  for  use  on  a  hearing 
for  review  before  the  Industrial  Commission,  within 
thirty  (30)  days  of  the  filing  of  the  petition  for 
review,  the  Industrial  Commission  may,  in  its  dis- 
cretion, order  a  trial  de  novo  before  the  Industrial 
Commission  in  such  case,  on  application  of  either 
party.  ' ' 


SEC.  19— (e)  "THE  COMMISSION  SHALL  REVIEW"     273 

"The  Commission  shall  reYiew." 

318      The  Commission,  in  determining  the  reduction  of 
323  earning  capacity  of  an  employee,  can  consider  only 
competent  evidence  and  cannot  resort  to  conjecture 
or  surmise.     Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  229,  233;  129  N.  E.  722. 

318  Where  an  employee  was  allowed  to  testify  before 
300  arbitrator  without  objection  as  to  the  percentage  of 
his  loss  of  earning  capacity  and  on  the  hearing 
before  the  Commission  he  was  asked  whether  he  had 
not  testified  to  that  before  the  arbitrator,  which  was 
objected  to,  it  was  held  that  the  objection  was  prop- 
erly in  the  record  because  testimony  of  this  char- 
acter is  not  competent.  Old  Ben  Coal  Co.  v  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  229,  232;  129  N.  E.  772. 

318  Where  the  employee  disaffirms  the  agreement  to 
take  a  lesser  amount,  upon  a  hearing  before  the 
Commission,  it  is  the  right  of  the  Commission  to 
decline  to  recognize  the  settlement  and  to  proceed  to 
a  hearing  upon  review.    International  Coal  &  Min- 
ing Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  530; 
127  N.  E.  703. 

".May  find  specially  upon  any  question  of  fact." 

319  Complaint  that  there  was  no  finding  that  the  work- 
man was  in  the  employ  of  the  employer,  that  they 
were  working  under  the  provisions  of  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act,  or  that  he  was  injured,  or 
that  he  died  as  the  result  of  an  injury  arising  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment.    Held,  that 
it  is  not  necessary  for  the  Commission  to  make  a 
specific  finding  of  all  the  facts  where  there  is  evi- 
dence in  the  record  showing  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties  and  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  the  award. 


274  SEC.  19— (e)  "MAY  FIND  UPON  QUESTION  OF  FACT" 

Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175,  177; 
130  N.  E.  517. 

319  Finding  of  Commission,  where  claimant  testified 
that  his  earning  capacity  is  reduced  50  per  cent, 
but  it  is   shown  that  he  earns   $18.00  as   against 
$26.53,  that  his  earning  capacity  was  reduced  to 
$14.25,  is  not  justified  by  the  evidence.     Old  Ben 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  229,  233 ; 

129  N.  E.  772. 

320  Intimated  that  all  of  the  jurisdictional  facts  and 
all  of  the  ultimate  facts  necessary  to   entitle  the 
employee  to  compensation  ought  to  have  been  found 
by  the  Commission;  but  this  is  not  necessary  where 
all  of  the  facts  appear  in  the  stenographic  report  or 
record.     Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
175,  178;  130  N.  E.  517. 

320  Even  though  the  findings  of  the  Commission  on 
all  questions  were  not  made,  and  even  though  the 
findings  are  not  as  complete  as  they  should  be,  if 
the  award  is  sustained  by  the  evidence  in  the  record, 
it  will  stand.    Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
111.  175,  178;  130  N.  E.  517. 

321  In  the  findings  of  the  Commission,  where  the  word 
11  petitioner"  was  used  instead  of  the  word  "de- 
ceased, ' '  such  finding  is  faulty,  but  as  it  is  a  clerical 
error  only,  the  award  does  not  have  to  be  set  aside. 
Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175,  178; 

130  N.  E.  517. 

The  practice  of  the  Commission  of  incorporating 
a  written  opinion  in  its  findings  was  criticized  in 
Lorchitsky  v.  Gotham  Folding  Box  Co.,  230  N.  Y.  8, 
128  N.  E.  899;  Clark  v.  Vorhees,  131  N.  E.  553. 


SEC.  19— (e)    "SHALL  BE  RECORD  OF  PROCEEDINGS"  275 

"Shall  be  the  Record  of  Proceedings." 

320  Section  19  provides  for  the  determination  of  the 
dispute,  and  what  documents  filed  before  the  Com- 
mission constitute  the  record  of  the  proceedings. 
Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  353,  357;  124  N.  E.  552. 


321  An  award  by  the  Commission  resembles  a  judg- 
332  ment,  in  the  respect  that  a  review  of  the  award  does 

not  vacate  the  award  pending  the  decision  in  the 
court  of  review.  Big  Muddy\  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  515,  517 ;  124  N.  E. 
564. 

322  A  miner  received  an  eye  injury  on  October  29, 

1917.  Returned  to  work  December,  1917.    February 
2,   1918,   he   was  paid  compensation.     August   31, 

1918,  served  written  demand  for  compensation.    Oc- 
tober 28,  1918,  filed  application  for  adjustment  of 
claim.    Arbitrator  denied  award  December  3,  1918. 
Commission  affirmed  arbitrator.    This  decision  not 
reviewed  by  certiorari.    May  9, 1919,  petition  filed  to 
review  on  the  ground  that  disability  had  increased. 
Commission  made  finding  that  petition  was  under 
Section  8,  (d),  that  employee  returned  to  work  for 
same  employer,  and  set  aside  its  former  decision 
and  awarded  100  weeks  for  the  loss  of  eye.    Held, 
the  award  must  be  set  aside.    The  Commission  has 
no  power  to  review  its  former  decision  and  set  it 
aside  and  to  substitute  another  decision  in  its  stead. 
Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297 
111.  451 ;  130  N.  E.  727. 

323  An  award  under  the  Compensation  Act  cannot 
rest  upon  speculation,  conjecture  or  surmise.     St. 


276  SEC.  19— (e)  "THE  DECISION  OF  THE  COMMISSION" 

Louis  Smelting  &  Refining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  272,  277;  131  N.  E.  617. 

Where  the  Industrial  Commission  had  affirmed 
an  arbitrator  who  refused  to  make  an  award,  such 
decision  is  res  judicata  and  it  has  no  authority  on  a 
subsequent  hearing  to  review  and  set  aside  this 
previous  decision.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  451,  454;  130  N.  E.  727. 
322  The  writ  of  error,  when  sued  out,  does  not  vacate 
363  the  award  of  the  Commission,  and  it  is  not  a  trial 
de  novo,  but  merely  a  hearing  for  the  correction  of 
errors  found  to  exist  in  the  record.  Big  Muddy 
Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
515,  518;  124  N.  E.  564. 

322  The  date  of  the  award,  even  in  cases  under  re- 
view where  such  award  is  sustained,  is  the  date 
when  such  award  is  entered  by  the  Commission. 
Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  515,  519;  124  N.  E.  564. 

323  It  is  for  the  Commission  to  determine  as  an  ulti- 
277  mate  fact  the  per  cent  of  loss  and  to  hear  all  evi- 
dence which  would  aid  in  its  conclusion.     Decatur 
Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290, 
294;  129  N.  E.  738. 

323  Where  there  is  a  conflict  in  the  evidence  as  to 
dependency,  the  Commission  has  a  right  to  consider 
all  of  the  evidence  in  reaching  a  conclusion  as  to 
dependency.  Richardson  Sand  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  335,  339;  129  N.  E.  751. 

329  The  finding  of  the  Commission  cannot  be  based 
on  conjecture ;  it  must  have  some  substantial  founda- 
tion in  the  evidence.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  428 ;  127  N.  E. 
752. 


SEC.   19— (e)    "THE   DECISION   OF   THE   COMMISSION"  277 

329  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  hear  and 
weigh  the  evidence  and  to  make  its  finding  for  that 
party  in  whose  favor  the  evidence  preponderates. 
Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  425,  427;  127  N.  E.  752. 

329  The  Commission  is  not  justified  in  finding  for  one 
party  because  there  is  some  evidence  in  the  record 
which,  standing  undisputed,  would  justify  that  find- 
ing. Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  425,  427;  127  N.  E.  752. 

329  The  Commission  should  not  base  its  finding  on 
testimony,  which  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  in 
the  record,  show  to  be  untrue.  Hafer  Washed  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  427;  127 
N.  E.  752. 

329  A  miner  hung  his  lamp  on  a  staple  while  he  was 
drawing  some  gasoline,  the  fumes  caught  fire  and 
the  miner  was  burned.  The  miner  makes  statements 
that  he  was  badly  burned,  that  his  eyes  were  burned 
so  that  he  lost  fifty  per  cent  of  the  vision.  There 
was  testimony  of  other  witnesses  that  he  helped  put 
out  the  fire  and  that  he  had  no  scars;  that  he  went 
back  to  work  in  a  few  days,  and  that  he  made  no 
complaint  of  his  eyes.  Held,  that  the  Commission 
was  not  justified  in  finding  for  the  claimant  on  the 
evidence.  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  425;  127  N.  E.  752. 

322  A  carpenter  employed  by  a  coal  mine  agreed  to 
build  mine  cars  for  the  employer  at  $17.50  a  car. 
The  employer  furnished  the  materials  and  tools, 
and  directed  the  dimensions  and  sizes  of  the  cars. 
The  employee  was  subject  to  other  orders  of  the 
employer  while  doing  this  work  on  the  premises. 
Held,  that  the  decision  of  the  Commission  that  the 


278  SEC.   19— (e)    "THE    DECISION   OF   THE   COMMISSION" 

man  was  an  employee  is  conclusive,  if  there  is  any 
evidence  to  determine  this  fact.  Franklin  Coal  &  C. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  329;  129  N.  E. 
811. 

Where  the  evidence  in  the  record  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  a  certain  relationship  is  conflicting,  the 
Commission  is  justified  in  finding  that  a  person  is 
an  employee  and  not  an  independent  contractor. 
Cinofsky  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  521, 
525;  125  N.  E.  286. 

It  is  the  exclusive  duty  and  province  of  the  Com- 
mission to  weigh  the  evidence  and  their  decision  is 
binding  on  the  reviewing  court.  Cinofsky  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  521,  525 ;  125  N.  E.  286. 

Where  doctors  testify  that  the  employee  is  totally 
disabled  and  that  the  total  disability  would  continue 
six  months  longer,  and  that  thereafter  the  employee 
would  be  partially  disabled  to  the  extent  of  25  per 
cent  in  work,  which  would  require  him  to  stand  on 
his  lower  limbs,  the  Commission  cannot  substitute  its 
judgment  for  the  uncontroverted  expert  evidence 
and  a  finding  that  the  employee  is  entitled  to  $2.00 
a  week  for  175  weeks  may  be  set  aside  by  the  Circuit 
Court.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  449,  454;  124  N.  E.  566. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  consider  all  of 
the  evidence  in  a  hearing  and  to  render  its  decision 
in  accordance  with  the  preponderance  of  the  evi- 
dence. McGarry  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
577,  578;  125  N.  E.  318. 

The  Commission  should  not  grant  an  award 
merely  because  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  which 
tends  to  support  that  award,  nor  should  it  speculate 
upon  a  possible  state  of  facts,  which  does  not  reason- 


SEC.  19— (f)   "ACTING  WITHIN  ITS  POWERS"       279 

ably  appear  to  exist  from  the  evidence.  McGarry 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  577,  578 ;  125  N.  E. 
318. 

329  A  finding  of  the  Commission  cannot  be  based  on 
mere  conjecture,  but  must  have  some  substantial 
foundation  in  the  evidence,  and  the  Commission  is 
not  justified  in  finding  for  one  party  because  there 
is  some  evidence  which,  standing  undisputed,  would 
justify  the  award.  Decatur  Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  296  111.  290,  294;  129  N.  E.  738. 

329  Where  an  employee  has  a  heat-stroke  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  and  there  is  evidence  from  which 
the  Commission  may  find  that  it  arose  out  of  the 
employment,  the  court  must  sustain  the  award. 
City  of  Joliet  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  555, 
558;  126  N.  E.  618. 

329  That  the  proof,  on  behalf  of  the  employer,  was 
contradictory  to  that  of  the  employee,   as  to   the 
effect  of  the  injury  on  his  ability  to  work,  and  his 
earning  power,  affords  no  basis   to  authorize  the 
court   to    review   the    decree    of   the   lower    court. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  222, 
226 ;  124  N.  E.  811. 

321  (f)  The  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  acting  within 
its  powers,  according  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  ~(e)  of  this 
section  shall,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  be  conclusive  unless  re- 
riewed  as  in  this  paragraph  hereinafter  provided. 

"Acting  within  its  Powers." 

330  Public  officials  are  presumed  to   do  their  duty. 
Stubbs  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  525,  527; 
124  N.  E.  527. 

330      Even  though  the  Commission,  by  seeing  the  legs, 
240  discerned  a  strip  of  scar  on  the  leg  of  the  claimant, 


280  SECTION    19— (f)    1 

yet  they  could  not  determine  from  appearance  that 
there  was  a  degree  of  permanent  disability  for  which 
an  award  could  be  made.  Decatur  Const.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290,  294;  129  N.  E. 
738. 

832  (1)  The  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  where  any  of  the  parties 
defendant  may  be  found  shall  by  writ  of  certiorarl  to  the  Indus- 
trial Commission  have  power  to  review  all  questions  of  law  and 
fact  presented  by  such  record;  Provided,  that  no  additional  evi- 
dence shall  be  heard  in  the  Circuit  Court,  and  the  findings  of 
fact  made  by  the  Commission  shall  not  be  set  aside  unless  con- 
trary to  the  manifest  weight  of  the  evidence,  except  such  as  arise 
in  a  proceeding  in  which  under  paragraph  (b)  of  this  section 
a  decision  of  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  has  be- 
come the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission.  Such  writ 
shall  be  issued  by  the  clerk  of  such  court  upon  praeclpe.  Service 
upon  any  member  of  the  Industrial  Commission  or  the  secretary 
thereof  shall  be  service  on  the  Commission,  and  service  upon 
other  parties  interested  shall  be  by  scire  facias,  or  service  may 
be  made  upon  said  Commission  and  other  parties  in  interest  by 
mailing  notice  of  the  commencement  of  the  proceedings  and  the 
return  day  of  the  writ  to  the  office  of  said  Commission  and  the 
last  known  place  of  residence  of  the  other  parties  in  interest  at 
least  ten  days  before  the  return  day  of  said  writ.  Such  suit  by 
writ  of  certiprari  shall  be  commenced  within  twenty  days  of 
the  receipt  of  notice  of  the  decision  of  the  Commission. 

The  Industrial  Commission  shall  not  be  required  to  certify 
the  record  of  their  proceedings  to  the  Circuit  Court,  unless  the 
party  commencing  the  proceedings  for  review  in  the  Circuit 
Court,  as  above  provided,  shall  pay  to  the  Commission  the  sum 
of  five  cents  per  one  hundred  words  of  testimony  taken  before 
said  Commission  and  three  cents  per  one  hundred  words  of  all 
other  matters  contained  in  such  record. 

Section  19  (f),  (1),  was  amended  by  inserting  the 
words  "and  fact"  after  the  word  "law"  and  by 
adding  after  the  word  "record"  the  following:— 
"Provided,  that  no  additional  evidence  shall  be 
heard  in  the  Circuit  Court,  and  the  findings  of  fact 
made  by  the  Commission  shall  not  be  set  aside  unless 
contrary  to  the  manifest  weight  of  the  evidence." 
The  idea  that  the  findings  of  fact  shall  not  be  set 
aside  unless  contrary  to  the  manifest  weight  of  the 


SEC.  19—  (f)  1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS  281 

evidence  was  taken  from  Section  68,  Chapter  Ilia, 
Illinois  Revised  Statutes,  in  force  July  1,  1913, 
known  as  the  Public  Utilities  Act. 

Memorandum  of  Authorities  on  the  Question  of 
Review  of  Facts  by  the  Circuit  Court. 

Section  19  (f)  (1),  as  amended,  gives  the  Circuit 
Court  the  right  to  review  questions  of  law  and  fact 
presented  by  the  record,  provided  that  no  additional 
evidence  shall  be  heard  in  the  Circuit  Court  and  the 
findings  of  fact  made  by  the  Commission  shall  not 
be  set  aside,  unless  contrary  to  the  manifest  weight 
of  the  evidence. 

What  is  the  meaning  of  the  expression,  "weight 
of  the  evidence"?  It  is  undoubtedly  the  same  as 
the  expression  "preponderance  of  evidence."  This 
means  evidence  which  is  of  greater  weight  or 
more  convincing  than  evidence  offered  in  opposition 
to  a  certain  fact.  Ewen  v.  Wilbor,  208  111.  492 ;  Mor- 
timer v.  McMullen,  202  111.  413 ;  North  Chicago  Street 
Railway  Co.  v.  Fitzgibbons,  180  111.  466;  Grimm  v. 
Clark  Delivery  Car  Co.,  199  111.  A.  553. 

Preponderance  of  the  evidence  does  not  require 
proof  which  satisfies  the  triers  of  fact  without  quali- 
fication, because  such  a  rule  would  require  proof 
beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Sonnemann  v.  Mertz,  221 
111.  362 ;  Stratton  v.  Central  City  R.  R.  Co.,  95  111. 
25 ;  Ruff  v.  Jarrett,  94  111.  475 ;  Protection  Life  In- 
surance Co.  v.  Dill,  91  111.  174;  Graves  v.  Colwell,  90 
111.  612 ;  Herrick  v.  Gary,  83  111.  85. 

Under  the  rules  above  stated  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  triers  of  fact  be  entirely  or  thoroughly 
satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 


282  SEC.  19— (f)  1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS 

The  rule  as  to  preponderance  of  evidence  is  vio- 
lated where  the  court  refers  to  a  great  weight  of 
testimony  or  evidence  as  constituting  a  clear  or  full 
preponderance.  Carter  v.  Gunnels,  67  111.  270 ;  Lun- 
don  v.  Chicago,  83  111.  A.  208 ;  Nelson  v.  Fehd,  203 
111.  120;  Lenning  v.  Lenning,  176  111.  180;  Taylor  v. 
Felsing,  164  111.  331;  Mitchell  v.  Hindman,  150  111. 
538 ;  Bitter  v.  Saathoff,  98  111.  266 ;  McDeed  v.  Mc- 
Deed,  67  111.  545;  Crabtree  v.  Reid,  50  111.  206. 

The  rule  as  to  the  preponderance  of  evidence  re- 
ferred to  the  determination  of  probabilities,  requir- 
ing the  probabilities  to  be  such  that  the  conclusion 
of  the  court  or  jury  may  accept  such  probabilities 
in  the  light  of  the  evidence  of  that  case.  Peak  v.  Peo- 
ple, 76  111.  289;  Warner  v.  Crandell,  65  111.  195;  To- 
ledo, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Foster,  43  111.  480. 

There  is  no  requirement  as  to  the  number  of 
witnesses  determining  or  establishing  the  weight  of 
testimony.  A  single  creditable  witness  may  estab- 
lish the  weight  of  evidence  as  against  several  con- 
tradictory witnesses.  Chenoweth  v.  Burr,  242  111. 
312;  Bishop  v.  Busse,  69  111.  403;  Meyer  v.  Mead,  83 
111.  19 ;  Phenix  v.  Castner,  108  111.  207 ;  Chicago  R.  Co. 
v.  Fischer,  141  111.  614 ;  Chytraus  v.  Chicago,  160  111. 
18;  North  Chicago  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  176 
111.  635 ;  Gage  v.  Eddy\,  179  111.  492 ;  North  Chicago 
R.  Co.  v.  Fitzgibbons,  180  111.  466 ;  Chicago  v.  Marsh, 
238  111.  254. 

The  testimony  of  a  single  witness,  even  though 
opposed  by  several  witnesses  whose  evidence  is  con- 
trary, will  support  the  finding.  Phenix  v.  Castner, 
108  111.  207 ;  Keokuk  North  Line  Pack.  Co.  v.  True, 
88  111.  608;  Maggert  v.  Peoria  R.  Co.,  179  111.  A. 
229. 


SEC.  19— (f)  1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS  283 

In  several  cases  the  court  has  leaned  toward  the 
testimony  given  by  the  fewer  number  of  witnesses. 
West  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Dean,  112  111.  A.  10;  Clark 
v.  Gotts,  1  111.  A.  454;  LaSalle  v.  Evans,  111  111.  A. 
69;  Knowles  v.  Knowles,  86  111.  I;  Bishop  v.  Bitsse, 
69  111.  403;  Maggert  v.  Peoria  R.  Co.,  179  111.  A. 
229. 

In  compensation  cases  a  great  deal  of  the  proof 
is  of  a  negative  character.  Where  negative  testi- 
mony stands  alone  it  is  of  some  weight,  but  where 
there  is  some  positive  evidence,  negative  testimony 
is  not  entitled  to  much  weight.  The  weight  of  the 
evidence  depends  on  the  question  of  the  ability  of 
one  side  to  produce  the  evidence  and  the  power  of 
the  other  side  to  contradict  it.  Mere  opinions  are 
outweighed  by  positive  evidence.  Direct  testimony 
overcomes  a  theoretical  possibility  and  in  deciding 
a  question  all  the  evidence  presented  must  be  con- 
sidered. Harper  v.  Owen  Fay  Livery\  Co.,  177  111. 
A.  138;  Brown  v.  Chicago  City  R.  Co.,  155  111.  A. 
434;  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Hirsch,  132  111.  A.  656. 

Evidence  that  a  certain  fact  occurred  is  entitled 
to  more  weight  than  evidence  that  the  fact  did  not 
occur.  Frizell  v.  Cole,  42  111.  362 ;  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stumps,  55  111.  367;  Chicago  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dickenson,  88  111.  431. 

It  is  well  settled  that  positive  testimony  of  one 
witness  is  entitled  to  greater  weight  than  negative 
testimony  of  a  large  number  of  witnesses.  Horn  v. 
Baltimore  Ry.  Co.,  54  Fed.  301 ;  Meeker  v.  Boylan, 
28  N.  J.  L.  274;  Fronts  v.  Lenhart,  56  Pa.  365; 
Draper  v.  Baker,  61  Wis.  450 ;  Ralph  v.  Chicago  R. 
Co.,  32  Wis.  177. 


284  SECTION  19— (f)  1  REVIEW  OP  FACTS 

It  has  been  repeatedly  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
that  the  applicant  in  a  compensation  case  has  the 
burden  of  proving  his  case.  See  pages  253-255. 
The  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  can  not 
rest  upon  surmise,  guess,  speculation  or  conjecture. 
In  other  words,  this  court  required  legal  evidence 
to  support  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, long  before  the  amendment  giving  the  court 
the  right  to  review  questions  of  fact  became  the  law. 

So,  too,  this  court  has  held  that  a  mere  scintilla 
of  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  sustain  an  award. 
Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  425  (semble,  Fisick  v.  Lorber,  95  Misc.  574; 
159  N.  Y.  S.  722.) 

And  this  Court,  even  under  the  old  rule,  set  aside 
a  decision  of  the  Commission  after  reviewing  and 
inquiring  into  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.  Hafer 
Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
425. 

The  court  therefore  thought  that  it  had  the  right 
to  set  aside  a  decision  where  it  was  against  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  and  probably  that  power 
rested  in  the  court  under  its  right  to  review  ques- 
tions of  law.  The  amendment  here  may  or  may  not 
be  considered  a  limitation  on  the  right  of  the  court. 
For  it  is  quite  clear  if  the  court  had  the  right  and 
power  to  set  aside  a  decision  which  was  against  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  as  it  did,  the  same  court  now 
has  the  power  only  to  set  aside  the  decision  where 
it  is  against  the  manifest  weight  of  the  evidence, 
which  is  undoubtedly  one  step  further  removed 
from  the  right  that  the  court  exercised  in  the  case 
of  Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  425. 


SECTION  19— (f)   1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS  285 

The  question  of  the  weight  of  the  evidence  must, 
of  course,  have  been  intended  by  the  legislature  to 
have  been  left  as  a  question  for  determination  with 
the  triers  of  the  fact ; — the  arbitrator  or  the  commis- 
sioner hearing  the  case.  The  court  can  not  be 
deemed  to  have  been  given  the  right  to  review  the 
evidence,  because  the  amendment  specifically  limits 
the  right  of  the  review  on  the  fact  question  to  those 
cases  where  the  findings  of  the  Commission  are 
contrary  to  the  manifest  weight  of  the  evidence. 
There  is  no  other  way  to  explain  the  insertion  of 
the  word  "manifest,"  except  in  the  light  of  this 
reason. 

Thus  the  legislature  must  have  meant  when  they 
inserted  that  the  findings  of  the  Commission  shall 
not  be  set  aside  unless  contrary  to  the  manifest 
weight  of  the  evidence,  that  such  finding  should  not 
be  disturbed  unless  it  is  absurd,  ridiculous  or  im- 
possible in  the  light  of  the  evidence  in  the  record. 

This  view  seems  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  spirit 
of  the  act.  The  reason  for  the  Compensaton  Act 
was  to  expedite  the  payment  of  claims  to  working- 
men  and  their  families.  It  has  been  held  that  the 
act  must  be  construed  in  the  light  of  the  beneficent 
purposes  of  the  act.  It  would  be  in  keeping  with  the 
spirit  of  the  act,  if  the  courts  took  the  view  that 
the  triers  of  fact,  having  seen  the  witnesses  and 
being  best  able  to  determine  their  truth  and  veracity 
and  the  weight  of  their  testimony,  this  matter  should 
be  left  to  them  in  determining  where  the  weight  of 
the  evidence  lay  and  that  the  decision  or  award  can 
not  be  disturbed  unless  it  is  so  obviously  and  palpa-- 
bly  wrong  as  to  result  in  a  miscarriage  of  justice. 


286  SECTION  19— (f)  1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS 

Does  the  amendment  in  question  limit  the  review 
of  the  facts  to  the  Circuit  Court  only  ?  Or  does  this 
amendment  carry  with  it  a  review  of  the  facts,  so 
that  the  Supreme  Court  must  go  into  the  question 
of  the  weight  of  the  evidence  I 

The  Supreme  Court  has  said  in  a  long  line  of  de- 
cisions before  the  enactment  of  this  amendment  that 
its  jurisdiction  was  limited  to  a  review  of  questions 
of  law  only  and  that  it  had  no  power  to  review  the 
evidence  under  the  Statute  as  it  was  then  written. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  law  itself  that  limits  the 
Supreme  Court's  right  of  review  of  the  law.  The 
Act  says:  " Judgments  and  orders  of  the  Circuit 
Court  under  this  Act  shall  be  reviewed  only  by  the 
Supreme  Court  upon  a  writ  of  error  *."  An 

investigation  of  the  authorities  fails  to  disclose  any 
discussion  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  to  its  pow- 
ers under  this  wording  of  the  act,  but  it  has  always 
held  consistently  that  it  was  limited  in  its  right  of 
review  to  questions  of  law  only.  Whether  it  reached 
this  conclusion  because  the  Act  said  that  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  had  only  power  to  review  questions  of  law 
or  whether  a  review  of  judgments  and  orders  of  the 
Circuit  Court  was  construed  to  mean  only  questions 
of  law  is  problematical.  There  is  no  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  which  discusses  that  problem 
from  that  point  of  view.  But  in  the  light  of  the 
decisions,  it  may  well  be  considered  as  settled  law 
that  the  Supreme  Court  can  under  the  language  of 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  review  only  the 
questions  of  law. 

If  this  be  true,  then  its  power  of  review  remains 
the  same  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  Workmen 's 
Compensation  Act  as  amended  that  affects  the  prac- 


SECTION  19— (f)  1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS  287 

tice  in  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Court  might  how- 
ever, say  that  inasmuch  as  the  Circuit  Court  was 
given  the  right  to  review  questions  of  fact,  that  ipso 
facto,  the  power  became  vested  in  the  Supreme  Court 
because  it  could  not  determine  that  the  judgment 
or  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  was  correct  unless  it 
went  over  the  facts  to  see  whether  the  Circuit  Court 
was  correct  in  either  affirming  the  decision  of  the 
Commission,  or  setting  it  aside,  as  the  case  might 
be.  If  this  latter  view  be  adopted  by  the  Court,  then 
there  is  no  doubt  that  it  would  be  compelled  to  re- 
view the  evidence  and  determine  whether  the  Circuit 
Court  reached  the  right  result. 

The  history  of  the  adoption  of  the  amendment  giv- 
ing the  Circuit  Court  the  right  to  review  questions 
of  law  and  fact  is  rather  interesting.  It  had 
been  supposed  by  the  members  of  the  bar  that  the 
Compensation  Act  was  no  longer  subject  to  consti- 
tutional objections  as  the  Court  had  passed  upon 
these  questions  in  the  case  of  Deibeikis  v.  Link-Belt 
Co.,  261  111.  454,  and  again  in  G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167.  A  great  num- 
ber of  cases  had  been  taken  up  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  and  the  Compensation  Acts  had 
uniformly  been  upheld.  But  in  the  spring  of  1921, 
the  United  States  Supreme -Court  had  handed  down 
a  decision  in  the  case  of  Ben  Avon  Borough  v.  Ohio 
River  Valley  Co.,  253  U.  S.  287,  in  which  case  that 
court  had  reversed  the  Supreme  Court  of  Penn- 
sylvania because  the  Utilities  Act  of  Penn- 
sylvania did  not  give  the  right  of  a  review  of 
the  facts  to  a  public  service  company  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  valuation  of  its  property  in  a  rate-fixing 
case.  This  case  was  immediately  seized  upon  as  be- 


288  SECTION  19— (f)   1  REVIEW  OF  FACTS 

ing  an  authority  on  the  proposition  that  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  was  unconstitutional  be- 
cause it  did  not  provide  for  a  court  review  of  the 
facts.  The  fact  that  the  Compensation  Acts  were 
an  exercise  of  the  Police  Power  of  the  State,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Ben  Avon  Borough  case,  supra, 
in  which  the  question  of  the  exercise  of  the  Police 
Power  was  in  no  way  involved,  was  not  considered. 
The  various  precedents  laid  down  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  relating  to  Workmen's 
Compensation  Acts  were  thrown  aside  as  having 
been  expressly  overruled,  whereas  there  was  not  the 
slightest  intimation  by  that  highest  tribunal  that  such 
was  the  case.  Then  came  the  case  of  Odin  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392,  in  which  it 
was  urged  that  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
violated  the  14th  Amendment  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution. The  Supreme  Court  said  that  the  ques- 
tion of  the  constitutionality  of  the  Compensation  Act 
had  not  been  raised  and  did  not  decide  the  question. 
This  was  taken  as  an  indication  that  the  Supreme 
Court  would  hold  the  Act  unconstitutional. 

There  followed  the  legislative  session.  Employers 
and  legislators  who  did  not  believe  in  the  principles 
of  Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  became  very  so- 
licitous for  the  welfare  of  the  Compensation  Act. 
They  contended  that  the  opinion  in  the  Ben  Avon 
Borough  case  settled  as  a  legal  proposition  the  rights 
of  the  courts  to  review  questions  of  fact.  They 
contended  that  they  were  the  friends  of  the  princi- 
ples declared  in  the  Compensation  Act  and  that  they 
desired  to  conserve  the  Act  in  toto.  But  in  order  to 
conserve  the  Act  and  make  it  valid,  one  thing  was 
necessary,  the  Circuit  Court  must  be  given  the  right 


SEC.  19— (f)    1— JURISDICTION  289 

to  review  questions  of  fact.  A  committee  of  em- 
ployers and  employees  who  had  prepared  amend- 
ments to  the  Compensation  Act  had  examined  into 
the  merits  of  the  Ben  Avon  Borough  decision  as  af- 
fecting the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  had 
concluded  that  that  decision  had  no  bearing  and  had 
drafted  and  introduced  amendments,  which  in  no 
way  changed  the  method  of  review.  But  when  the 
agreed  amendments  were  introduced  in  the  Senate 
as  Senate  Bill  222,  they  were  met  with  opposition. 
One  bill  had  already  been  introduced  giving  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  the  right  to  review  questions  of  fact  and 
another  bill  had  been  introduced  by  the  representa- 
tives of  a  large  industry,  which  tore  the  very  vitals 
out  of  the  Compensation  Act  and  would  have  put 
labor  in  a  worse  position  than  it  was  in,  prior  to  the 
enactment  of  the  Compensation  Act. 

There  followed  a  long  protracted  fight  which  ended 
in  the  acceptance  by  the  Senate  Committee  of  the 
amendment  giving  the  Circuit  Court  the  right  to  re- 
view questions  of  fact  and  the  amendment  was  put 
in  the  Act  and  became  a  law. 

Jurisdiction. 

The  question  has  often  been  raised  whether  the 
Superior  Court  of  Cook  County  has  jurisdiction  to 
award  the  writ  of  certiorari  in  compensation  cases. 
Judge  Hopkins  of  the  Superior  Court  denied  this 
right  to  an  employer  in  the  case  of  Dietzen  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission.  This  case  is  pending  in  the 
Supreme  Court  and  should  be  decided  at  the  Octo- 
ber Term.  The  docket  number  is  No.  14017. 
332  Circuit  Courts  are  courts  of  general  jurisdiction 
and  may  have  conferred  upon  it  by  statute,  a  special 


290  SEC.  19—  (f)    1— JURISDICTION 

statutory  jurisdiction  not  arising  out  of  the  common 
law,  but  which  is  outside  of  the  general  jurisdic- 
tion of  such  court.  Central  Illinois  Public  Service 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  62;  127  N. 
E.  80. 

332  Where  specia.1  jurisdiction  is  conferred  upon  a 
court,  as  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act, 
its  proceedings  and  judgments  are  treated  as  those 
of  courts  of  special  jurisdiction.  Central  Illinois 
Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
62;  127  N.  E.  80. 

332  When  a  court  is  in  the  exercise  of  special  jurisdic- 
tion, that  jurisdiction  is  limited  to  the  language  of 
the  act  conferring  it.      That  court  has  no  powers 
from  any  other  source.    Central  Illinois  Public  Serv- 
ic  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  62;  127  N. 
E.  80. 

333  The  powers  of  the  court  under  the  writ  of  certio- 
rari provided  for  in  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  are  different  from  those  under  the  common  law 
writ  of  certiorari  and  are  limited  to  the  powers  and 
jurisdiction  conferred  by  the  Act.     Central  Illinois 
Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
62,  66;  127  N.  E.  80. 

333  Where,  in  a  special  statutory  proceeding,  one  form 
of  review  is  especially  given,  all  other  forms  of  re- 
view are  excluded.  (Smith-Lohr  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trila  Commission,  279  111.  88;  People  v.  McGoorty, 
270  111.  610.)  Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  62,  66;  127  N.  E.  80. 

"By  Writ  of  Certiorari." 

339  Where  an  affidavit  was  filed  alleging  the  loss  of 
the  original  writ  of  certiorari  and  sci.  fa.  and  an 


SEC.  19— (f)   1  "BY  WRIT  OF  CERTIORARI"          291 

order  was  entered  to  have  an  alias  writ  of  certiorari 
and  sci.  fa.  issue,  it  was  held  that  the  Circuit  Court 
had  authority  to  enter  an  order  directing  the  alias 
writ  to  issue  and  that  having  issued  the  alias  writ, 
it  had  jurisdiction  thereunder.  Oriental  Laundry 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  HI.  539,  543;  127 
N.  E.  676. 

341  Where  the  applicant  moves  to  quash  the  writ  of 
certiorari,  the  fact  that  there  was  a  finding  by  the 
Commission  that  notice  was  not  given  is  an  answer 
to  the  motion  to  quash,  for  it  shows  a  want  of  juris- 
diction in  the  Commission.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  532,  535;  131  N.  E.  637. 

332  The  commencement  of  a  suit  takes  place  when  the 
cqurt  acquires  jurisdiction  of  the  plaintiff  when  he 
applies  for  its  power  and  assistance  to  compel  the 
defendant  to  render  his  rights  under  the  law.  Ori- 
ental Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
539,543;  127  N.  E.  676. 

334  Courts  are  bound  to  presume  that  absurd  conse- 
quences leading  to  great  injustice  were  not  contem- 
plated by  the  legislature,  and  a  construction  should 
be  adopted  that  it  may  be  reasonable  to  presume  was 
contemplated.  Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 292  111.  284,  290,  291;  126  N.  E.  596. 

339  Under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  courts 
are  called  upon  to  assist  only  as  to  questions  of  law. 
Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  62,  66;  127  N.  E.  80. 

339  The  method  of  invoking  the  aid  of  the  Circuit 
Court  is  prescribed  by  statute,  as  are  the  questions 
that  can  be  raised  and  the  orders  the  court  may 
enter.  Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  111.  62,  66;  127  N.  E.  80. 


292  SEC.  19— (f)  1  "WHERE  ANY  OF  THE  PARTIES  FOUND" 

The  Circuit  Court  of  the  County  where  any  of  the  parties  de- 
fendant may  be  found." 

336  Jurisdiction  to  hear  a  writ  of  certiorari  thereby 
conferred  on  the  Circuit  Court ;  and  the  jurisdiction 
being  statutory,  it  is  conferred  only  on  those  circuit 
courts  selected  by  the  legislature.     Central  Illinois 
Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111. 
62,  67;  127  N.  E.  80. 

337  The  proceedings  under  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act,  where  the  writ  of  certiorari  was  issued 
are  not  the  same  as  in  other  similar  suits  but  are 
governed, wholly  by  the  statute  in  question.     Central 
Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 

293111.  62,  66;  127  N.E.  80. 

• 

"Upon  Praecipe." 

340  The  filing  of  the  praecipe  is  the  beginning  of  the 
suit,  thus  giving  the  Circuit  Court  jurisdiction  to 
review  the  proceedings  of  the  Industrial  Commis- 
sion. Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  539,  544;  127  N.  E.  676. 

333  When  the  plaintiff  files  with  the  clerk  of  court  the 
praecipe  for  the  process,  the  court  gets  jurisdiction 
of  the  plaintiff.  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  539,  543 ;  127  N.  E.  676. 

340  Although  there  is  no  provision  in  the  Act  for  the 
issuance  of  an  alias  writ,  nevertheless  it  may  be  is- 
sued if  the  praecipe  is  filed  and  the  suit  commenced 
within  twenty  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  board's  de- 
cision. Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  539,  542,  543;  127  N.  E.  676. 

340  An  objection  that  the  writ  of  certiorari  was  not 
sued  out  within  twenty  days  of  the  time  when  the 


SEC.  19— (f)   1— TRANSFER  OF  CAUSE  293 

decision  was  made  and  filed  is  not  well  taken  as  it 
should  be  sued  out  within  twenty  days  of  the  receipt 
of  notice  of  the  decision  of  the  Commission.  Decatur 
Const.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  290, 
292 ;  129  N.  E.  738. 

Transfer  of  Cause. 

341  The  legislature  has  power  to  give  the  limited  ju- 
risdiction to  a  court  to  transfer  a  cause,  in  which  it 
has  no  jurisdiction,  to  the  proper  court.  Central 
Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293111.  62,  69;  127  N.E.  80. 

341  Purpose  of  the  Venue  Act  gives  the  court  juris- 
diction to  transfer  cause  to  another  court  even 
though  it  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter. 
Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  62,  69;  127  N.  E.  80. 

341  Under  Section  16  of  the  Venue  Act,  the  clerk  of 
the  court  files  the  transcript  and  the  cause  proceeds 
as  if  it  had  originated  in  that  court.  Central  Illi- 
nois Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293111.62,  69;  127  N.  E.  80. 

341  A  person  residing  in  Champaign  County  was  ap- 
pointed administrator  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased 
workman  in  Coles  County.  A  certiorari  was  sued  out 
in  Coles  County  to  review  a  decision  of  the  Commis- 
sion and  notice  sent  to  Champaign  County.  The 
administrator  entered  a  limited  appearance  and  con- 
tested the  jurisdiction  of  the  Coles  County  Circuit 
Court.  The  certiorari  was  quashed  and  later  a  mo- 
tion was  made  to  vacate  the  order  quashing  the  writ 
and  to  transfer  the  cause  to  Champaign  County, 
which  was  allowed,  and  a  transcript  of  the  proceed- 
ings had  in  Coles  County  was  sent  to  Champaign 


294  SEC.   19—  (f)    1— SCOPE  OF  REVIEW 

County.  There  the  administrator  entered  a  limited 
appearance  and  moved  to  quash  the  writ  because  it 
was  not  sued  out  of  the  proper  court  within  twenty 
days  after  the  decision  of  the  Commission;  that 
neither  the  Coles  County  nor  the  Champaign  Coun- 
ty Circuit  Court  had  jurisdiction.  Held,  under  par- 
agraph 36  of  the  Venue  Act,  the  Circuit  Court  of 
Coles  County  had  jurisdiction  to  transfer  the  case  to 
Champaign  County  and  the  court  there  should  have 
proceeded  to  a  hearing  on  the  merits  of  the  case. 
Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  62 ;  127  N.  E.  80. 

341  Even  though  the  court  has  no  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties  or  the  subject  matter,  under  the  Venue  Act 
it  has  the  right  and  jurisdiction  to  transfer  the  cause 
to  the  proper  court  and  that  gives  the  court  to  which 
the  case  was  transferred  the  jurisdiction  to  hear  the 
cause  of  its  merits.  Central  Illinois  Public  Service 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  62,  68;  127  N. 
E.  80. 

341  That  there  must  be  jurisdiction  is  necessary,  but 
the  tendency  in  Workmen's  Compensation  cases  in 
following  out  the  spirit  of  the  Act,  has  been  to  per- 
mit the  hearing  and  adjudication  of  claims  with  as 
little  delay  and  formality  as  consistent  with  ordin- 
ary procedure.  Oriental  Laundry  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  539,  544;  127  N.  E.  676. 

Scope  of  Review. 

345  The  court  is  not  permitted  to  review  the  evidence 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  where  the  prepon- 
derance lies,  but  it  is  authorized  to  consider  the  evi- 
dence to  determine  whether  there  is  any  evidence  in 
the  record  to  sustain  the  finding  of  the  Commission. 


SEC.  19—  (f)  1— METHOD  OF  RAISING  QUESTION       295 

Hafer  Washed  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  425,  427;  127  N.  E.  752. 

348  Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  justifying 
the  decision  of  the  Commission  that  the  accident 
arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment, 
the  Supreme  Court  will  not  set  the  decision  aside. 
Challenge  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292   111. 
596,  597;  127  N.E.  83. 

Method  of  Raising  Question. 

349  If  the  question  as  to  whether  the  employer  is  un- 
der the  Act  is  raised  for  the  first  time  in  the  Su- 
preme Court,  it  can  not  be  passed  upon.     Questions 
to  be  considered  by  the  Supreme   Court  must  be 
raised  affirmatively  before  the  Commission  and  in 
the  Circuit  Court.     Bristol  &  Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  16,  25,  26;  126  N.  E.  599. 

353  Where  the  motion  of  the  employee  does  not  set 
out  the  reasons  for  quashing  the  writ  of  certiorari 
and  the  employer  does  not  set  out  his  reasons  for 
quashing  the  record,  either  party  has  the  right  to 
rely  upon  anything  shown  by  the  record  in  support 
of  his  position,  and  in  the  absence  of  some  showing 
no  waiver  of  any  right  or  failure  to  present  any 
answer  can  be  presumed.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  298  111.  532,  535;  131  N.  E.  637. 

349  The  record  of  the  Circuit  Court  must  disclose  that 
the  constitutional  question  was  presented  to  it  for 
determination.  Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 297  111.  392,  394;  130  N.  E.  704.* 

15      A  constitutional  question  cannot  be  presented  in 
349  the  Supreme  Court  for  review  unless  it  was  pre- 
sented to  the  lower  court  for  determination.    Odin 


296      SEC.  19—  (f)  1— METHOD  OF  RAISING  QUESTION 

Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392,  394 ; 
130  N.  E.  704. 

349  Where  there  is  no  ruling  on  a  motion  by  the  In- 
dustrial Commission  then  the  motion  as  made  is 
waived.  Lawrence  Ice  Cream  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  175,  180;  131.  N.  E.  369. 

349  Where  no  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  was  raised  in  the 
Circuit  Court,  it  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time 
in  the  Supreme  Court.  Davis  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 297  111.  29,  33;  130  N.  E.  333. 

341  Where  a  delivery  wagon  driver  was  killed  by  a 
third  person  and  it  appeared  that  his  employer  did 
not  engage  in  the  manufacture  or  assembling  of  ma- 
chinery, but  that  he  merely  dealt  in  machinery  and 
it  appeared  that  the  employee  was  not  exposed  to  a 
hazard,  the  employer  could  not  raise  this  question 
for  the  first  time  in  the  Supreme  Court.  Bristol  & 
Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16,  17,  25 ; 
126  N.  E.  599. 

349  Where  rules  of  procedure  of  Supreme  Court  are 
15  not  complied  with,  the  right  to  have  the  validity  of 
an  act  considered  is  waived.  Snyder  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  175, 18.3;  130  N.  E.  517. 

349      The  ruling  of  a  lower  court  must  be  challenged  by 

378  errors  properly  assigned  on  the  record.  Snyder  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  175,  183;  130  N.  E. 
517. 

353  Assignments  of  error  must  be  based  upon  the  rec- 
ord itself  and  not  merely  upon  the  argument  of  coun- 
sel or  upon  the  fact  that  the  question  might  have 
been  raised  in  the  pleadings  or  during  the  trial.  Odin 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392,  394 ; 
130  N.  E.  704. 


SEC.  19—  (f)    1— METHOD  OF  RAISING  QUESTION     297 

353  Where  the  motion  to  quash  the  record  fails  to 
show  a  reference  to  a  constitutional  question,  and  the 
record,  too,  fails  to  show  this  question,  the  Supreme 
Court  cannot  consider  this  question.  Odin  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392,  394;  130  N. 
E.  704. 

353  The  record  is  presumed  to  speak  the  truth  as  to 
the  finding  and  action  of  the  tribunal  whose  record 
it  is  and  a  reviewing  court  must  act  upon  the  record 
as  certified  to  it.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

350  There  can  be  no  vested  right  in  any  particular 
remedy,  method  or  procedure.  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409,  411 ;  127  N.  E. 
46. 

350  In  a  case  where  a  miner  was  injured  it  was  stip- 
ulated that  the  parties  were  under  the  Compensa- 
tion Act.      The  only  question  raised  was  the  con- 
stitutionality  of   the   Act.      It   was  urged  that  it 
violated  the  provisions  of  the  State  and  Federal  con- 
stitutions with  reference  to  due  process.     The  rec- 
ord in  the  Circuit  Court  failed  to  show  any  ruling 
on  these  questions.    Held,  assignments  of  error  must 
be  based  upon  the  record  itself  and  not  upon  the 
arguments  of  counsel  or  upon  the  fact  that  the  ques- 
tion was  raised  during  the  trial.     Odin  Coal  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392;  130  N.  E.  704. 

351  *NOTE. — The  point  raised  in  Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission. 297  111.  392,  as  disclosed  by  the  brief  was  that  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  violates  the  Federal  Constitution  be- 
cause it  does  not  give  the  Circuit  and  Supreme  Courts  the  right 
to  review  the  facts.     In    Ohio   Valley   Water   Co.   v.   Ben   Avon 
Borough,  et  al.,   253   U.  S.  287,  a  public  service  Commission  had 
made  a  valuation  of  some  property  and  ordered  a  new  rate.    The 
Superior  Court  reversed  the  Commission  and  the  Supreme  Court 
in  260  Penn.  St.  289,  reversed  the  Superior  Court,  holding  that 
the  finding  of  the  Commission  on  the  evidence  was  final.     The 


298      SEC.  19—  (f)   1— "CIRCUIT  COURT  HAS  POWER" 

350  Where  the  record  does  not  show  that  the  Commis- 
353  sion  refused  to  have  the  employee   examined  by 

their  own  physician,  there  is  no  ruling  on  the  mat- 
ter and  the  question  is  therefore  not  before  the  re- 
viewing court.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  109,  115;  130  N.  E.  470. 

353  Where  there  is  any  controversy  in  the  evidence 
whether  a  certain  word  ought  to  be  in  the  finding, 
the  record  cannot  be  disregarded.  Ridge  Coal  Com- 
pany v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  532,  534; 
131  N.  E.  637. 

"Circuit  Court  has  Power  to  Review  Questions  of  Law." 

352  There  is  a  distinction  between  setting  aside  a  de- 
cision of  the  Commission  which  finds  that  a  certain 
state  of  facts  proves  that  the  death  resulted  from 

United  States  Supreme  Court  reversed  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Pennsylvania  on  the  ground  that  the  14th  Amendment  required 
the  state  to  provide  a  review  by  a  judicial  tribunal.  They  held 
that  a  person  was  entitled  to  a  judicial  review  as  to  the  confisca- 
tion of  their  property.  The  theory  which  underlies  the  reasoning 
in  this  case  is  that  the  action  of  the  Commission  in  fixing  the 
rates  was  "legislative"  and  conflscatory  in  character.  297  111. 
392,  130  N.  E.  704. 

351  NOTE. — The  Fourteenth  Amendment  cannot  interfere  with  the 
police  power  of  the    State.     Babier   v.    Connolly,    113  U.  S.  27; 
Stertz  v.   Industrial  Commission.  91    Wash.    588;     Hawkons    v. 
Blakely.  243  U.  S.  210;  Plymouth  Coal  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania,  232 
U.  S.  531;  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  663;  Butchers'  Union  Co. 
v.  Crescent  City  Co..  Ill  U.  S.  746;  Barbier  v.  Connolly.  113  U.  S. 
27;  Yick  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356;  Powell  v.  Pennsylvania, 
127  U.  S.  678.    Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission. 

351  NOTE. — The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  placed  all  Com- 
pensation Acts  under  the  Police  Power  of  the  State.  N.  Y.  C. 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  White,  243  U.  S.  188;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
McOuire,  219  U.  S.  549;  Second  Employers'  Liability  Cases,  223 
U.  S.I;  Mountain  Timber  Co.  v.  State  of  Washington,  243  U.  S. 
219. 

361  NOTE. — The  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  has  held  that  the  scin- 
tilla rule  does  not  apply  in  Compensation  cases  and  that  there 
must  be  substantial  competent  proof.  Hajer  Washed  Coal  Co.  \. 
Industrial  Commissoin,  293  111.  524. 


SECTION  19— (f)  1— "CIRCUIT  COURT  HAS  POWER"    299 

accidental  injuries,  than  to  confirm  the  decision  of 
the  Commission,  that  the  death  was  not  by  accident. 
Baggott  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  530,  535 ; 
125  N.  E.  254. 

353  Where  the  abstract  shows  that  there  was  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  there  was  no  notice  given,  it 
is  not  necessary  for  the  reviewing  court  to  look 
in  the  record,  where  there  is  a  finding  by  the  Commis- 
sion, as  this  would  merely  raise  a  question  of  fact 
with  which  the  court  is  not  concerned.  Ridge  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  532,  535;  131 
N.  E.  637. 

352  Where  it  appears  from  the  record  that  the  ques- 
tion of  amendment  is  pending  in  the  Circuit  Court 
on  a  writ  of  certiorari  which  was  filed  after  the 
original  case  was  brought  to  the  Supreme  Court, 
that  question  should  be  passed  upon  by  the  Circuit 
Court  on  the  certiorari  proceedings.  Rosenthal  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  323,  326;  125  N.  E. 
250. 

In  Its  decision  on  review  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  de- 
termine in  each  particular  case  the  amount  of  the  probable  cost 
of  the  record  to  be  filed  as  a  return  to  the  writ  of  certiorari  in 
that  case  and  no  praecipe  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  may  be  filed 
and  no  writ  of  certiorari  shall  issue  unless  the  party  seeking  to 
review  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  exhibit 
to  the  clerk  of  the  said  Circuit  Court  a  receipt  showing  payment 
of  the  sums  so  determined  to  the  secretary  of  the  Industrial 
Commission. 

This  paragraph  was  inserted  by  an  amendment  in 
1921.  The  amendment  was  passed  to  cure  an  evil 
which  existed  under  the  old  act.  The  attorney  rep- 
resenting the  employer  who  prayed  the  appeal  could 
sue  out  the  writ  of  certiorari.  This  would  prevent 
proceedings  under  section  19  (g).  By  refusing  to  pay 
for  the  record,  the  Commission  would  hold  up  the 


300  SEC.   19— (f)    2   "FILE   A   BOND" 

record,  which  would  result  in  delay  at  the  expense 
of  the  employee.  The  writ  can  not  issue  now  unless 
the  appealing  party  shows  that  they  have  paid  for 
the  costs  of  the  record  to  be  furnished  by  the  Com- 
mission. 

S&5  (2)  No  sncli  writ  of  certiorari  shall  issue  unless  the  one 
against  whom  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  have  rendered  an 
award  for  the  payment  of  money  shall  upon  the  filing  of  his 
praecipe  for  such  writ  file  with  the  clerk  of  said  court  a  bond 
conditioned  that  if  he  shall  not  successfully  prosecute  said  writ, 
he  will  pay  the  said  award  and  the  costs  of  the  proceedings  In 
said  court.  The  amount  of  the  bond  shall  be  fixed  by  any  mem- 
ber of  the  Industrial  Commission  and  the  surety  or  sureties  on 
said  bond  shall  be  approved  by  the  clerk  of  said  court. 

"File— a  Bond." 

355  The  employee  is  fully  protected  by  the  bond  re- 
quired of  the  employer  on  petition  for  review.  Juer- 
gens  Bros.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
420,  424;  125  N.  E.  337. 

856  The  court  may  confirm  or  set  aside  the  decision  of  the  Indus- 
trial Commission.  If  the  decision  is  set  aside  and  the  facts 
found  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Commission  are  sufficient, 
the  Court  may  enter  such  decision  as  is  justified  by  law,  or  may 
remand  the  cause  to  the  Industrial  Commission  for  further  pro- 
ceedings and  may  state  the  questions  requiring  further  hearing, 
and  give  such  other  instructions  as  may  be  proper. 

"Court  may  confirm  or  set  aside." 

356  Where  a  coal  miner  suffered  a  fracture  of  the  leg 
and  was  confined  to  bed,  the  Commission  allowed 
him  $7.79  for  78  weeks  and  $2.00  per  week  for  175 
weeks  as  provided  by  paragraph  (d),  of  Section  8, 
for  partial  disability.     On   review  by  the   Circuit 
Court,  the  award  was  set  aside  and  a  judgment  en- 
tered for  83  weeks  at  $7.79  a  week  and  333  weeks  at 
$2.00  per  week  for  permanent  partial  disability  for 
the  reason  that  the  disability  sustained  was  25  per 


.       SEC.  19— (f)   2  "COURT  MAY  CONFIRM  OR  SET  ASIDE"  301 

cent  permanent  disability.  On  review  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  the  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  was 
affirmed.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  449;  124  N.  E.  566. 

345  Where  all  the  evidence  without  dispute  showed 
an  injury  to  the  left  leg  but  the  Commission  found 
the  partial  permanent  loss  of  use  of  the  right  leg, 
the  reviewing  court  may  take  notice  of  and  correct 
the  error.  Ridge  Coal  Company  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

357      Where  opinion  evidence  cannot  be  considered  and 
280  the  finding  of  the  percentage  of  loss  of  use  of  the  legs 
is  not  sustained  by  competent  evidence,  the  award 
must  be  set  aside.    Decatur  Construction  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  296  111.  290,  294 ;  129  N.  E.  738. 

356  Where  the  proof  that  the  money  was  sent  to  the 
dependents,  is  not  definite  and  positive,  the  Circuit 
Court  can,  on  review  by  certiorari,  set  aside  the  deci- 
sion of  the  Commission  or  enter  such  decision  upon 
the  facts  as  is  justified  or  required  by  law.  Peabody 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  330,  334; 
124  N.  E.  603. 

356  Record  held  not  to  have  sufficient  facts  upon  which 
378  an  award  or  judgment  could  be  based  but  if  it  ap- 
pears that  it  may  be  possible  for  the  claimant  to 
establish  his  case,  then,  the  matter  should  be  re- 
manded for  further  proceedings.  Peabody  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  330,  333;  124  N.  E. 
603. 

356  When  the  trial  court  considers  the  findings  and 
award  of  the  Commission  to  be  correct,  its  only 
authority  is  to  confirm  the  decision.  McGarry  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E.  318. 


302  SEC.  19— (f)  2  "COURT  MAY  ENTER  SUCH  DECISION" 

The  court  may  enter  such  decision  as  is  justified  by  Law." 

356  Where  a  workman  left  him  surviving  a  father  and 
mother  aged  84  and  75  years,  respectively,  both  re- 
siding in  Italy,  and  it  was  shown  that  the  deceased 
twice  sent  money  to  them,  it  was  held  under  the  1915 
Act,  that  the  Circuit  Court  committed  error  in  quash- 
ing the  proceedings  of  the  Commission,  which  en- 
tered an  award,  that  the  Circuit  Court  should  have 
entered  such  decision  as  was  justified  by  law,  or 
should  have  remanded  the  case  to  the  Commission 
for  further  proceedings.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  330;  124  N.  E.  603. 

356  Under  paragraph  (f),  clause  (2),  Section  19,  the 
Circuit  Court  is  authorized  to  render  such  decision 
as  is  justified  by  law  where  evidence  is  undisputed 
and  this  carries  with  it  the  power  to  enter  a  judg- 
ment for  the  correct  amount  where  there  is  no  dis- 
pute as  to  the  facts.  Peabody  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  449,  453;  124  N.  E.  566. 

356  Where  it  is  clear,  that  the  Commission  misappre- 
hended the  law  applicable  to  the  facts  in  a  case,  the 
Circuit    Court  may  enter    a  judgment    as  to    the 
amount  of  compensation,  because,  in  entering  this 
judgment,  it  merely  passed  upon  a  question  of  law 
and  did  not  review  any  question  of  fact.    Peabody 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  449,  453, 
454;  124  N.  E.  566. 

357  A  clerical  error  in  the  record  of  the  Commission, 
if  discovered  should  be  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  Circuit  Court  and  corrected  there.     Centralia 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  325,  326 ; 
128  N.  E.  554. 


SEC.  19— (f)  2  JUDGMENT  AND  EXECUTION          303 

Judgment  and  Execution  in  Certiorari  Proceeding. 

357  The  Circuit  Court  errs  in  entering  a  money  judg- 
ment and  ordering  execution  thereon.  Bristol  & 
Gale  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  16,  26; 
126  N.  E.  599. 

357  The  Circuit  Court  erred  in  entering  a  money  judg- 
ment in  a  certiorari  proceeding ;  in  this  proceeding  it 
has  only  authority  to  confirm  the  findings  of  the  Com- 
mission or  to  set  them  aside.  Baggott  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  530,  535;  125  N.  E.  254. 

357  The  Circuit  Court  had  no  authority  to  enter  a 
money  judgment  and  to  issue  execution  and  the  case 
is,  therefore,  reversed  and  remanded  as  to  that  mat- 
ter with  directions.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  323,  326;  125  N.  E.  250. 

357  The  Circuit  Court  cannot  authorize  a  judgment 
and  issue  execution.  Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  402,  406;  125  N.  E.  351. 

357  The   Circuit  Court  erred  in  entering  judgment 
upon  the  award  and  in  ordering  execution  to  issue. 
It  has  only  authority  on  review  by  certiorari  to  con- 
firm the  findings  and  award  of  the  Commission  and 
order  the  petitioner  to  pay  the  costs.    Juergens  Bros. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  420,  424;  125 
N.  E.  337. 

358  The  Circuit  Court  errs  in  entering  a  decree  direct- 
ing the  payment  of  the  award  of  the  Commission  and 
ordering  execution  thereon.    McGarry  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E.  318. 

357  Where  it  was  stipulated  that  the  judgment  of  the 
trial  court  was  entered  by  inadvertance,  the  Supreme 
Court  modified  without  reversing  that  part  pertain- 


304  SEC.  19—  (f)  2  "REMAND" 

ing  to  issuance'of  execution.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  599,  603;  125  N.  E. 
378. 

357  The  Circuit  Court  held  to  have  erred  in  setting 
aside  the  decision  of  the  Commission  suspending 
compensation.     Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  182,  186;  129  N.  E.  176. 

"Remand." 

358  The  provision  of  the  Act  with  reference  to  re- 
manding the  cause  to  the  Commission,  should  be 
liberally  construed  to  the  end  that  the  intent  and 
purpose  of  the  act  may  be  reasonably  accomplished. 
Schweiss  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  99; 
126  N.  E.  566. 

358  Where  on  the  hearing  before  the  Circuit  Court 
affidavits  were  presented  in  support  of  a  motion  to 
remand  the  cause  to  the  Commission  for  further  evi- 
dence, on  the  ground  that  the  language  in  an  opinion 
of  the  Supreme  Court  had  been  modified,  denying 
the  motion  to  remand  was  held  to  be  error.  Schweiss 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  99,  100;  126  N. 
E.  566. 

359  Under  Section  19,  (f),  the  Circuit  Court  may  re- 
mand the  cause  to  the  Industrial  Commission  for 
further  hearing  and  a  refusal  to  remand  the  cause 
because  the  beneficiaries  are  not  in  court  or  repre- 
sented, is  error.     National  Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  598,  604;  127  N.  E.  135. 

358  Affidavits  in  support  of  motion  to  remand  cause 
to  Commission  need  not  show  diligence.  Schweiss  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  90,  99 ;  126  N.  E.  566. 


SEC.  19— (f)  2  REVIEW  BY  SUPREME  COURT  305 

358  An  apparent  clerical  error  is  not  ground  for  re- 
versal of  an  award.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  294  111.  325,  326;  128  N.  E.  554. 

358  Where  the  Circuit  Court  on  confirming  an  award 
ordered  execution  to  issue  and  it  was  urged  that  the 
court  had  authority  to  modify  its  judgment,  the  Su- 
preme Court  modified  the  judgment  by  striking  out 
that  part  of  the  order  relative  to  the  execution  with- 
out reversing  and  remanding  the  same.    G.  T.  W.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167,  178; 
125  N.  E.  748. 

359  Where  there  is  an  insufficiency  of  proof  as  to  the 
existence  of  alleged  beneficiaries,  the  application  to 
remand  the  cause  to  the  Commission  for  further 
proof  as  to  that  fact  should  have  been  granted.    Na- 
tional Zinc  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  598, 
604;  127  N.  E.  135. 

339  Judgments  and  orders  of  the  Circuit  Court  under  this  Act  shall 
be  reriewed  only  by  the  Supreme  Court  upon  a  writ  of  error 
which  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  discretion  may  order  to  issue, 
if  applied  for  not  later  than  the  second  day  of  the  first  term  of 
the  Supreme  Court  following  the  rendition  of  the  Circuit  Court 
judgment  or  order  sought  to  be  reviewed:  provided,  that  if  the 
first  day  of  said  term  is  less  than  thirty  days  from  the  rendition 
of  said  judgment  or  order,  then  application  for  said  writ  of  error 
may  be  made  not  later  than  the  second  day  of  the  second  term 
following  the  rendition  of  said  judgment  or  order. 

The  writ  of  error  when  issued  shall  operate  as  a  supersedeas. 

The  bond  filed  with  the  praecipe  for  the  writ  of  certiorari  as 
provided  in  this  paragraph  shall  operate  as  a  stay  of  the  judg- 
ment or  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  until  the  time  shall  hare 
passed  within  which  an  application  for  a  writ  of  error  can  be 
made,  and  until  the  Supreme  Court  has  acted  upon  the  applica- 
tion for  a  writ  of  error,  If  such  application  is  made. 

The  decision  of  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  committee 
of  arbitration  or  of  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  be  consid- 
ered the  decision  of  such  committee  or  commission,  respectively. 


306          SEC.  19— (f)   2  SUPREME  COURT  PRACTICE 

Supreme  Court  Practice. 

360  Where  a  cause  is  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court 
on  a  question  of  jurisdiction  and  it  appears  that  on 
the  merits  the  decision  of  the  lower  court  is  con- 
trolled by  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  which 
will  require  merely  an  order  confirming  the  decision 
of  the  Commission,  the  court  should  take  the  short 
cut  by  affirming  the  judgment  on  the  merits,  thus 
saving  the  delay  and  additional  costs  in  connection 
with  the  other  hearing.  (Dissenting  opinion)  Cen- 
tral Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  62,  70;  127  N.  E.  80. 

360  The  delay  in  sending  a  case  back  to  the  Circuit 
Court  to  correct  an  error  in  procedure,  where  the 
merits  of  the  cause  are  controlled  by  another  deci- 
sion, is  not  in  accordance  with  justice.  (Dissenting 
opinion)  Central  Illinois  Public  Service  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission.  293  111.  62,  70;  127  N.  E.  80. 

360  Where  final  judgment  might  be  delayed  by  re- 
manding the  cause  for  correction  of  a  clerical  error, 
the  Supreme  Court  will  modify  the  judgment  and 
make  the  correction.  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  294  111.  325,  326;  128  N.  E.  554. 

360  Section  19  which  was  amended  so  as  to  give  right 
to  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  by  writ  of  error 
held  to  affect  practice  and  procedure  only.  City  of 
Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409,  411; 
127  N.  E.  46. 

360  Although  an  appeal  under  the  Compensation  Act 
is  a  statutory  proceeding,  the  ordinary  rules  of 
practice  and  procedure  will  be  followed  upon  a  re- 
view of  the  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court.  Odin 
Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392,  394; 
130  N.  E.  704. 


SEC.  19— (f)   2  SUPREME  COURT  PRACTICE          307 

360  When  the  change  (by  amendment  to  the  law) 
merely  affects  the  remedy  or  the  law  of  procedure, 
all  rights  of  action  will  be  enforcible  under  the  new 
procedure  without  regard  to  whether  the  suit  had 
been  instituted  or  not.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  292  111.  409,  411;  127  N.  E.  46. 

360  The  Circuit  Court  affirmed  an  award  of  the  Com- 
mission on  June  10,  1919,  the  judge  certifying  that 
the  case  was  a  proper  one  to  be  reviewed  by  the  Su- 
preme Court,  the  Section  (19)  providing  for  this 
practice  was  amended  July  1,  1919,  so  that  the  Su- 
preme Court  could  in  its  discretion  order  a  writ  of 
error  to  issue.  The  writ  of  error  was  not  sued  out 
until  February  Term,  1920.  Held,  As  the  amend- 
ment affected  practice  and  procedure,  the  Court  was 
without  jurisdiction  to  issue  the  writ  at  the  February 
Term  and  the  writ  was  dismissed.  City  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409, 127  N.  E. 
46. 

360  The  amendment  to  Section  19,  giving  the  Supreme 
Court  the  right  to  issue  a  writ  of  error  merely 
affected  a  question  of  practice  and  procedure,  and 
the  right  of  action  is  enforcible  under  the  new  pro- 
cedure. City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
292111.  409,  411;  127  N.E.  46. 

360  Where  an  order  granting  a  certificate  of  review 
was  entered  June,  1919,  and  the  case  was  brought  to 
the  Supreme  Court  by  writ  of  error  to  the  June,  1920, 
term,  it  was  held  that  under  Section  4  of  the  law  on 
statutes,  the  Supreme  Court  had  jurisdiction  to  issue 
the  writ  even  though  the  amendment  of  1919  was  in 
effect  at  the  time  that  the  writ  was  issued.  (Revers- 
ing City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission  292 
111.  409.)  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 295  111.  141;  128  N.  E.  917. 


308  SEC.  19—  (f)   2  SUPREME  COURT  PRACTICE 

360  Section  4  of  law  on  statutes  construed  in  connec- 
tion with  the  amendment  of  1919  of  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act  permits  the  application  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  former  Act  as  to  the  right  of  review 
by  writ  of  error.  (Western  Electric  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  285  111.  279  approved).  Vulcan  De- 
tinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  141, 
144;  128  N.  E.  917. 

360  Where  final  judgment  was  entered  by  the  Circuit 
Court  May  16,  1919,  it  was  proper  to  bring  the  case 
to  the  Supreme  Court  on  a  certificate  of  review  and 
not  under  the  amendment  of  July  1, 1919.  Clark  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  561,  570 ;  126  N.  E. 
579. 

360  Where  a  point  is  presented  by  the  evidence  but 
abandoned  in  the  brief,  the  Supreme  Court  will  not 
consider  it  further.  Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  358,  360;  129  N.  E, 
135. 

360      When  defendants  in  error  on  petition  for  rehear- 
15  ing  raise  the  question  that  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
9  sation  Act  violates  the  due  process  clause  of  the 
fourteenth  amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution 
because  it  provides  for  judicial  review  only  as  to 
questions  of  law,  the  court  cannot  consider  the  ques- 
tion because  it  was  not  properly  presented  for  con- 
sideration in  the  lower  court.    Snyder  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  175,  183;  130  N.  E.  517. 

360      Intimated  that  under  Rule  43,  it  is  better  practice 

512  for  a  respondent  to  reply  to  a  petition  for  a  writ  of 

error  and  not  to  wait  until  the  writ  has  issued  to  file 

a  brief  and  abstract.    Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 

Commission,  296  111.  11, 16;  129  N.  E.  536. 


SEC.  19— (f)   2  SUPREME  COURT  PRACTICE          309 

360      Petitions  under  Rule  43  for  a  writ  of  error  receive 
512  the  consideration  of  the  entire  court.    Sesser  Coal 

Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  296  111.  11,  16;  129 

N.  E.  536. 

360  Costs  may  be  taxed  in  the  Supreme  Court  in  a 
compensation  case  among  both  of  the  parties  ac- 
cording to  shares.  Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  HI.  109,  116;  130  N.  E.  470. 

360  Compensation  computed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
and  judgment  entered  in  that  court  for  compensa- 
tion and  interest  due,   thus   reversing  the   Circuit 
Court  in  part  and  affirmining  in  part.   Voight  v.  In- 
dustrial   Commission,    297   111.    109,    115,  116;    130 
N.  E.  470. 

361  Where  the  award  of  the  Commission  was  quashed 
by  the  Circuit  Court,  and  the  employee  prayed  an  ap- 
peal to  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the  employer  filed 
no  brief  but  simply  a  printed  argument,  in  violation 
of  the  rule  that  printed  briefs  must  be  filed  in  that 
court,  the  Court  considered  the  case  on  the  brief  of 
the  employee  and  affirmed  the  order  of  the  Circuit 
Court  quashing  the  award  of  the  Commission.  Mep- 
ham  v.  Industrial  Commission,   289   111.  484,   488; 
124  N.  E.  540. 

361  Rule  15  of  the  Supreme  Court  requires  that  the 
brief  shall  contain  the  points  made  and  the  authori- 
ties relied  upon  in  support  of  them.  McGarry  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E. 
318. 

361  Rule  27  of  the  Supreme  Court  provides  that  if  a 
brief  is  not  filed  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of 
court  within  the  time  prescribed,  the  judgment  of 
the  court  below  will  be  affirmed.  McGarry  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E.  318. 


310  SEC.  19— (f)   2  SUPREME  COURT  POWERS 

512  Under  Rule  43  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  respon- 
dent may  reply  to  the  petition ;  if  the  petition  or  ab- 
stract is  incomplete  or  incorrect  the  respondent 
should  make  a  complete  statement  of  the  case  so  as 
to  prevent  awarding  the  writ  without  apparently 
good  cause.  Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 296  111.  11,  16;  129  N.  E.  536. 

361  The  filing  of  a  printed  argument  in  the  Supreme 
Court  does  not  comply  with  the  rule  of  court,  which 
requires  a  printed  brief  of  the  points  and  authorities 
relied  upon  for  the  reversal  of  the  trial  court.  M c- 
Garry  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  577,  579; 
125  N.  E.  318. 

361  Even  though  the  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  was 
right  on  the  merits,  the  Supreme  Court  could  affirm 
for  failure  to  comply  with  the  rules.    McGarry  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E. 
318. 

Court — Powers. 

360  The  court  is  not  authorized  to  write  a  provision 
into  the  act  in  order  to  sustain  an  award  even  though 
the  case  is  a  meritorious  one.  Chicago  Home  for  the 
Friendless  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  286, 
288;  130  N.  E.  756. 

362  Section  19  providing  that  judgments  and  orders 
of  the  Circuit  Court  shall  be  reviewed  only  by  the 
Supreme  Court  upon  writ  of  error  construed  so  as 
not  to  give  it  retrospective  operation.    City  of  Chi- 
cago v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111.  409,  411 ;  127 
N.  E.  46. 

362  Where  the  employment  is  but  casual,  the  Circuit 
Court  commits  error  in  entering  judgment  by  affirm- 


SEC.   19—  (f)    2   "SUPERSEDEAS"  311 

ing  the  award  of  the  Commission  in  a  case  where  the 
evidence  shows  that  the  employment  is  casual.  Dia- 
mond Livery  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
591,  595;  124  N.  E.  609. 

363  The  suing  out  of  a  writ  of  error  is  the  bringing  of 
a  new  suit  and  is  governed  by  the  rules  of  practice 
and  procedure  in  effect  when  the  writ  is  sued  out. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  292  111. 
409,  410;  127  N.  E.  46. 

"Supersedeas." 

363  Where  the  amendment  of  the  award  by  the  Com- 
mission and  the  petition  to  have  the  Court  amend 
its  judgment  was  filed  after  the  writ  of  error  was 
granted  and  made  a  supersedeas  in  the  case,  the 
Circuit  Court  is  without  jurisdiction  to  enter  any 
order  in  the  case.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  323,  325,  326;  125  N.  E.  250. 

363  A  supersedeas  operates  to  suspend  all  further 
action  of  the  trial  court  touching  the  matter,  as  does 
the  perfecting  of  an  appeal.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  323,  325;  125  N.  E.  250. 

"Writ  of  Error." 

363  Writ  of  error  brings  up  the  entire  record,  the 
same  as  an  appeal.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  323,  325 ;  125  N.  E.  250. 

363  Employee,  a  carpenter,  suffered  a  rupture  while 
carrying  a  heavy  board.  The  trial  court  found  that 
the  employer  and  employee  were  under  the  Act  and 
that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the 
employment.  Thereupon  a  writ  of  error  was  issued 
out  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Thereafter  a  petition 
was  filed  with  the  Commission  asking  for  a  modifica- 


312  SEC.  19—  (f)  2  "WRIT  OF  ERROR" 

tion  of  the  award  on  the  ground  that  the  employee 
refused  to  undergo  an  operation.  A  petition  was 
then  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  to  modify  the  judg- 
ment, and  this  Court  dismissed  the  petition  on  the 
ground  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction.  Held,  that  the 
writ  of  error  operated  as  a  supersedeas  and  the 
Circuit  Court  was  right  in  holding  that  it  had  no 
jurisdiction.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  323,  326;  125  N.  E.  250. 

363      Even  though  the  award  is  being  attacked  by  writ 
392  of  error  either  party  can  file  a  petition  under  Section 

19,  (h),  to  have  the  award  reviewed  for  the  reasons 

set  out  in  the  section.    Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co. 

v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  515,  518;  124  N.  E. 

564. 

363  The  right  to  file  an  application  for  review  of  an 
392  award  accrues  as  soon  as  the  award  is  made  and  is 
not  held  in  abeyance  by  appeal  or  writ  of  error.  The 
period  of  time  is  eighteen  months  and  extends  from 
the  time  of  the  agreement  or  the  award  and  is  not 
affected  by  any  appeal.  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289,  515,  519;  124  N.  E. 
564. 

366  The  question  of  what  the  amount  of  compensation 
should  be,  is  for  the  Commission  and  is  not  subject 
to  review  by  the  Supreme  Court,  when  the  award 
is  within  the  statutory  limit  as  to  amount,  except  for 
fraud.  Stubbs  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
525,  527;  124  N.E.  527. 

Scope  of  Review. 

366  The  question  whether  the  Circuit  Court  erred  in 
refusing  to  conform  its  judgment  to  the  amendment 
of  the  Commission  for  failure  on  the  part  of  an  em- 


SEC.  19—  (f)  2  SCOPE  OF  REVIEW  313 

ployee  to  submit  to  an  operation.  Held,  not  to  be 
before  the  court.  Rosenthal  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  323,  325;  125  N.  E.  250. 

366  Where  the  Supreme  Court  has  passed  on  the  ques- 
tion of  there  being  evidence  in  the  record  tending  to 
establish  disfigurement,  such  decision  is  conclusive 
and  operates  as  res  judicata.  Stubbs  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  525,  527;  124  N.  E.  527. 

366  The  weight  of  competent  evidence  does  not  pre- 
378  sent  a  question  of  law  for  the  consideration  of  the 

reviewing  court.  O'Callaghan  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  222,  226;  124  N.  E.  811. 

367  Even  though  the  Supreme  Court  might  think  that 
the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  showed  that  the 
condition  of  an  employee  was  due  to  an  organic  dis- 
ease, it  cannot  disturb  the  holding  of  the  Commis- 
sion on  that  ground.    McGarry  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 290  111.  577,  578;  125  N.  E.  318. 

367  Whether  or  not  the  Compensation  Act  or  any  sec- 
tion thereof,  which  it  is  claimed  brings  the  case 
within  its  terms,  is  constitutional  is  a  question  of 
law  presented  by  any  record  of  the  Industrial  Board. 
Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  392, 
394;  130  N.  E.  704. 

367  There  can  be  no  vested  right  in  any  matter  affect- 
ing practice  or  procedure.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  292  111.  409,  411;  127  N.  E.  46. 

367  In  the  absence  of  fraud,  if  there  is  competent  evi- 
dence to  support  the  award,  and  no  question  of  law, 
the  award  is  binding  on  the  Supreme  Court.  O'Cal- 
laghan v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  222,  226; 
124  N.  E.  811. 


314          SEC.  19— (f)   2  SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE 

367  It  is  not  the  province  of  the  courts  to  pass  upon 
the  merits  of  the  various  systems  now  in  use  and 
practice  in  the  treatment  and  cure  of  diseases. 
Voight  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  109,  113; 
130  N.  E.  470. 

Sufficiency  of  Evidence. 

369  Facts  held  to  justify  conclusion  of  the  Commission 
that  employee  was  knocked  out  of  the  open  window 
or  that  he  fell  from  the  fire  escape  while  trying  to 
get  the  air.    Sparks  Milling  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 293  111.  350,  354;  127  N.  E.  737. 

370  Evidence   that   an   employee  was   doing  certain 
kinds  of  work  considered  by  the  Supreme  Court  and 
held  that  it  did  not  show  a  condition  which  rendered 
the  employee  incapable  of  work.     Ballou  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  296  111.  434,  437,  438;  129  N.  E. 
755. 

370  Where  there  is  no  evidence  to  sustain  the  award, 
it  must  be  set  aside.    Edelweiss  Gardens  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  459,  463;  125  N.  E.  260. 

371  Where  the  evidence  indicated  that  the  employee 
took  reasonable  care  of  his  injury  under  the  circum- 
stances, the  Court  cannot  say  from  the  evidence  that 
the  Commission  was  warranted  in  concluding  that 
his  conduct  was  such  as  to  preclude  the  adminis- 
trator from  recovering  for  death.    Snyder  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  297  111.  175,  182;  130  N.  E.  517. 

371  An  employee  who  worked  as  a  welder  had  to  wear 
heavy  glasses  while  doing  his  work.  While  welding, 
one  of  the  glasses  broke  and  he  received  the  flash  of 
light  in  his  naked  eye.  He  returned  to  work  right 
away  but  gradually  his  sight  failed  him.  There  was 
some  evidence  that  he  had  a  pre-existing  disease. 


Sec.  19—  (f)   2  SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE          315 

Held,  that  there  was  evidence  in  the  record  that  jus- 
tified the  finding  that  the  blindness  was  the  result  of 
the  accident.  Rockford  City  Traction  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  295  111.  358;  129  N.  E.  135. 

375  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  the  courts  cannot 
weigh  the  evidence ;  that  in  the  absence  of  fraud  the 
courts  are  bound  by  the  decision  of  the  Industrial 
Commission  if  there  is  any  legal  evidence  to  support 
it.  Vulcan  Detinning  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  141, 148;  128  N.  E.  917. 

377  Where  there  is  evidence,  that  employees  used  a 
certain  fire  escape  as  a  means  of  descent  instead  of 
a  stairway  and  that  the  fire  escape  was  apparently 
safe  and  that  employees,  after  descending,  turned 
in  their  numbers  to  the  time-keeper  and  no  eye-wit- 
ness saw  the  accident  to  the  employee  who  was  killed, 
it  is  sufficient  to  establish  that  the  injury  arose  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment.  Stephens 
Engineering  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
88,  92;  124  N.E.  869. 

377  Evidence  that  an  employee  fell  from  a  ladder  and 
suffered  injuries  that  impaired  his  working  capacity 
after  the  accident  is  sufficient  to  sustain  an  award. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  222, 
226;  124  N.  E.  811. 

377  Where  the  Commission  makes  an  award  and  there 
is  competent  evidence  in  the  record  to  sustain  the 
award,  neither  the  Circuit  Court  nor  the  Supreme 
Court  are  warranted  in  reversing  a  finding  of  the 
Commission  where  there  are  no  errors  of  law  which 
call  for  a  reversal.  Snyder  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 297  111.  175, 183;  130  N.  E.  517. 

377  It  has  been  said  with  tiresome  regularity  by  the 
Supreme  Court  that  it  cannot  weigh  the  evidence, 


316          SEC.  19— (f)  2  SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE 

but  that  it  must  confirm  the  decision  of  the  Commis- 
sion if  there  is  any  competent  evidence  in  the  record 
which  justifies  its  finding.  McGarry  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  577,  579;  125  N.  E.  318. 

377  Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  that  the  in- 
jured employee  reported  the  injury  to  the  super- 
intendent within  thirty  days  "under  the  rule  many 
times  stated"  the  Court  is  not  allowed  to  weigh 
the  evidence.  Chicago-Sandoval  Coed  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  294  111.  351,  352;  128  N.  E.  567. 

377  A  trapper  in  a  mine  was  killed  while  driving  a 
mule.  It  was  proved  that  it  was  the  custom  for 
trappers  to  change  places  with  the  drivers.  The 
boss  driver  and  the  superintendent  testified  that  the 
trapper  was  driving  contrary  to  instructions.  Held, 
as  the  question  whether  the  mine  authorities  ac- 
quiesced in  letting  trappers  drive  was  disputed,  it 
was  a  question  of  fact  passed  on  by  the  Commission, 
which  cannot  be  disturbed  by  the  courts.  Sunny- 
side  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  523 ; 
126  N.  E.  196. 

377  Where  there  is  competent  evidence,  in  the  record, 
tending  to  support  the  findings  of  the  Commission, 
the  reviewing  court  is  not  authorized  to  disturb  the 
award.  Walsh  Teaming  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  536,  540;  125  N.  E.  331. 

377  Where  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  justify  an 
award,  the  Supreme  Court  is  not  allowed  to  set  aside 
the  award  because  it  would  have  reached  a  different 
conclusion  from  the  evidence.  Hafer  Washed  Coal 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  425,  428;  127 
N.  E.  752. 

377  Evidence  that  a  waiter  was  suddenly  assaulted  by 
a  busboy  who  threw  a  platter  at  his  head,  is  not 


SEC.  19—  (f)   2  THE  RECORD  317 

sufficient  to  prove  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment.  Edelweiss  Gardens 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  459,  463 ;  125  N.  E. 
260. 

377  Where  there  is  evidence  in  the  record  to  justify 
the  conclusion  that  an  employee  was  either  under 
interstate  or  in  intrastate  commerce  and  the  Commis- 
sion finds  that  he  is  under  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act,  the  Supreme  Court  will  not  substitute 
its  judgment  for  that  of  the  Commission  where  there 
is  evidence  to  justify  its  findings.    G.  T.  W.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  167, 172;  125  N.  E. 
748. 

378  Under  section  19,   (d),  whether  an  operation  is 
reasonably  essential  is  for  the  Commission  to  de- 
termine based  upon  the  evidence  submitted  to  it,  and 
unless  the  Commission  acts  unreasonably  or  abuses 
its  discretion,  the  Court  cannot  interfere  with  its 
finding.    Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  182,  184;  129  N.  E.  176. 

377  Held,  that  there  was  evidence  in  the  record  that 
justified  the  Commission  in  finding  that  the   em- 
ployee had  requested  medical  and  hospital  services. 
Cnicago-Sandoval  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
294  111.  351,  353;  128  N.  E.  567. 

378  Where  there  is  competent  legal  evidence  to  sup- 
port the  award,  although  there  is  contradictory  evi- 
dence, the  award  cannot  be  disturbed  on  that  ground. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  222, 
226;  124  N.  E.  811. 

The  Record. 

378      Where  the  record  itself  presents  any  question  of 
law,  the  parties  are  entitled  to  have  it  determined 


318  SEC.  19—  (f)  2  COSTS 

by  the  Circuit  Court.     Odin  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  297  111.  392,  394;  130  N.  E.  704. 

378  Cases  arising  under  the  provision  permitting  a 
suspension  of  the  ward  for  failure  to  submit  to  an 
operation  depend  on  the  special  facts  and  if  the 
facts  in  the  record  justify  the  finding  of  the  Com- 
mission, then  the  courts  are  bound  by  such  finding. 
Rosenthal  &  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
182,  186;  129  N.  E.  176. 

378  There  is  a  difference  between  proving  the  exist- 
ence of  a  record  and  using  the  record  to  prove  mat- 
ters of  fact  found  by  it.  Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  594,  596;  125  N.  E.  252. 

Costs. 

378  Costs  for  an  additional  abstract  filed  by  defend- 
ant in  error  on  submission  of  the  cause  for  decision 
may  be  taxed  to  the  plaintiff  in  error  on  affirming 
the  judgment.  Sesser  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 296  111.  11,  16;  129  N.  E.  536. 

881  (g)  Either  party  may  present  a  certified  copy  of  the  decision 
of  the  Industrial  Commission,  when  no  proceedings  for  review 
thereof  have  been  taken,  or  of  the  decision  of  such  arbitrator  or 
committee  of  arbitration  when  no  claim  for  review  is  made,  or  of 
the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  after  hearing  upon  re- 
view, providing  for  the  payment  of  compensation  according  to 
this  Act,  to  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  in  which  such  acci- 
dent occurred  or  either  of  the  parties  are  residents,  whereupon 
said  court  shall  render  a  judgment  in  accordance  therewith ;  and 
In  case  where  the  employer  does  not  institute  proceedings  for  re- 
view of  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Commission  and  refuses  to 
pay  compensation  according  to  the  award  upon  which  such  judg- 
ment Is  entered,  the  court  shall,  in  entering  judgment  thereon, 
tax  as  costs  against  him  the  reasonable  costs  and  attorney  fees 
in  the  arbitration  proceedings  and  in  the  court  entering  the  judg- 
ment, for  the  person  In  whose  favor  the  judgment  is  entered, 
which  judgment  and  costs,  taxed  as  herein  provided  shall,  until 
and  unless  set  aside,  have  the  same  effect  as  though  duly  ren- 
dered in  an  action  duly  tried  and  determined  by  said  court,  and 
shall,  with  like  effect,  be  entered  and  docketed.  The  Circuit 
Court  shall  have  power,  at  any  time,  upon  application,  to  make 


SECTION  19— (g)  JUDGMENT  319 

any  such  judgment  conform  to  any  modification  required  by  any 
subsequent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon  appeal,  or  as  the 
result  of  any  subsequent  proceedings  for  review,  as  provided  in 
this  Act. 

Judgment  shall  not  be  entered  until  fifteen  days'  notice  of 
the  time  and  place  of  the  application  for  the  entry  of  judgment 
shall  be  served  upon  the  employer  by  filing  such  notice  with  the 
Industrial  Commission,  which  commission  shall,  in  case  it  has 
on  file  the  address  of  the  employer  or  the  name  and  address  of  its 
agent,  upon  whom  notices  may  be  served,  immediately  send  a 
copy  of  the  notice  to  the  employer  or  such  designated  agent;  and 
no  judgment  shall  be  entered  in  the  event  the  employer  shall  file 
with  the  said  commission  its  bond  with  good  and  sufficient  surety 
in  double  the  amount  of  the  award,  conditioned  upon  the  payment 
of  said  award  in  the  event  the  said  employer  shall  fall  to  prose- 
cute with  effect  proceedings  for  review  of  the  decision  or  the 
said  decision,  upon  review,  shall  be  affirmed. 

Judgment. 

386  A  motion  to  vacate  a  judgment  under  Section  19, 
199  paragraph  (g),  is  addressed  to  the  sound  legal  dis- 
cretion of  the  Court,  and  unless  it  appears  that  such 
discretion  has  been  abused,  the  Supreme  Court  will 
not  interfere.  Liberty  Foundries  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  601,  604;  124  N.  E.  559. 

"Judgment  Modified." 

386  A  judgment  may  be  modified  because  there  is  no 
evidence  of  the  item  stricken  out  of  the  award. 
Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  HI. 
532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

386      Denial  by  the  Circuit  Court  to  vacate  a  judgment 

199  entered  under  paragraph  (g),  of  Section  19,  is  not 
an  abuse  of  its  judicial  discretion.  Liberty  Foun- 
dries Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  601,  604; 
124  N.  E.  559. 

386  Where  the  Circuit  Court  entered  a  judgment  on 
an  award  made  by  an  arbitrator,  which  became  the 
award  of  the  Commission  by  lapse  of  time,  and  it 


320  SEC.  19— (g)    INTEREST  ON  AWARD 

appeared  that  notice  of  the  award  had  been  received 
by  the  employer,  that  he  did  not  file  a  petition  for  re- 
view; that,  thereafter,  notice  was  given  under  para- 
graph (g),  of  Section  19,  that  judgment  would  be 
asked  for,  with  reasonable  attorney's  fees,  and  that, 
as  no  one  appeared,  judgment  was  accordingly  en- 
tered, and  on  the  next  day  it  was  moved  by  the  em- 
ployer that  the  judgment  be  vacated  for  the  reason 
that  the  employer  had  notified  the  employee  that  the 
money  was  in  the  hands  of  a  certain  person  ready 
to  be  delivered  to  the  employee,  but  the  employee, 
nevertheless,  asked  for  the  entry  of  the  judgment, 
and  it  was  contended  that  the  Court  erred  in  not 
vacating  the  judgment.  It  was  held,  that  no  good 
reason  was  shown,  why  the  Circuit  Court  erred  in  re- 
fusing to  vacate  the  judgment,  as  this  is  addressed 
to  the  sound  legal  discretion  of  the  Court.  Liberty 
Foundries  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  601 ; 
124  N.  E.  559. 

Interest  on  the  Award. 

388  Although  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  does 
not  permit  the  allowance  of  interest,  yet  under  the 
Interest  Act  the  award  bears  interest,  at  the  rate  of 
five  per  cent  on  the  amount  due  at  the  date  of  the 
award  and  from  that  date,  on  subsequent  install- 
ments after  they  have  respectively  become  due.  Big 
Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  515,  519;  124  N.  E.  564. 

590  (h)  An  agreement  or  award  under  this  Act  providing  for 
compensation  in  installments,  may  at  any  time  within  eighteen 
months  after  snch  agreement  or  award  be  reviewed  by  the  In- 
dnstrial  Commission  at  the  request  of  either  the  employer  or  the 
employee,  on  the  ground  that  the  disability  of  the  employee  has 
subsequently  recurred,  Increased,  diminished  or  ended;  and  on 
snch  review,  compensation  payments  may  be  re-established,  In* 


SECTION    19— (h)  321 

creased,  diminished  or  ended:  Prorided,  that  the  commission 
shall  gire  fifteen  days'  notice  to  the  parties  of  the  hearing  for 
review:  And  provided,  further,  any  employee,  npon  any  petition 
for  such  review  being  filed  by  the  employer,  shall  be  entitled  to 
one  day's  notice  for  each  one  hundred  miles  necessary  to  be 
traveled  by  him  in  attending  the  hearing  of  the  commission  upon 
said  petition  and  three  days  in  addition  thereto,  and  snch  em- 
ployee, shall,  at  the  discretion  of  the  commission,  also  be  entitled 
to  fire  cents  per  mile  necessarily  trareled  by  him  in  attending 
snch  hearing  not  to  exceed  a  distance  of  300  miles,  to  be  taxed 
by  the  commission  as  costs  and  deposited  with  the  petition  of 
the  employer. 

382  The  Commission  erred  in  dismissing  a  petition  for 
review  under  Section  19,  (h),  where  there  had  been 
a  previous  lump  sum  settlement  made.  Peoria  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  177,  180;  125 
N.  E.  1. 

390  Under  paragraph  (h)  of  Section  19,  the  Indus- 
trial Commission  had  authority  to  review  its  former 
proceedings,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  lump 
sum  settlement  had  been  made  with  the  employee 
under  Section  9  of  the  Act.  Ellsworth  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  290  111.  514,  518;  125  N.  E.  246. 

390  Employee  was  injured  while  riding  a  bucking  horse 
for  exhibition  purposes.  Bones  in  leg  were  broken, 
but  he  made  settlement  for  a  lump  sum.  Thereafter, 
a  petition  was  filed  under  Section  19  (h),  alleging 
that  the  settlement  had  been  made  under  a  misap- 
prehension of  facts  and  that  the  disability  had  re- 
curred and  increased.  On  the  hearing,  the  Com- 
mission gave  credit  for  the  amount  paid  and  awarded 
an  additional  amount.  The  Circuit  Court  set  aside 
the  award  on  the  ground  that  the  parties  were  not 
under  the  Act  at  the  time  of  the  accident.  On  re- 
view, the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  Circuit  Court 
erred  and  ordered  the  award  of  the  Commission 
confirmed  after  reversing  the  trial  court.  Ellsworth 


322  SECTION    19—  (h) 

v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  514,  519;  125  N. 
E.  246. 

390  By  making  a  settlement  with  the  employee,  the 
employer  waived  the  limitation  of  Section  24  and 
the  agreement  brought  the  employer  and  employee 
within  the  purview  of  Section  19  (h).  Tribune  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  402,  405;  125  N. 
E.  351. 

390  By  settlement  agreement,  both  parties  submitted 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  on  the  merits 
of  the  case,  and  they  waived  jurisdiction  as  to  the 
time   limitation  with   reference  to  voluntary  pay- 
ments,  even  though  the  agreement  stated  to   the 
contrary.      Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  402,  405;  125  N.  E.  351. 

391  Any  agreement  made  between  an  employer  oper- 
ating under  the  Act  and  an  employee  must  be  con- 
sidered as  having  been  made  under  the  Act,  and  is  a 
submission  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission 
and  a  waiver  as  to  any  question  of  time  limitation 
then  existing,  even  though  the  agreement  stated  to 
the  contrary.     (W 'abash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 286  111.  194.)      Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  293  111.  461,  466;  127  N.  E.  743. 

391  The  mere  determination  on  the  part  of  the  em- 
ployer to  do  something  for  the  employee  is  not  an 
agreement  to  pay  compensation.     Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  293  HI.  461,  467;  127  N.  E. 
743. 

392  The  Commission  has  jurisdiction  to  review  a  lump 
sum  settlement  and  to  modify   its  award  on  the 
ground  that  the  injury  recurred  or  increased.    Tri- 
bune Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  402,  406 ; 
125  N.  E.  351. 


SECTION    19— (h)  323 

392  Under  paragraph  (h),  of  Section  19,  the  review  is 
not  limited  to  a  case  where  the  payments  are  paid 
in  installments.  A  voluntary  settlement  is  a  lump 
sum  agreement  that  is  reviewable  under  this  pro- 
vision. Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290 
111.  402,406;  125  N.  E.  351. 

392  Section  19  (h)^  providing  for  the  review  of  an 
agreement  or  award  within  eighteen  months,  begins 
to  run  at  the  date  of  the  award  and  not  at  the  time 
of  the  filing  of  a  Supreme  Court  opinion.  Big  Mud- 
dy Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  515,  519;  124  N.E.  564. 

392  Where  no  award  has  been  entered  by  the  Com- 
mission, until  after  review  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  period  of  eighteen  months  for  filing  application 
for  review  of  compensation  begins  to  run  when  the 
Commission  enters  an  award  on  such  reconsidera- 
tion of  the  case.  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  515,  519;  124  N.  E. 
564. 

392  The  provision,  relative  to  an  application  for  a 
88  review,  in  paragraph  (h)  of  Section  19,  within 
eighteen  months,  is  not  a  statute  of  limitations,  but 
provides  for  a  period  of  time  in  which  it  may  be 
determined,  whether  the  injuries  received  recurred, 
increased  or  diminished.  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  515,  518;  124 
N.  E.  564. 

392      The  eighteen  months  provision  in  paragraph  (h) 
95  of  Section  19,  extends  from  the  time  of  the  agree- 
ment or  award.     Big  Muddy   Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  515,  519,  520;  124 
N.  E.  564. 


824  SECTION    19— (h) 

392  Where  an  insurance  company  had  been  paying  in- 
stallments of  compensation  to  the  widow  of  a  de- 
ceased employee  by  checks  sent  to  her  and  before 
all  of  the  claim  was  paid,  it  became  insolvent,  and 
the  widow  commenced  proceedings  against  the  em- 
ployer, the  casualty  company  in  making  the  pay- 
ments was  acting  as  the  agent  of  the  employer.  Ste- 
phens Engineering  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  88,  92;  124  N.  E.  869. 

392  Section  19,  (h),  permits  a  review  either  before  or 
after  an  award  has  been  commuted  to  a  lump  sum. 
Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111. 
177,180;  125  N.  E.  1. 

392  The  employer  and  employee  were  both  operating 
under  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act ;  after  a  hearing  on  review  by  the 
Industrial  Commission,  a  writ  of  certiorari  was  sued 
out  in  the  Circuit  Court  which  confirmed  the  award 
of  the  Industrial  Commission;  the  case  was  then 
brought  to  the  Supreme  Court  by  writ  of  error  and 
an  opinion  rendered  by  the  Supreme  Court  affirming 
the  Circuit  Court  (279  111.  235).  After  this  pro- 
ceeding, the  employee  filed  a  petition  with  the  Com- 
mission for  a  review  under  Section  19,  (h),  on  the 
ground  that  the  injury  had  increased.  The  employer 
urged  that  the  petition  was  not  filed  within  eight- 
een months  after  the  award  but  the  Commission 
found  that  the  injury  increased,  and  increased  the 
compensation  accordingly.  On  certiorari,  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  quashed  the  proceedings  of  the  Commis- 
sion. Held,  that  the  time  for  filing  review  is  eight- 
een months  from  the  date  of  the  award  and  this  is 
not  affected  in  any  way  or  suspended  by  the  pen- 
dency of  an  appeal  by  certiorari  or  writ  of  error. 


SECTION    19— (i)  325 

Big  Muddy  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  515;  125  N.E.  564. 

392  The  purpose  of  paragraph  (h),  Section  19,  is  to 
give  a  period  of  time  in  which  it  may  be  determined 
whether  the  injuries  received  recurred,  increased  or 
diminished.  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  515,  519;  124  N.  E.  564. 

392  Where  a  petition  is  filed  to  review  a  previous  de- 
cision of  the  Industrial  Commission  under  the  pro- 
visions of  Section  8,  (d),  the  Commission  is  not  au- 
thorized to  treat  this  as  a  review  under  Section  19, 
(h).  Centralia  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
297  111.  451,  453;  130  N.  E.  727. 

402  The  period  of  eighteen  months  was  inserted  in 
Section  19,  (h),  by  the  law  making  body,  because  of 
the  recognized  inability  of  the  medical  profession 
to  forecast  with  certainty,  the  results  of  an  injury 
causing  partial  disability  and  the  exact  extent  of  the 
injury.  Peoria  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290111.177,  179;  125  N.  E.  1. 

402  Where  an  employee  accepts  a  settlement  for  what 
he  considers  a  temporary  disability  and  it  turns  out 
to  be  a  permanent  disability,  the  Commission  is 
justified  in  finding  that  the  injury  had  increased  and 
recurred  and  its  decision  should  be  confirmed.  Ells- 
worth v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  514,  518, 
519;  125  N.  E.  246. 

402  (I)  Each  party,  upon  taking  any  proceedings  or  steps  what- 
soever  before  any  arbitrator,  committee  of  arbitration,  Industrial 
Commission  or  court,  shall  file  with  the  Industrial  Commission 
his  address,  or  the  name  and  address  of  any  agent  upon  whom 
all  notices  to  be  given  to  such  party  shall  be  served,  either  per- 
sonally or  by  registered  mail,  addressed  to  such  party  or  agent 
at  the  last  address  so  filed  with  the  Industrial  Commission: 
Provided,  that  In  the  event  such  party  has  not  filed  his  address, 


326  SEC.  19— (j),  (k),  20,  21 

or  the  name  and  address  of  an  agent,  as  above  provided,  service 
of  any  notice  may  be  had  by  filing  such  notice  with  the  Industrial 
Commission. 

402  (j)     Whenever  in  any  proceeding  testimony  has  been  taken 
or  a  final  decision  has  been  rendered,  and  after  the  taking  of 
snch  testimony,  or  after  snch  decision  has  become  final,  the 
injured    employee    dies,    then    in    any    subsequent    proceeding 
brought  by  the  personal  representative  or  beneficiaries  of  the 
deceased  employee,  such  testimony  in   the  former  proceeding 
may  be  Introduced  with  the  same  force  and  effect  as  though  the 
witness  having  so  testified  were  present  In  person  in  such  sub* 
sequent  proceeding  and  such  final  decision,  If  any  shall  be  taken 
as  a  final  adjudication  of  any  of  the  issues  which  are  the  same 
In  both  proceedings. 

403  (k)     In  any  case  where  there  has  been  any  unreasonable  or 
vexations   delay   of   payment   or   intentional  underpayment   of 
compensation,  or  proceedings  have  been  Instituted  or  carried 
on  by  the  one  liable  to  pay  the  compensation,  which  do  not  pre- 
sent a  real  controversy,  but  are  merely  frivolous  or  for  delay, 
then  the  commission  may  award  compensation  additional  to  that 
otherwise  payable  under  this  Act  equal  to  fifty  percentum  of 
the  amount  payable  at  the  time  of  such  award.    [Amended  by 
Act  approved  June  29,  1921.] 

SECTION  20. 

404  The  Industrial  Board  shall  report  in  writing  to  the  Governor 
on  the  30th  day  of  June,  annually,  the  details  and  results  of  its 
administration  of  this  Act,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this 
Act,  and  may  prepare  and  issue  such  special  bulletins  and  re- 
ports from  time  to  time  as  in  the  opinion  of  the  board,  seems 
advisable. 

SECTION  21. 

KH  No  payment,  claim,  award  or  decision  under  this  Act  shall 
be  assignable  or  subject  to  any  Hen,  attachment  or  garnish- 
ment, or  be  held  liable  in  any  way  for  any  lien,  debt,  pen- 
alty or  damages.  A  decision  or  award  of  the  Industrial  Com- 
mission against  an  employer  for  compensation  under  this  Act, 
or  a  written  agreement  by  an  employer  to  pay  such  compensa- 
tion shall,  upon  the  filing  of  a  certified  copy  of  the  decision  or 
said  agreement,  as  the  case  may  be,  with  the  recorder  of  deeds 
of  the  county,  constitute  a  lien  upon  all  property  of  the  em- 
ployer within  said  county,  paramount  to  all  other  claims  or 
liens,  except  mortgages,  trust  deeds,  or  for  wages  or  taxes, 
and  such  liens  may  be  enforced  in  the  manner  provided  for  the 
foreclosure  of  mortgages  under  the  laws  of  this  State*  Any 
right  to  receive  compensation  hereunder  shall  be  extinguished 
by  the  death  of  the  person  or  persons  entitled  thereto,  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  relative  to  compensation  for  death 


SEC.  21— "RIGHT  TO  COMPENSATION  EXTINGUISHED"  327 

received  in  the  course  of  employment:  Provided,  that  npon  the 
death  of  a  beneficiary,  who  is  receiving  compensation  provided 
for  in  section  7,  leaving  surviving  a  parent,  sister  or  brother  of 
the  deceased  employee,  at  the  time  of  his  death  dependent  upon 
him  for  support,  who  were  receiving  from  such  beneficiary  a 
contribution  to  support,  then  that  proportion  of  the  compensa- 
tion of  the  beneficiary  which  would  have  been  paid  but  for  the 
death  of  the  beneficiary,  but  in  no  event  exceeding  said  unpaid 
compensation,  which  the  contribution  of  the  beneficiary  to  the 
dependent's  support  within  one  year  prior  to  the  death  of  the 
beneficiary  bears  to  the  compensation  of  the  beneficiary  within 
that  year,  shall  be  continued  for  the  benefit  of  such  dependents, 
notwithstanding  the  death  of  the  beneficiary.  [Amended  by  Act 
approved  June  28,  1919.] 

"Right  to  Compensation  Extinguished." 

405  Providing  for  the  extinguishing  of  compensation 
to  certain  beneficiaries  in  Section  7  construed  and 
considered  in  connection  with  Section  9  where  an 
aged  beneficiary  petitioned  for  a  lump  sum  settle- 
ment. Clark  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111. 
561,  570;  126  N.  E.  579. 

404  Where  a  widow,  who  is  entitled  to  compensation 
for  the  death  of  her  husband,  dies  before  the  award 
is  made,  her  right  to  receive  the  compensation  is  not 
extinguished  within  the  meaning  of  this  section,  by 
her  death.  East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  298  111.  61,  64;  131  N.  E.  123. 

404  The  right  to  receive  compensation  is  fixed  at  the 
time  of  the  employee's  death,  and  under  Section  21 
stops  any  further  right  to  payments  upon  the  death 
of  the  beneficiary,  but  is  not  retroactive  so  as  to  ex- 
tinguish the  right  to  receive  the  payments  for  the 
period  from  the  date  of  the  injured  employee 's  death 
until  the  beneficiary's  death.     East  St.  Louis  Board 
of  Education  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  61, 
65;  131  N.E.  123. 

405  Section  7  determines  dependency  and  the  award 
while  Section  21  provides  for  the  extinguishment  of 


328  SECTION  22 

the  award  by  the  death  of  the  beneficiary  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  Section  7,  which  determines  the 
right,  and  it  cannot  be  construed  as  retroactive  but 
only  to  abate  the  right  to  receive  payments  due  after 
the  death  of  the  beneficiary.  East  St.  Louis  Board 
of  Education  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  61, 
64;  131  N.  E.  123. 

410  The  proviso  in  Section  7  shows  the  right  to  go 
forward  with  the  proceeding  and  receive  compensa- 
tion under  the  application,  and  under  the  circum- 
stances mentioned  in  the  proviso,  the  right  continues 
in  the  beneficiary  after  his  death.  East  St.  Louis 
Board  of  Education  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298 
111.  61,  65;  131  N.  E.  123. 

209  While  the  right  to  receive  compensation  is  extin- 
guished by  the  death  of  the  beneficiary  entitled  there- 
to, it  does  not  mean  that  if  the  widow  had  received 
installments  under  the  award  the  amount  she  had 
received  to  the  day  of  her  death  must  be  refunded  be- 
cause the  right  had  been  extinguished  by  her  death. 
East  St.  Louis  Board  of  Education  v.  Industrial  Com- 
mission, 298  111.  61,  65 ;  131  N.  E.  123. 

Section  22. 

410  Any  contract  or  agreement  made  by  any  employer  or  his 
agent  or  attorney  with  any  employee  or  any  other  beneficiary 
of  any  claim  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  within  seven  days 
after  the  injury  shall  be  presumed  to  be  fraudulent. 

410  An  employer  cannot  relieve  himself  from  liability 
under  the  Compensation  Act  by  a  contract  with  his 
employee.  (Tribune  Co4  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  402;  Chicago  Ratttvays  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Board,  276  111.  112.  W abash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  286  111.  194.)  International  Coal  & 
Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524, 


SECTION  22  329 

530;  127  N.  E.  703.    Semble,  Receipt  in  full  not  a  re- 
lease.   Re  Holland  (Ind.)  126  N.  E.  236. 

410  Even  though  a  settlement  contract  states  that  the 
settlement  is  made  voluntarily  and  after  jurisdiction 
had  been  lost,  it  does  not  stand,  for  the  employer 
cannot  relieve  himself  of  liability  by  a  contract  with 
his  employee.  Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 290  111.  402,  405,  406;  125  N.  E.  351. 

410  Although  the  Compensation  Act  encourages  the 
settlement  of  claims,  yet  settlements  to  be  within  the 
contemplation  of  the  Act  must  be  made  in  accordance 
with  its  terms  and  provisions.  International  Coal 
and  Mining  Company  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293 
111.  524,529;  127  N.  E.  703. 

410  Even  though  the  parties  may  have  intended  no 
wrong  in  attempting  to  make  the  settlement,  it  is 
the  tendency  of  such  contracts  to  the  perversion  of 
justice  that  renders  them  illegal.    International  Coal 
&  Mining  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524, 
533;  127  N.  E.  703. 

411  Where  no  claim  for  compensation  is  made  with- 
in six  months  of  the  accident,  though  within  that 
time  payments  are  made  and  thereafter  a  contract 
of  settlement  is  made  which  is   approved  by  the 
Commission  (Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
290  111.  402)  distinguished  from  the  case  at  bar  where 
no  contract  to  pay  anything,  nor  promise  of  any 
amount  for  any  time  made,     Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  461,  466;  127  N.  E.  743. 


330  SECTION  23 

Section  23. 

411  No  employee,  personal  representative,  or  beneficiary  shall 
hare  power  to  waive  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act  in  regard 
to  the  amount  of  compensation  which  may  be  payable  to  snch 
employee,  personal  representative  or  beneficiary  herennder 
except  after  approval  by  the  Industrial  Board. 

411  Where  there  is  no  contract  made  to  pay  anything 
and  no  promise  for  any  amount  or  for  any  time, 
there  is  nothing  for  the  Commission  to  approve  or 
disapprove.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Indit^trial  Commis- 
sion, 293  111.  461,  467;  127  N.  E.  743. 

411  Section  23  providing  that  an  employee  has  no 
right  to  grant  a  release  to  his  employer  applies  to 
the  insurance  carrier  as  well  as  the  employer  and  the 
insurance  carrier  cannot  take  advantage  of  the  fact 
that  it  is  not  specifically  mentioned  in  that  section. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  240;  124  N.  E.  665. 

411  The  insurer  is  in  the  same  place  as  the  employer 
436  whom  he  has  insured  with  reference  to  the  release 
of  the  claim  and,  therefore,  a  release  given  to  an 
employer^  which  is  void  under  the  Act,  could  not  be 
availed  of  by  the  insurance  carrier.  Illinois  Indem- 
nity Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111. 
233,  240;  124  N.  E.  665. 

411  The  provision  which  prohibits  an  employee  from 
waiving  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  act  in  regard 
to  the  compensation  payments  due  precludes  an  em- 
ployer taking  a  release  from  his  employee  in  which 
he  waives  any  rights  accruing  to  him  under  the  Act. 
International  Coal  and  Mining  Company  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  293  111.  524,  528 ;  127  N.  E.  703. 

411  It  would  be  anomolous  to  hold  that  the  protec- 
tion of  an  employee  should  be  guaranteed  by  the 


SECTION  23  331 

Act  against  an  insurer  the  same  as  against  an  em- 
ployer but  that  the  insurer  could  be  released  regard- 
less of  Section  23,  while  the  employer  could  not  be 
released.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  HI.  233,  240 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

412  Even  though  it  seems  harsh  to  give  employee  the 
benefit  of  an  attempted  settlement,  it  is  the  law  that 
the  court  will  not  assist  either  party  to  an  illegal 
transaction  but  will  leave  them  where  they  have 
chosen  to  place  themselves.  (Arter  v.  Byington,  44 
HI.  468;  Neustadt  v.  Hall,  58  111.  172;  Harris  v.  Hat- 
field,  71  111.  298;  Workmen's  Banking  Co.  v.  Rauten- 
berg,  103  111.  460.)  International  Coal  &  Mining  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  533;  127  N.  E. 
703.  Semble:  Re  London  G.  &  A.  Co.  (Mass.)  124 
N.  E.  286. 

412  It  is  contrary  to  the  policy  of  the  Act,  to  permit 
an  employer,  while  choosing  to  come  under  its  pro- 
visions by  not  filing  an  election  in  writing  to  the 
contrary,  to  relieve  himself  from  liability  under  the 
Act  by  private  agreement  or  contract  with  the  em- 
ployee. (W  abash  Ry.  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
286  HI.  194.)  International  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  524,  530;  127  N.  E. 
703. 

412  Where  there  is  no  agreement,  there  is  no  waiver 
and  consequently  there  can  be  nothing  for  the  Com- 
mission to  approve  or  disapprove.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  293  HI.  461,  466;  127  N.  E. 
743. 


332  SECTION  24 


SECTION  24. 

412  No  proceedings  for  compensation  under  this  Act  shall  be 
maintained  unless  notice  of  the  accident  hits  been  siren  to 
the  employer  as  soon  as  practicable,  but  not  later  than  thirty 
days  after  the  accident.  In  cases  of  mental  incapacity  of  the 
employee  notice  must  be  given  within  six  months  after  such 
accident.  No  defect  or  inaccuracy  of  such  notice  shall  be  a  bar 
to  the  maintenance  of  proceedings  of  arbitration  or  otherwise  by 
the  employee  unless  the  employee  proves  that  he  is  unduly 
prejudiced  In  such  proceedings  by  such  defect  or  Inaccuracy. 
Notice  of  the  accident  shall  state  the  name  and  address  of  the 
employee  injured,  the  approximate  date  and  place  of  the  acci- 
dent, if  known,  and  in  simple  language  the  cause  thereof;  which 
notice  may  be  served  personally  or  by  registered  mall,  addressed 
to  the  employer  at  his  last  known  residence  or  place  of  busi- 
ness; provided  no  proceedings  for  compensation  under  this  Act 
shall  be  maintained  unless  claim  for  compensation  has  been 
made  within  six  months  after  the  accident,  or  in  the  event 
that  payments  have  been  made  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
unless  written  claim  for  compensation  has  been  made  within 
six  months  after  such  payments  have  ceased  and  a  receipt  there- 
for or  a  statement  of  the  amount  of  compensation  paid  shall 
have  been  filed  with  the  Commission:  Provided,  that  no  em- 
ployee who  after  the  accident  returns  to  the  employment  of  the 
employer  in  whose  service  he  was  injured  shall  be  barred  for 
failure  to  make  such  claim  If  an  application  for  adjustment  of 
such  claim  is  filed  with  the  Industrial  Commission  within  eigh- 
teen months  after  he  returns  to  snch  employment  and  the  said 
commission  shall  give  notice  to  the  employer  of  the  filing  of 
snch  application  in  the  manner  provided  in  this  Act. 

Section  24  was  amended  and  the  following  was 
stricken  out:  " Provided,  that  the  failure  on  the  part 
of  any  person  entitled  to  such  compensation  to  give 
such  notice  shall  not  relieve  the  employer  from  his 
liability  for  such  compensation,  when  the  facts  and 
circumstances  of  such  accident  are  known  to  such 
employer,  his  agent  or  vice  principal  in  the  enter- 
prise." 

412  Section  24  provides  that  technical  notice  is  not 
necessary,  provided  the  employer  has  actual  notice 
and  the  employer  can  only  make  a  quasi  appearance 
for  the  purpose  of  objecting,  but  if  he  appears  to 


SECTION  24  333 

the  merits,  he  submits  to  the  jurisdiction  and  must 
abide  the  consequences.  Tribune  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  402,  405;  125  JJ.  E.  351. 

418  Where  there  was  evidence  that  the  wife  of  de- 
ceased told  the  president  of  the  employer-company 
that  her  husband  died  from  anthrax  from  a  hide, 
this  fulfilled  the  requirement  of  the  thirty  day  no- 
tice. Chicago  Rawhide  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  616,  621;  126  N.  E. 
616. 
Actual  notice  supplies  any  deficiency  in  the  notice 

420  if  it  is  within  the  time  prescribed  and  is  to  the  prin- 
cipal, vice-principal  or  agent.  Hydrox  Chemical  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  291  111.  579,  582,  583 ;  126 
N.  E.  564. 

418  The  thirty  day  notice  and  the  claim  for  compen- 
423  sation  within  six  months  are  jurisdictional  and  if 

there  is  no  evidence  showing  a  compliance  with  these 
requirements,  the  award  cannot  be  sustained.  Ohio 
Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461,  465; 
127  N.  E.  743. 

419  Where  it  is  shown  that  the  f  orelady  of  the  depart- 
ment in  which  the  employee  worked  knew  that  the 
employee  hurt  his  hand  and  that  she  understood  that 
it  was  hurt  in  the  factory  while  he  was  engaged  in 
work  for  the  employer,  it  is  held  to  be  sufficient  no- 
tice under  Section  24.     Hydrox  Chemical  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  291  111.  579,  582;  126  N.  E.  564. 

419  Where  the  only  evidence  bearing  on  the  question 
of  notice  within  thirty  days  is  the  testimony  of  the 
wife  as  to  a  conversation  she  heard  her  husband  have 
with  the  field  boss,  it  is  incompetent.  Ohio  Oil  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461,  465;  127  N. 
E.  743. 


334  SECTION  24 

419  Where  an  arbitrator  found  that  the  parties  were 
operating  under  the  Act,  that  the  employee  sustained 
accidental  injuries  which  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  his  employment;  that  notice  of  the  acci- 
dent was  not  given  but  demand  for  compensation 
was  made,  that  the  injured  employee  was  entitled 
to  receive  compensation,  which  was  affirmed  by  the 
Commission,  it  was  held  that  the  notice  of  accident 
within  thirty  days  was  jurisdictional  and  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  the  right  to  maintain  the  proceed- 
ing, and  as  notice  was  not  given  the  award  was  set 
aside.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298  111.  532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

422  Where  the  legislature  has  seen  fit  to  fix  the  time 
for  making  claim  for  compensation  at  six  months 
after  the  accident,  such  a  provision  is  within  the  do- 
main of  legislative  power  and  the  Supreme  Court 
is  without  authority  to  modify  it.     Central  Locomo- 
tive Works  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436, 
439,  440;  125  N.  E.  369. 

427  A  written  demand  for  compensation  within  the 
six  months  period  of  the  date  of  the  cashing  the  in- 
surance company's  check  is  in  time  even  though  the 
date  on  the  receipt  is  more  than  six  months  before 
the  notice.  StepJiens  Engineering  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  88,  93;  124  N.  E.  869. 

423  The  claim  for  compensation  required  by  Section 
24  is  jurisdictional.     Central  Locomotive  Works  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436,  438;  125  N.  E. 
369. 

419  Section  24  provides  that  no  procedings  shall  be 
maintained  unless  notice  of  the  accident  has  been 
given  to  the  employer  within  thirty  days.  This 
notice  is  essential  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Com- 


SECTION  24  335 

mission.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
298  111.  532,  534;  131  N.  E.  637. 

423  An  employer  can  waive  the  question  of  the  time 
when  the  claim  shall  be  filed  under  Section  24,  and 
it  is  not  a  question  of  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter  rather  than  jurisdiction  of  the  person.  Tri- 
bune Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  402,  406 ; 
125  N.  E.  351. 

423  Employee  received  injury  to  his  eye  October  12, 
1913;  he  received  a  permit  to  see  the  doctor  and 
was  treated  for  eleven  days.  He  returned  to  work 
the  day  after  the  accident.  He  worked  for  the  com- 
pany until  1917.  In  1915,  he  went  to  the  company 
doctor,  then  to  a  clinic;  in  1916  to  another  doctor. 
In  May,  1916,  he  went  to  the  general  manager  of 
the  company  and  asked  for  compensation.  Held, 
the  demand  for  a  permit  to  the  doctor  is  a  claim 
for  compensation  and  if  a  writen  demand  is  not  made 
in  six  months  thereafter  that  the  employee  is  not 
entitled  to  compensation  and  the  award  was  set 
aside.  Central  Locomotive  Works  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  290  111.  436,  438;  125  N.  E.  369. 

423  No  special  form  for  claim  of  compensation  is  re- 
quired and  the  claim  need  not  be  in  writing,  but  it 
must  apprise  the  employer  that  the  employee  has 
sustained  injuries  of  such  a  character  as  to  entitle 
him  to  compensation  and  that  such  claim  will  be 
made.  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  298 
111.463,468;  131  N.  E.  649. 

423  Under  Section  24,  where  the  request  of  employee 
for  medical  services  was  complied  with  and  no  claim 
for  further  compensation  is  made  within  six  months 
after  the  accident  or  after  the  services  of  the  doc- 
tor, the  employee  is  barred.  Central  Locomotive 


336  SECTION  24 

Works  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436,  438, 
439;  125  N.  E.  369. 

423  The  making  of  a  claim  for  compensation  within 
six  months  is  jurisdictional  and  a  condition  prece- 
dent to  the  right  to  maintain  the  proceeding  which 
is  not  waived  by  a  failure  to  make  the  objection  on 
the  hearing  before  the  arbitrator,  the  Commission,  or 
the  Circuit  Court.  Ridge  Coal  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  298  111.  532,  535;  131  N.  E.  637. 

423  Section  24  provides  that  no  proceedings  shall  be 
maintained  unless  claim  has  been  made  within  six 
months  of  the  accident  and  the  filing  of  an  applica- 
tion with  the  Commission  satisfies  this  requirement. 
Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  353,  356;  124  N.  E.  552. 

423  A  claim  for  compensation  need  not  be  in  writing 
but  may  be  verbal,  and  is  sufficient  if  the  employer 
is  informed  by  it  that  the  employee  intends  to  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  Act.  Ideal  Fuel  Co.  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  298  111.  463,  468;  131  N.  E.  649. 

427  Under  Section  24,  which  requires  a  demand  to  be 
made  within  six  months,  if  the  parties  voluntarily 
submit  to  the  jurisdiction  after  the  time  has  elapsed 
to  make  a  settlement,  that  provision  is  waived.  Tri- 
bune Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  402,  405 ; 
125  N.  E.  351. 

423  Even  though  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  claim  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  six  months  because  the  re- 
sult of  the  accident  is  not  apparent,  the  employee 
is  not  entitled  to  compensation  if  he  has  not  complied 
with  the  provisions  of  Section  24.  Central  Locomo- 
tive Works  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436, 
439;  125  N.  E.  369. 


SECTION  24  837 

423  Although  in  some  states  the  claim  runs  from  the 
culmination  of  the  injury,  under  the  Illinois  Act,  the 
accident  is  fixed  as  the.  date  from  which  the  time  shall 
run,  and  the  court  cannot  extend  the  time  to  await 
the  development  of  the  injury,  in  the  light  of  the 
express  language  of  the  Act.  Central  Locomotive 
Works  v.  Industrial  Commission,  290  111.  436,  439; 
125  N.  E.  369. 

423  Where  there  is  nothing  in  a  letter  to  inform  the 
employer  that  the  employee  claimed  the  right  to 
compensation  and  although  the  case  appeals  strongly 
to  one's  sense  of  humanity  and  kindness,  the  court 
cannot  create  liability  where  the  law  has  not  done 
so,  where  it  appears  that  no  demand  was  made  with- 
in the  time  required  by  the  statute.  Ideal  Fuel  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  463,  468;  131  N. 
E.  649. 

425  Where  payments  are  manifestly  not  made  under 
the  provisions  of  the  act  but  are  made  voluntarily, 
liability  being  denied  at  the  time,  a  written  claim 
within  six  months  after  the  last  payment  does  not 
come  within  the  provision  of  Section  24.  Ohio  Oil 
Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461,  466,  467; 
127  N.  E.  743. 

423  An  employee  who  was  injured  on  February  4, 
1919,  made  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  Sep- 
tember 24,  1919,  it  was  contended  that  a  letter  writ- 
ten February  14,  1919,  was  a  sufficient  claim  under 
the  Compensation  Act,  the  letter  was  calculated  to 
appeal  to  the  kindness  and  generosity  of  the  em- 
ployer but  contained  no  intimation  that  he  claimed 
any  legal  right  to  demand  compensation.  Held,  that 
this  was  not  a  claim  for  compensation  within  the 
meaning  of  Section  24  of  the  Act.  Ideal  Fuel  Co. 


338  SEC.   24— "PROVIDED   EMPLOYEE  WHO  RETURNS" 

v.  Industrial  Commission,  298  111.  463,  468;  131  N.  E. 
649. 

427  Where  question  was  raised  as  to  demand  made 
within  the  statutory  time,  it  was  held  that  the  date 
of  the  receipt  of  a  check  was  not  payment  of  the  debt 
and  not  until  the  check  is  honored  or  accepted  is 
there  a  payment.  Stephens  Engineering  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  290  111.  88,  93;  124  N.  E.  869. 

427  Where  the  claim  for  compensation  was  filed  with 
the  Commission  and  notice  served  on  the  employer 
within  the  six  months,  it  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  Section  24,  as  it  is  not  essential  that 
a  claim  be  made  previous  to  presenting  it  to  the 
Commission.  Mississippi  River  Power  Co.  v.  In- 
dustrial Commission,  289  111.  353,  356;  124  N.  E. 
552. 

"Provided  employee  who  returns." 

427  Where  a  petition  is  filed  to  review  proceedings  of 
the  Industrial  Commission  under  this  paragraph,  it 
is  error  for  the  Industrial  Commission  to  set  aside 
the  previous  decision,  inasmuch  as  the  statute  does 
not  authorize  any  such  review.  Centralia  Coal  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  451,  453 ;  130  N.  E. 
727. 

430  Section  8  (d)  gives  an  employee  eighteen  months 
in  which  to  file  his  claim  with  the  Commission  if  he 
returns  to  the  same  employer  and  has  a  right  to 
compensation,  but  it  does  not  create  in  him  a  new 
right  which  he  did  not  have  at  the  time  he  returned 
to  work.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
293  111.  461,  467;  127  N.  E.  743. 

430  The  provision  of  Section  8  (d),  which  allows  claim 
to  be  filed  by  employee  eighteen  months  after  he 


SECTION  25  339 

returns  to  former  employment,  is  intended  to  ex- 
tend the  right  of  an  employee  to  maintain  an  exist- 
ing claim  and  not  to  grant  a  new  right.  Ohio  Oil  Co. 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461,  467;  127  N. 
E.  743. 

431  Employee  injured  while  cutting  a  piece  of  wood 
during  the  employment.  The  injury  developed  into 
cancer  from  which  he  later  died.  Accident  occurred 
August  29,  1916,  but  employee  continued  at  his  work 
until  March  22,  1917,  when  he  went  to  hospital  to 
get  treatment  for  cancer.  Returned  to  work  Au- 
gust 13,  1917,  to  October  22,  1917.  Held,  that  no 
claim  was  made  for  compensation  within  the  six 
months  and  that  the  provision  relative  to  the  eight- 
een months  does  not  grant  a  right  but  only  gives  the 
employee  the  right  to  maintain  an  existing  claim. 
Ohio  Oil  Co.  v.  Industrial  Commission,  293  111.  461; 
127  N.  E.  743. 


SECTION  25. 

Any  employer  against  whom  liability  may  exist  for  compensa- 
tion under  this  Act,  shall  upon  the  order  and  direction  of  the 
Industrial  Commission: 

(a)  Deposit  the  commuted  value  of  the  total  unpaid  com- 
pensation for  which  such  liability  exists,  computed  at  three  per- 
centum  per  annum  in  the  same  manner  as  provided  in  Section  9, 
with  the  State  Treasurer   or   county  treasurer  in  the  county 
where  the  accident  happened  or  with  any  State  or  National  bank 
or  trust  company  doing  business  in  this  State,  or  in  some  other 
suitable   depository   approved   by   the    Industrial   Commission: 
Provided,  that  any  such  depository  to  which  such  compensation 
may  be  paid,  shall  pay  the  same  out  in  installments  as  in  this 
Act  provided,  unless  such  sum  is  ordered  paid  in,  and  is  com- 
muted to  a  lump  sum  payment  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  this  Act,  or 

(b)  Purchase  an  annuity,  in  an  amount  of  compensation  due 
or  computed,  under  this  Act  within  the  limitation  provided  by 


340  SECTION  26 

law  in  any  insurance  company  granting  annuities  and  licensed 
or  permitted  to  do  business  in  this  State,  which  may  be  desig- 
nated by  the  employer,  or  the  Industrial  Commission. 

This  section  was  amended  in  1921  by  giving  the 
Commission  power  to  order  the  employer  against 
whom  liability  exists  to  deposit  the  unpaid  compen- 
sation or  to  purchase  an  annuity.  This  is  a  section 
that  affords  relief  to  employees,  whose  employers 
are  on  the  brink  of  insolvency.  By  implication  this 
section  also  applies  to  the  insurance  carrier  because 
it  is  primarily  liable  and  is  standing  in  the  shoes  of 
the  employer.  See  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v. 
Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  237;  124  N.  E. 
665.  This  is  a  drastic  provision  and  gives  the  In- 
dustrial Commission  great  latitude  in  its  powers. 


SECTION  26. 

481  (a)  Any  employer  who  shall  come  within  the  provisions  of 
section  3  of  this  Act,  and  any  other  employer  who  shall  elect  to 
provide  and  pay  the  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act  shall: 

(1)  File  with  the  commission  a  sworn   statement  showing 
his  financial  ability  to  pay  the  compensation  provided  for  in  this 
Act,  or 

(2)  Furnish  security,  indemnity  or  a  bond  guaranteeing  the 
payment  by  the  employer  of  the  compensation  provided  for  in 
this  Act,  or 

(S)  Insure  to  a  reasonable  amount  his  liability  to  pay  such 
compensation  in  some  corporation  or  organization  authorized, 
licensed  or  permitted  to  do  such  insurance  business  In  this 
State,  or 

(4)  Make  some  other  provisions  for  the  securing  of  the  pay- 
ment of  compensation  provided  for  In  this  Act,  and 

(5)  Upon  becoming   subject  to   this   Act  and   thereafter  as 
often  as  the  commission  may  in  writing  demand,  file  with  the 
commission  in  form  prescribed  by  it  evidence  of  his  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph. 

(b)  The  sworn  statement  of  financial  ability,  or  security,  in- 
demnity or  bond,  or  amount  of  Insurance,  or  other  provision, 
filed,  furnished,  carried,  or  made  by  the  employer,  as  the  case 
may  be,  shall  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  commission,  upon 


SECTION  26  341 

the  approval  of  which,  the  commission  shall  send  to  the  em- 
ployer written  notice  of  Its  approval  thereof.  The  filing  with 
the  commission  of  evidence  of  compliance  with  paragraph  (a)  of 
this  section  as  therein  provided  shall  constitute  such  compliance 
until  ten  days  after  written  notice  to  the  employer  of  the  dis- 
approval by  the  commission. 

(c)  Whenever  the  Industrial  Commission  shall  find  that  any 
corporation,  company,  association,  aggregation  of  individuals, 
or  other  insurer  affecting  workmen's  compensation  insurance 
in  this  State  shall  he  insolvent,  financially  unsound,  or  unable 
to  fully  meet  all  payments  and  liabilities  assumed  or  to  be 
assumed   for  compensation  insurance  in  this   State,   or   shall 
practice  a  policy  of  delay  or  unfairness  toward  employees  in 
the  adjustment,   settlement,  or  payment  of  benefits  due  such 
employees,  the  said  Industrial  Commission  may  after  reason- 
able notice  and  hearing  order  and  direct  that  such  corporation, 
company,  association,   aggregation   of   individuals,   or  insurer, 
shall  from  and  after  a  date  fixed  in  such  order  discontinue  the 
writing  of  any  such  workmen's  compensation  insurance  in  this 
State.    Subject  to  such  modification  of  said  order  as  the  com- 
mission may  later  make  on  review  of  said  order,  as  herein  pro- 
vided, it  shall  thereupon  be  unlawful  for  any  such  corporation, 
company,  association,  aggregation  of  individuals,  or  insurer  to 
effect  any  workmen's   compensation   insurance   in   this    State. 
Any  such  order  made  by  said  Industrial  Commission  shall  be 
subject  to  review  by  the  courts,  as  in  the  case  of  other  orders 
of  said  Industrial  Commission,  provided  that  upon  said  review 
the  Circuit  Court  shall  have  power  to  review  all  questions  of 
fact  as  well  as  of  law. 

(d)  The  failure  or  neglect  of  an  employer  to  comply  with 
the  provisions  of  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  shall  be  deemed 
a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a  fine  equal  to  ten  cents  per  each 
employee  of  such  employer,  at  the  time  of  such  failure  or  neg- 
lect, but  not  less  than  one  dollar  nor  more  than  fifty  dollars, 
for  each  day  of  such  refusal  or  neglect  until  the  same  ceases. 
Each  day  of  such  refusal  or  neglect  shall  constitute  a  separate 
offense. 

432  Insurance  carrier  cannot  accept  a  premium 
charged  for  insurance  against  industrial  accidents 
and  yet  make  its  own  contract  as  to  its  liability  and 
method  of  payment.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  241;  124  N. 
E.  665. 

432      The  provisions  of  an  insurance  policy  cannot  pre- 
436  vail  over  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compen- 


342  SECTION  27 

sation  Act.     Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  233,  241;  124  N.  E.  665. 

432  Where  an  insurance  carrier  assumes  the  obliga- 
tions of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  it  waives 
all  provisions  in  its  policy  in  conflict  with  the  Act. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  240,  241 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

432  To  permit  a  provision  in  an  insurance  policy,  that 
no  action  for  indemnity  shall  be  maintained  except 
for  money  paid,  cannot  be  set  up  by  the  carrier  to 
relieve  him  from  liability  where  he  has  agreed  to  as- 
sume the  obligations  of  the  Act.  Illinois  Indemnity 
Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  241 ; 
124  N.  E.  665. 

SECTION  27. 

434  (a)  This  Act  shall  not  affect  or  disturb  the  continuance  of 
any  existing:  insurance,  mutual  aid,  benefit,  or  relief  association 
or  department,  whether  maintained  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the 
employer  or  whether  maintained  by  the  employees,  the  payment 
of  benefits  of  snch  association  or  department  being  guaranteed 
by  the  employer  or  by  some  person,  firm  or  corporation  for  him : 
Provided,  the  employer  contributes  to  snch  association  or 
department  an  amount  not  less  than  the  full  compensation  herein 
provided,  exclusive  of  the  cost  of  the  maintenance  of  snch  asso- 
ciation or  department  and  without  any  expense  to  the  employee. 
This  Act  shall  not  prevent  the  organization  and  maintaining 
under  the  insurance  laws  of  this  State  of  any  benefit  or  insurance 
company  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  against  the  compensation 
provided  for  in  this  Act,  the  expense  of  which  is  maintained  by 
the  employer.  This  Act  shall  not  prevent  the  organization  or 
maintaining  under  the  Insurance  laws  of  this  State  of  any  vol- 
untary mutual  aid,  benefit  or  relief  association  among  employees 
for  the  payment  of  additional  accident  or  sick  benefits. 

(b)  No  existing  insurance,  mutual  aid,  benefit  or  relief  asso- 
ciation or  department  shall,  by  reason  of  anything  herein  con- 
tained be  authorized  to  discontinue  its  operation  without  first 
discharging  its  obligations  to  any  and  all  persons  carrying  insur- 
ance in  the  same  or  entitled  to  relief  or  benefits  therein. 

(c)  Any  contract,  oral,  written  or  implied,  of  employment 
providing  for  relief  benefit,  or  insurance  or  any  other  device 


SECTION  28  343 

whereby  the  employee  Is  required  to  pay  any  premium  or  pre- 
miums for  insurance  against  the  compensation  provided  for  in 
this  Act  shall  be  null  and  void,  and  any  employer  withholding 
from  the  wages  of  any  employee  any  amount  for  the  purpose  of 
paying  any  such  premium  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and 
punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  ten  dollars  nor  more  than 
one  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisonment  in  the  county  jail  for  not 
more  than  six  months,  or  both,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court. 


SECTION  28. 

435  In  the  event  the  employer  does  not  pay  the  compensation 
for  which  he  is  liable,  then  an  insurance  company,  association  or 
insurer  which  may  have  insured  such  employer  against  such 
liability  shall  become  primarily  liable  to  pay  to  the  employee, 
his  personal  representative  or  beneficiary  the  compensation  re- 
quired by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  be  paid  by  such  employer. 
The  insurance  carrier  may  be  made  a  party  to  the  proceedings 
to  which  the  employer  is  a  party  and  an  award  may  be  entered 
jointly  against  the  employer  and  the  insurance  carrier. 
(Amended  by  Act  approved  June  28,  1919.) 

435  Where  there  is  a  stipulation  that  a  policy  shall  be- 
come void  on  the  happening  of  some  subsequent 
event,  and  the  insurer  has  notice  that  the  event  has 
occurred,  but  does  not  cancel  the  policy,  the  pro- 
vision is  waived  and  the  policy  remains  in  force. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  241;  124  N.  E.  665. 

435  Where,  after  the  dissolution  of  a  partnership,  a 
release  was  given,  covering  an  accident  happening 
prior  to  the  dissolution,  it  is  a  waiver  of  any  defense 
•  on  account  of  the  dissolution  of  the  partnership. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  241 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

435  The  dissolution  of  a  partnership  does  not  render  a 
policy  void.     Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  233,  241;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  An  employer  had  a  contract  with  an  insurance  car- 
rier, which,  by  a  rider,  was  amended  to  cover  cases 


344  SEC.  28— "PRIMARILY  LIABLE" 

arising  under  the  Compensation  Act.  One  of  his 
employees  was  injured  and  the  Commission  entered 
an  award  against  the  carrier.  It  appeared  that  the 
insured  had  been  paid  $250.00  by  the  carrier  and  had 
given  a  release  to  the  insurance  carrier  and  an  agree- 
ment that  he  would  hold  the  carrier  harmless.  The 
money  had  been  paid  by  the  employer  to  the  em- 
ployee for  hospital  expenses  who  gave  his  employer 
a  release.  It  was  held  that  the  insurance  carrier 
was  liable  to  the  employee  for  the  compensation  even 
though  the  employer  went  into  bankruptcy.  Illinois 
Indemnity  ExcJuinge  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
HI.  233;  124  N.  E.  665. 

"Primarily  Liable." 

436  By  Section  28,  the  legislature  intended,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  to  charge  the  liability  directly  to  the 
insurer  and  it  is  not  an  unreasonable  construction  to 
hold,  it  intended  to  include  the  method  of  collection 
in  compensation  cases.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  237;  124  N. 
E.  665. 

436  "  Primarily  liable  to  pay  *  *  by  the  provi- 
sions of  this  Act,"  must  necessarily  include  the 
method  of  collection  in  compensation  cases.  Illinois 
Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
HI.  233,  237;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  A  rider  attached  to  a  policy  of  insurance,  that  in 
consideration  of  the  premium,  the  contract  is  in- 
tended to  cover  liability  under  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act,  makes  the  insurance  carrier  primarily 
liable.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  233,  235,  238;  124  N.  E.  665. 


SEC.  28— "PRIMARILY  LIABLE"  345 

436  Section  28  was  not  intended  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  the  applicant  the  common  law  or  equitable 
right  of  subrogation,  by  which  the  employee  would 
have  no  greater  right  than  the  employer  and  could 
not  compel  payment  by  the  insurance  company. 
Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 289  111.  233,  237;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  Where  an  insurance  company,  in  a  rider  attached 
to  a  policy,  assumed  the  responsibility  to  pay  com- 
pensation it  became  liable  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
employer  and  the  provisions  of  the  original  policy, 
which  conflicted  with  the  agreements  in  the  riders, 
were  set  aside  by  said  rider.  Illinois  Indemnity  Ex- 
change v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233,  238; 
124  N.  E.  665. 

436  Where  an  insurance  company,  by  a  rider  attached 
to  a  policy,  assumes  responsibility  under  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act,  the  Act  becomes  a  part  of 
the  company's  contract  liability.  Illinois  Indemnity 
Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289  111.  233, 
238;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  By  the  provisions  of  Sections  26  and  28,  the  legis- 
lature intended,  that  in  case  of  the  employer's  in- 
solvency, the  insurance  company  should  step  into 
the  shoes  of  the  employer  and  make  the  payments 
as  the  employer  would  have  made  them,  and  that  in 
the  case  of  such  insolvency,  the  insurance  company 
would  be  primarily  liable  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
employer  would  have  been  if  solvent.  Illinois  In- 
demnity Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission,  289 
111.  233,  238;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  Under  the  British  Act,  it  was  held  that  the  em- 
ployee had  a  right  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  the 
policy  directly  against  the  insurance  company.  Illi- 


346  SECTION  29 

nois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
289  111.  233,  239;  124  N.  E.  665. 

436  The  intention  is  clear  to  make  the  insurer  or  con- 
tractor primarily  liable  under  the  provision  of  the 
Act.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Industrial 
Commission,  289  111.  233,  239;  124  N.  E.  665. 

SECTION  29. 

487  Where  an  injury  or  death  for  which  compensation  is  pay* 
able  by  the  employer  nnder  this  Act,  was  not  proxlmately  caused 
by  the  negligence  of  the  employer  or  his  employees,  and  was 
caused  nnder  circumstances  creating  a  legal  liability  for  damages 
in  some  person  other  than  the  employer  to  pay  damages,  such 
other  person  having  also  elected  to  be  bound  by  this  Act,  or  being 
bound  thereby  under  section  three  (8)  of  this  Act,  then  the 
right  of  the  employee  or  personal  representative  to  recover 
against  such  other  person  shall  be  subrogated  to  his  employer 
and  such  employer  may  bring  legal  proceedings  against  such 
other  person  to  recover  the  damages  sustained  in  an  amount 
not  exceeding  the  aggregate  amount  of  compensation  payable 
nnder  this  Act,  by  reason  of  the  injury  or  death  of  such  em* 
ployee.  Where  the  injury  or  death  for  which  compensation 
is  payable  nnder  this  Act,  was  not  proximately  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  the  employer  or  his  employees  and  was  caused 
nnder  circumstances  creating  a  legal  liability  for  damages  on 
the  part  of  some  person  other  than  the  employer  to  pay  dam- 
ages, such  other  person  having  elected  not  to  be  bound  by  this 
Act,  then  legal  proceedings  may  be  taken  against  such  other 
person  to  recover  damages  notwithstanding  such  employer's 
payment  of  or  liability  to  pay  compensation  nnder  this  Act,  but 
In  such  case  if  the  action  against  such  other  person  is  brought  by 
the  injured  employee  or  his  personal  representative  and  judgment 
Is  obtained  and  paid,  or  settlement  is  made  with  such  other  per* 
son,  either  with  or  without  suit,  then  from  the  amonnt  received 
by  such  employee  or  personal  representative  there  shall  be  paid 
to  the  employer  the  amount  of  compensation  paid  or  to  be  paid 
by  him  to  such  employee  or  his  personal  representative:  Pro* 
vided,  that  if  the  injured  employee  or  his  personal  representa- 
tive shall  agree  to  receive  compensation  from  the  employer  or  to 
Institute  proceedings  to  recover  the  same  or  accept  from  the 
employer  any  payment  on  account  of  such  compensation,  snch 
employer  shall  he  subrogated  to  all  the  rights  of  such  employee 
or  personal  representative  and  may  maintain,  or  in  case  an 
action  has  already  been  instituted,  may  continue  an  action  either 
in  the  name  of  the  employee  or  personal  representative  or  In 
his  own  name  against  snch  other  person  for  the  recovery  of 


SECTION  30  347 

damages  to  which  but  for  this  Section  the  said  employee  or 
personal  representative  would  be  entitled,  but  such  employer 
shall  nevertheless  pay  over  to  the  injured  employee  or  per- 
sonal representative,  all  snms  collected  from  such  other  person 
by  judgment  or  otherwise  in  excess  of  the  amount  of  such  com- 
pensation paid  or  to  be  paid  under  this  Act,  and  all  costs,  attor- 
neys' fees  and  reasonable  expenses  incurred  by  such  em- 
ployer in  making  such  collection  and  enforcing  such  liability. 
(Amended  by  Act  approved  June  25,  1917.) 

440  Where  the  Appellate  Court  held  that  the  declara- 
tion was  brought  under  the  second  Section  of  29  of 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  Held,  that  the 
declaration  presented  a  good  cause  of  action  at  com- 
mon law  and  not  under  the  Act  and  the  Appellate 
Court  was  reversed.  O'Brien  v.  Chicago  City  Ry. 
Co.,  293  111.  140, 146;  127  N.  E.  389. 


SECTION  30. 

461  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  employer  within  the  provisions 
of  this  Act  to  send  to  the  Industrial  Board  in  writing  an  im- 
mediate report  of  all  accidental  injuries  arising  out  of  or  in  the 
course  of  the  employment  and  resulting  in  death;  it  shall  also 
be  the  duty  of  every  such  employer  to  report  between  the  15th 
and  the  25th  of  each  month  to  the  Industrial  Board  all  acci- 
dental injuries  for  which  compensation  has  been  paid  under  this 
Act,  which  injuries  entail  a  loss  to  the  employee  of  more  than 
one  week's  time,  and  in  case  the  injury  results  in  permanent 
disability,  a  further  report  shall  be  made  as  soon  as  it  is  deter- 
mined that  such  permanent  disability  has  resulted  or  will  result 
from  such  injury.  All  reports  shall  state  the  date  of  the  injury* 
including  the  time  of  day  or  night,  the  nature  of  the  employer's 
business,  the  name,  address,  the  age,  sex,  conjugal  condition  of 
the  injured  person,  the  specific  occupation  of  the  injured  person, 
the  direct  cause  of  the  injury  and  the  nature  of  the  accident,  the 
character  of  the  injury,  the  length  of  disability,  and,  in  case  of 
death,  the  length  of  disability  before  death,  the  wages  of  the 
injured  person,  whether  compensation  has  been  paid  to  the  in- 
jured person,  or  to  his  legal  representatives  or  his  heirs  or  next 
of  kin,  the  amount  of  compensation  paid,  the  amount  paid  for 
physicians',  surgeons'  and  hospital  bills,  and  by  whom  paid,  and 
the  amount  paid  for  funeral  or  burial  expenses,  if  known.  The 
making  of  reports  as  provided  herein  shall  release  the  employer 
covered  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  from  making  such  reports 
to  any  other  officer  of  the  State. 


348  SECTION  31 


SECTION  81. 

451  Any  one  engaging  In  any  business  or  enterprise  referred  to 
In  sub-sections  1  and  2  of  section  3  of  this  Act  who  undertakes 
to  do  any  work  enumerated  therein,  shall  be  liable  to  pay  com- 
pensation to  his  own  immediate  employees  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  in  addition  thereto  if  he  directly 
or  indirectly  engages  any  contractor  whether  principal  or  sub- 
contractor to  do  any  such  work,  he  shall  be  liable  to  pay  compen- 
sation to  the  employees  of  any  such  contractor  or  sub-contractor 
unless  such  contractor  or  sub-contractor  shall  have  insured,  in 
any  company  or  association  authorized  under  the  laws  of  this 
State  to  insure  the  liability  to  pay  compensation  under  this  Act, 
or  guaranteed  his  liability  to  pay  such  compensation. 

In  the  event  any  such  person  shall  pay  compensation  under 
this  section  he  may  recover  the  amount  thereof  from  the  con- 
tractor or  sub-contractor,  if  any,  and  in  the  event  the  contractor 
shall  pay  compensation  under  this  section  he  may  recover  the 
amount  thereof  from  the  sub-contractor,  If  any. 

This  section  shall  not  apply  in  any  case  where  the  accident 
occurs  elsewhere  than  on,  in  or  about  the  Immediate  premises 
on  which  the  principal  has  contracted  that  the  work  shall  be 
done.  (Amended  by  Act  approved  June  28,  1919.) 

452  Where  a  person  hires  an  independent  contractor 
who  might  be  engaged  in  a  dangerous  enterprise  to 
do  some  work  for  him,  and  the  principal  is  not  under 
the  Act,  he  cannot  be  held  liable  to  the  sub-con- 
tractor under  the  provision  of  Section  31.  Lombard 
College  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  548,  550; 
128  N.  E.  553. 

452  Section  31  provides  for  recovery  against  the  con- 
tractor when  the  sub-contractor  failed  to  furnish  the 
insurance.  Illinois  Indemnity  Exchange  v.  Indus- 
trial Commission,  289  111.  233,  238 ;  124  N.  E.  665. 

452  Where  an  employer  has  not  elected  to  come  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  is  not  under 
the  Act  by  any  of  the  provisions  of  Section  3,  he  can- 
not be  held  liable  for  failure  to  insure  under  Section 
31.  Lombard  College  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294 
111.  548,  550;  128  N.  E.  553. 


SECTION  31  349 

452  Where  it  is  contended  that  a  man  who  is  engaged 
134  in  the  hardware  and  paint  business  is  not  liable 
under  the  Act  because  an  employee  of  a  contractor 
sustained  injuries  while  working  on  a  building  which 
was  maintained,  it  was  Held,  that  one  does  not  have 
to  be  exclusively  engaged  in  one  of  the  hazardous  en- 
terprises enumerated  to  make  him  liable  for  com- 
pensation. Davis  v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111. 
29,  32;  130  N.E.  333. 

452  A  retail  grocer  who  hired  a  builder  to  make  alter- 
ations to  his  dwelling-house,  not  being  engaged  in 
an  extra-hazardous  occupation  under  Section  3,  did 
not  have  to  procure  insurance  for  the  contractor 
under  Section  31,  in  order  to  relieve  himself  from 
liability.  Alabach  v.  Industrial  Commission,  291 
111.  338;  126  N.E.  163. 

452  In  construing  Section  31,  the  whole  Act  should  be 
considered  for  the  purpose  of  determining  what  the 
legislature  meant,  and  it  cannot  be  held  that  it  in- 
tended to  include  any  person,  firm  or  corporation 
not  covered  by  the  Act  or  operating  under  it.  Lom- 
bard College  v.  Industrial  Commission,  294  111.  548, 
549,  550;  128  N.  E.  553. 

456  If  work  is  being  done  for  an  owner  in  maintain- 
ing his  building,  the  contractor  and  the  immediate 
employer  of  the  injured  workmen  are  bound  by  the 
Act,  and  if  the  contractor  is  insolvent  and  has  no 
insurance,  his  employer  is  bound  by  the  Act.  Davis 
v.  Industrial  Commission,  297  111.  29,  32;  130  N.  E. 
333. 

456  The  provision  of  Section  31  requiring  principal  to 
see  that  sub-contractor  takes  out  insurance  applies 
to  a  city  engaged  in  enterprise  of  the  kind  mentioned. 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111. 
291,  293;  129  N.  E.  112. 


350  SECTION  32 

456  "A"  was  engaged  by  "BM  who  was  a  sub-con- 
tractor of  the  city  of  "C."  "B"  furnished  team, 
wagon,  and  driver  to  haul  ashes  for  the  city  under 
the  direction  of  the  ward  superintendent.  Inspect- 
ors watched  the  teamster  to  see  that  he  cleaned  the 
streets  and  alleys.  A  street  car  ran  into  the  wagon 
and  injured  "A."  "B''  carried  no  insurance  and 
"C"  contended  that  it  was  excluded  by  Section  5 
from  the  provision  of  Section  31.  Held,  city  is  liable 
to  employee  of  sub-contractor  for  injuries  under  Sec- 
tion 31.  City  of  Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission, 
295  111.  291 ;  129  N.  E.  112. 

456  Section  5  provides  that  employee  of  a  contractor 
shall  not  be  considered  an  employee  of  the  city  but 
under  Section  31  the  city  is  liable  to  such  employee 
if  the  contractor  does  not  carry  insurance.  City  of 
Chicago  v.  Industrial  Commission,  295  111.  291,  293; 
129  N.  E.  112. 

SECTION  82. 

467  If  any  of  the  provision*,  of  this  Act  providing  for  compensa- 
tion for  Injuries  to  or  death  of  employees  shall  be  repealed  or 
adjudged  invalid  or  unconstitutional,  the  period  Intervening  be- 
tween the  occurrence  of  any  injury  or  death  and  such  repeal  or 
final  adjudication  of  invalidity,  shall  not  be  computed  as  a  part 
of  the  time  limited  by  law  for  the  commencement  of  any  action 
relating  to  such  injury  or  death,  but  the  amount  of  any  com- 
pensation which  may  have  been  paid  for  any  such  injury  shall 
be  deducted  from  any  judgment  for  damages  recovered  on  ac- 
count of  such  injury.  Any  claim,  disagreement  or  controversy 
existing  or  arising  under  "An  Act  to  promote  the  general  wel- 
fare of  the  people  of  this  State,  by  providing  compensation  for 
accidental  Injuries  or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employ- 
incut."  approved  June  10,  1911,  In  force  May  1,  1912,  shall  be 
adjusted  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  said  Act,  not- 
withstanding the  repeal  thereof,  or  may  by  agreement  of  the 
parties  be  adjusted  in  accordance  with  the  method  of  procedure 
provided  In  this  Act  for  the  adjustment  of  differences,  jurisdic- 
tion to  adjust  such  differences  so  submitted  by  the  parties  being 
hereby  conferred  upon  the  Industrial  Board  or  committee  of 
arbitration  provided  for  in  this  Act.  (Amended  by  Act  approved 
Jane  25,  1917.) 


SECTIONS  33-35  351 


SECTION  38. 

407  Any  wilful  neglect,  refusal,  or  failure  to  do  the  things  re- 
quired to  be  done  by  any  section,  clause,  or  provision  of  this 
Act,  on  the  part  of  the  persons  herein  required  to  do  them,  or 
any  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  or  requirements 
hereof,  or  any  attempt  to  obstruct  or  interfere  with  any  court 
officer,  or  any  other  person  charged  with  the  duty  of  administer- 
ing or  enforcing  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  be  deemed  a 
misdemeanor,  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  $10.00  nor 
more  than  $500.00  at  the  discretion  of  the  court. 


SECTION 

468         This  Act  may  be  cited  as  the  Workman's  Compensation  Act. 
(Added  by  an  Act  approved  June  28,  1915.) 


SECTION  84. 

458  The  Invalidity  of  any  portion  of  this  Act  shall  In  no  way 
affect  the  validity  of  any  other  portion  thereof  which  can  be 
given  effect  without  such  invalid  part, 


SECTION  85. 

458  That  an  Act  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  State  of 
Illinois  by  providing  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or 
death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment,  approved  June  10, 
1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912,  be,  and  the  same  is,  hereby  repealed. 


RULE  43  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT. 


Supreme  Court  rule  43  as  amended  February  17, 1920. 
The  amendment  merely  changes  the  second  sentence  of 
the  rule  as  originally  adopted. 

Rule  43.  In  case  application  shall  be  made  for  a  writ 
of  error  to  review  any  judgment  or  order  of  court  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  there  shall  be  filed  a 
petition  for  the  writ  signed  by  the  applicant  or  his  attor- 
ney, together  with  a  transcript  of  the  proceedings  and 
judgment  of  the  trial  court,  with  an  assignment  of  errors 
written  upon  or  attached  to  the  transcript,  and  with 
proof  of  notice  to  the  respondent.  There  shall  be  filed 
with  such  transcript  the  transcript  of  proceedings  of  the 
Industrial  Commission  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  circuit 
court.  The  petitioner  shall  file  with  his  petition  an  ab- 
stract of  the  record,  prepared  in  accordance  with  rules 
14  and  16  of  this  court.  The  petition  shall  contain  a  con- 
cise statement  of  the  case  and  of  the  points  and  authori- 
ties relied  upon  for  the  issuance  of  the  writ.  Twelve 
copies  of  such  petition  and  abstract  shall  be  filed  with 
the  clerk  of  this  court  within  the  time  allowed  by  said 
Workmen 's  Compensation  Act  for  the  filing  of  said  peti- 
tion asking  for  a  writ  of  error.  If  the  petition  is  filed  in 
vacation  the  respondent  may  file  a  reply  within  seven 
days  after  notice  of  the  filing  of  the  petition,  and  if  the 
petition  is  filed  at  a  term  a  reply  may  be  filed  on  or  before 
the  following  Tuesday.  Such  reply  shall  state  briefly 
and  concisely  the  points  and  authorities  relied  upon  to 
meet  or  obviate  the  alleged  errors  and  sustain  the  judg- 


354  RULE  43  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

ment,  which  reply  shall  constitute  an  appearance  in  the 
case.  Twelve  copies  of  such  reply  shall  be  filed.  Oral 
arguments  will  not  be  heard  upon  such  application.  In 
case  the  writ  shall  not  be  granted  the  transcript  of  the 
record  of  the  trial  court  shall  be  returned  forthwith  to 
the  clerk  of  the  court  from  which  the  record  was  brought. 

The  application  shall  be  docketed,  " ,  Petitioner,  v. 

,  Respondent. ' '    If  the  petition  shall  be  granted  the 

cause  shall  be  docketed  thereafter  as  in  cases  of  ordinary 
writs  of  error,  the  petitioner  being  designated  as  plaintiff 
in  error,  but  shall  retain  the  original  number  of  the  peti- 
tion, and  no  additional  docket  fee  shall  be  required  of  the 
petitioner.  A  scire  facias  to  hear  errors  shall  be  issued 
in  the  manner  provided  by  rule  6,  returnable  on  the  first 
day  of  the  next  term  for  all  respondents  who  have  not 
appeared  in  opposition  to  the  petition.  If  the  petition  is 
granted  the  cause  shall  proceed  as  if  pending  on  a  writ 
of  error.  Either  party  may  file  a  further  brief  or  ab- 
stract or  submit  the  cause  on  the  petition  and  abstract  or 
reply  filed  by  such  party  on  the  application  for  the  writ. 

At  page  513  of  Schneider's  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act,  1912-19,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  rule  adopted 
October  27,  1919,  would  work  a  hardship  in  some  in- 
stances. 

The  amendment  adopted  February  17,  1920,  meets 
these  objections. 

The  practice  with  reference  to  filing  a  reply  to  the  peti- 
tion is  different  from  the  usual  rule.  The  reply  must  be 
filed  within  seven  days  after  notice  of  the  filing  of  the 
petition  for  the  writ  of  error,  whether  in  vacation  or  term 
time. 

For  a  form  of  petition  for  writ  of  error,  see  Schneider's 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  1912-1919,  at  page  534. 


INDEX. 


A 

ACCIDENT 

accidental 

death  presumed  59 

injuries  defined    51 

adhesions  in  tendons  of  wrist  53 

air-hose,  cause  of   73 

altercation  as   79 

anthrax  57 

as    79 

as  an  64 

resulting  in  death  240 

aorta    ruptured    54 

"arising  out  of"    69 

arm  injured  264 

asphyxiation  as    Ill 

assault    107 

as    48,  90 

blindness  resulting  from  60 

blister  opened  79 

blood  pressure  intensified 261 

blood  vessel  ruptured  52 

boy  shot  by  air-hose  49 

burned  to  death  80 

cancer  as  cause  of 339 

carrying   matches    80 

casualty  insurance  rule,  not  followed 53 

catching  fire   78 

causal  connection    70 

causative    danger    100 

cerebral    hemorrhage    55,  250 

chill  as   78 

cigarette  causing  77 

clot  on  brain    56 

compressed  air  hose   76 

condition,  result  of  254 

conditions  of  employment   105 

curiosity  of  employee  68 

danger  incurred  by  employee  103 

death  not  by  299 

defective  vision  not  caused  by  200 

defined 52 

(355) 


356  INDEX 

ACCIDENT— (Continued) 

disablement  by  occupational  disease  63 

disfigurement   from   lock-jaw   198 

drunken  condition,  cause  of 56 

drunkenness,  result  of 75 

during 

intervals  112 

lunch-hour  89 

duty  to  report   29 

electrocution   116,  247 

elemental  forces    131 

elements  as  cause  of  73,  111 

elevator  cause  of 89 

employment  82 

epilepsy  causing  death 61 

evidence,  to  prove  256 

exertion  not  shown    56 

external  force,  considered   66 

eye 

hurt  by   screw-driver   121 

injury 122,  200 

sight  injured  314 

lost  200,  254,  263 

restored  by  lense   200 

restored  by  operation 270 

fall 

causing  death  88 

from  fire  escape   315 

from   scaffold    260 

from  wagon  51,  263 

fear  resulting  in  blood  clot   58 

finger  197 

injured 79 

lost    157 

freezing  hands   106 

fright,  causing  stroke   55 

frost-bite    66 

getting  fresh  air   112 

hand    198 

heart 

disease  from  excitement  58 

trouble    60 

heat    stroke    55,  57,78, 105,  263 

hernia    182 

horse-play    49,  57,.  101 

incident  to  work  71 

incurring  own  danger  71 

infection 

by  bacillus    241 

cause  of   79 

injured  by  elements    66 


INDEX  357 

ACCIDENT—  ( Continued ) 

injured   cutting  wood    339 

injury 

common  to  public  107 

excluded   68 

on  elevator    113 

to  back   189 

in  the  course  of   82,  85 

killed  by  elevator   80, 149 

knee  injury 230 

larking,  as  cause  of  74 

lead  poisoning  as   62,    64 

leg 

broken  by  fall 130 

fracture    300 

lost  152 

pains    65 

leisure  period   90 

lightning     77,  78, 105 

local  infection,  as   65 

lock-jaw 

as    186 

from  rusty  nail   271 

machinist  killed  85 

maritime  commerce   156 

moving  freight  train   73 

nephritis,  not  an  51 

no  contract  of  employment  146 

not  common  to  neighborhood    72 

notice  of  25 

occurrence   53 

on  way  to  work  86,    91 

origin   of    70, 104 

paralysis,  carrying  baggage    54 

partial  loss  of  hand  203 

phalange  lost   195 

physical   exertion    54 

premises    30,   86,    91 

proof  of    114 

pulmonary  hemorrhage,  as 58 

quarrel  about  work   55, 108 

refusal  to  submit  to  operation   53 

related    to   employment    85 

relation  of  assault  to  work  108 

requirement  as  to  time,  place  and  cause 53 

risk 

common  to  public  66, 104 

incidental  to  employment    70, 103 

of  employment   54, 100 

rupture,  cause  of 311 

rusty  nail,  causing  262 


358  INDEX 

ACCIDENT—  (Continued) 

sciatica,  not 59 

sequence  of  events  59 

shock,    aggravating    condition    61 

sky-larking    49 

sleeping,    as    75 

smoking,  cause  of  81 

spine    injury    191 

statistics   of    131 

stomach  pain,  as  65 

striking  matches  78 

sun-stroke    52,   77 

tornado,  as   79,  111 

two  theories  of   11G 

ulcer  of  stomach  88 

voluntary  Work   95 

weight-lifting,  cardiac  dilatation  54 

while  getting  warm   112 

wind-storm    77 

ACT 

affects  social  relations 35 

automatic  provisions    3 

constitutional 37 

effect  on  law  action  35 

exercise  of  police  power 37 

expense  of  injury  like  cost  of  machinery 36 

extra-territorial  effect  46 

invalidity  of  part,  effect  of 30 

purpose    of    232 

refusal  to  comply  with 31 

referred  to  occupational  disease 64 

scope    of    35 

speedy  remedy  contemplated 36 

statutory  indemnity   fixed    36 

subject  of — statutory 51 

ACTION  AT  COMMON  LAW 

allegations  in  pleadings  4 

averments 

in  declaration    60,  133 

of  casual  employment  139 

compensation,   as   substitute    162 

certificate 

as  to  non-election  4 

form  of  4 

death  of  human  being,  not  provided  for 140 

declaration 

amended   138 

averring,  neither  under  Act 140 

specific  averments    139 


INDEX  359 

ACTION  AT  COMMON  LAW—  (Continued) 

employee,  when  under  act  5 

inapplicable  to  modern  conditions   36 

no  judicial  notice  in  absence  of  averments 139 

no  presumption,  as  to  being  under  act  139 

no  vested  right  in 45 

right 

given  to  administrator 140 

of,  taken  away    162 

to  nullify   45 

statement  as  to  employment,  in  declaration 139 

when  abrogated 5 

APPLICATION  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIM 

claim  previous,  not  required  338 

how  acted  upon   234 

insanitary  practices   238 

is  claim  for  compensation   336 

petition  to  suspend  267 

who   files    180,  238,  239 

ARBITRATOR 

duties   of    18 

hearings 18 

salary    of 16 

"ARISING  OUT  OF" 
accident 

as    69, 116 

during  intervals 112 

applying   principle    69 

causal  connection    69 

clothing  catching  fire  80 

danger   incurred    71 

defined    72 

determination,  as  to    67,    71 

disobeying  orders    93,    97 

drunkenness  69,  75 

evidence 

as  to 117,  317 

as  to  heat-stroke  279 

going  to  and  from  work  71 

horse-play    76, 101 

injury 

in  performance  of  employment  ; 101 

when    125 

killed  by  tornado   Ill 

leaning  against  car   76 

letting  another  do  work  95 

negligence,  affect  on 68 


360  INDEX 

"ARISING  OUT   OP"—  (Continued) 

prank  with  air-hose  73 

quarrel,  about  drink    109 

regaining  pipe    77 

risk   intensified    78 

short-cut  down  fire-escape  315 

voluntary    act    72, 76,  94 

not  accepted    96 

volunteering    94 

"ARISING  OUT  OF  AND  IN  THE  COURSE  OF" 67 

ASSAULT 

felonious    108 

injury  by   258 

origin  in  employment   109 

personal   grudge    107, 109 

quarrel    102 

over  drink  109 

over  past  event  108 

over  staves  107 

when  90 

ATTORNEY'S  FEES 

reasonableness    235 

when  allowed  22 

AWARD 

administrator,  how  distributed  179 

against  insurance  carrier 28 

binding  on  court,  when   313 

clerical  error    258,  305 

corrected    274 

how  corrected  257 

competent  evidence    189 

to   sustain    263 

covering  more  than  time  for  healing  259 

date,  how  fixed    276 

death  of  widow   128 

decision  on  review,  effect  of  276 

determination  of  earning  capacity   390 

disfigurement 

and  loss  of  earning  capacity  189 

and  same  injury  not  allowed  187 

double  compensation,  error 192 

effect  of  writ  of  error 276 

eighteen  months  review  from  when   323 

evidence 

as  to  notice  conflicting 257 

does    not   sustain    263 


INDEX  361 

AWARD —  ( Continued) 
finding 

of  dependency 175 

of   facts,  unnecessary    257 

of  payment  to  another   257 

referring  to  section  of  statute  258 

should  state  nature  of  injury  258 

that  notice  not  given    258 

foreclosure  of  24 

for  leg  not  sustained   , 65 

for  loss  of  leg  set  aside  199 

for  partial  dependency   173 

how  computed   259 

how   modified    322 

how  reduced  to  judgment   319 

interest  on 320 

judgment  on   22 

lien  on  property   24 

limited  by  time  of  temporary  total  disability 186 

modified,  when  204 

negligence  affecting 68 

no  basis  for 258 

non-assignable 24 

not  allowed,  when 92 

not  justified  108 

not  sustained,  when  65,  266 

not  vacated  pending  review  275 

opinion  evidence,  not  competent   301 

partial  incapacity   188 

partial  loss  of  arm  203 

pension 

ceases  when 205 

for  life    259 

permanent  partial  disability  set  aside   185 

petition  to  review,  though  attacked  by  writ  of  error. .  312 

requirement  as  to  existence  of  beneficiary 179 

res  judicata  128 

reversed,  where  employee  refuses  operation   270 

review 

not  statute  of  limitations   323 

within  eighteen  months   23 

second,  after  reversal   260 

set   aside    102 

when    190,  258 

where   no   evidence    243 

where  no  notice    334 

where  notice  not  complied  with  333 

similar  to  judgment  275 

suspension  for  failure  to  submit  to  operation 318 


362  INDEX 

AWARD—  ( Continued ) 

sustained    ]  54 

by  evidence  271 

by  evidence  though   findings  incomplete 274 

when    262,  315 

when  eye  injured  201 

time  to  review  where  wtit  of  error  pending 323 

time  within  which  to  review  for  increase 324 

two   injuries    187 

vacated,  where  return  to  work 191 

when  modified    7 

when  not  justified   279 

where  notice  not  given  259 

where  partial  incapacity  no  percentage  of  loss 193 

widow  dies  before   327 

B 

BENEFICIARIES 

administration  required    7 

burden  as  to  contribution 255 

child 

emancipated   165,  168 

supporting  self    168 

under  sixteen  years  207 

child's  share  paid  how 7 

children    defined    164 

effect  of  divorce  166 

out  of  wed-lock  42 

common-law  wife,  rights   170 

compensation  increased,  when  7 

death 

before   award    128 

effect  of   24 

of  widow   327 

dependency 

determination  of  7,  327 

question  of  degree 177 

question  of  fact  174,  175,  265 

though  no  contribution  173 

dependent 

defined    174 

on  beneficiary    25 

rights  of  163 

determined,    how     236 

divorced  wife   166 

effect  of  contributions  176 

emancipation  167 

proof  of   165 


INDEX  363 

BENEFICIARIES—  ( Continued) 

existence  of  will  172 

expectancy  of  life  considered  212 

father  not   dependent    176 

illegitimate  child    164 

insufficiency  of  proof 305 

legal  obligation  to  support   164 

alimony 166 

defined    168 

lineal   heir,   defined    206 

marriage,  proof  of 169 

means  of  support   174 

mother 

in  Servia   171 

partially  dependent  174,  176 

no  lump  sum  to  pay  debts  of  ; . .  215 

non-resident    7 

order  of  dependency  modified 7 

parents  as   171 

partial   dependency    172 

pension  entitled  to,  when 144 

presumption  as  to  existence  176 

proof  of  existence 171,  256 

receipt  of  check,  time  for  claim   338 

right  in,  after  death   328 

right  to  waive  compensation  25 

son  in  army   168 

test  of  dependency 172 

where  partial  dependency 173 

widow  dies    128 

wife,  dependency  presumed  165 

BUSINESSES 

acids 3 

act  refers  to 133 

altering  structure 3 

automatic  effect  on 120 

carriage  by  land •. 3,  126 

and  delivery,  distinguished 134 

cleaning  walls  of  building 123 

college 

as 122 

not  hazardous 123 

delivery,  as  incident  to 134 

demolishing  structure 3 

departments,  not  connected  with  hazard 135 

deriving  income  from  building 125 

detective  agency 137 

determination  of  hazard 131 

distribution  of  commodities 3 

electrical  work  .                                                                   .  126 


364  INDEX 

BUSINESSES—  ( Continued ) 

employer 

in  hazardous 128 

in  two  kinds 121 

enterprise 

defined 132 

establishes  status 134 

erecting  own  dwelling  house 122 

erection  of  structure 3 

explosive-materials 3 

farmers  excluded  3 

felling  trees 124 

fluids    3 

gases    3 

hazard 

of  130 

question  of  fact 123 

hazardous 

enterprise 122 

when 132 

horse-buying    120 

horse-buying  and  selling 50 

junk-dealer 122 

legislature  classifies,  which  are  under 136 

livery-stable  keeper 129 

machinery  regulated  by  ordinance 3 

maintaining  structure 3 

manufacturing 

chemicals    135 

peroxide    122 

mining  3 

molten  metal 3 

non-hazardous,  no  duty  to  insure 349 

ordinance  regulations  imposed 127 

preparing  junk,  hazardous 123,  136 

providing  home,  not  hazardous 136 

quarrying  3 

removing  structure 3 

retail  grocer 125 

school  subject  to  inspection 128 

selling  of  sewing-machines 131 

some  departments,  hazardous 133 

stock-raising,  excluded 3 

storehouse 3 

supplying  water 127 

under  act 3 

vapors    3 

ware-house  3 

what  determines  liability 119 

when  not  specifically  mentioned 137 


INDEX  365 


CIRCUIT  COURT 

affidavits  need  not  show  diligence 304 

alias  writ  of  certiorari 291 

how  issued  292 

appearance  limited 293 

authority,  where  finding  is  correct 301 

bond  required 300 

clerical  error 

corrected    301,  302 

not  reversed 305 

certiorari,  when  commenced 21 

constitutionality  of  review  of  law  only 288 

decision 

as  justified  by  law 302 

by   22 

not  set  aside 304 

reviewed  21 

delay  avoided 294 

duty  of  clerk 293 

judgment 

entered  300,  302 

how  stayed 23 

on  award 22 

judicial  review  of  facts 287 

jurisdiction 292 

contested 293 

how  obtained 292 

of  289 

special  290 

transferred   293 

may  confirm  or  set  aside 300 

money  judgment,  error 303 

motion  to  remand  should  have  been  granted 304 

objection  to  writ  of  certiorari 292 

orders  reviewed,  how 22 

other  forms  of  review  excluded 290 

power 

to  review  evidence 284 

where  no  dispute  as  to  facts 302 

practice 

additional  evidence 21 

law  and  fact 21 

notice  for  judgment 23 

petition  for  judgment 22 

power  to  modify  judgment 23 

prescribed  by  judgment 291 

praecipe,  filing 21,  292 

proceedings,  how  governed 292 

proof  indefinite,  power 301 


366  INDEX 

CIRCUIT  COURT—  (Continued) 

proving  existence  of  record 318 

quashing  writ 294 

question  of  fact — not  proper 299 

record    295 

insufficient   301 

presents,  what 317 

presumed  to  be  true 297 

shows  no  ruling 297 

refusal  to  remand,  error 304 

remanding 301,  304 

remedy,  vested  right  in  297 

requirement  for  certiorari 21 

review 

additional  evidence  not  heard 281 

evidence 294 

how  20 

is  special  statutory  proceeding 290 

of  fact,  question 280 

record  must  show  ruling 298 

record  not  disregarded 298 

remanding  cause 22 

scope  of 294,  312 

weight  of  evidence 281 

scire  facias 21 

setting  aside  decision,  distinguished 298 

stay  of  judgment 22 

suit  commenced  when 291 

supersedeas,  effect  on  jurisdiction 311 

transfer  of  cause 293 

Venue  Act 293 

writ  of  certiorari 290 

authority 303 

how  quashed   291 

no  money  judgment 303 

receipt  necessary 299 

when  sued  out 293 

writ  of  error,  effect  on  jurisdiction 312 

CLAIM 

See  Notice,  Compensation 

CLASS  LEGISLATION 

legislative  question  39 

COMPENSATION 

additional  for  delay 24 

agreement  for,  how  reviewed 23 


INDEX  367 

COMPENSATION—  ( Continued) 

amount 

earned,  not  basis  for  reduction 191 

limited  8 

of,  question  for  commission 163,  312 

of,  for  death 6 

of,  not  reviewed  by  court 312 

recovered  from  contractor 30 

to  widow 164 

annual  earnings 222 

effect  of 6 

annuity  purchased 26 

application  satisfies 336 

arm   10 

assault 108 

basis 

for  computation 205,  222 

on  average  earnings 222 

where  partial  permanent  incapacity 190 

beneficiaries  effect  of 7 

children's  right  to 6 

claim 

for 25 

for,  condition  precedent 336 

for,  verbal 335 

from  time  of  accident 337 

in  six  months 329,  333 

insufficient   337 

jurisdictional  334 

letter  appealing  to  kindness 337 

not  extended  by  eighteen  months'  provision 339 

not  in  writing 336 

time  from  payment  of  check 338 

where,  return  to  work 25 

within  six  months 334 

collateral  heirs,  right  to 6 

collection  by  administrator 180 

commuted  when    211 

computation 

dependent  on  ability 221 

how  made 218,  224 

wages  subject  to  deduction 221 

where  interruptions  to  employment 220 

death 

effect  on  payments 11 

of  beneficiary 24 

deductions  allowed 6 

demand 

for,  permit  to  doctor  as  claim 335 

required 230 

denial  of,  no  effect  on  examination 227 

denied,  when 253 


368  INDEX 

COMPENSATION—  (Continued) 

dependent's  right  to 6 

depositing,  when  required 26 

determination 

as  to  person  entitled 180 

for  installment  period 14 

of  weekly  rate 208 

difference  in  earning  capacity 9 

disability  and  disfigurement 187 

disfigurement 188 

and  loss  of  earning  capacity 189 

and  loss  of  member 188 

how  fixed 8 

distinction  in  term 182 

double,  not  allowed 187,  192,  198 

earnings 

effect  on 218 

as  basis  of 220 

deductions  allowable 220 

how  computed 223 

effect  of  possible  recovery 200 

employee 

earning,  same  as  before 192 

refusing  operation 182 

employer  discharged  as  to 7 

estate,  no  interest  in 163 

extinguished,  how 24,  327 

not  retroactive 327 

eye-sight  10 

finger  9 

foot 10 

for  death 163 

for  loss  of  eye 201 

grand-children's  right  to 6 

grand-parent's  right  to 6 

hand   10 

how  computed 13 

impossibility  to  make  claim  in  six  months 336 

increase  of  percentage 12 

installments 

how  fixed 6 

how  paid 11 

maximum  increased 12 

minimum  increased 12 

leg 10 

legal  obligation  to  support 165 

liability,  where  third  person  involved 28 

loss  of  hand 198 

loss  of  leg 199 

loss  of  two  members 10 

maximum    6 

in  case  of  death..                                                    .  178 


INDEX  369 

COMPENSATION—  (Continued) 

minimum    6 

none,  for  pain  and  suffering 190 

non-fatal  injury 8 

not  dependent  on  acknowledging  liability 228 

official,  not  entitled  to 145 

original  capacity  returned 192 

parents,  right  to 6 

partial 

dependency  6 

incapacity 188 

loss  of  vision 60 

permanent   incapacity 9 

payment 

of  in  lump  sum 12 

of,  without  reference  to  act 50 

payments 

abated    328 

beyond  accrued  amount 194 

commenced  when 8 

not  under  act 337 

pension 

amount  of 11 

for  life 10,  61 

when,  ceases 11 

period  of  payment 11 

permanent  partial  loss  of  use  of  member 10 

persons  similarly  situated 105 

phalange  9 

practice,  printed  argument 309 

pre-existing  disease 60 

previous  injuries,  effect  of 14 

proceedings  for 25 

proportioning  loss 10,  202 

reduced,  when 267 

reduction,  not  allowed 224 

refund  of 328 

refusal  to 

accept  operation,  effect  of 268 

pay   22 

take  treatment 206 

release  from 330 

report  of  amount  paid .' 30 

requirements  as  to 182 

right  to 234 

specific  losses 9 

suspended,  when 19,  270 

table  of 31 

temporary  total  incapacity 8 

third  person  not  under  act 29 

thumb    9 

toe 9 


370  INDEX 

COMPENSATION—  ( Continued) 

total  dependency 6 

total  permanent  disability 10 

to  whom  paid 1,  179 

vested    163 

waiver  of  amount 25 

when  illegal 213 

when  suspended 50 

where  employee  recovers  earning  capacity 193 

who  entitled  to 179,  236 

widow's  right  to 6 

written  demand,  when  necessary 334,  335 

yearly  wage,  how  figured 223 

CONSTITUTIONALITY 

automatic  provisions 120 

presumption  favors 45 

section  three  considered 120 

CONTRACT 

accident  with 73 

contemplation  of 98 

effect  of 158,  331 

elements,  discussed 147 

employment 

necessary 82 

terminated,  when 146 

evidence  as  to 

existence  of 142 

relationship   146 

fulfilling  service 101 

hazardous  outside  of 93 

implication  from 81 

in  perversion  of  justice 329 

insurance 344 

of  employer 328 

of  two  employers  as  affecting  employee 142 

presumed  fraudulent,  when 25 

requirement  of 4,  5 

right  of,  not  impaired 39 

risk  incidental  to 100 

settlement 

by  232 

where  jurisdiction  lost 329 

volunteering,  effect  of 95 

when  casual  employment 148 

with  employer,  not  affected 87 

CONSTRUCTION 

absurd  consequences  avoided 291 

British  Act  considered  . ,  41 


INDEX  371 

CONSTRUCTION—  ( Continued) 

court  cannot  go  beyond  law 41 

courts,  power  limited 40 

extent  of  modification  not  for  courts 42 

fine-spun  theories  disregarded 41 

foreign  act  worded  differently 41 

humane  law,  liberal 43 

intention  of  legislature  considered 40,  42 

liberal    35,  200,  304 

reason  of  enactment  considered 43 

remedial  nature  considered 44 

statute  not  retrospective 42 

statutes  operate  in  future 43 

true  intent  carried  out 45 

words  considered  in  ordinary  sense 42,  43 


D 

DEPENDENCY 

determination  of 7 

DISABILITY 

arm  injury 198 

broken  bone 185 

ceasing,  rights 23 

color  blindness 202 

complete,  effect  of 204 

difficulty  to  ascertain  extent  of 325 

disablement,  accident 63 

disfigurement 195 

distal  phalange 197 

double  compensation  set  aside 198 

finger,  phalange 196 

green  stick  fracture 185 

healing 

period  considered 185 

process  completed 259 

process  defined 194 

incapacity  to  use  member 203 

index  finger 197 

loss 

both  hands  203 

eye 201 

leg,  whole  or  part 199 

one-sixteenth  of  phalange,  not 185 

partial,  of  phalange 195 

partial  permanent 194 

percentage  loss,  not  ascertainable 202 

reduction  in  earning  capacity 189 

substitute  for  hand. .                                                            .  198 


372  INDEX 

DISABILITY—  ( Continued ) 

temporary 

incapacity  for  work 190 

total  defined 194 

total  incapacity 184 

thumb,  phalange 196 

DISEASE 

accident,    when    79 

anthrax    58,  62 

arterio-sclerosis 61 

bacillus  inoculating   58 

beat  hand. 62 

cardiac  dilatation   54 

epilepsy    61 

excitement  58 

heart  trouble  60,  66 

hemorrhage  54 

hernia   182 

correction  of  270 

injury  by  58 

lead  poisoning   62 

nephritis 61,  247,  263 

no  relation  to  accident 200 

occupational,  defined  61,  65 

pre-existing 59,  314 

affecting  blindness 60 

choroiditis   263 

plumbism   65 

prostate  infected  65 

pulmonary  hemorrhage 58 

sciatica   59 

sun-stroke,  as  58 

teeth  infected  65 

tonsils  infected 65 

ulcer  of  stomach 88 

vision  lost  by  59 

wool  sorter's  62 

DISFIGUREMENT 

lock-jaw,  as 186 

serious  and  permanent 186 

DISOBEYING  ORDERS 

accident,  not  result  of  orders 73 

conclusion  from  evidence  251 

customary  path    81 

custom  to  violate 98 

death,  where  68 

employee 92,  97,  110 

paper  rules   98 

smoking 77,    98 


INDEX  373 


DOCTOR 


chiropractor,  as  expert   242 

court  won't  pass  on  merits  of  systems  314 

duty,  where  employee  about  to  die 15 

expert  testimony   241 

impossibility  to  determine  cause 262 

inability  to  forecast  results 247 

not  allowed  to  express  belief 245 

opinion   as   to   injury    242,   246,  247 

qualification  as  expert  242 

statement  as  to  what  he  would  have  done 270 

testimony  as  to 

cause  of  nephritis    263 

disability 243 

infection   262 

plumbism 65 

testimony  of  chiropractor  191 

when  not  qualified   247 

when  qualified  as  expert   246 

DUE  PROCESS 

employer  not  deprived  of  property  38 


£ 

EARNINGS 

how  ascertained  14 

EMPLOYEE 

ability  to  earn,  effect  on  pension 11 

able  to  earn 193 

able  to  work,  when   192 

acting  in  emergency 94 

acts  incidental  to  comfort 89 

after  death,  not  143 

aliens 5 

all-around  man  exposed  to  hazard   135 

appointment,  effect  of 5 

arrangement  among   87 

area  of  duty 91 

asleep   90,  104 

assault  by 107 

assisting  in  execution  of  order 99 

assuming  to  act  for  himself  110 

benefit  from  illegal  settlement  331 

bobbin-grinding  as  hazard   134 

bridge-repairer  hurt  153 

burden  of  proof  102 

burned  starting  fire 243 

eager  driving  mule 99 


374  INDEX 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 

carpenter  injured 271,  277,  311 

carrying  matches 99 

ceasing  work  '. 83 

chauffeur  drunk 56,     88 

choosing  dangerous  place 71,    97 

chore-man  in  stable   148 

claim  enforced  against  carrier 231 

claiming  compensation 336 

climbing  freight-train 73 

coal  digger  injured 184,  204 

coal  miner  injured  189,  300 

compelled  to  work  under  adverse  conditions 223 

compensation,  where  he  is  earning 193 

conductor   ordering   lunch    69 

contractor  as 145 

contract   required    5 

contributions  to   family    172 

crossing  flag-man  155 

curiosity  of 76 

custom,  effect  of 85 

cyclone  injuries   104 

danger  of  own  choosing  76 

dead-heading   114 

death  of,  evidence  preserved  24 

denned  5 

delivery-wagon  driver  killed   296 

determination   of   relationship    144 

directions  to 97 

disabled  by  occupational  disease 63 

disfigurement  and  incapacity 187 

doing 

duty  not  required   97 

incidental  act 102 

piece  work  157 

work  outside  of  contract 95 

drunkenness  of 69,  75,  100 

duty 

apart  from  machinery 118 

putting  him  in  dangerous  place 97 

to  show  knowledge  of  employer 183 

to  submit  to  examination 227,  228 

earnings 

denned 219 

in  ascertaining  compensation 220 

eating  lunch   76 

effect  of 

beginning  work 49 

ordinance   129 

electing  own  physician 8,  183 

employed  by  two  employers 141 


INDEX  375 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 
employment  of 

abandoned 98 

determines   119 

not  in  act  124 

engaged  in  maritime  commerce  156 

engineer 

asphyxiated   -. Ill 

injured 152 

killed 110,  262 

evidence,  as  to  duties 136 

exchanging  work  94 

exclusion  by  Federal  Laws 5 

expecting  to  perform  task  in  interstate  commerce 151 

exposed  to 

hazard 104,  136 

risk  not  incidental 101 

express-man  injured  157 

extra  switchman    146 

facts  determine  status  161 

falling  asleep 112 

fall  from 

ladder    315 

scaffold    126 

wagon    134 

filling  bottle 91 

fire-chief  killed  143 

freight-trucker  handling  interstate  commerce 149 

found  dead 60,  70,  115,  116 

getting  fresh  air  99 

getting  receipt 83 

going  to  and  from  work 81,  88 

going  to  toilet 89 

grudge  of  109 

hazardous  work  of   132 

health  of 102 

hide-sorter    79 

horse-play,  injures    76 

hours  of  service  act  152 

hurt,  answering  phone  61 

janitor  killed 128 

ice  cream  wagon  driver  killed 264 

idleness  and  inefficiency  222 

incidental  duties 133 

incompetent,  rights  of  11 

in  course  of 82 

incurring  danger  103 

independent  contractor,  as  5 

in  hazardous  occupation 232 

in  heated  building 57 


376  .  INDEX 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 

injured 

by  elements  72 

on  elevator 113 

on  fire  escape  315 

riding  bucking  horse   321 

in  line  outside  of  hiring  48 

near   premises    86 

on  premises  86 

insanitary  practises 19,  238,  267 

insurance  solicitor,  frost-bitten 66 

in  interstate  commerce 149 

killed 

by  electric  shock    251 

by  lightning   106 

by   tornado    79 

cutting  trees 124,  158 

in  elevator  89 

knocked  out  of  window  314 

laborer  assaulted  109 

laborer  on  street 57 

laundress  injured 186 

laying  switch  in  mine 189 

lead  poisoning   62 

leaving  premises 89 

leaving   work    71 

legal  obligation  to  support 165 

leisure  periods  of 90 

long  shoreman   106 

loss  of  accommodation  of  eye  201 

lunch  hour  89 

machine-hand 80 

medical  examination  of  14 

wilk  wagon  driver  injured  106,  128 

mine  examiner  killed  116 

miner 

assaulted 108 

eye-sight  lost   263 

injured 275 

injured  by  fire  277 

killed  by  train  115 

sustains  eye-injury 200 

minors  5 

mode  of  payment,  not  controlling 158 

mule-driver  hurt   191 

negligence    68 

night  watchman  killed  137 

no  refusal  to  take  treatment 271 

not  exposed  to  machinery 129,  130 

not  independent  contractor 159 

not  in  hazardous  occupations 125 


INDEX  377 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 

not  in  usual  course  of  trade 6 

not  on  pay-roll  148 

not  performing  duty 102 

obeying  orders  113 

obstructing  examination 15 

occupations,  hazardous  124,  133 

officials  excepted 5 

officials  excluded  144 

on  duty,  when 146 

operating  elevator  113 

operation 

does  not  have  to  submit  to  267 

rule  as  to 268 

orchestra  leader  stabbed  132 

orders 

disobeyed    68 

from  co-employee 95 

ordinance  protects  128 

other  person  permitted  to  drive 95 

overcome  by  heat   105 

paint-mixer  injured 93 

parent  under  legal  obligation  to  support  167 

part  in  hazardous,  part  in  non-hazardous  work 135 

partially  incapacitated  188 

pension 

effect  of    5 

rights    144 

permanently  disabled  when 205 

piece-work  by 143 

pit-car  driver  hurt 264 

planer  injured    157 

playing  with  air-hose  74 

plumber   killed    56,    57 

policeman 

killed 145 

not  an  144 

powers  of  5 

power  to  waive  rights 25 

procuring  lunch 102 

prohibition  as  to  work 99 

protected  by  ordinance 129 

punch-press  worker 96 

quarrel   of    102 

quenching  thirst 113 

railroad  detective  killed    153,  154 

refusal 

of  treatment  by  19 

to  submit  to  examination  258 

to  submit  to  operation 182,  185,  205,  269,  312 

to  submit  to  treatment  203 


378  INDEX 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 

rejection  by 2 

relationship  ceases   84 

repairing  transmission  line 99 

resting 

in  dangerous  place   81 

in  shade 101 

restored  to  work 194 

return  to  former  employment 11,  25,  339 

riding  free  91 

right  to  control 159 

right  to  pension    143 

risk  increased  98 

satisfying  curiosity 68 

serious  suffering,  as  result  of  treatment 271 

setting  up  machinery 121 

settlement  by 322 

shot  by  air-hose 49 

simple  work 161 

slate-picker  hurt 96 

sleeping 75,  101 

smelter  injured 65 

solicitor  for  laundry 130 

special  policeman  killed 137,  154 

stone-mason  injured 260 

street  inspector 88 

struck  by  lightning 105 

subjected  to  peculiar  risk Ill 

subject  to  risk  of  public 106 

subrogation  to  employer 345 

substantial  part  of  work  in  inter-state 152 

taking  care  of  injury 314 

teamster  killed,  by  elevator 80 

testimony  as  to  injuries 244 

test  as  to  submitting  to  operation 269 

testimony  as  to  relation 143 

track-welder  injured 141 

trapper  killed 316 

travelling  salesman  paralyzed 54 

truck  driver  killed 69,  110 

trucker  killed 114 

two  injuries 187,  195 

unfit  for  work 75 

using  substitute  for  hand 198 

violating  orders 92,  98 

voluntary  act  of 72 

volunteer  defined  76,  93,  95 

wages 

how  ascertained 219 

not  subject  to  premium 28 

waiter  assaulted  by  bus-boy 109,  316 


INDEX  379 

EMPLOYEE—  ( Continued) 

warning,  possible 91,98 

welder  injured 314 

what  is  not  refusal 270 

when  exposed  to  hazard 135 

when,  in  hazardous  business 128 

when  not  entitled  to  compensation 192 

when  totally  disabled 206 

wholly  incapacitated 259 

withdrawal  from  act 2 

wood- worker 79 

wool-sorter  dies 57 

working  for  sales  department 134 

yard  foreman  injured 55 

EMPLOYER 

ability  to  work 266 

accepting  by  letter 50 

agreement  reviewed 322 

automatically  under,  when 130 

bond  filed  by 300 

business  of  as  factor 119 

business  of,  hazardous 124 

city  liable  as 125,  350 

college  as 122 

compulsion  to  pay  compensation 26 

condition  imposed  by 221 

contractor 

hired  by  agent 126,  141 

not  insured    348 

contract  with  others 30 

credited  for  compensation 268 

defenses  abolished 46 

definition  of 4 

delivery  of  water  incident  to  business 134 

detective  agency 138 

discharge  of  liability 7 

duty  to 

guard  air-hose 73 

insure 26 

procure  insurance  when 350 

report  accident 29 

election 

bound,  when 1 

by  writing  letter 121 

effect  of 2,  50 

not  to  pay  compensation 2 

to  pay 1 

engaged  in 

inter-state  commerce 150 

two  businesses .  125 


380  INDEX 

EMPLOYER—  (Continued) 

erecting  own  home 122 

failure  to 

comply  with  occupational  disease  act 66 

insure 348 

reach  agreement 237 

forfeiture  of  amount  paid 214 

insurance  not  necessary,  when 124 

interests,  not  advanced 258 

knowledge  of 91,  93,  94 

clerk 141 

custom  49 

foreman 49,  96,  266 

imputed  70 

necessary  48 

liability 

dependent  on,  what 119,  130 

for  medical  services 183,  184 

how  determined 130 

how  limited 14,  48 

not  released 331 

when  74 

where  contractor 145 

where  employee  submits  to  operation 269 

where  third  person  involved 28 

without  fault 120 

limitation 

on  request  for  examination 228 

waived   322 

measure  of  responsibility 225 

medical  services  furnished  by 8 

necessity  for  contract 4 

negligence 74 

no  duty  to  insure  where,  not  in  hazardous  business...  349 

no  liability  where  official 145 

non-election  117,  123 

notice  to  agent,  effect  of 141 

not  insurer 50,  103 

owner  of  home  not  under 136 

payment  not  election 50 

penalty  for  not  insuring 27 

premises   of 81 

question  of  time  waived 335 

released  from  reporting  to  other  officers 30 

release  from  employee 330 

relief  from  liability 179,  328 

request  for  examination 226 

retail  grocer 125 


INDEX  381 

EMPLOYER—  ( Continued) 
right  to 

opinion  as  to  employee's  condition 226 

settle    194 

rights  where  third  person  sued 29 

scope  of  agent's  authority 141 

settling  without  approval  of  commission 213 

statement  of  financial  ability 26 

subrogated  to  employee  when 28 

transportation  furnished  by 86 

trip  in  interest  of 152 

two  businesses 121 

violation  by,  penalty 31 

voluntary 

offer  accepted 96 

payment    179 

when  not  carrier 127 

where  servant  lent 141 

willing  to  settle,  not  waiver  of  right 212 

who  are  within  act 4 

EMPLOYMENT 

acts  incidental  to 101,  113 

area  of 92 

assault  in  109 

break  in 90 

casual 87,  147 

ceases  when 88 

classification    132 

commencement  of 84 

connection  with  hazard 135 

consideration  as  to  hazard 122 

conveyance  of  employer 84 

custom  to  change  places 316 

day  to  day 83 

departure  from 99 

determination  of  hazard 131 

duration  of 83 

effect  of  order 92 

employee  in  line  of 86 

evidence  as  to  scope  of 248 

exceptional  risk Ill 

extra-hazardous  106 

defined   135 

occupation    133 

extraordinary  risk 100 

getting  receipt 83 

going  to  and  from  work 84,  90 

grade  of 221 


382  INDEX 

EMPLOYMENT—  ( Continued) 

hazard 

apart  from  107 

considered 134 

horse-play    92 

not  incident  to 75 

not  in  scope  of 74 

incidental  to 71,  85,  87,  102 

interruption 89 

lunch  ordered 69 

looking  for  work 84 

lunch  incidental  to 102 

not  outside  of 96 

no  work 83 

premises   85 

proximity  considered 110 

risk 

connected  with 103 

incidental  to 72,  100 

intensified  72 

not  common  to  public Ill 

of,  public 105 

of,  rule 100 

scope  of 49,  83,  90,  91 

effect  of  orders 97 

sleeping,  not  incidental  to 104 

special  risk 105 

termination  of 84,  88 

transportation  furnished  87 

volunteering 95 

while  dead-heading 146 

ENACTING  CLAUSE 1 

ENTERPRISES 

under  act 3 

EVIDENCE 

accidental  death 115 

admission,  autopsy 252 

agency  causing  death  present 247 

all  of,  taken  into  consideration 276 

anthrax  resulting  in  accident 240 

as  to 

accident  263 

blindness   315 

death    248 

dependency   174,  176 

earning  capacity 189 

emancipation  251 

employment  considered 148 


INDEX  383 

EVIDENCE—  ( Continued ) 
as  to — (Continued) 

expectancy  required 215 

heat  stroke 279 

incapacity  considered 314 

inter-state  commerce 150 

loss  of  eye 263 

loss  of  leg 199 

notice  incompetent 333 

permanent  disfigurement 265 

relationship  conflicting 278 

status  of  employee 243 

support 264 

what  employee  could  do 245 

autopsy 

effect  of 247 

refusal  for  request 252 

award,  contrary  to 259 

bacillus,  as 79 

based  on  inference 254 

burden  as  to  beneficiaries 171 

burden  of  proof 252 

as  to  inter-state 154 

in  inter-state  commerce 150 

on  whom 253 

casual  employment 254 

cerebral  hemorrhage 250 

circumstances  of  accident 256 

circumstantial    103,  255 

competency  considered 80,  243,  301 

condition  of  applicant 189 

conflicting 248 

not  grounds  for  review  by  court 279 

conjecture   114,  252 

considered  216 

as  to  proving  disability 206 

in  connection  with  accident 59 

sufficient  56 

continuance  of  life 249 

conversations  of  third  parties 239 

custom  as ^ 99 

degree  of  proof 251 

dependency,  question  of  fact 266 

determination  of  probabilities 282 

did  not  justify  award 184 

direct  not  required 169 

effect  of  conflict  of 160 

existence  of  beneficiary 256 

expert 

how  weighed 247 

not  regarded 242 


384  INDEX 

EVIDENCE—  ( Continued ) 

expression  of  opinion  as  to  cause 264 

eye-witness 

lacking    116 

unnecessary 248,  253 

facts   equally   consistent 253 

failure  to  object  to  hearsay 256 

finding 

cannot  rest  on  conjecture 253 

justified    80,  115 

formula  for  guessing  facts 250 

found  dead 60,  114,  116,  250 

greater  probability 255 

hearsay   252 

brought  out  on  cross-examination 252 

not  admissible 255 

hemorrhage 261 

how  preserved,  where  death  occurs 24 

husband  or  wife  testifying 239 

hypothesis   unsupported 247 

elicited  on  cross-examination  competent 256 

improper  may  be  competent 256 

incompetent 

as  to  permanent  disability 242 

not  objected  to 243 

inferences    240,  247 

conflicting 255 

necessary    102 

injury  traceable  by  proof 255 

insufficient 51,  65 

judgment,  not  party  to 239 

judicial  knowledge  of  war 172 

lacking  as  to  death 115 

marriage 

how  proved 169,  170 

license  lost 169 

medical  testimony  considered 65 

movements  of  arm  shown 264 

negative  testimony 283 

no  eye-witness 315 

not  sufficient  to  show  disability 280 

number  of  witnesses 282 

on  lump  sum  settlement 216 

order  of  Probate  Court. 170 

opinion 

as  to  percentage  loss  of  vision 245 

incompetent    202,  245 

of  applicant  241 

of  experts 241 

payment  of  money  as  legal  presumption 251 

per  cent  of  loss 240 

preponderance  of,  defined 281 


INDEX  385 

EVIDENCE—  ( Continued) 

presumption  as  to 

beneficiaries  171 

continuance  of  life 172,  265 

death   251 

defined  249 

fact  249 

fraud    25 

legal  obligation 167 

payment  of  money 249 

rebuttable,  when 248 

suicide  59 

where  war  exists 171 

proof 

as  to  emancipation 165 

contradictory  265 

of  accident 114 

of  conditions  240 

review  by  court 277,  316 

when 262 

reduction  of  earning  capacity 190 

relation  of  employee 158 

requirement  of 114 

scintilla 

not  sufficient 277 

rule 284 

scope  of  employment 102 

scrutiny  of  reviewing  court 255 

sequence  of  events 58,  241 

statements 

as  to  objective  injuries 244 

of  claimant  as  to  percentage  loss 244 

of  injured 244 

to  co-employee 244 

sufficiency 

as  to  contract 143 

as  to  disfigurement 186 

considered   80,  240 

of   66,  114,  116,  154,  261,  314 

of,  where  hernia 191 

where  elicited  on  cross-examination 244 

sufficient  to  find  accident 266 

susceptible  of  one  explanation 241 

table  of  heirship  not  admissible 169 

tending  to  support  award,  insufficient 278 

testimony 

as  to  hand-writing  in  letter 240 

as  to  loss  of  use 264 

of  co-employee 94 

of  expert 246 

of  single  witness 282 

of  wife,  incompetent 252 

untrue  .                     239 


386  INDEX 

EVIDENCE—  ( Continued ) 

theories  vary 250 

triers  of  fact  examining  injury 241 

ultimate  fact  as  issue 240,  246 

violation  of  order 92 

warranting  conclusion  as  to  death 262 

weight  of 

determined  how   246,  285 

not  for  courts 262,  313 

witnesses  must  state  facts 241 

when  entitled  to  weight 241 

EXPOSED  TO  HAZARD 

driver,  not  to  machine 134 

employee,  when 106,  117,  128,  158 

employment   71 

machinery    122 

peculiar  hazard 106 

power-driven  shears 122 

question  raised  296 

risk  of  storm 106 

work  with  simple  tools 134 

EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY 46 

EYE-SIGHT 

lost  by  disease 59 

partial  loss  of  vision 60 


F 

FOUND    DEAD 114 

employee    70,  250 

in  toilet  vault 113 

fall  from  heart  trouble 60 

special  officer  of  railroad 154 


I 

INDEPENDENT  CONTRACTOR 

defined   159 

facts  determine  status 162 

hiring  by  principal 126 

insolvent    349 

payment  by  piece 159 

question  of  law 146 

status 

depends  on  facts 160 

fixed  how 158 

test  of .  156 


INDEX  387 

INDUSTRIAL  COMMISSION 

approval  required 329 

arbitrator  designated 237 

award  like  judgment 275 

compensation  not  under  Act 330 

contempt,  how  punished 17 

costs,  for  record 21 

court  will  not  interfere 317 

decision 

according  to  preponderance  of  evidence 278 

as  res  judicata 276 

binding  on  court 315 

not  reviewable 275 

on  facts  binding 278 

when  conclusive 20 

disputes,  how  determined 236 

disregarding  evidence 241 

duty  to 

find  with  preponderance  of  evidence 277 

pass  on  evidence 263 

weigh   evidence 243 

duties  of 16,  236 

eighteen  months  for  claim  where  return  to  employment  338 

employer  compelled  to  insure 26 

evidence  considered  by 273 

finding  as  to 

dependency,  conclusive 265 

injury  258,  314 

notice  259 

finding 

based  on  evidence 276 

based  on  foundation  in  evidence 279 

cannot  be  based  on  untrue  evidence 277 

must  be  based  on  evidence 243 

not  justified  by  evidence 274 

of  facts  unnecessary 257,  273 

of  fact  conclusive 277 

on  groundless  assertions 240 

further  time 261 

how  created 15 

inference  drawn  from  facts 251 

judgment  not  substituted  for  uncontroverted  evidence.  278 

jurisdiction    92 

for  disfigurement  188 

in  maritime  commerce 156 

lacking 117,  134,  232 

of 16 

once  assumed 233 

over  employee  in  non-hazardous 130 

over  insurance  carrier 27 

to  approve  settlement 213 


388  INDEX 

INDUSTRIAL  COMMISSION—  (Continued) 
jurisdiction —  ( Continued ) 

to  review  settlement 322 

wanting,  where  business  non-hazardous 136 

where  inter-state  field 151 

members 

reimbursed 16 

salaries   15 

ministerial  body 231 

motion  waived 296 

nature  of  proceedings 236 

no  finding  of  ultimate  facts  where  they  appear  in  record  274 

no  power  to  compel  operation 267 

officials  presumed  to  do  duty 279 

operation  cannot  be  compelled  by 270 

order  to  suspend  affirmed 270 

petition  for  review 321,  324 

eighteen  months  312 

increase  of  amount 321 

not  held  in  abeyance  by  appeal 312 

purpose  of 325 

time  323 

petition  to  review  previous  decision 338 

power  to 

examine  employee 199 

make  rules 234 

review   275 

presumed  to  do  duty .' 259 

physician  appointed  by 19 

practice 

adjustment  of  claim 238 

argument  before  members 20 

authentication  of  report 19,  20 

bond  fixed 21 

cost  of  record  determined  21 

decision 

notice  of 18 

of  majority 22 

on  review  19 

reviewed  how 21 

dedimus  235 

employer  ordered  to  deposit  compensation 26 

evidence  preserved  how 24 

filing  stenographic  report 19 

hearings  where  held 19 

notice 

for  judgment 23 

how  given 23 

of  hearing 18 

to  attorneys 20 


INDEX  389 

INDUSTRIAL  COMMISSION—  (Continued) 

notification  234 

penalty  for  delay 24 

petition  for  review 19 

record  of  proceedings 20 

review 

for  increase 230 

in  eighteen  months 23 

of  award  or  agreement 19,  23 

of  lump  sum 217 

report  of  proceedings 20 

special  findings 20 

stenographic  report  lost 20 

time  for  filing  report 19 

trial  de  novo 20 

vexatious  delay 24 

questions  under  act 17 

record 

must  show  jurisdiction  257 

of  proceedings 275 

records  of 17 

refusal  to  testify  17 

reports , 24 

review 

evidence  on • 273 

of  previous  decision  not  allowed  325 

of  settlement 323 

right  to 

fix  fees 17 

suspend  compensation   270 

rules  and  orders 16 

secretary 16 

settlements 

approved 210,  232 

can  not  deprive  of  jurisdiction 231 

not  recognized   273 

stenographers  of 17 

stenographic  report 

amendment  of    260 

authentication 261 

filing 261 

inaccurate 260 

not  obtainable 260 

withdrawal  of  260 

submission  to  jurisdiction,  effect  of  230 

summary  powers  231 

transcript  not  furnished,  practice 272 

trial  de  novo 260 

ultimate  fact  determined  by 276 

written  opinion  criticized  274 


390  INDEX 

INJURY    (See  ACCIDENT)    66 

INSURANCE 
carrier 

agent  of  employer  324 

contract  subject  to  commission 341 

in  shoes  of  employer 330,  345 

insolvent   27,  324,  340,  345 

party  defendant  28 

primarily  liable 28,  344 

release  not  valid 330 

released  when  331 

substituted  for  employer 41 

city  liable  to  sub-contractor's  employee 350 

commission  power  over  carrier 231 

compelling  employer  to  procure  26 

discontinuance   prohibited    28 

dissolution  of  partnership  343 

duty  to  procure  where  sub-contractor 30 

effect  of 

existing 27 

rider 343 

mutual  benefit  society  28 

penalty  if  employer  fails  to  procure 27 

policy 

can  not  be  cancelled 343 

limited    344 

of  carrier  342 

whole  Act  part  of  345 

premium  not  deductible  from  wages  28 

required  when   349 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE 141 

burden  of  proof 150,  155 

crossing  flag-man  155 

dead-heading  as  152 

defined 150 

delivering  mail  as  149 

employee  in  149 

expectation  to  do  certain  work  155 

Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act   150 

Intrastate  train  155 

railroad  detective  in  153 

railroad  watchman  in    154 

watchman  killed   154 

where  none  of  business  is 152 

test  as  to  151 

transmitting  messages  as  149 

two  bridges  used  153 


INDEX  391 

'IN  THE  COURSE  OF" 

accident  arising  out  of 83 

custom 82 

denned 81 

employee's  leisure  period  90 

interruption  of  employment 69 

using  customary  route  81 


J 

JUDGMENT 

modified 319 

motion  to  vacate  319 

on  award 319 

vacation  of 320 

JUDICIAL  POWERS 

not  delegated 89 


LEGISLATURE 

classification 

as  to 121 

of  hazards 133 

restricted  by  constitution 40 

right  to  modify  actions  40 

LUMP  SUM 

commutation  how  made 12 

compensation  paid  in 12 

complete  disability,  effect  of       12 

notice    12 

rejection  of  13 


M 

MAINTAINING 

building  for  income  125 

building  own  home 124 

city,  cleaning  streets   125 

cleaning  walls 126 

of  building 123 

delivery  of  water,  not  134 

dwelling  house,  not 125 

operation  of  pipe-lines  125 


382  INDEX 

MEDICAL  SERVICES 

as  claim  for  compensation 335 

by  whom  furnished   8 

employee  refusing  206 

employer  when  liable  184 

liability  for,  when  183 

refusal  to  pay  expenses   183 

when  rendered   .  .183 


N 

NEGLIGENCE 

crossing  tracks  69 

employee    68 

NOTICE    332 

by  commission  to  employer  2 

defect  in  25 

deficiency  in   333 

evidence  of,  incompetent 333 

jurisdictional 334 

posting  of 2 

requirement  as  to  25 

statement 

by  wife  of  deceased   333 

statement  to  fore-lady  266 

sufficient,  where  fore-lady  knows  333 

thirty  days  jurisdictional 334 

withdrawal   in  thirty  days    2 


0 

ORDINANCE 

building  regulation  129 

regulating  stalls    129 

OPERATIONS 

refusal  to  submit   54 

OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASES.  (See  DISEASE)    .  61 


POLICE  POWER 

health  subject  to  38 

regulating  health  permitted ::S 


INDEX  393 

R 

RAISING  QUESTION 

arguments  of  counsel  297 

before  commission 243 

constitutionality 295 

Federal  Constitution 297 

not  first  time  in  Supreme  Court 295 

record  constitutionality 297,  313 

record,  what  must  be  shown , 295 


s 

SETTLEMENT 

according  to  act • 329 

based  on  temporary,  reviewed  for  permanent 325 

commutation  of  amount  210 

credits   for   payment    194 

for  lesser  amount 230 

industrial  commission  authorizes   232 

illegal  when 194 

jurisdiction  as  to  time  limit  waived 322 

lump  sum 

commutation  based  on  expectancy 215 

commutation  defined 211 

compensation  fixed  before  commutation 212 

evidence  for  basis    215 

evidence  of  age,  health,  etc 216 

how  reviewed   321 

interest  of  parties  215 

not  for  debts    215 

petition  necessary  210 

probable  future  payments  211 

right  to  review   216 

when  improper  218 

when  proper 212 

without  approval  210 

without  approval,  illegal    214 

public  interest  in 214 

when   illegal 213 

when  made  in  good  faith  217 

STREET  RISKS   ' 110 

SUICIDE 

evidence  as  to 115,  250 

presumption  against  59 

SUPERIOR  COURT 

jurisdiction  of 289 


394  INDEX 

SUPREME  COURT 

amendment  affecting  procedure 307 

assignment  of  errors  296,  297 

can  not  disturb  finding  313 

can  not  weigh  evidence   265 

can  not  write  provision  in  act  310 

clerical  error  corrected  306 

decision 

not  set  aside  294 

of  other  state  70 

res  judicata   265,  313 

delays  avoided 306 

disregarding  question  of  fact  257 

error  in  procedure  corrected 306 

evidence  not  weighed  315 

examination  of  record   362 

judgment  not  substituted  317 

judicial  review  of  facts  298 

jurisdiction 

amendment  in  Circuit  Court   : 299 

to  issue  writ   307 

modification 

of  judgment    305 

without  reversal   303 

not  allowed  to  set  aside,  when  316 

ordinary  rules  of  practice  followed   306 

power 310 

practice 

additional  abstract,  costs   318 

brief 309 

compensation  computed  309 

costs  taxed  309 

petition  for  writ  of  error  309 

point  abandoned  in  brief 308 

points  and  authorities  309 

printed  brief  required   310 

question  presented  in  lower  court 308 

reply  brief  to  petition  for  writ 308,  310 

rule  15 309 

rule  27    309 

rule  43  considered  308 

rules  not  complied  with  310 

writ  of  error 22 

question  raised  first  time  296 

record  must  show  what 296 

retrospective  effect  of  amendment  308 

review  of 

facts  by    285 

law  by 286 

rules  not  complied  with  296 


INDEX  395 

SUPREME  COURT—  (Continued) 

supersedeas 22,  311 

pending  appeal  311 

vested  right  in  procedure   313 

writ  of  error 276,  311 

as  supersedeas   22 

effect  on  petition  for  review 324 

new  suit  311 

practice  affected  306 

retrospective  operation 310 

when  issued  .                                                              .  307 


T 

THIRD  PERSON 

action  against 28 

liability  where  not  under  act 29 

TRIAL  BY  JURY 

incident  to  right  of  action  39 


V 

VOLUNTEER   93 

definition   of    95 

knowledge  of  employer  93 


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